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LETTERS PATENT 
ELIZABETH THE SECOND, by the Grace of God Queen of Australia and Her 
other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth: 
TO— 
DR. HERBERT COLE COOMBS 
MR. PETER HAMILTON BAILEY, O.B.E. 
PROFESSOR ENID CAMPBELL 
THE HONOURABLE JOSEPH EZRA ISAAC 
MR. PAUL ROBERT MUNRO 
GREETING: 
WE DO BY these Our Letters Patent issued in Our name by Our Governor-
General on the advice of Our Executive Council and pursuant to the Constitution 
of Australia, the Royal Commissions Act 1902-1966 and other enablihg powers, 
appoint you to be Commissioners to inquire into and report upon the 
administrative organization and services of the Australian Government, and in 
particular- 
(i) the purposes, functions, organization and management of Australian 
Government Departments, statutory corporations and other authorities 
and the principal instruments of co-ordination of Australian Government 
administration and policy; and 
(2) the structure and management of the Australian Public Service, 
and to make recommendations for improving efficiency, economy, adaptability 
and industrial relations and the despatch of public business: 
AND, without restricting the scope of your inquiry, We direct you, the said 
Commissioners, to give particular attention to the following matters:— 
(a) the appropriate role of ministerial departments, statutory corporations 
and other authorities; 
(b) relationship of the Australian Public Service and statutory corporations 
and other authorities with the Parliament, Ministers and the community; 
(c) parliamentary scrutiny and control of administration; 
(d) responsibility and accountability of public servants, and their partici-
pation in forming policy and making decisions; 
(e) adequacy of the machinery available to assess the relevance and economy 
of existing programs in meeting government objectives; 
(f) the extent to which central management of the Australian Public Service is 
necessary, and internal control and co-ordination in that Service, 
especially the functions of the Public Service Board, the Auditor-General 
and the Treasury; 
(g) centralization, decentralization and delegation of functions; 
(h) the principles applicable to staffing of statutory corporations and other 
authorities; 
(i) personnel policies and practices, including eligibility, recruitment, 
selection, appointment, tenure, training (especially management train-
ing), promotion, classification, discipline, morale and conditions of service 
of members of the Australian Public Service, both generally and in relation 
to particular classes of persons; 
(j) the determination of salaries, wages and other conditions of service of 
persons in the service of the Australian Government, including those 
serving overseas; 
(k) the rights of public servants as citizens; and 
(1) any other matters to which the attention of the Commission is particularly 
directed by the Prime Minister in the course of the inquiry: 
AND WE further instruct you, the said Commissioners, that it is not intended 
that you should make special inquiry into, or special reference to, matters relating 
to postal and telecommunications services that were the subject of the inquiry 
made in accordance with the Letters Patent issued by Us on 22 February 1973, or 
to matters relating to superannuation. 
AND WE APPOINT you the said Dr. Herbert Cole Coombs to be the 
Chairman of the said Commissioners. 
AND WE DIRECT that for the purposes of taking evidence, two 
Commissioners shall be sufficient to constitute a quorum, and may proceed with 
the inquiry under these Letters Patent. 
AND WE require you as expeditiously as possible to make your inquiry and to 
report the results of your inquiry and your recommendations to our Governor-
General of Australia. 
WITNESS HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR PAUL 
MEERNAA CAEDWALLA HASLUCK, a member of Our Most Honourable 
Privy Council, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint 
Michael and Saint George, Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order, 
Knight of the Most Venerable Order of the Hospital of Saint John ofJerusalem, 
Governor-General of Australia, this sixth day ofJune 1974. 
(Paul Hasluck) 
Governor-General 
By His Excellency's Command, 
(E. G. Whitlam) 
Prime Minister 
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Chapter i 	 Preface 
,.i THE TASK OF THE COMMISSION 
• i . i The system of Australian government administration is seventy-five years 
old. It is more than fifty years since Commissioner Duncan McLachlan 
conducted the first and only comprehensive review of that system. Since then, 
other reviews of particular aspects of the administration have been attempted, 
including those of the Bailey Committee of 	 on promotions and 
temporary transfers, and the Boyer Committee of 1957-58 on recruitment. 
Numerous aspects of the Australian Public Service have incidentally been 
considered by parliamentary committees, including the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee on, Public Accounts and the Estimates Committees of the Senate. 
1.1.2 The years since Commissioner McLachlan's inquiry have seen a great 
extension of the functions of government and of the Commonwealth government 
in particular as well as important changes in the attitudes and expectations of the 
community in relation to government. In the last two decades the proportion of 
Gross National Expenditure which passes through the Federal Budget has risen 
from about 21 per cent to about 30 per cent. In Australia, as in countries overseas, 
these changes have placed strains on the machinery of government. The strains 
have been recognised in recent years in the appointment of commissions of 
inquiry into the civil services of the United States, Canada, Great Britain, New 
Zealand and Ireland. 
1.1.3 The terms of reference of this Commission areas broad as any in recent 
history for an inquiry into any similar style of government. They reflect a growing 
awareness of the need to adapt the national public administration to the needs of 
contemporary government and they provide the framework for a fundamental 
rethinking of administrative principles and practices. 
,-1  .4 The Commission was requested to report its findings within two years of 
its appointment. The magnitude of its task and the limited time available made it 
inevitable that it would select issues on which to focus its attention. In this 
selection it has been guided by the need to produce recommendations designed 
not merely to bring public administration up to date but to build into it a 
Continuing responsiveness to the changing demands of government and the 
Community. The Commission has not sought to prepare a comprehensive 
description of the system as it works but rather to develop a strategy for its 
development. 
1.2 METHODS OF WORK 
1.2.1 The Commission thought it desirable that its inquiries should take place 
at the centre of widespread public debate and discussion of the issues involved and 
that its work should be informed by that debate. It has sought at all times to 
3 
conduct its business with the minimum of formality, to involve the greatest 
number of interested people in its inquiries and to keep the government, members 
of the administration itself and the community informed of its activities. 
1.2.2 The Commission, by means of nationwide advertisement, invited written 
submissions from members of the public on any matters related to its terms of 
reference. More than 150  government agencies and 500 community and business 
organisations were invited by letter to make submissions. In addition the 
Australian Council of Social Service was asked to encourage the expression of 
points of view from members of the community, especially from clients of 
government departments and agencies, many of whom normally are reluctant to 
express their views publicly. Special encouragement to public servants to come 
forward with views on matters before the Commission was given by the then 
Prime Minister in a letter to all departmental heads in October 1974, in response 
to fears which had been expressed that to volunteer evidence might contravene 
provisions of the Public Service regulations.' 
1.2.3 Since July 1974 the Commission has received over 750 submissions. These 
are of varying lengths, cover a wide range of subjects and express diverse and often 
conflicting points of view. They have constituted for the Commission a valuable 
source of information and opinion, and served to focus its thinking on those 
aspects of the structure and operations of'the administration which appeared to 
occasion the greatest concern. The papers prepared by the Public Service Board 
in particular have assisted the work of the Commission in many ways. 
1.2.4 In the earliest phase of its work, between July and November 1974, the 
Commission sought to establish informal contacts with individuals and 
organisations whose wisdom and experience it felt would assist it to determine the 
directions its inquiries should take. Informal meetings were arranged with 
parliamentarians, the Public Service Board, heads and former heads of 
government departments and instrumentalities, public servants at various levels 
in the Service and in various age brackets, members of ministerial staffs, officials 
of Public Service staff organisations, members of the business community and 
academics. 
1.2.5 The Commission also arranged a program of visits to workplaces, which 
included the Taxation Offices in Sydney and Melbourne, the Aeronautical 
Research Laboratories at Fisherman's Bend near Melbourne, the Repatriation 
Hospital at Greenslopes near Brisbane, the Townsville branches of the 
Department of Social Security and the Commonwealth Employment Service, the 
CSIRO's Kimberley Research Station near Kununurra in Western Australia 
and the Weapons Research Establishment at Salisbury in South Australia. These 
visits normally coincided with hearings for the presentation and elaboration of 
prepared submissions but served also to illustrate the great diversity of tasks and 
styles of work carried out within the Commonwealth government administration. 
1.2.6 Formal public hearings, directed primarily to issues raised in written 
submissions, began in Canberra on 18 November 1974. Between that date and 12 
August 1975 the Commission heard 356 witnesses on 55 sitting days. The 
transcripts of evidence run to 3250 pages. Hearings were held in Canberra and 
Darwin, in all State capitals, in Albury-Wodonga, Townsville and Alice Springs. 
In March 1975 the Commission toured central, northern and western Australia 
and took evidence in Port Hedland, Derby and Kununurra.' 
1.2.7 The Commission, while making this tour, also sought contact with 
members of the public at a series of fifteen public meetings arranged by the 
Australian Council of Social Service, as well as in a series of meetings with 
community leaders and representatives of organisatioiis whose affairs arc affected 
by the activities and procedures of the government and its agencies. Meetings 
were also arranged between the Commission and Commonwealth public servants 
in centres outside Canberra. 
1.2.8 Communication between the Commission and trade unionists and 
business leaders was assisted by the establishment of two advisory committees 
representative of these groups. 2 
1.2.9 Copies of all written submissions, other than those which the authors had 
made in confidence or which the Commission decided warranted confidential 
treatment, have been available for public inspection in the Commission's offices 
in Canberra and Melbourne. Copies of the transcripts of evidence were placed in 
the Commission's Canberra office, in the Parliamentary Library and in the offices 
of the Public Service Inspector in each State capital. 
1.2.10 The press was kept informed of the progress of the Commission's work by 
a press liaison officer. At times, press conferences were arranged to review 
progress with our inquiries. Press coverage of the work of the Commission has, in 
Canberra, been lively and consistent. Elsewhere it has attracted less attention, 
although there have been notable examples of informed examination by the press 
of the issues before the Commission. 
1.2.11 It was envisaged from the outset that the Commission would not rely 
solely on submissions and its own work but would sponsor professional studies of 
issues of particular importance. It hoped thereby to base its conclusions on 
competent and informed research. A great deal of its resources has consequently 
been devoted to the design and conduct of an extensive research program in 
which many of the problems facing the administration and the resources and 
options available to deal with them have been analysed. The Commissioners have 
participated in that work as have most of the Commission's staff. Their work has 
been supplemented by that of academic and commercial consultants. The 
collected papers which have come from that research program constitute a 
formidable body of work on public administration in Australia and will no doubt 
be a resource for study for many years. 
1.2.12 The research techniques applied to different issues and problems before 
the Commission have varied. In some cases, that research has involved analysis of 
existing material—for example, of studies carried out by the Public Service 
Board; in others it has drawn on existing factual and survey material not 
Previously studied—for example, the Continuous Record of Personnel main-
tained by the Public Service Board was put into a new format that allowed 
valuable information to be extracted from it. New first-hand data have been 
gathered on some matters—for example, in the comprehensive Career Service 
1. See the list of hearings at the end of this Report. 
2. A list of the members of these committees is included at the end of the Report. 
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Survey' and in the studies of access to government services.2 Papers have been 
sought from persons with relevant experience. Wherever possible, research has 
been practical and action-oriented. For example, the Commission has initiated 
continuing experiments designed to test the practicability and effectiveness of 
some proposals which could have widespread implications for the conduct of 
government affairs. Thus, the opening of the NOW Centre in Coburg, Victoria, is 
designed to test whether a range of services provided by federal, State and local 
government authorities can be delivered more effectively if their delivery is co-
operatively organised and in so doing to assess the capacity of local staff to initiate 
change and to approach administrative problems experimentally. 
1.2. 13  A technique of some interest for this form of inquiry has been the use of 
task forces to develop an action plan for possible innovation and to assess its costs 
and benefits. Thus one task force, led by a Commissioner, sought to design 
regionally-based structures for Australian government administration in four 
representative regions and several possible designs were produced. Task forces 
were also established to consider the organisation of science in government; the 
definition, measurement and achievement of efficiency; the administrative 
arrangements of the Australian government for the planning, formulation and 
implementation of health and welfare policy and the review and evaluation of 
related programs; and the co-ordination of economic policy. Each of these task 
forces has been organised and has worked in ways different from the others. As 
well as being each under the general guidance of one of the Commissioners, some 
have included members drawn from interested departments and agencies and 
from the Commission's own staff. Their work has substantially influenced the 
content of the Commission's Report. The Commission is deeply grateful to those 
who have participated in them and to the employers of the members for their co-
operation. 
1.2. 14  Since June 1975 the Commission has published as discussion papers 
work done by consultants or staff dealing with certain key issues and expressing 
views on which it sought reactions from a wide range of people, and also the 
reports or working papers of the various task forces. These publications have 
sometimes formed the bases for seminars and other organised discussions. 
Commissioners and staff have participated in these discussions, which have done 
much to broaden the area of debate and to stimulate interest in the possibilities of 
innovation and greater efficiency in the conduct of government affair0 
1.2. 15  We have been impressed, for instance, by the interest in the possibilities 
for reform evident within the administration itself. Significant changes have 
already been set in train and a climate more favourable to innovation has, we 
believe, already developed. An administration spontaneously adapting to change 
would be a more important outcome of the work of the Commission than any of 
the specific reforms it suggests. The magnitude and complexity of changes current 
and in prospect for our society add weight to the importance of this capacity to 
adapt. 'l'hc Commission has. thcrcfbrc, given much thought to influences—
organisational, intellectual and emoiional—likelv to stimulate it. 
Sec Appendix 3.A. 
Sec Appendix 2.C. 
Sec Appendix 2.1. 
A list of these publications appears at the end of this Report. 
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1.2.16 Because of the very wide scope of the Report, some degree of 
specialisation in the areas of interests of individual Commissioners was necessary. 
Accordingly, individual Commissioners accepted primary responsibility for the 
drafting of different parts of the Report. The drafts were then considered by the 
Commission as a whole and modified as necessary to arrive at a consensus. With 
very few exceptions, agreement was reached on all matters of substance. It will be 
appreciated that, while the Report reflects the consensus of the Commission, all 
Commissioners have not been involved equally in all parts of it and do not have an 
equal commitment to all its recommendations. In the few instances where a 
Commissioner found it necessary to make a reservation or submit a minority view, 
this has been indicated in a footnote to the relevant paragraph or paragraphs and 
a supplementary note prepared by the Commissioner concerned has been added 
at the end of the appropriate Chapter. In some instances these supplementary 
notes have been further supported by material contained in the appendices. 
1.2.17 As the Commission prepared its final Report it consulted the heads of the 
government agencies particularly affected, including the Public Service Board, 
Treasury, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Auditor-
General, and other individuals with special knowledge of the administration. We 
were greatly assisted in writing the final version of the Report by the comments 
received on earlier drafts. 1  
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE REPORT 
1.3.1 The capacity of any system to accept change is limited, especially when it 
is essential that the system should continue to operate while the change occurs. It 
is not possible for major parts of the Australian government administration to stop 
work while they are being rebuilt; nor is it practicable to build a parallel 
organisation wholly to replace the original when its construction is complete. 
Furthermore, evidence from the Career Service Survey suggests that the 
uncertainty produced by changing roles and responsibilities adversely affects the 
morale of those officials involved. Changes proposed must, therefore, in other 
than times of extensive social breakdown, be of a kind which can be incorporated 
quickly or progressively into the working environment. 
1.3.2 The task of achieving planned change is further complicated. No human 
organisation is wholly constant in its working: changes occur continuously, 
reflecting the changing standards, experience and values of those who work 
within it and the influences to which they are exposed. These changes often occur 
without the conscious awareness of those in authority, or they may run counter to 
their wishes. Furthermore, there is an inbuilt conservatism in all organisations; 
change tends to be resisted passively, if not actively, as fruitlessly disturbing and in 
the short run costly and wasteful. There is, of course, an element of wisdom in this 
conservatism: change merely for the sake of change is purposeless. 
1-3-3 Nevertheless, the Commission has concluded that Australian government 
adminjstni tjoi 
 now nc ds significant adaptation to deal responsibly, effectively 
and efficiently with the tasks which confront it. 
3:4 This Report will therefore seek to deal with the problems and weaknesses 
Which the Commission's examination suggests exist and to propose action which 
I. For a further discussion of the Commission's methods of work see Appendix i A. 
will contribute to solving the problems and overcoming the weaknesses. Our 
approach will be basically pragmatic: we will not propose a wholly different 
system of administration nor a wholly different set of relationships between it, the 
political arm of government and the community. In the light of the comments 
above, the Report will seek to concentrate on changes which the Commission 
believes justifiable and practicable and compatible with continued effective 
operation. Perhaps more importantly, it will pay special attention to changes 
which progressively can affect the attitude of mind of those engaged in 
administration, and the range of influences to which they are exposed, in ways 
likely to improve their performance. Among these changes will be measures 
designed to stimulate a greater awareness of social change, a capacity to learn 
from the experience of other administrations, and a willingness to see innovation 
as a logical response to that change. 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT 
1.4.1 The Report itself has three parts. The rest of Part A seeks to review briefly 
the way in which Australian government administration fits into and adapts to 
the pattern of Australian society and government in particular. It surveys and 
attempts to assess the main lines of criticism of its working and seeks to identify 
characteristics of the system and those who compose it which might contribute to 
its inadequacies. Finally, we seek to state in simple terms the general principles 
which we believe provide the foundation for our approach to more detailed issues. 
1.4.2 Part B concentrates on the issues and institutions about which our 
investigations have led us to propose action. This part does not seek to be 
comprehensive. There are important parts of the administration to which little 
reference is made. The reasons for such omissions are various. Perhaps the most 
striking omission is that of a consideration of the administration of defence and 
military affairs. The Commission concluded that there was so much that was 
distinctive about this area of government that, if we were to deal with it, a more 
detailed and comprehensive study would be necessary than was possible in 
reasonable time. The Commission was conscious, furthermore, that a major re-
organisation of defence administration was scarcely complete and a judgment 
about its effectiveness would not at this stage be possible. We believe, however, 
that the reorganisation is potentially of great interest to other parts of the 
administration, and suggest that when the new system has been functioning for 
several years a special study be undertaken of defence administration. 
1.4.3 Part C contains material and suggestions concerned with the need for 
ensuring that the capacity for self-generated review and change becomes 
characteristic of the administrative system itself. It also includes a summary of the 
Commission's recommendations and suggestions relating to the way in which 
they might be implemented. Despite our efforts to concentrate on the practicable, 
these recommendations would in the aggregate involve substantial restructuring 
ofgovernment administration and would require svst( ma tic apl)liCatiOfl over a 
period of years. Part C therefore expresses some views about the strategy of that 
application. 
1.4.4 The Commission has sought to keep the Report itself as brief as possible 
and to express its content simply and in non-technical language. Much of the 
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material which provides support and justification for the views expressed and the 
recommendations made will be found in the four supplementary volumes.' A 
collection of submissions and research reports will also be published separately in 
microfiche form .2  The Report itself will make reference to such material so that 
those with special interests or responsibilities will be able to study the foundations 
of the Report more comprehensively. 
1. Appendix Volumes One to Four: Material in these Volumes is referred to in the text by a 
number denoting the Volume, and a letter denoting the particular Appendix thus, Appendix 
iA). A complete list of the contents of the Appendix Volumes appears at the end of this 
Report. 
2. A note on this material appears at the end of this Report. 
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Chapter 2 	 The Administration 
—The Basis For 
Reform 
2.1 THE ADMINISTRATION AS A COMPONENT IN GOVERNMENT 
2.1.1 This Report is about the men and women who are employed by the 
government, and the ways in which they are organised to form the 
administration.' These men and women perform widely-ranging functions and 
serve different instruments of government—ministers and the Cabinet, Parlia-
ment, the Courts and a great variety of statutory and non-statutory agencies. 
Their employment is authorised and, in varying degrees, regulated by a number 
of Acts of Parliament, not simply by the Public Service Act; indeed more than 6o 
per cent of Commonwealth employees are outside that Act. The Report will 
recommend changes in the conditions of their employment, in the ways in which 
they are organised, in their relationships to one another, to the instruments of 
government which they serve, and to the individuals and groups which compose 
the community, so that the functions of government in its widest sense can be 
more adequately performed. 
2.1.2 Sensible judgment about changes necessary cannot be made unless the 
administration is studied and judged in the context of the Australian system of 
government. This system has traditionally been identified and described as an 
example of the Westminster system. The Commission has become increasingly 
Conscious of the degree to which the Australian system in fact differs from the 
Westminster model and of the significance for the administration of such 
differences. 
2.1.3 There may be reason to question whether that model in its purest form 
ever was an accurate image of Australian government, or indeed of the United 
Kingdom government itself since early in the century. Certainly, it seems that 
Changing social attitudes in our time and the increasing tempo of technological 
Change are widening the range and intensifying the complexity of the functions 
performed by governments and presenting them with a different pattern of 
Characteristic problems. 
2.1.4 The Westminster model envisages a government chosen from elected 
representatives and responsible and accountable to them.2 It presents the 
1. It is difficult to find a word which stands precisely for the entity we are concerned with. Perhaps 
the closest would be 'bureaucracy' but this term has become almost pejorative. We have 
therefore decided generally to use the word 'administration' to refer to the complex of persons 
and organisations concerned, despite the danger of occasional confusion with the process of 
administering. 
2. Responsibility and accountability are closely related concepts. We use them in this Report to 
describe two aspects of the relationship between a person entrusted with a task towards that 
task and towards the authority which entrusts him with it. Thus, a person is responsiblefor 
performing the task and to the authority which entrusts him with it. If there is a procedure by 
which he can be called upon to report on and justify his performance, and can be rewarded or 
Penalised according to judgment on it, then he is also accountable. 
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bureaucracy as simply an extension of the minister's capacity: it exists to inform 
and advise him; to manage on his behalf programs for which he is responsible. 
Except where Parliament specifically legislates otherwise, its power to make 
decisions or to act derives entirely from the minister by his delegation and he 
remains responsible to his Cabinet colleagues and to Parliament for decisions 
made and actions performed under that delegation. 
2.1.5 A consultant, Professor H. V. Emy, draws attention in his paper' to the 
increasing unreality of this picture as a description of either how Australian 
government works or how it should work. It is true that the Australian 
Constitution (section 64)2  enshrines the principle of ministerial responsibility in 
its provision for 'departments of State' under the control of ministers. 
Nevertheless Professor Emy points out, ministers do not accept, nor does 
Parliament or the public expect them to accept, a blanket responsibility for the 
acts of their officials—or for anything other than the most serious and personal 
errors. Furthermore, it is obvious that a minister does not and cannot have a 
detailed knowledge of all that goes on within his department: indeed the Public 
Service Act gives to the head of a department certain powers (for example, in 
respect of promotion and departmental establishments) independent of those 
derived from ministerial delegation and many would contend that the ministerial 
control of a department is curtailed by legislation and practice assuming the force 
of convention. The minister's responsibility and control over departmental affairs 
are shared in a number of respects. Cabinet or Prime Ministerial directives 
restrict the scope for autonomous ministerial action, particularly in relation to 
demands upon resources. Departmental action at ministerial direction relies 
upon the co-operation of other departments and agencies. 
2.1 .6 To the extent, therefore, that the head of the department and his 
colleagues have capacity to act in ways for which their minister cannot be fairly 
held responsible there is, unless the official concerned can be identified and called 
to account, a gap in the hierarchy of responsibility and accountability through 
which political control could escape altogether. But traditionally, officials have 
been held to be anonymous. This is not simply a matter of convention. In a large 
and complex organisation which deals with issues requiring time-consuming 
consideration, decision-making tends to become diffused, incremental and 
impersonal and it becomes difficult to pin-point its precise locus. Furthermore, it 
has been argued that if the official concerned is in fact identifiable, he may be 
exposed publicly to criticism with little capacity for effective defence. Thus in a 
system which combines the anonymity of officials with an inability of ministers 
effectively to accept responsibility, effective and economical administration can 
fall between the stools of the theory of ministerial responsibility and of the practice 
of management by anonymous officials. 
The Public Service and Political Control: The Problem of Accountability in a Westminster 
Style System with Special Reference to the Concept of Ministerial Responsibility. See 
Appendix i.B. 
Section 64: 'The Governor-General may appoint officers to administer such departments of 
State of the Commonwealth as the Governor-General in Council may establish. 
Such officers shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor-General. They shall be 
members of the Federal Executive Council, and shall be the Queen's Ministers of State for the 
Commonwealth. 
After the first general election, no Minister of State shall hold office for a longer period than 
three months unless he is or becomes a senator or a member of the House of Representatives.' 
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2.1.7 The reality of ministerial responsibility and accountability is further 
eroded by the existence of a large number of statutory bodies and other agencies 
which, either by Act of Parliament or by executive practice, exercise considerable 
decision-making power independently of ministers. Some of these conduct 
publicly owned commercial enterprises; some (including a range of Adminis-
trative Tribunals) perform regulatory functions over private actions in diverse 
fields; some provide means for the expression of the views of important sectional 
interests; other iesemble more directly government departments themselves in 
that their functions include the provision of information and advice to ministers. 
In some instances these agencies are required to accept ministerial direction but 
in practice even these act with substantial independence. In some instances also, 
they are required to report to Parliament, suggesting that a degree of direct 
accountability has been contemplated. If this were so, there is little provision for 
systematic examination of their work by either House. 
2. 1.8 Clearly there is a dilemma here which must be faced. On the one hand, if 
ministers involve themselves in decisions to a degree necessary for them to accept 
responsibility for them, officials are likely to feel less personally responsible and 
the outcome may therefore be less efficient. On the other hand, attempts to 
acknowledge and give precision to the responsibility of officials and to hold them 
accountable for its exercise may be seen as weakening direct ministerial 
responsibility and therefore political control. 
2. 1.9 Throughout Part B of our Report we have attempted to develop a system 
that balances the demands of ministerial responsibility and official accounta-
bility, recognising that the realities of contemporary government require that the 
bureaucracy be seen as exercising some powers in its own right; that the 
independence of those powers requires that those exercising them should be held 
accountable; and that the tradition of the supremacy of Parliament requires that 
the lines of that accountability should lead ultimately to Parliament. 
2.2 DEMOCRACY—CAN IT BE PARTICIPATORY? 
2.2.1 The problem of holding the bureaucracy accountable for the powers it in 
fact exercises is too complex to be resolved simply by minor modifications of the 
traditional Westminster model. The Commission is aware of political attitudes 
which question whether the representative principle underlying the role of 
Parliament and its control of the executive and its bureaucracy is an adequate 
expression of the democratic rights of the community. Those who hold these 
attitudes advance the counter-principle of participation in the processes of 
government as the proper, or at least an important supplementary, expression of 
those rights, though what is meant by 'participation' can vary widely between its 
different proponents. 
2.2.2 It has, of course, long been recognised by writers on politics that power is 
not the exclusive possession of the political instruments of government—
Parliament, ministers and the Cabinet—and their officials. In some societies 
power has been exerted by members of historically privileged classes; in most, 
it is exercised by the wealthy, by leaders of large industrial and commercial 
corpDrations, by the owners of the press and other media, by trade union officials; 
and, in somewhat different categories and with different levels of effectiveness, by 
organised religions, racial groups and other associations of persons with common 
Social, political or other interests. The first group—the so-called vested 
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interests—exercise their power partly directly (for example, by the use of their 
wealth or their control of resources), but partly also by influence, persuasion and 
pressure (formal and informal) exerted on the political instruments of 
government. 
2.2.3 There are those who assert that effective decisions in important matters 
are in fact made by these non-governmental focuses of power and that 
constitutionally established government is either simply their instrument in 
dealing with community wide issues or is tolerated by them only so long as it does 
not seek significantly to shift the real location of power. It is not necessary for us to 
judge the validity of these assertions nor to assess the relative importance of the 
various influences involved. It is necessary for us, however, to acknowledge the 
reality of these influences and to note the development in recent decades of new 
focuses of influence which have learnt something from the longer established 
interests about ways of exerting pressures on governments. 
2.2.4 Thus, we now see organised groups working for specific social objectives 
such as conservation of the environment; the development or protection of the 
amenities of particular areas or communities; groups expressing the attitudes of 
women, of migrants, of the young; developing programs of protest, persuasion 
and organised pressure to modify the policies of the government. These groups 
have borrowed not merely from the traditional vested interests but also from more 
violent and emotional demonstration techniques. However the development of 
these new groups does not mean that all members of the community can exercise 
significant influence on government decisions. Apart from the many who simply 
do not choose to be involved there remain those who are excluded by isolation or 
organisational incapacity: frequently these include the severely disadvantaged 
and deprived. 
2.2.5 The development of these new group pressures and changing attitudes 
towards the established vested interests has had, and continues to have, important 
effects for officials. Traditionally, officials tended to regard such groups with some 
suspicion. Indeed, the traditional anonymity and aloofness of the official was in 
part a means to protect him from the fact or accusation of undue influence by such 
interests. 
2.2.6 A good example of changing attitudes is in economic matters where, as the 
role and influence of government policy became more pervasive and its 
application more detailed in its effect on individuals and enterprises, important 
interest groups sought to influence officials as well as ministers and parliamen-
tarians. Similarly officials having responsibility to inform, advise and manage in 
economic matters needed contacts which could provide knowledge of the interests 
of those involved in industry and commerce and of the feel of the 
cconomv—knowlcdgc which supplemented statistical and other data. In this and 
other fields the officials have helped to develop officially recognised groups.' 
Similarly, in the field of social welfare, government policy and administration 
have had progressively greater impact on the lives of persons, families and 
communities, and this has led to more frequent and systematic attempts to 
communicate directly with officials, sometimes by-passing local members and 
ministers. 
I . 	 Sce T. B. Smith, Non-Statutory Bodies in Australian Government, Appendix i .L. 
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2.2.7 Such attempts to communicate have been assisted by the emergence 
outside government employment of expertise relevant to government policies. 
Thus, organisations representing significant economic interest groups, chambers 
of manufacturers and of commerce, employers' associations, and the like, employ 
qualified economists and other professionally trained staff. Similarly, private 
welfare agencies like the Australian Council of Social Service have voluntary and 
professional workers with academic training and field experience in welfare work, 
and neighbourhood groups can frequently recruit supporters with architectural, 
engineering and planning qualifications and experience derived from private 
practice. The possessors of this expertise (the quality of which can vary widely), 
speaking for the interest groups involved, have sought to share the 'inform and 
advise' functions of the bureaucracy and in some matters, such as town and 
regional planning and the grass-roots administration of programs in health and 
social welfare, the function of management also. 
2.2.8 These trends impair the traditional exclusiveness of the relationship of 
senior officials with the executive arm of government-with the ministers. Of 
course that relationship has never been wholly exclusive. Ministers have always 
sought information and advice from a variety of sources. The change is in the 
extent of this practice, in the range of groups and individuals from which it is 
sought, in its openness, and in the fact that it is becoming increasingly 
institutionalised. Furthermore, compared with the past, those who share in it are 
more diverse in their interests, derive their authority in part from newly emerging 
sources closer to the grass roots and employ less familiar techniques. Senior 
officials, therefore, are finding that they must be prepared consciously to work 
within a pluralist range of influences on ministers and perhaps even to see their 
role as being primarily to organise those influences, so that, while ministers are 
exposed to the widest choice of advice and of options, they are helped by their 
officials to assess and give appropriate weight to them. This development has its 
disadvantages. 
2.2.9 Participatory democracy, except at the local and small-scale level, 
increases the influence and power of activists and can weaken concern for the 
interests of the inarticulate and the unorganised. As well as this the loss of 
simplicity in the relationship between the official and his minister complicates 
further the already difficult issue of accountability. On whatever basis 
responsibilities are in fact divided between the minister and his officials, the latter 
must now be conscious of the need to be responsive to those groups who seek to 
compete with them for the attention and confidence of ministers. This 
responsiveness may be reflected both in the 'style' of administrative behaviour 
and in the content of decisions. On the one hand the official will be conscious of 
the need to perform his tasks in a more open style, to be accessible, to be a good 
listener, and to act as if he considered himself in part directly accountable to the 
Community. On the other, it may lead him to give undue weight to effectively 
expressed interests at the cost of the interests of the inarticulate. 
2.2. 10 Greater responsiveness will also be expected of those officials who 
organise, or work in, those parts of the administration which provide services to 
the public. An increasing consciousness among the users of these services that they 
receive them as a right means not merely that they will look for promptness, 
efficiency and courtesy in their delivery, but will expect to be satisfied about the 
conditions of their eligibility, priority and allocation. The officials involved may 
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therefore become increasingly responsive to the wishes and attitudes of their 
clients or customers—those to whom the services are directed. Such a 
development seems wholly beneficial, although it may add to the cost of the 
services being provided. 
2.2.11 Thus, the simple image of the official as the instrument of ministerial 
authority, accountable to the minister alone, working unseen, unheard and 
anonymous, is now seriously inaccurate. Rather he must now be seen to have a 
special but not exclusive relationship with this minister; he must compete for 
influence and authority; often he must do his work in the full light of public 
awareness, be accessible, attentive and responsive to those seeking to influence the 
processes of government and to those whom it serves. An administration 
constituted of such officials, and equipped to train successors, will be very 
different from that adequate for the Westminster model of representative 
democracy with narrowly limited functions for which the existing bureaucracy 
was originally designed. 
2.2.12 These changes have important implications for the creation and use of 
'Information' in government. By information we mean not just the statistical and 
file data which public servants use every day but the means for perceiving and 
ordering the varied demands which the community makes of the Public Service 
and also the information about its own activities which the administration feeds 
out to the community. We urge in Part B that officials should be much more 
sensitive to community needs than, on the whole, they have hitherto been 
(Chapters 6 and 7). We also emphasise the need for better use of information 
within the administration itself; this is not just a matter of efficiency but is central 
to accountability and political control. Furthermore we argue that the 
community, and in particular active groups, need to have access to information 
which until now has often been the privileged possession of public servants. 
(Chapter 10.7). 
2.2. 13  Such an administration may require both a different structure and 
different patterns of behaviour among those who form it. In the past the 
characteristics of the traditional 'career service'—entry governed by educational 
qualifications; promotion on the basis of assessed 'merit'; security of tenure and 
the expectation that, with occasional exceptions, senior positions will be filled 
from those whose working life has been wholly or predominantly in the service of 
government—all contributed to the development of senior officials as a 
professional class. Members of that class were conscious of exercising power, but 
believed that their own accountability to a minister, and his to his ministerial 
colleagues and to Parliament, provided legitimacy for that exercise. They also 
believed that their professionalism, knowledge and experience made them to a 
degree the guardians of the 'public interest' and the central thread of political 
consensus around which political parties weave their colourful variations. The 
traditional 'code of ethics' also, with its emphasis on anonymity and discretion, 
reflects these qualities in that professional class. It expresses a sense of obligation, 
and responsibility towards 'the Service' and to professional colleagues as well as 
towards the objectives and policies of ministers. 
2.2. 14  The breaking down of the simplicity of the relationship between 
ministers and their officials brings a new complexity in its lines of responsibility 
and a sense of conflict between the loyalties demanded. Long-trusted sign-posts, 
established conventions of behaviour can no longer be relied upon. 
16 
2.2. 15 If the administration is to become flexible and responsive as well as 
responsible, it will be necessary to consider whether the principles which govern 
its staffing policies are likely to contribute to the development of these qualities. In 
its attitude towards staffing and organisation, as well as towards the substance of 
its work and in its approach to clients, the administration needs to be responsive to 
new trends within society; to an increasing reluctance among employees to work 
within the old-style strictly hierarchical organisations; to a growing awareness of 
the need for ordinary people to find satisfaction and fulfilment in theirjobs; to the 
demands of individuals for more flexibility and variety throughout their working 
lives. The Commission has considered that the traditional ideas about such 
matters need to be re-examined and tested to see whether they are actually or 
potentially able to adapt to the new pressures upon them. The results of our 
deliberations and our recommendations for change in this particular area are 
contained in Chapters 8 and g. 
2.3 MAIN LINES OF CRITICISM 
2.3.1 Some of the issues thrown up by the foregoing comments on the changing 
forms and lines of responsibility and accountability within the administration 
emerged also from the criticisms directed at that administration in submissions 
and other material before the Commission. Before proceeding to look in more 
detail at the issues and institutions with which we are concerned, there may be 
value in reviewing briefly the main lines of those criticisms. Two general 
preliminary comments should, however, be made. 
2.3.2 First, the charge that the general level of effort and dedication shown by 
the members of the bureaucracy compares unfavourably with that in the private 
sector has not, in the Commission's view, been substantiated. Indeed, in some 
categories of staff at all levels extremely heavy work-loads are accepted. This is 
not to say that there are not idle and incompetent officers or that there are not 
areas of inefficiency. There is ample room for better organisation and improved 
methods but there is no obvious reason to believe that personal attitudes towards 
work generally stand in the way of their achievement. 
2.3.3 Secondly, much of the criticism before the Commission----including a 
great deal that is constructive in tone and purpose—has originated from within 
the administration. Submissions from departments and agencies, from unions, 
from individual officers of the Public Service, are the major sources both of 
criticism and proposals for reform. In this connection the Commission has been 
interested in changes in practice and attitude which have occurred during the life 
of the Commission itself. Thus, for instance, later material from the Public Service 
Board has taken into account and responded to the content of submissions, reports 
of research projects and discussion papers arising from the Commission's work, 
and the Commission is aware of other organisational developments in progress in 
several departments. These changes encourage the Commission to believe that 
the personnel of the administration is capable of responding creatively to the 
problems which confront it. 
2.3.4 Criticisms of the bureaucracy have been many and varied. However, they 
can be grouped by their relevance to those critical issues before the Commission to 
which reference has been made above. Thus, they have been concerned especially 
with: 
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(a) the capacity of the administration to perform its functions effectively and 
with economy in the use of resources; 
(b) the relationship of the administration with, other components in the 
machinery of government; 
(c) the relationship of the administration with the community as individuals 
or groups, as consumers or producers, as taxpayers or beneficiaries; 
(d) the record of the administration as an employer. 
2.3.5 The scope of' government: The most frequent criticism however is 
based on outright hostility to the size and cost of the public bureaucracy. This 
feeling is not peculiar to Australia and has inspired a variety of 'anti-big 
government' movements of both right and left in many western countries in 
recent years. We do not see this criticism as being properly directed at the officials 
of the Public Service. It is essentially a protest against the activities of government 
itself and can only be evaluated in terms of the propriety of government 
intervention in fields such as health, welfare, pensions, transport and countless 
and increasing others. The Commission believes that whether or not this growth 
is, in the broad, desirable and inevitable, questions about the scope of government 
in the modern state are in principle separable from the concerns of this Report. 
This does not mean that we are forced to defend the operations of the machinery 
of the state. On the contrary, accepting the fact of government intervention 
impels us to search for ways of improving its effectiveness and therefore to pay 
close attention to criticisms of it. 
Inefficient Use of Resources 
2.3.6 A related group of criticisms refer to the alleged inefficiency of the 
administration. It has been freely asserted that it is wasteful in its use of manpower 
and other resources; that its organisational structures are based upon out-of-date 
principles and are resistant to change; that excessive reliance on hierarchical 
authority structures leads to too much centralisation, to failure to delegate and to 
a waste of creative capacity in the middle and lower levels of staff. This question of 
efficiency, and the more precise significance of the term, are critical and bear 
upon the working of the administration in all its functions and in all its 
relationships. It will therefore form the subject of Chapter 3,  The Efficient Use of 
Resources, and will be referred to frequently in the subsequent chapters which 
deal with particular issues and institutions: in particular, in Chapter 7, 
Administration Away from the Centre, where we discuss the need to devolve 
administration to State, regional and local levels, and in Chapter i i, Co-
ordination and Control, where we return to the problems of the power 
relationships between co-ordinating and 'line' agencies. It is sufficient at this 
stage to say that the administration is frequently criticised as suffering from the 
characteristic weaknesses of large organisations—in a word, that it is 'bureauc-
ratic'. The Commission is convinced that, while many of the individual criticisms 
expressed from outside the Service are exaggerated and based as much upon 
prejudice as upon knowledge, there is no doubt that government service is, with 
notable exceptions within it, like many other large organisations excessively 
centralised, excessively hierarchical, excessively rigid and inflexible, and 
excessively resistant to organisational change. 
The Administration and Political Authority 
2.3.7 Thirdly, it is argued that the administration, especially in its higher 
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echelons, has an exaggerated conception of its proper role in the processes of 
government; that it believes, consciously or unconsciously, that, independently of 
Parliament or the government, it is the guardian of 'the public interest' as 
opposed to sectional or vested interest, of continuity and stability in government 
administration, and of an assumed social consensus about certain basic 'supra-
political' values. Some ministers, members of Parliament and others with firm 
political affiliations have expressed the view that senior officials pursue their own 
independent political objectives. Accordingly they expect to find them insensitive 
to the objectives of the elected government and inclined to resist, at least 
passively, when these objectives conflict with the officials' assessment of the public 
interest or the assumed consensus. This critical view of the administration is, in 
Australia, more likely to be held by members of the Labor Party whose programs 
have historically been more frequently directed to reform than have those of other 
parties. It was intensified between 1949 and 1972 because of that Party's long 
absence from office, during which many Labor politicians became convinced that 
senior officials, because of long association with more conservative governments, 
were likely to view change—especially radical change—with suspicion or 
hostility. They became convinced also that senior officials, from the exercise of 
their proper function of informing ministers of the difficulties involved in 
proposed change, tended to develop a persistently negative attitude to programs 
which involve it. 
2.3.8 This line of criticism, while more common among Labor supporters, is not 
confined to them. Ministers of Liberal-Country Party governments, perhaps 
primarily those with a record of or inclination towards governmental 
intervention in social and economic affairs, have also voiced it. 
2.3.9 There appear, following earlier changes of government and in the 
Commission's view certainly after December 1972, to have been periods of lack of 
confidence and poor communication between ministers and some senior officials 
of the administration. The Commission is convinced that an effective partnership 
between the elected government and its senior officials is fundamental to effective 
government, that significant elements in this partnership have in recent years 
been defective, and that blame for these deficiencies lies with all the parties 
involved. It will, therefore, in this Report, examine the attitude of the 
administration to the political instruments of government and the influences 
which bear upon it, the means of communication between it and those in the 
political arm of government, and the procedures by which the political objectives 
of elected governments can be translated with the aid of the administration into a 
program of action. 
2.3.10 From what has been said earlier, it will be clear that the Commission 
observes that, for purely practical reasons, the administration inevitably plays a 
role in determining the character of the processes of government and that there is 
a lack of definition and clarity about the nature and extent of that role. Such lack 
of precision can be a significant source of misunderstanding and cross-purposes. It 
is essential that the role be recognised, sensibly delimited and appropriately 
Controlled. We will suggest ways of achieving these ends in Part B of the Report. 
Furthermore, the Commission cannot dismiss as trivial the influences to 
Conformity and conservatism bearing upon senior officials. It believes these 
influences to be real. Conservatism in its non-partisan sense clearly is an essential 
factor in the preservation of what is good in society and in the achievement of 
orderly change in what is not. But an administration with a tradition of even-
handedness in its attitude towards different governments will be handicapped in 
its performance if it can be criticised justifiably as conservative in the sense of 
being antagonistic to change. Accordingly the influences which tend to produce 
such antagonism need to be resisted. Changes in the content of training and the 
planning of career patterns will be necessary to provide counter-influences. More 
generally, if government affairs were conducted with greater openness and 
flexibility, officials would be stimulated and refreshed by more varied influences. 
2.3.11 Despite a tendency to conservatism among senior officials, ministers and 
politicians, especially those who have not had extensive experience of office, have 
seemed seriously to exaggerate the problems they are likely to encounter in 
getting effective service from officials in the achievement of their political 
objectives. There are reservoirs of good will and traditions of respect for political 
authority which have been insufficiently trusted and inadequately drawn upon. 
As we note above, the Commission sees the establishment of an effective working 
partnership between the administration and the political arm of government as 
critical. These matters also form part of the argument in Chapter 3,  The Efficient 
Use of Resources and are taken up in Chapter 4,  Ministers and the 
Administration and Chapter 5,  The Administration and Parliament. 
The Administration and the Community 
2.3.12 Criticisms of the relationships between the administration and the 
community covered the whole range of the administration's functions. There 
exist some doubts among officials-as to whether and how they fit into the pattern 
of relationships between the public and the government. To the extent that 
members of the community have been concerned to ensure that their wishes and 
influence form part of the input of information on which decisions are based, 
officials have tended to remain satisfied that there are adequate established 
channels for that input, primarily through parliamentarians and ministers which, 
with appropriate limitations, officials could indirectly supplement. Frequently, 
therefore, officials have felt justified in standing aloof from the issues of 
communication between ministers and the community. This sense of satisfaction 
has rarely been shared by those who have sought to influence decisions at all levels 
of government—including decisions for which they believed officials were in fact 
responsible. 
2.3.13 Evidence before us, for instance, in the -responses to the Access 
Questionnaire' suggests that members of the community have seen even less 
justification for what they feel to be officials' lack of concern with community 
access to the services of government. The commonest criticism has been that 
many officials in face-to-face contact with members of the community seeking 
such access were unsympathetic to the needs, wishes and sensibilities of those to 
whom the services are directed, that the officials responsible at a higher level were 
either uninformed about or indifferent to complaints, and that procedures for 
informing and involving them were poorly developed. 
2.3.14 The Commission is satisfied that all too frequently, although with 
honourable exceptions, these latter criticisms have been warranted. The blame 
lies not only with counter staff—indeed frequently they also are the victims of 
I . 	 Sec Appendix 2.C. 
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more basic deficiencies. Access to government services has often been badly 
planned; the work in relation to it has been undervalued, and those involved 
inadequately trained and supervised. When, none the less, they have de-
monstrated special competence, there has been little scope for appropriate 
reward in salary or promotional opportunity. The planning, organisation and 
supervision of work of this kind are essentially managerial functions having little 
in common with the role of the official as the minister's source of information and 
advice. It is this latter function which is most highly esteemed among officials as 
well as most highly rewarded and it is to this, rather than to management tasks, 
that ambition, study and other forms of training are directed. 
2
.3. 15 The problem of the relationship between officials and the community 
which arises out of the desire to influence policy judgments and decisions can 
scarcely be resolved except in the context of a clearer conception of the nature and 
extent of the administration's role. There is an inevitable tension between what 
the Commission sees as the legitimate demands of members of the public to be 
fully informed about and even to participate in decisions that effect them, and the 
role of the official in adjudicating between conflicting demands for the allocation 
of scarce resources. This tension is explored further in Chapter 6, The 
Administration and the Community, and in Chapter 7,  Administration Away 
from the Centre. We suggest ways in which the administration may he made both 
more efficient and more responsive to the needs of communities through 
devolution and delegation of administrative responsibility. We do not claim to 
have definitively resolved the problems even in principle. There are inherent 
conflicts and some tension will persist. Indeed that may be desirable, but the 
problem of achieving efficiency and sensitivity in face-to-face dealings with the 
public is more straightforward. It is a clear problem of management, and its 
solutions lie in better organisation, proper motivation, adequate training, 
efficient supervision and appropriate rewards. We return to these matters both in 
Chapter 6, The Administration and the Community and in Chapters 8 and 9, 
which deal with staffing problems. 
The Administration as Employer 
2.3.16 Apart from a number of submissions from individual officials with 
complaints about the particular treatment they had received, the Commission 
heard a variety of complaints about the administration as an employer. In 
particular, procedures were seen as cumbersome and outmoded; there were 
complaints about excessively rigid organisational structures and over-detailed 
control by the Public Service Board, stifling the initiative of staff and managers 
alike; there were allegations of bias in recruitment and promotion procedures, 
favouring the selection and advancement of certain social or educational groups 
at the expense of others; there was concern among many different occupational 
groups, in particular among fourth division or specialist professional staff that 
their opportunities for career development were unnecessarily limited. 
2.3.17 From the outside came the criticism that the government as employer 
had become a 'pace-setter' in terms and conditions of employment to a degree 
Which tended to produce a 'flow-on' to the private sector, inflating costs or acting 
as a deterrent to international competitiveness. This question is dealt with in 
Chapter 9.6.18. 
2.3.18 The Commission is persuaded by the evidence it has heard, by the 
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extensive research program it has conducted in this area and in particular by 
some of the results of its Career Service Survey that there is a need to make the 
administration more responsive in its role as employer and for its policies to be 
more in line with modern employment practice. 
2.3.19 The Commission is also aware that there is a need to strike a balance 
between equitable employment practices and the need to operate efficiently. 
Greater recognition and reward of skill and merit must be balanced by action to 
penalise failure. What the Commission has to say about accountability will make 
like more uncomfortable for some officials. But accountability is the price which 
must be paid for the more equitable, the more demanding and more rewarding 
staffing practices advocated in Chapters 8 and 9,  Staffing the Administration. 
2.4 SOME VALUE QUESTIONS 
2.4. i Most of the criticisms reviewed in the foregoing paragraphs can be tested 
objectively. But some of the criticisms derive from more subjective considerations, 
and opinions will differ as to whether change should be sought at all and 
especially about the lines on which it should proceed. 
2.4.2 These criticisms derive from different value systems held by the critics and 
have given the Commission deep concern both because of the inherent difficulty 
of their subject matter and also because we are conscious that our views about 
them and possible responses to them will reflect our own value systems and that 
we will therefore almost certainly differ, to some degree, among ourselves. 
Because of the pervasiveness of the issues involved, responses to these criticisms 
will, too, affect judgment about many of the issues raised in later chapters of the 
Report. They raise quite fundamental questions about the composition of the 
administration and the professional ethos and standards of behaviour of those 
who staff it. These issues are the more important to the extent that officials 
exercise power, in their capacity as advisers or as managers and administrators, 
which is not simply an expression of conscious ministerial decision. 
2.4.3 The most fundamental criticism deriving from these value considerations 
is that the administration is, consciously or unconsciously, the instrument of 
dominant social groups and the values which they espouse: that its composition 
reflects this domination; that its methods of recruitment, placement and 
promotion ensure its continuance; that its isolation from the community, the 
weakness of the lines of accountability to ministers, Parliament and the public, 
and its dislike of 'lateral' recruitment protect it from influences alien to it; and 
that the ethos and standards of behaviour urged upon its recruits, with emphasis 
on 'neutrality' and anonymity, tend to promote uniformity and to discourage 
internal dissent. 
2.4.4 The Commission believes: 
(a) that the administration should serve a government dedicated to such 
change or reform as competently and devotedly as one which aims to 
preserve the status quo or to achieve a more gradual rate of adaptation; 
(b) that men and women who favour and work for change and reform should 
be as wel€ome within it and have as good prospects as those of more 
conservative disposition. 
2.4.5 The study of the Career Service sponsored by the Commission and data 
assembled by the Public Service Board enable objective judgment to be made 
WA 
about some aspects of the social composition of the administration. In brief, it 
suggests that there is some basis for the criticisms stated above about the 
administration generally, and about its top levels in particular. Certainly it can 
be said that: 
(a) obviously disadvantaged groups such as aboriginals, migrants and women 
are less than proportionately represented in the administration and almost 
entirely absent from its senior levels (see Chapter 8.3); 
(b) persons educated at independent schools appear to hold a disproportionate 
share of senior positions compared with those educated elsewhere though 
this share may have declined; 
(c) Catholics appear to hold proportionately fewer senior positions than 
persons of other religious denomination though possibly less so now than 
previously; 
(d) views expressed by senior officers on questions relating to the efficiency and 
fairness of practices in the Public Service and on 'ethical' questions are 
markedly less critical of the status quo than those at lower levels; there is a 
similar division between older and younger officers.' 
2.4.6 In Chapter 8, we draw attention to the importance of an appropriate 
social and intellectual background and access to high-quality educational 
facilities in enabling recruits to meet standards of entry, to acquire qualifications 
for special work and those helpful in promotion. It cannot be doubted that such 
backgrounds and access to the more successful educational institutions are more 
likely to be gained by those who are already privileged and that, while these 
standards and qualifications continue to be applied, the composition of the 
administration will continue to reflect that privilege. There is clearly a dilemma 
to be faced. To attempt to achieve a composition which mirrors that of the 
community generally may involve the loss of competence and prove a recipe for 
inefficiency. On the other hand, to take no action means that we must, for 
instance, accept as inevitable the continued absence of women from the upper 
levels of the Service and of migrants and aboriginals from all levels. 
2.4.7 The Commission has concluded that many factors tend to isolate 
members of the administration from the community. This isolation—physical, 
social and organisational—is real and particularly unfortunate because it 
stimulates the emotional excesses of a 'we-they' dichotomy, encourat : g aniong 
administrators a sense of belonging to a distinctive, privileged and authoritative 
class of officers of the state, and among the community a sense offrustration and of 
inability to communicate with officials whom they come to regard as aloof and 
Unpredictable. 
2.4.8 The concentration in Canberra of the central sources of authority, the 
Separate 
 of the point of decision from that of first or personal contact, the 
Concentration of lines of responsibility and accountability exclusively towards 
ministers rather than also towards the public, and organisational weaknesses 
encouraging an apparent unresponsiveness among officials in contact with 
members of the community, all contribute to this dichotomy and to the inward-
looking character of the administration, especially in its most senior levels. The 
strong preference for promotion from within, despite modifications in recent 
Years, which exists within key departments and with the administration as a 
Whole undoubtedly strengthens this cultural and intellectual inbreeding. The 
' 	 See Appendix 3.A, Paper i, Demographic Tables and Tables Gi, 2. 
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problems of responsibility and accountability to ministers, Parliament and to the 
community have been discussed above (see sections 2.1 and 2.2). Enough was said 
there to make clear the Commission's concern. These matters, too, receive 
attention in Part B of the Report—particularly in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
2.4.9 There remains the vexed question of whether there is or should be an 
'ethos'—a prevailing moral attitude—among officials towards their work, which 
expresses the obligations they should accept towards it and towards those among 
whom and for whom they perform it; and if so what its content should be and 
whether it can or should be embodied in a code of behaviour sanctioned and 
enforced by legislation or firm convention. This issue arose in the Commission's 
work most frequently in relation to the claim that officials should be 'neutral' on 
political issues. On the one hand, such neutrality was seen as basic to the capacity 
of the administration to serve equally well governments of different political 
persuasion. On the other hand, it was argued that a claim to be neutral frequently 
was either false or reflected merely a singular lack of self-awareness; that the 
closest an honest man or woman can come to neutrality on any particular issue is 
an awareness of his or her on convictions or prejudices. it was clear that some in 
the administration had joined it partly at least in the hope of being able to exercise 
some influence on the patterns of change in society. These would argue that such 
a purpose was legitimate and did not inhibit competent and responsible work; 
that awareness of their own convictions, respect for ministerial and other political 
authority, and a professional attitude provided a better guarantee of integrity 
than a specious pretence of neutrality. 
2.4.10 But the question of an appropriate ethos is wider than political 
neutrality. It is characteristic of professional and occupational groups that they 
tend to develop an ethos, or prevailing sense of obligation, to their work and to 
one another and that this ethos is sometimes expressed in the form of codes or 
generally accepted conventions of behaviour. This tendency is perhaps most 
popularly recognised in the standards required of legal and medical practitioners, 
but similar standards exist in many other professional and occupational 
categories. Usually such an ethos and the relevant codes of behaviour serve two 
purposes—to express a consensus about a style of behaviour most conducive to the 
effective performance of the group's social functions, so justifying community 
respect; and, secondly, to protect the status and privileges of members of the 
group. 
2.4.11 Whether such a consensus exists in the administration as a whole must be 
doubted. The administration ircludes many occupational groups whose interests 
and loyalties as members of those groups sometimes take precedence over those 
they may owe tor the administration as a whole. The social composition and the 
work patterns of the administration are and have been changing rapidly as have 
also the age and sex profiles. A consistent and uniform ethos among so large and 
diverse a group is improbable. 
2.4.12 It is important to consider how an ethos comes into existence. It seems 
likely that it develops naturally during the training and early experience of 
recruits to the extent that they are exposed to and influenced by the attitudes of 
admired seniors. This is most likely within groups which actually or potentially 
are reasonably uniform in socio-economic status as well as in professional or 
occupational interests. In the administration there is little opportunity for recruits 
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to be personally influenced by top-level officials, and the great majority of such 
recruits will quickly become conscious of the limitations to their career potential 
which confine their sense of identity of interest to narrower groups. 
2.4.13 The Commission doubts, therefore, whether in any significant sense 
there is an ethos which pervades the administration as a whole although there is 
evidence of some elements of the requisite consensus among the most senior 
categories—yet even there, difficulties and disparities are common. 
2.4.14 The Commission also has doubts as to whether it is legitimate or 
practicable to seek to create or impose an ethos which, of its nature, expresses the 
existence of a consensus. Attempts to impose such a consensus are likely merely to 
provoke hostility and to lend strength to any different attitudes which in fact 
exist—perhaps in antagonism to that desired. 
2.4.15 Nonetheless, officials at all levels will from time to time be faced with 
situations when they will be puzzled about how they should behave. Thus, for 
instance, the Commission had its attention directed to widely difieringjudgments 
among officials as to how they should respond to the assertion by the Whitlam 
government of the policy of 'open government'. Similarly, there have been 
occasions when senior officials have believed that ministers have acted or 
proposed to act in ways which seemed to the officials concerned irregular or even 
illegal. There will also be occasions when senior officers will believe that 
members of their talfs have behaved improperly to a degree calling for rebuke or 
disciplinary action. Officials faced with such problems are entitled to guidance. 
2.4.16 The Commission recommends against any official attempt to codify Ri' 
standards of behaviour beyond those appropriate in general conditions of 
employment or a special contract. However, it believes that a modest but realistic 
contribution can be made to meeting these problems. The Commission suggests 
for consideration the following: 
(a) that training courses for officials devote attention to the ethical problems 
facing officials, but that the approach of such courses should be non-
doctrinaire and should differentiate between officials at various grades and 
in various occupational groups; 
(b) that discussion of these issues be stimulated; 
(c) that any definition of 'improper' conduct should be non-specific and the 
procedure forjudging whether an offence has been committed should give 
weight to the judgment of the peers (that is, persons of similar occupation 
and seniority) of the person charged; 
(d) that the Public Service Board, in collaboration with the relevant staff 
associations, should provide facilities for counselling about ethical 
problems on a voluntary, confidential and informal basis; 
(e) that officials who are concerned about ethical problems arising in their 
relationships with ministers should have an established procedure for 
obtaining guidance from statutory officials such as the Chairman of the 
Public Service Board, the Auditor-General or the Solicitor-General, who, 
I. A marginal 'R indicates a recommendation or nggCstion by the Commission. A summary of 
recommendations and suggestions can be found at Chapter 12.3. 
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in cases where they considered it warranted, could arrange for the official 
concerned to see the Prime Minister.' 
2.4.17 Even with these measures, the Commission believes that conscious action 
is necessary if the administration is to counter the criticism that it reflects the 
values and serves the purposes of the existing social establishment and is to 
maintain its technical and professional competence. This will not be easy. The 
administration is composed of a complex of institutions dealing with growing 
tasks of increasing complexity in an environment becoming progressively 
different from that in which the institutions themselves developed or were 
created. institutions can be changed but slowly, and a shift in basic attitudes 
among ministers and senior officials will be required to achieve such change. 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
2.5. i The following summary brings together considerations which, in the 
Commission's view, justify significant reform within the administration and 
suggests some guidelines about the content of that reform. In Part B of this Report 
some of these issues and their effects on the institutions concerned are explored in 
more detail. 
i. The concept of the administration as simply an extension of the capacity of a 
minister fully responsible and accountable to Cabinet and to Parliament for 
matters within his portfolio is unrealistic and misleading. It is necessary, 
therefore, to acknowledge and delimit the area of responsibility of officials and 
to establish the means by which they are held accountable for their actions 
within it. 
2. The widespread and increasing demand within the community, by individuals 
and groups, to participate in the decision-making processes of government 
modifies the exclusiveness of the relationship of officials to their ministers and 
requires reforms in the relationship between officials and the community. 
3. The extension of the role of government as a provider of services to the 
community strengthens the importance of the managerial role of officials 
compared with that of informing and advising ministers. It is necessary to 
review the adequacy of organisation in departments and agencies, and the 
patterns of training, experience and rewards, so that this managerial function 
is more adequately recognised and performed. 
4. The extension of services increases the amount and importance of face-to-face 
contact between officials and those receiving the services. There is a need 
greatly to improve the efficiency of access to and delivery of these services and 
to give greater sensitivity and responsiveness to the style of delivery. 
. The prevailing pattern of organisation within the administration is unduly 
centralised and hierarchical. This involves a waste of human capacity in the 
middle and lower levels of staff and frequently creates a sense of frustration and 
lack of purpose. It is necessary to devolve responsibility and decentralise the 
focal points of decision. Greater diversity and flexibility in organisational styles 
for tasks of different character would also contribute to greater efficiency and 
job satisfaction. 
6. More efficient and economical use of manpower is possible. The means by 
which this can be achieved are examined in Chapter 3,  The Efficient Use of 
Resources. 
I . 	 See Chapter 4.2 for a further discussion of ethical problems and convcntions'. 
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The present characteristics of the 'career service' enable the administration to 
function to some degree as a self-contained elite group exercising significant 
power generally in the interests of the status quo but without effectively being 
accountable for its exercise. Effort is necessary to ensure: 
(a) that obstacles which prevent the administration reflecting generally the 
social composition of the community are steadily reduced and eliminated; 
(b) that there is reasonably free movement into and out of the administration, 
between it and other types of employment; 
(c) that by such mobility and by training and continuing education, officials 
are exposed to more diverse sources of stimulus, and helped to respond to 
social change; 
(d) that officials can be called to account for their performance. 
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Part B 
Major Issues 

Chapter 3 
	
The Efficient Use of 
Resources 
3.1 CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS: EFFECTIVENESS, ECONOMY 
AND EFFICIENCY 
3-1.1 Many of the submissions and other material before the Commission allege 
that Australian government administration is inefficient; that its use of manpower 
is excessive; that much of the time of those employed is wasted; that there is 
purposeless duplication of functions; that the work of individuals, organisational 
units, departments and agencies is not effectively controlled or co-ordinated; and 
so on. Most of these criticisms can validly be directed at one time or another at 
most human institutions in the private as well as the public sector—particularly 
perhaps at large and complex institutions. However, the cumulative impact of 
these criticisms of government administration, some of which come from officers 
in the administration itself, is impressive. Indeed it can be said that a belief that 
government processes are inherently inefficient forms part of contemporary folk-
lore. 
3.1 .2 The Commission's direct personal experience of those processes is limited 
and the studies it has initiated of them are necessarily less than comprehensive. 
Nevertheless the material before it leaves it firmly convinced that there is scope for 
substantial improvement in standards of efficiency, despite its conviction that 
some of the criticism reflects prejudice rather than informed judgment. Our 
approach is therefore rather to seek a prescription for that improvement than to 
deplore existing deficiencies. We deal with the question at the outset of this part of 
the Report because the conclusions we reach are relevant to our consideration of 
all the functions which the administration performs. 
3-1 -3 Efficiency is not an Cds\ concept. Some specialist writers on adminis-
tration, rightly seeking to avoid imprecision in discussion, have analysed and 
distinguished between elements of the concept as generally held. The new 
definitions that some of these writers proceed to give words such as 'efficiency' 
itself and 'economy' differ from standard usage and also from meanings which the 
Words have in other specialisccl disciplines such as economics. It is possible to 
maintain the conflicting currencies inside the borders of each specialist literature, 
but this Report is not addressed to any single group of readers. To depart very far 
from ordinary usage is not desirable; but we must still be specific as to what we 
Consider this usage signifies. 
3.1.4 For the purposes of this Report, effectiveness is one of two distinguishable 
elements in efficiency. Effectiveness is concerned with the relationship between 
Purpose 
 and result. Thus, an action or program is effective if it achieves the 
Purpose for which it was initiated. But efficiency involves additionally a 
Consideration of the resources used in achieving the result. A program is efficient 
Only if its effectiveness is achieved with an economic use of resources. Efficiency is 
therefore also concerned with the relationship between resources used and the 
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results achieved: between 'input' and 'output'. It comprehends both economy in 
this sense and effectiveness. 
3.1.5 Effectiveness and efficiency arc matters of degree. Few programs or 
courses of action are perfectly effective or perfectly efficient. Furthermore, it is 
often found in practice that some choice is involved between them. A program to 
prevent tax evasion, for instance, is unlikely to be i oo per cent effective; beyond a 
certain point it would become increasingly difficult, and would involve the use of 
progressively more resources, to improve the percentage of effectiveness. 
1.6 While efiectiveness and efficiency are quantitative concepts, it is not 
always practicable to measure them. In purely commercial enterprises this can 
usually be managed, because the objectives, the results and the resources used can 
all be expressed in money terms. The prime objective in such enterprises is money 
profit, and the resources of labour, materials, equipment and working capital 
employed, and the resulting produce marketed, can all be related to one another 
in money terms. Measurement, and comparison between alternative ways of 
using the resources involved, are therefore practicable. 
3.1.7 This is not so easy when the objective is difficult to quantify—especially 
when quality is important in the output or when there are multiple objectives. In 
the processes of government, objectives are frequently by their nature difficult to 
quantify, and a program or course of action will almost always be directed 
towards several purposes which to some degree compete with one another. 
Subsidiary objectives are, of course, not peculiar to government. Even in the 
private sector one would not judge a medical practitioner's efficiency by the 
number of patients dealt with per hour of consultancy time, or by the money 
income he derives from them. A manufacturer, although profit may be his 
primary objective, will wish also to establish a respected corporate image and to 
maintain harmonious industrial relations with his employees. Indeed, he may 
well be prepared to sacrifice some profit to achieve these subsidiary, competing 
purposes. Nevertheless in the private sector the effect of the relationship between 
input and output on the resulting profit of the enterprise can be accepted as a 
generally acceptable test of efficiency. In government there is no such 
predominant test. The circumstances of the official resemble much more those of 
the medical practitioner whose objectives in relation to an individual client's 
immediate problem must take account of the client's general welfare and family 
and social relations, as well as social and professional considerations relating to 
the practitioner himself. 
3.1.8 It is important to note that progress towards these unquantifiable 
organisational goals may often be assessed only by way of some kind of reaction 
from or dialogue with relevant groups of people, both inside and outside the 
organisation. Again, like the medical practitioner, government organisations 
often can only evaluate and appropriately modify their performance by asking 
In the specialist literature some, but not all, writers on administration use efflciencv' in a sense 
which divorces it from considerations of effectiveness. They focus the word's meaning on the 
relationship between input and output, so that the ineffectiveness of an operation (failure to 
achieve its object) need not affect its claim to efficiency. Their meaning of efficient' 
corresponds to what other people (including economists) would call 'economic'. Some of the 
same writers on administration define 'economy' in ways which refer to scales of input only 
without any relation to corresponding outputs. 
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their clients: 'Where does it hurt?'. Efficiency in the public sector, even more than 
elsewhere, is elusive. It is a dynamic and not a static concept. The vigilant 
manager will have no absolute standards in his field of responsibility. He will be 
continually seeking not only to improve performance but also to review the very 
bases of his judgments to ensure that the measures he employs remain relevant 
and economical for all the purposes of his organisation. In this continuing quest 
for efficiency, the good manager will also know that it is necessary to enlist a 
corresponding alertness and mental initiative among those who work with him in 
each of the various levels of the organisation. 
3.2 PREREQUISITES OF EFFICIENCY 
3.2.1 While it is difficult, if not impossible, to write a definitive prescription for 
efficiency in administration, it is possible, from a priori reasoning, from the 
experience of successful administrators in the private and public sectors, and from 
evidence and reports based upon the responses both of administrators and clients, 
to suggest factors which are likely to contribute to it. Thus, it is axiomatic that 
efficiency is unlikely to be achieved if those engaged do not know to what end or 
ends their efforts should be directed, or appreciate the relationship of those ends to 
the wider purposes of the government's programs.' At present such direction, to 
the extent that is is in fact expressed, generally emerges progressively in informal 
contact between a minister and the head of his department. 2 
3.2.2 Of primary importance to efficiency in the bureaucracy, then, is clarity in 
the objectives of the government and in the priority which is to be attached to 
them. Clear and effective processes will be required by which the government 
establishes and reviews its objectives and their priorities. To provide an adequate 
base for administrative performance, such objectives must be more than general 
directions for a department or agency as a whole. They must be capable of 
expression in sufficient detail to provide a program of work not only for the 
department or agency but also for sections and units, functional and 
geographical, within it. Only if this is possible will departments and agencies 
receive adequate political direction on which to base their administrative 
See: Fourth Class Servants of the Public Service, paper by Fourth Division RCAGA StaLl 
August iq, p. 38, in Commission's Collected Papers. 
The absence of conscious effort to formulate objectives is illustrated by the reply of one 
departmental head to a request from the Commission for a statement setting out his 
department's objectives: 
'Perhaps as it refers to an organisation it (this request) was not intended for me as I have 
not previously encountered the suggestion of objectives for a Department of State.' 
On the other hand, Mr P. J. Lawler, Secretary of the then Department of the Special Minister 
of State was conscious of this absence. He wrote of 
'the lack of explicit goal formulation and goal analysis in the Public Service, leading to: 
• undesirable tendencies to continue government programs after the need for such 
programs had passed; 
• the lack of 'management by objectives' philosophy in the public service; 
• it continuation of traditional line-item budgeting procedures that defy any attempt to 
analyse the effects of overlapping government pmgra.ms through a focus on program 
diects rather than on line items which make up a program: and 
• it continuation of tendencies to separate the planners from the doers resulting in 
reduced feedback to update rolling plans.' 
(Supplementary Submission No. 669, 5 May 
	
Commission Document 679, P. 4, 21 
October 1975.) 
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processes, or will individual officers receive an adequate stimulus to effort and an 
ability to relate their individual performances to group objectives. 
3.2.3 Secondly, government administration is likely to be more efficient if the 
decision makers and managers at various levels have the scope to exercise 
initiative within the range of work for which they are primarily responsible. In the 
performance of any task there will always be a variety of forms of organisation, 
procedures and combinations of resources capable of achieving it. At any time 
there will always be the possibility of some capital, organisational or human 
innovation which will enable the task to be achieved more effectively or more 
economically. The recognition of such possibilities and the capacity to realise 
them are seen in economic writing as the essence of the entrepreneurial function. 
This function has long been the driving force of increasing productivity and 
efficiency in the private sector. The Commission believes that opportunities for it 
exist at all managerial levels in government administration and that capacity to 
perform it is as widely spread among those employed there as in the private sector. 
For that capacity to be realised, however, significant organisational changes will 
be called for, in which something can be learned from the practice of the private 
sector. 
3.2.4 In accordance with that practice, or at least traditional accounts of it, the 
chosen manager of an enterprise is given, within broad policies and objectives, 
significant freedom to use reason, experience and intuition in decisions on how to 
organise the resources at his disposal. He is, however, held accountable for the 
results. His status and future will depend upon those results (even if they are not 
wholly or substantially attributable to his decisions). In any situation where 
personaljudgment and intuition must play an uncertain but significant role in the 
processes leading up to decision, it is difficult to devise an alternative which, in the 
interests of efficiency, could rationally be preferred. The Commission believes 
that efficiency in the public sector will be increased if decision makers at various 
levels are given similar scope to act entrepreneurially. 
3.2.5 Material placed before the Commission suggests also that efficiency 
depends upon adequate authority being devolved upon or delegated to officers at 
various points of decision—indeed, that the aim should be to shift the authority to 
decide as close to the geographical periphery and as low in the hierarchical 
structure as possible.' 
3.2.6 A range of discretion is desirable at each point of decision. The degree of 
discretion to be allowed is a matter of judgment in particular situations. The 
Commission is conscious that a sudden transfer of responsibility to officials 'down 
the line' may impose excessive burdens on them and lead to temporary but 
embarrassing inefficiencies. (This seems to have been the experience in Canada 
following the Glassco Report.) However, the precise recommendations set out for 
the transfer of responsibilities from co-ordinating authorities to individual 
departments in Chapter ii, and from the centre to the periphery in Chapter 7, 
illustrate that effective action can be taken by coherent planned stages. 
3.2.7 Initial uncertainties or mistakes, which in any such change cannot be 
• See: i ReioiueI Bmo Jo :1 ia/ia! ian (aeonrnent Adminzv/iation. RCAGA Task F orcc Report 
August 1975. reproduced on microfiche and see also Appendix 2.H; Access Report, Appendix 
2.C; H. R. Dent, Delegations in the Australian Public Service, September 1975, Appendix 2.1. 
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completely avoided, should be weighed against the successes and the basis for 
improvement provided by the mistakes themselves. Ingrained resistance to 
delegation often reflects a fear of the unknown and the untried, or an insufficient 
understanding of the two faces of delegation—that the scope for exercising 
discretion involves the corresponding discipline of being held accountable. The 
Commission believes that some degree of discretion should exist at all levels. Only 
then can decisions take adequate account of the special circumstances of the 
individual case only then can managerial innovation be encouraged and more 
junior officers be given experience in decision making. The opportunity to 
exercise judgment and discretion in the pursuit of objectives should therefore not 
be regarded as a characteristic only of senior 'managerial' positions. Officials at 
all levels may exhibit 'managerial' behaviour to a greater or lesser extent (for 
example, in planning, decision-making and evaluation), so that the benefits of 
entrepreneurial freedom and challenge are not limited only to those designated in 
some formal way as 'managers'. 
3.2.8 Delegation and devolution if they are to be effective, will depend upon an 
adequate flow downwards of information from top management about 
objectives, priorities, and the principles on which individual decisions should be 
made. Similarly, the progressive modification of policies at the top and the 
adequate monitoring of performance at lower levels will depend upon 
information which top management derives from those at lower levels and from 
the geographical periphery. It has been submitted to the Commission that new 
technologies now make more practicable this two-way flow of information.' 
3.2.9 Thirdly, efficiency will be promoted to the degree to which staff identify 
themselves with the objectives to which their own efforts arc directed, and with 
the procedures by which those objectives and the related tasks have been 
formulated and allocated. The Commission is conscious of markedly different 
styles among departments and believes that, in some, efficiency could be 
improved by the greater use of managerial techniques concerned to promote staff 
involvement. Some of the techniques have been derived from extensive work by 
social scientists and require the services of trained and experienced people to 
establish and apply them. We have considered examples of such techniques, and 
have noted experimental work in the Public Service Board and some 
departments , 2 and we comment on the issues in Chapters 4.3.10-13 and 
9.6.81-87. 
3.2.10 Fourthly, efficiency will be enhanced to the extent that the staff involved 
in the various activities are properly recruited, trained, organised and promoted. 
This involves improved managerial techniques and greater opportunities for 
departmental managers to act entrepreneurially in their fields of responsibility. 
While management needs a special kind of judgment in the use of resources, 
Successful managers themselves do not necessarily need detailed knowledge of 
Personnel matters, including those techniques referred to in the preceding 
Paragraph. It will, however, be essential that managers be responsible for the 
I. See: James Cutt Program Budgeting in the Australian Federal Government, August 1975, 
Appendix .C; and Keith Hevdon, Public Sector Managcnicnt and Related Information 
Rcquii'cmi, c,s, December i 97. Appendix i .E. 
2. See: Appendix g.L, Changing Organisations; and Department of Urban and Regional 
Development. Submission to RCAGA. No. 426. 
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areas of work under them and that they have access to sources of expertise. As we 
have already indicated, the Commission sees the Public Service Board as a central 
source of such expertise. The departmental manager, too, will need to take 
account of the needs of the administration as a whole and of the impact of action 
he may wish to take on other parts of the administration. A balance between 
discretion and the recognition of the need for discipline will be called for. In these 
matters also we see a special role for the Public Service Board. They are dealt with 
more extensively in Chapters 8 and 9  in relation to staff and organisation practice 
and in Chapter ii in respect of the need for discipline and co-ordination. 
3.2.11 Finally, it is likely that efficiency will be stimulated if it is known that 
performance will be assessed and that those responsible can be called to account 
for it, that is if officers at all levels are held accountable for their actions and 
decisions. Judgments in the process of accountability can be given greater 
precision in those activities which are measurable, or where performance in them 
can be assessed by measurable indicators. There is clearly scope for the 
development of measures of performance, both individual and organisational, in 
administrative activities, both directly and by the examination of relevant 
indicators. Accountability can be a stimulus to efficiency, but justly and 
effectively only if the outcome and the assessment on which it is based are seen to 
bear upon professional standing, opportunity for promotion, salary and other 
rewards and indicators of achievement. The significance of such accountability 
for discipline, and the review of administrative decisions as they affect staff 
employed are taken up in Chapter 8.4 and 8.5. 
3.2. I 2 To summarise, the Commission considers that efficiency is likely to be 
promoted if: 
a) the objectives to which work is to be directed and the priorities attached to 
them are stated clearly; 
(b) decision makers at all levels have scope to act entreprcneurially; 
(c) officers are able to identify themselves with the objectives to which their 
personal efforts are directed, and with the ways in which these objectives 
have been determined and the related work organised; 
(d) staff involved are appropriately reruited, trained, organised and 
promoted; 
(e) managers at all levels have acess to both the information upon which their 
actions should properly depend, and to the appropriate expertise in 
managerial and related techniques; 
(f) performance at all levels is regularly assessed and those responsible are held 
accountable for it in ways which ensure that the assessment bears upon 
their rewards, standing and future. 
3.2. 13 The remainder of this chapter will he devoted to a consideration of 
means whereby these prerequisites can be achieved. 
3.3 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBJECTIVES AND THEIR 
PRIORITIES: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FORWARD ESTIMATES 
3.3. i The establishment of objectives, their embodiment in programs designed 
to achieve them and the determination of priorities between such programs are 
essential functions which link the political and administrative aspects of 
government. The starting point has usually been a party program and a policy 
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speech. But to provide working objectives the content of the policy speech must be 
translated into a series of programs of tasks to be performed: into timetables of 
work. Such programs should provide the means of informing the administration 
about what is expected of it, enabling it to establish subsidiary programs and 
timetables for the various organisational units at all levels. The programming 
process, however, has not so far in Australia been carried out consciously or 
systematically. 
3.3.2 The Commission is aware of and has studied the processes involved in the 
forward financial and manpower estimates obtained separately by the Treasury 
and the Public Service Board, and notes that both authorities regard the further 
development of the respective estimates as being necessarily an evolutionary 
process. The Commission considers that there is an urgent need for the two 
related resource inputs to be dealt with together. Neither a party program nor a 
policy speech is a blue-print for performance. Each will be in part declaratory and 
persuasive in character. Its specific proposals will have been designed to be put 
into elect over a period of time, in an order subsequently to be determined in the 
light of political and economic constraints. Yet a blue-print for action—even 
allowing that it will be subject to progressive modification—is necessary if 
resources are to be allocated rationally. 
3.3.3 The development of such a blue-print is essentially a budgetary process. It 
is only in the preparation of a budget that the determination of priorities becomes 
precise and realistic. It is here that the government must decide what proportion 
of the actual or potential gross national product, and of the available workforce, it 
is prepared to allocate to its purpose and how it will distribute the resources thus 
pre-empted between its various objectives and their related programs. 
3.3.4 However, the annual budget in its present form is not a suitable 
instrument for the development of the government's blue-print. Its time-scale is 
limited, and it will not be capable of comprehending the longer term implications 
of the government's programs. Its processes do not bring continuing expenditures 
electively under review, or provide an adequate opportunity to reassess 
programs introduced in circumstances which are now changed or no longer 
relevant. 2 Above all, it is the prime instrument of short-term economic policy, 
and its content frequently is dominated by short-term considerations. These can 
I 
. See the submission to RCAGA by the Professional Officers Association: Without adequate 
central co-ordination there is a strong possibility that the competing claims of departments and 
of States will distort the allocation of resources and priorities from that which is set for meeting 
the Government's objectives.' (Submission No. 249 P. 2.) 
2. In a report prepared by the Parliamentary Library for a member of the Senate it was stated: 
'The Budget plans are presented with the introduction of Appropriation Bills Nos. r and 2 
usually in August. The Parliament then has an opportunity to debate the Budget and vote on 
the Appropriation Bills. Authority to spend from these Acts expires at the end of the financial 
year. However, Appropriation Bills Nos. i and 2 cover only about 40 to 45  per cent of total 
Budget expenditure. (This can he seen from Table i of Budget Paper No. 4.)  Some associated 
Bills for expenditures or taxes may come before the Parliament for voting at about the same 
time. However, a large proportion of expenditure cannot be voted upon at Budget time as it 
remains authorised by previously passed Acts of Parliament—although it is recorded in the 
Budget Papers and there may be various other opportunities to criticise it in Parliament. This 
might be seen as a problem if there are certain expenditures hidden amongst them that were 
approved by Parliament years before but have since lost their original relevance, or perhaps 
the need for them might be viewed differently in the light of current priorities.' 
(Tabiccl in the Senate, 5  October 1975, Australia. Senate, &balc3 1 975,   No. 23, P. 1 773.) 
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produce a use and allocation of resources which is different from those called for 
by the government's objectives and priorities, and which sometimes tend to 
frustrate their achievement. 
3.3.5 Furthermore, the fact that the annual budget embodies only financial 
decisions means that it accepts without conscious ministerial review or 
commitment judgments about the manpower required to administer the 
programs and activities involved. For both political and practical reasons, such 
manpower requirements both in total and in certain categories impose their own 
constraints. At present the responsibility for decisions relating to manpower use is 
not consciously accepted by Cabinet in a meaningful way. Its intervention is 
intermittent and exercised through 'staff ceilings'. As pointed out to the 
Commission by one of its consultants, the allocation of permitted percentages of 
growth between departments in times of manpower constraints has usually 
involved decisions which reflect the relative importance of the government's 
various programs as the Board sees Ihem. 1  Similarly, at the level of departments 
themselves, the allocation of permitted growth among their divisions reflects and 
in effect determines departmental priorities. While departments doubtless seek to 
be guided by government and ministerial attitudes, they must largely interpret 
these for themselves, though lacking the means to balance their own claims 
against those of other ministers and their departments. Thus, the submission from 
the Secretary to the Department of Environment and Conservation states in 
relation to staff ceilings: 
'There is an obvious inconsistency between such an arbitrary growth figure and 
the continued commitment of Departments by the Government, to the 
implementation of a new policy initiative-unless at the same time there is a 
clear and decisive commitment to reduce or terminate some existing programs 
and reallocate the staff resources accordingly. 
I have no evidence of any organised attempt by the Government or the Board 
to do so. It seems to remain a matter for the Permanent Heads, who are placed in 
the unenviable position of having to choose between trying to do everything 
which the Government has required their Departments to do in the past, as well 
as to take on board new programs, or to reduce or abandon existing 
commitments without any clear direction or mandate to do so. It seems essential 
that some machinery be devised to review all existing programs on a regular 
basis, in order to reassess their significance, relevance and priority.' 2 
Clearly, effective political direction requires conscious decisions about the use of 
manpower as well as of money, and these decisions must relate to specific purposes 
and programs so that ministers will in fact be conscious of what they are deciding, 
and significant decisions of a political character will not, by default, be made by 
officials. 
3.3.6 The Commission considers that in the development and use of Forward 
Estimates there exists a potential instrument for developing a blue-print for 
action.3 The production and monitoring of Forward Estimates can be made 
I . 	 Kenneth \\ ilishire, Stall Ceilings, July 1975-  Sec also Manpower Planning by the same 
consultant. Both reports are at Appendix I.D. 
2. 	 Submission No. 390, p. II. 
See The Piocesses oJ Economic Policy Making in Ausircilia, RCAGA Task Force Report, December 
975 paragraphs 1050, 1059-60. Sec also Appendix 4.A ftr the conclusions and 
rceommendaions of the Task Force. 
relevant to economic management not only at the highest (macro-economic) 
level but also down to the efficient use of resources in detail. To embody political 
preferences, these processes would require the attention of ministers, especially 
the most senior, as well as senior officials. Because of their importance for much of 
this Report, we shall later (Chapter ii) consider in some detail the appropriate 
machinery for this preparation and approval, and assess their relevance to longer 
term planning and annual budgeting. Here we are concerned with their 
relevance for the efficient use of resources. For this purpose (and even more for the 
wider economic context) it is necessary that: 
(a) Forward Estimates are prepared within guidelines set by Cabinet about 
the proportions of potential gross domestic product and the total workforce 
to be allocated to governmental purposes and about the government's 
current political objectives; 
(b) they assess departmental needs in both money and manpower; 
(c) they become the main vehicle for the competitive bidding for available 
resources between ministers which now takes place in the preparation of 
the annual budget; 
(d) their preparation involves ministers, and their adoption becomes a matter 
for Cabinet; 
(e) they are accepted when endorsed by Cabinet as embodying the 
government's priorities, and therefore as a basis for ministerial and 
departmental planning. 
With the Forward Estimates so up-graded and given greater precision, the 
preparation of the annual Budget would be concerned primarily with assessing 
how the content of the relevant part of the Forward Estimates needed to be 
modified in the light of considerations of economic management. 
3.3.7 It is important to note that this process would involve ministers and 
officials working together. Thus the preparation of departmental estimates 
should involve collaboration between each minister and his senior officials and 
would provide an effective means for officials at the departmental level to be 
brought into contact with, and to respond to, the government's political 
objectives and those of their ministers. At the same time, it would allow ministers 
who may lack experience of the constraints of administrative practicalities to 
become acquainted with the need to fit action to achieve objectives into a 
manageable timetable and to the parameters of Cabinet guidelines. 
3.3.8 The fact that Forward Estimates would require departments (and 
governments) to document, in advance, the longer term implications of their 
proposals should reduce the risk that only the 'tip of the iceberg' was funded by an 
ad hoc Cabinet decision in the Supply Year, leaving unforeseen and inescapable 
associated commitments to be funded in following years. In this respect it is a 
development of the reports of forward commitments now being required of 
departments by Treasury. 
3.3.9 It would be necessary to revise the Forward Estimates in respect of both 
finance and manpower at least annually, and the Cabinet consideration of them 
WQuld again be the main occasion for major policy revisions requiring changes in 
the allocation of resources. The adoption outside the Forward Estimates of new 
Policy initiatives would in theory, and sometimes in practice, call for a recasting of 
the Forward Estimates themselves and of the priorities they expressed. In 
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submitting such initiatives to Cabinet, ministers and departments should 
therefore be expected to include estimates of the financial costs, the additional 
employment involved and proposals for consequent adjustments to the Forward 
Estimates (including any reductions in other items or, alternatively, increases in 
the share of gross domestic product and available manpower to be reserved for the 
government's use). The problems involved in the progressive revision of Forward 
Estimates could be reduced if departments included in their initial bids a 
judicious provision for contingencies and new developments. The aggregate 
provision included in the Forward Estimates approved by Cabinet for such 
reserves would provide a source within which revisions could be accommodated. 
3.3.10 The preparation of the ministerial bids for inclusion in the Forward 
Estimates, and their subsequent revision, would provide the opportunity to 
develop, for various working units within departments, subsidiary statements of 
objectives and programs and timetables of work. In the development of some of 
these programs it would be possible, in some instances, to design a 'critical path' 
to the completion of the various tasks involved, so as to give a greater sense of 
urgency and purpose to the work of the various units and to provide managers at 
all levels with a scale against which performances could be measured. 
Furthermore, experience appears to suggest that timetables of work of this kind 
provide the opportunity to set up short-term groupings of staff on a non-
hierarchical basis to carry particular tasks to completion. There is evidence that a 
'task force' approach in appropriate instances can generate a positive response 
from staff.' 
3-3-1 i The Commission has been interested in experiments for the development 
of objectives as a tool of management and in the use of non-hierarchical groupings 
in some departments and agencies. It has, in collaboration with the Department 
of Aboriginal Affairs and the Public Service Board, arranged for that Department 
to conduct an experiment in the setting of objectives and for the experiment to be 
monitored. The responsibility for the use of such managerial techniques should be 
with the head of the department or agency responsible, but the Public Service 
Board should be concerned and equipped to be in the forefront of developing 
knowledge and experiment in this and similar aspects of organisation, using its 
influence to inform and advise heads of departments, assisting them to design and 
conduct experiments and monitoring and making known the results. 
3-3-1 2 The establishment of objectives in this way, not merely for the 
department or agency as a whole but also for its constituent working units, will 
make it possible for some units to express their objectives as targets in quantitative 
form. In those cases, resources used may he measured alongside results achieved, 
and the pursuit of efficiency in terms of the relationship between them will rest on 
a firmer foundation (see section 3.6 below). The Commission is aware of work in 
the United States government administration to develop such measurement as an 
instrument of management and of audit. It believes that the method can usefully 
be applied more widely in Australian government, although important parts of 
the administration will not lend themselves readily to its use. The areas in which it 
can most easily be applied will be those which carry out more repetitive processes 
involving large numbers of transactions. However, even among these, the 
simplicity of the rclationliip between resources used and results achieved will be 
I . 	 Sec Changing Organisations, Appendix 3.1. 
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impaired to some degree by the need to take account of subsidiary objectives. 
3.3.13 The measurement of output against resources used will rarely be possible 
in activities which command the greatest prestige: those associated with advice to 
ministers. These activities are, however, supported by others more regular and 
repetitive: the assembly and assessment of data; the formulation of models; the 
preparation of projections and estimates; and similar professionally skilled 
processes. It is interesting to find that the number of officials directly involved 
with ministers in tendering advice has, over recent decades, been increasing 
relatively slowly while, on the other hand, the ranks of those who inform and 
advise the advisers, assemble and analyse the data, construct the models, and 
provide 'supporting services' have multiplied many times. 1  This is a field of work 
to which men and women of special capacity and sophisticated training are 
attracted in the expectation of intellectual stimulus and by the desire to influence 
policies. In fact, it is frequently a field of employment much marked by frustration 
and, as the years pass, by disillusion, bitterness and simple deterioriation. It is, 
therefore, a field which represents a challenge to imaginative management. The 
establishment of short-term objectives, timetables for their achievement and the 
development of task force groupings could well make a contribution to meeting 
this challenge. The experience of the Industries Assistance Commission has 
demonstrated that these techniques can usefully be applied to research work 
providing the basis for Commission reports to the government. 
3.3.14 The Commission believes that the up-grading of the Forward Estimates 
is a logical and practical development of the preliminary efforts which have been 
made to this end in recent years. By establishing more precisely what the 
government wishes to achieve and in what order, the process would both provide 
the basis for effective planning and action, and avoid the waste involved in the 
unordered allocation of resources. It would constitute the necessary framework 
for a devolution of responsibility and for work programs at levels remote from the 
central focus of ministerial and departmental decision making. It would begin to 
provide a means for the continuous assessment of trends in manpower use and 
administrative costs for the conduct of specific programs and activities, without 
which judgment about changes in general levels of efficiency must remain largely 
speculation. For these reasons the Commission sees this development of Forward 
Estimates as the first and critical step in the achievement of greater efficiency. 
3.3.15 The Commission has observed the existence of some evidence to suggest 
that the broad annual costs of adniiiiistiation in Commonwealth government 
(as distinct from transfer payments, capital outlays and other elements of budget 
expenditure) may have grown appreciably as a proportion of the national income 
since the early ig6os. It should be emphasised that the form and content of the 
available published information bearing on this matter are far from adequate or 
satisfactory; and it should also be appreciated that a significant rise in the 
Proportion of government administrative costs to national income or gross 
domestic product would not in itself be a basis for any immediate value judgment 
Concerning such a trend. More work has to be done within the bureaucracy to 
This is perhaps indicated by the fact that inJune 1957, 4.9 per cent of clerical admiistriitive 
staff were in Class 8 and above positions. In December 1974 the proportion was 13-o  per cent. 
This growth has been more a feature of ACT than of branch offices. Sec Appendix 3.A, Paper 
2, Two Services. 
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discern the trend in the comparative cost of its own upkeep. To take one 
suggestive but certainly limited pointer, the salaries and pay and other quoted 
'administrative expenses' of all Commonwealth departments excluding Defence 
and the former Postmaster-General's Department for the year ended 30 June 
1975, appear in the last Estimates of Receipts and Summary of Estimated 
Expenditure to amount to more than $1.5 billion (including payments made from 
the Budget for superannuation benefits); and this figure would represent the 
equivalent of about 2.7 per cent of that year's gross domestic product. On the 
available data, such a ratio may be approximately 70 per cent higher than the 
ratios of ten and fifteen years previously, after allowances are made for variations 
in the recorded range and content of the departmental figures over the period. A 
comparison of the ratio of the departments' 'salaries and pay' alone to the 
national wage and salaries bill would suggest a growth of about 50  per cent over 
the same periods. The point of referring to such imperfectly refined and 
necessarily inconclusive figures is not to attempt to comment on the course of 
administrative costs in relation to the development of government functions, but 
rather to indicate that there should be a responsibility for assembling and 
analysing fully appropriate data, and for monitoring their trends, such as does not 
appear now to be focussed anywhere in the administration.' An integrated 
Forward Estimates procedure would help to promote such a sense of 
responsibility. 
3 THE LOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
34.1 The annual budget processes based on the Forward Estimates should 
determine what is to be done and in what order. The next task will be to 
determine who is responsible for doing what has been decided or seeing that it is 
done. Attention has been drawn in the first part of this Report to the lack of clarity 
in contemporary practice as to where responsibility lies. The theory of the 
Westminster system asserts that the minister is wholly responsible for all actions in 
matters within his department, but in fact much responsibility lies with officials. 
It is important that this be acknowledged, the nature and extent of the 
responsibility be clarified as far as possible, and procedures established to assess 
performance and to provide that those responsible at all levels will be accountable 
for their performances. Unless this is done no-one can justly be regarded as 
responsible and no-one can fairly be called to account for failure or poor 
performance. 
3.4.2 Some clarification is clearly necessary. Members of Parliament, and in 
their turn ministers, are selected by processes which give predominant weight to 
The scope of the figures referred to is restricted by the exclusion of the trends of most non-
departmental bodies, and by the omission from the departments' listed 'administrative 
expenses of such items as rents or interest charges (actual or imputed) and depreciation. As to 
internal consistency over the period, it is possible to make adjustments for recorded variations 
in treatment as to the inclusion or exclusion of some statutory bodies and the territories in the 
departmental aggregates, but not possible to allow quantitatively for any transfers of functions 
and activities as between departments as a group and extra-departmental bodies; in cases of 
the latter type, changes in the recorded departmental costs may not reflect changes for the 
administration as a whole. The indication from the series of figures that the growth of 
departmental salaries as a proportion to the nations wages and salaries bill has not been as fast 
as the growth of more broadly defined running expenses to gross domestic product is consonant 
with the fact that the proportion of GDP represented by wages and salaries has risen over this 
period. 
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qualities and considerations which have little relevance to their capacity to 
manage a large and complex organisation. This is not to belittle politicians or 
ministers. Their essential functions are different. 
The fundamental task is to integrate the authority which comes from 
popular election with that which derives from professional knowledge and 
experience, while upholding the principle of ultimate political control. If the two 
sources of authority are to be so integrated, the roles of minister and official must 
be seen as complementary. Given this, the managerial responsibilities of 
departmental officials can be readily recognised if not precisely defined. Final 
authority must be in political hands, but without making management 
ineffective. This will be fully achieved only if officials accept an obligation 
towards the spirit as well as the letter of government objectives. Their acceptance 
of that obligation cannot be ensured either by legislation or convention. We can 
only note, as we have done in paragraph 3.2.9 above, that such acceptance is 
more likely if officials have participated effectively in the process of converting the 
generalities of the political program into a blue-print for action. For this reason, 
amongst others, we suggest to governments that they associate senior officials 
constructively with the work of ministerial committees in the development of such 
a blue-print (see paragraph 3.3.7 above and Chapter 11.2). 
3.4.4 Because ministers are frequently less skilled in administration than heads 
of departments and often lack comparable expertise even in the policy aspects of 
their portfolios, they are sometimes content to allow their departmental heads to 
dominate both administrative and policy processes. This tends to make the 
political authority less effective. The processes to be described in section 3.6 are 
designed to assist the minister to hold his departmental head effectively 
accountable even in matters of which his own experience is limited. 
3.4.5 There are two possible approaches to the problem of reconciling effective 
management with ultimate political control. The first has been adopted for 
certain statutory bodies which are required to conduct their affairs subject to any 
direction issued by the minister or, in some instances, by the Governor-General-
in-Council. This requirement gives the minister or Cabinet the potential 
authority at any time to assert political control. As noted in our consultant's 
report on statutory bodies', some ministers have used their reserve power to 
intervene in matters of detail or in ways which Impair the effectiveness of 
management. This approach, even if not so misused, provides no significant 
Stimulus to better managerial performance. Nor does it clarify the manager's 
responsibility in a way which helps make him accountable for its exercise. 
3.4.6 The second approach, which comes closer to practice in the private sector, 
IS to acknowledge the managerial responsibility of officials, but also to prescribe 
the means by which their performance will be assessed and reported upon in ways 
Which will influence ministerial judgment about their professional standing and 
future. At present no such assessment occurs at departmental head levels, and the 
assessment processes at lower levels do not relate in any direct way to the conduct 
Of programs as they might be judged by ministers. The Commission believes that 
it is desirable and practicable to establish a regular practice of assessing 
d
epartmental performance by means which provide ministers and Cabinet with 
. 
	 Dr R. L. \\ ettcrihall, Statutory Autlioritics, Octobcr 1975. Sec Appendix i .K. 
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the basis on which to form their own judgment. The task of assessment will, as we 
have noted, be more difficult and complex than in most private enterprises: the 
simple profit test is lacking and most tasks are complicated by subsidiary and 
usually competing objectives. Nevertheless, the Commission remains satisfied, after 
examining the efficiency studies recently arranged by the Public Service Board, 
that worthwhile assessments can be made. Furthermore, it is convinced that at 
present there is inadequate external stimulus to improved performance, and that 
any reasonably based assessment, honestly performed, is likely to prove valuable. 
R3 3.47  The Commission proposes therefore that: 
a) the departmental head should be regarded as responsible for the efficiency 
of his department's performance in giving effect to ministerial and Cabinet 
decisions;' 
(b) the relationship between departments and co-ordinating authorities 
should be changed so that the departmental head's responsibility is clear 
and capable of being made effective; 
(c) departmental efficiency should be regularly assessed by means which 
would bring before ministers, Cabinet and Parliament the content of the 
assessment and the data on which it is based. 
3.4.8 If departmental heads are to be accountable to ministers and Cabinet for 
the efficiency with which they manage their departments, changes will be 
required in their relationship with the major co-ordinating 
authorities—particularly Treasury and the Public Service Board. The Commis-
sion heard in evidence strongly-worded criticisms of the effect which controls 
exercised by the Treasury and the Public Service Board have in limiting 
departments' initiative and their capacity to give effect to government policies. 
Similar but less forceful criticisms were directed at controls which require 
departments to accept services from centralised agencies when they judged it 
more convenient and more economical to deal directly with other suppliers.' It 
was argued that, apart from obscuring lines of responsibility and inhibiting the 
entrepreneurial capacity of departmental heads, the exercise of these co-
ordinating powers has tended to discourage experiment and innovation. 
These criticisms were not endorsed by all departmental heads. Some 
indicated that it was usually possible to convince the co-ordinating authorities 
with well prepared material, but even they claimed that generally the response of 
such authorities involved wasteful delays. 
3.4.10 The Commission notes that in recent years the Public Service Board has 
increasingly delegated decisions in establishment and personnel matters to 
departmental and agency heads. The adoption of 'bulk establishment' approvals 
by the Board illustrates this trend.3 Similarly, the recentjoint review of the Audit 
Act and related matters by officers of Treasury and the Auditor-General's Office 
recommends significant increases in the delegation of authority to the 
departments concerned.4 The Commission welcomes this trend. Indeed, it 
believes that, given a clear statement of the principles to be followed, 
departmental officers are as competent as those of the controlling authorities to 
I . 	 Sc.' also Chapter 4.2, Ministcrial Responsibility, and 4.5,  Heads of Departments. 
2. 	 Sec Chapter 4-3,17-24. 
'.. 	 See Manpower Planning, Appendix i.1). 
4. 	 Sec further Appendix 4.F. 
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apply them. A reduction in the number of persons required to be involved in any 
decision, consistent with it being macic responsibly and sensibly, will clearly 
contribute to economy and efficiency. 1  Additional persons should be involved 
only when a significant improvement in performance is likely to follow. The 
Commission suggests, therefore, that a conscious effort should be made by co-
ordinating authorities to extend the practice of delegation more widely and more 
deeply. This would place responsibility more firmly with the department, 
consistently with the principles of accountable management. The means by 
which and the limits within which this transfer of authority can be achieved are 
reviewed in more detail in Chapter ii, Co-ordination and Control. 
3.5 PARTICIPATION AND IDENTIFICATION 
3.5.1 Generally in this chapter we are concerned to comment on the ways in 
which the prerequisites of efficiency can be provided by clarity of purpose, 
improved organisational methods and progressive observation and analysis of 
performance. It must not be forgotten, however, that the administration is 
composed of men and women, and that, however clearly directed, well organised 
or effectively monitored its performance may be, its quality will be dependent on 
the zeal and energy which they devote to its tasks and on the degree to which they 
draw on their personal resources of knowledge and ingenuity. To some extent the 
outcome will reflect the wisdom of the personnel practices followed and the skill 
with which the men and women concerned are organised and deployed. But it 
will also reflect emotional considerations—particularlv the degree to which the 
men and women engaged identify themselves with the successful performance of 
their tasks. 
3.5.2 Evidence is available to show the considerable benefits to efficiency which 
can be derived from more effective involvement of staff. The Commission has 
been interested in recent studies of the importance of this potential, of which the 
work of Professor Harvy Leibenstein, summarised in his article 'Allocative 
Efficiency is X-Efficiency', can be regarded as illustrative 2  Leibenstein provides 
instances of efficiency improvements flowing from a number of International 
Labour Organisation productivity missions. He emphasises that cost-reducing 
methods which derive their effectiveness from greater involvement of staff in their 
work and a more enthusiastic approach to it rarely require additional capital 
costs but derive from the application of commonsense to the work environment as 
it is seen by those engaged in it. 
35.3 It is difficult, if not impossible, to prescribe in general terms the means of 
Securing such staff involvement. It is a by-product of a human relationship 
between the manager and his team which reflects both a common acceptance of 
the relevance and value of the work being done and a mutual recognition of their 
See Access Report, Appendix aC. 
2. 
	
	 Knowledge may not he used to capacitvjust as capital or labor may be underutilised. More 
important, a good deal of our knowledge is vague. A man may have nothing more than a sense 
of its existence, and yet this may be the critical clement. Given a sufficient inducement, he can 
then search out its nature in detail and get it to a stage where he can use it. People normally 
operate within the bounds of 'a great deal of intellectual slack. Unlike underutilisecl capital this 
is an element that is very difficult to observe. As a result, occasions of genuine additions to 
knowledge become rather difficult to distinguish from those circumstances in which no new 
knowledge has been added, but in which existing knowledge is being used to greater capacity.' 
American Economic Review, May 1966, P. 40. 
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respective interdependence. The difficulty of prescribing the means a prioii does 
not reduce the importance of staff involvement.' 
3.6 EFFICIENCY AUDITS 
3.6.1 If, as the Commission proposes, departmental managers are to be given a 
clearer responsibility for their managerial functions and greater freedom and 
discretion to perform them, it will be the more important that the quality of their 
R4 performance should be subject to critical review. The Commission proposes, 
therefore, that there should be a regular program of efficiency audits in which 
departmental performance will be assessed. These assessments should be so 
designed that they would bring before ministers, Cabinet and Parliament both 
the assessment itself and the data on which it is based. Such a presentation would, 
at least to some extent, make the assessment open to public examination and 
comment. It would also clearly establish the primacy of political responsibility for 
administrative efficiency, including not merely that of the minister and Cabinet 
but also that of Parliament, which many observers consider has in recent decades 
been significantly eroded. 
3.6.2 The first stage of an assessment system should be within the department or 
R5 agency itself. The Commission proposes, therefore, that the head of the 
department or agency should be required to prepare annually, by a fixed date, a 
report on lines prescribed by an appropriate authority (see paragraph 3.6. 16 ii) 
which reviews the department's use of financial and manpower resources and 
outlines measures taken to improve 1t. 2  
3.6.3 The internal report would be submitted to the minister and also to the 
authority nominated to audit departmental and agency efficiency generally. 
That authority would have power to prescribe uniform practices and statistical 
bases for departmental and agency reports, to examine and conduct such checks 
of the performance reviewed in them as it considered necessary, and to prepare 
assessments on a selective basis which could, with the departmental and agency 
reports, be submitted to Cabinet and to Parliament. 
3.6.4 The Commission has examined several possibilities in the choice of an 
agency to be primarily responsible for these assessments. It has noted that section 
17 of the Public Service Act empowers the Public Service Board to conduct 
periodical examinations of departments and that the provisions of the Audit Act 
and the related regulations and guidelines give the Treasury significant power 
and responsibility to ensure financial prudence and that 'value for money' is 
obtained in departmental expenditure. It has read with interest the proposal of a 
member of its Task Force on Efficiency, Professor Caiden, that a new agency (the 
Office of Policy Analysis and Administrative Management, or OPAAM) be 
organised to perform such external assessments as well as a variety of other 
functions designed to stimulate greater efficiency in the bureaucracy generally. It 
has also considered the wide conception of the audit function as performed by the 
United States General Accounting Office. 3  
See also Appendix 3.L, Changing OraI1isatio11. 
See (hapiei' 	 7 and ii 
3. Dr Caidens proposals have been published in the working paper 'Towards a more LJficieal 
(ozernmenl Jdmino/ra/oii, September 1975, for the Commissions Efficiency Task Force. See 
Appendix j.1. References to the U.S. General Accounting 0111cc also appear in Appendix 4.1'. 
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3.6.5 There is a strong temptation when a new function is perceived, or when it 
is realised that an old function is not being adequately performed, to conceive a 
new institution to perform it. While such an institution exists only in the mind of 
its creator, it will suffer from none of the frailties which beset its predecessors. 
However, when it has been brought to birth, staffed with men and women 
(probably drawn from existing institutions) and finds its place in the bureaucratic 
market place, it may perform no better than the old ones. Consequently as a 
general rule, the Commission sees little merit in the creation of new agencies when 
institutions already exist to perform the same or closely related functions. 
3.6.6 The Commission has, therefore, preferred to look to modifications and 
developments of existing institutions within the machinery of government as a 
means of achieving changes it considers desirable, unless there is good reason to 
believe them incapable of such modifications or unless they are already too large. 
3.6.7 The Public Service Board has shown great reluctance to assess the 
performance of departments and agencies. Indeed, for some years, no section i 
examinations were made and, now that they have been resumed they are seen as 
exercises in assisting and improving management rather than in auditing or 
assessing performance. They are carried out by a team headed by an external 
consultant and including a senior officer from the department or agency 
concerned. The form of the Board's participation emphasises its role of servicing 
the team, although there is no reason to doubt its real contribution to the study 
itself. Furthermore, the report of the team is treated as strictly confidential to the 
department concerned and great care is exercised to preserve this confidentiality. 
It was only with much reluctance that the Board gave the Commission access to 
its reports, enabling it to study the scope and methods of the inquiries. That scope 
was found to be extremely narrow. 
3.6.8 The reviews are predominantly concerned with rearrangements of 
management structures and modifications of the procedures and practices within 
them. They are only marginally concerned with the basic systems and procedures 
governing the establishment of those structures or the recruitment to and 
advancement of people within them. No major aspect of the Treasury's or, 
particularly, the Public Service Board's role appears to have been followed 
through in any of the reviews. Nor do they comment, even on a strictly 
confidential basis, on the work of senior officers with major managerial functions, 
or encompass the efficient administration of programs as opposed to that of 
selected administrative units. Since the Commission believes that it is primarily in 
better organisation that the economies leading to greater efficiency will be found, 
the narrowness of the studies is disappointing. 
3.6.9 These characteristics of the present reviews are understandable and 
defensible when they are seen predominantly as educational exercises, but they 
emphasise the continued lack of a system of review which can make management 
genuinely accountable. The Commission understands and sympathises with the 
Board's reluctance to undertake such an 'audit' style review. The Board sees itself 
as a primary source of expertise and guidance for departments and agencies in 
organisation and personnel practice, and believes that its capacity to stimulate 
and assist departments to achieve greater efficiency depends upon the 
maintenance of harmonious working relations between the Board and depart-
n-lents. Harmony would be difficult to maintain if the Board were responsible fbr 
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reports embodying serious criticism of departmental performance—particularly 
if these reports were to reach a wider audience. 
3.6.10 Furthermore, it is evident that the Board cannot be wholly objective in 
its approach to section 17 studies. Much of what is done in departments is the 
result of the Board's own advice and, in important matters affecting 
establishments, organisational structures, recruitment, appointments, training, 
promotions, transfers, pay, conditions of service and the like, the Board still has 
the final authority to make decisions. The Board, in conducting such an audit, 
would to some extent be judging its own work. Apart from the influence which 
awareness of this conflict of interest may have on the reports themselves, it could 
have deleterious elects on the attitude of the Board to innovation. 
3.6-11 It is important that the Board, as the primary source of advice on 
organisation and personnel practice, should be in constant touch with new 
developments, and that it should be active in experiment and encouraging to 
departmental heads seeking to improve their practice. Responsibility for 
conducting the section 17 studies, however, is likely to promote a 'play safe' 
approach to innovation proposed or contemplated and to put a premium upon 
reliance on established practice. For these reasons, while the Commission believes 
that the Board should continue to arrange joint reviews of particular phases of 
departmental activity with the departments concerned, these should be clearly 
differentiated from efficiency audits of the kind contemplated by the Commission 
and dealt with in more detail in Chapter ii 
3.6.12 The Commission notes also that the present section 17 reviews do not, 
except incidentally, concern themselves with financial management—with the 
effectiveness of arrangements to ensure that value for money is obtained and that 
the procedures required by the Audit Act, Treasury regulations and instructions 
and departmental practice based on them are relevant and appropriate to the 
precise transactions which confront the department in all its locations. It seems 
reasonable to conclude that the benefits which departments derive from their 
joint studies with the Board in personnel and organisational matters (in their 
widest scnse;  would flow similarly from joint studies conducted in association 
with Treasury. They might also serve to bring Treasury officers into more direct 
contact with the problems departments and their clients encounter. 
3.6.13 The Commission is aware that a review of the Audit Act and related 
provisions for financial control is in process, and considers the changes suggested 
in the draft interim report to be valuable but insufficient. It has been suggested to 
the Commission that, especially in smaller and isolated communities, but also in 
the large branch and even central offices, waste and delays result from the 
mechanical application of rules and procedures inappropriate to the surrounding 
circumstances.' The Commission believes that, consistent with accountable 
management, it should be possible to involve departments themselves more 
deeply in decisions about rules and procedures which are best applied in 
individual circumstances. 
3.6.14 Above all, the Commission believes that more than working to rule is 
involved in obtaining value for money. The design of the relevant program, the 
means adopted for its administration, the pattern of organisation chosen and 
I . 	 Sec Access Report. Appendix 2.C. 
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relationships established with other agencies of the federal and other governments 
and with voluntary organisations may all have a critical bearing on the cost of 
achieving the purposes of the program. These matters are primarily the 
responsibility of particular departments or agencies, and Treasury is not involved 
in systematic studies of their outcome or of the changing costs of achieving it. 
3.6. i 5 In all of these respects the Commission believes that there is room for R6 
joint studies of financial administration by Treasury and the departments 
concerned. Such studies, however, would again not eliminate the need for ex Jof 
audit type examinations conducted by a wholly independent authority. These 
audits, like those proposed above in respect of organisational and manpower 
efficiency, should be based upon assessments carried out within the responsible 
department or agency itself. Each program for which a department or agency is 
responsible should be reviewed in turn and the results also incorporated in the 
report referred to above in paragraph 3.6.2. As far as possible, the reviews should 
be based on uniform factual and statistical information in prescribed form, so as to 
promote the use of objective and measurable criteria and avoid reports becoming 
propagandist. 
3.6.16 An authority independent of departments and of Treasury and the 
Public Service Board will be needed to prescribe from time to time the bases of 
these reviews insofar as they are needed for the work of that authority; to seek to 
establish standards of performance where these are measurable; to make 
comparisons; and generally to judge and report upon performance. 
3.6.17 The Commission judges that it would be most appropriate for the role of R7 
the Auditor-General to be extended to comprehend this function. In so far as it is 
a review of performance after the event, it is similar in principle to the audit 
functions he now performs, and information at present examined by his staff in 
the course of perfbrming them would be relevant. Ihe Auditor-General has, too, 
a traditional independence and a link with the legislative and historical authority 
of Parliament that is essential to one whose task is to assess the perfbrmance of the 
executive arm of government. A more detailed account of the role we envisage for 
the Auditor-General can be found in Chapter ii.. 
3.6. 18 It should be noted that we do not include in this, the task of reviewing 
program effectiveness. The Commission considers that it is possible for the 
Auditor-General to examine efficiency in organisational matters as well as in 
financial management ('value for money') without being called upon to pass 
Judgment upon the programs themselves. This would require essentially political 
Judgment in which, in the Commission's view, the Auditor-General should not be 
involved. At the same time, much of the material on which his efficiency reviews 
Would be based would be relevant tq a consideration of program effectiveness. 
3.6. 19 The Commission considers that progressive review of the effectiveness of 
Continuing programs should be undertaken and linked with the development of 
the government's own new programs and priorities. It sees the analytical work 
associated with the assessment of such continuing programs as being most 
appropriately arranged from within the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, where it could form part of the background to new policy formation. 
There should however be close consultation by that department with the staff of 
the Auditor-General about information derived from the relevant efficiency 
audits. This matter is discussed further in Chapter ii 
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3.6.20 The Commission considers that Parliament should have a significant 
role as guardian of the administrative and executive efficiency of government. It 
contemplates, therefore, that a report by the Auditor-General on the outcome of 
his audits of efficiency should be presented to Parliament and examined by a 
special committee specially designed for this purpose. This committee should be 
assisted by the Auditor-General and his staff. To strengthen the role of Parliament 
R8 in this matter the Commission suggests for the consideration of Parliament: 
(a) that the role of the Auditor-General as an officer of Parliament should be 
clarified and strengthened; 
(b) that there should be a parliamentary committee on administrative 
efficiency (it is not for us to determine whether this function should be 
added to that of the Public Accounts Committee, or another existing 
committee, or whether a new and separate committee should be 
established for this purpose); 
(c) that the parliamentary committee on administrative efficiency should 
have the same powers to call witnesses as does the Public Accounts 
Committee. 
These suggestions are elaborated in Chapter 5. i and in Chapter 11.4. 
3.6.2 I Linking peijorinance and rewards: Selection for promotion—the 
primary source of reward and recognition (see Chapter 8.4)—involves the 
assessment of performance at all but the highest levels in the administration. At 
the top, where we propose that major responsibility and accountability should be 
concentrated, there is no such link. At this level, scope for promotion practically 
does not exist, except into one of the few departments which command a higher 
differential level of permanent head salaries. Standing with ministers and 
professional reputation can of course be affected by performance, and these are 
without doubt powerful motivating forces for senior officials. It seems to the 
Commission however that its proposals for accountable management call for 
more formal recognition of quality in the discharge of duties. There are two 
means by which this could be achieved. The first is in the periodical movement of 
departmental heads contemplated in Chapter 4.5.  The second is by salary 
differentials. 
3.6.22 There is no doubt that certain departments command more prestige 
than others, although it is interesting to observe changes over time in the order of 
that prestige. Within the Service, note would be taken of the direction of change 
in position reshuffles. This linking of prestige with performance could be 
strengthened by salary change. With an eye on the practice in private industry, 
the Commission has given thought to the advantages of having several levels of 
salary for heads of departments. In privatV industry, the setting of rates for top 
executives is one of the most sensitive issues, the rates being fixed by directors, 
more on their assessment of the person than the position, and with a high degree of 
flexibility. 
3.6.2 3 While from the point of view of providing incentive for excellence there is 
much to be said for such an approach, there are very real difficulties in applying it 
within the Service. By an analogy, it would mean that the Cabinet would from 
time to time fix a differential loading for heads of departments on the basis of its 
evaluation of the work of the persons concerned. For Cabinet to fix the salaries of 
departmental heads on a personal basis would be an invidious task and one which 
5° 
many would regard as inappropriate. It would be argued that their decisions 
would be seen as arbitrary and unjust and therefore adversely affect performance 
and relationships between ministers and departmental heads and between 
departmental heads themselves. To impose it on the Remuneration Tribunal 
would not serve the purpose intended since they clearly must base theirjudgment 
on objective criteria relating to the job itself, rather than to the way in which it has 
been performed. Yet, relating pay solely to factors such as relative size, 
complexity and other features of departments may reduce incentive for 
movement to the smaller departments which may nevertheless be deserving of 
more talent at the top, and precludes recognition of exceptionally good or bad 
performance. While the Commission believes that there is merit in having several R9 
salary levels for departmental heads and greater flexibility in their determination, 
we believe that before action is taken, the issues arising from such an approach 
require closer study as our proposals for greater accountability and mobility come 
into operation. 
.7 SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE, STIMULUS AND INNOVATION 
3.7.1 The shift of some decision-making authority to the departmental head 
and away from Treasury and the Public Service Board represents, at least in part, 
a transfer of power from specialists in financial control and organisation of 
personnel to a more generalist manager. While the Commission believes this is 
necessary to clarify lines of responsibility and accountability, it will remain 
important that the knowledge and skills of specialists should be effectively drawn 
upon. The Commission envisages that Treasury and the Public Service Board 
should continue to provide them. 
3.7.2 Thus Treasury, within the framework of a revised Audit Act and Treasury 
Regulations, would delegate authority for financial control to departments, 
assisting them in their preparation of detailed procedures which would comply 
with the broad legal framework. Treasury should stand ready, on a consultancy Rio  
basis, to advise on ways of dealing with the particular problems each department 
is likely to encounter. Treasury would be responsible for maintaining contact 
with academic institutions and professional associations, and with developing 
practice in the private sector, so that it was in a position to stimulate departments 
to adopt innovative techniques. Thus, general rules and other sources of guidance 
would be subject to continuous review, reflecting particularly the experience 
gained in the joint reviews of financial management, as described in paragraph 
3.6.15 above. A Treasury section with such functions would, we believe, develop 
and promote in others a more positive and creative approach to financial 
management. To ensure that the benefits of experience within it are shared with 
functional departments, the Commission contemplates that movement of staff 
between Treasury, such departments and the Auditor-General's staff will be 
More frequent and be consciously planned.' 
3.7.3 Similarly, the Commission sees the Public Service Board as a source of 
1. A consultant to the Commission, Professor James Cutt, has reported that some ordinary 
administering departments have been ahead of Treasury in the development of analytical 
techniques for forward estimating, and that there has been a general lack of central co-
ordination and directed interfiow of the results of departmental experiences. (See Appendix 
I 
.C.) If Treasury ceased to exercise as much detailed control over items of departmental 
expenditure, it might well be able to develop its role in promoting these techniques. 
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expertise in organisation, personnel management and related matters within the 
functions of the Board. It envisages that departments or agencies newly 
established or given additional functions calling for the establishment of new 
administrative units would normally seek advice from the Board, and that the 
new departments or units would be planned with their professional advice. To 
this end the Board should be prepared and able to second officers from its own 
staff and that of other departments temporarily for sufficient time to help 
undertake such developments. The Board, like the Treasury section described 
above, would also act as a channel through which contemporary ideas in 
organisation and personnel management would be fed into the bureaucracy, 
drawing upon academic, professional and non-government thinking and 
R  i experience. We recommend that the Board should, in collaboration with interested 
departments, arrange and conduct experiments in organisation and personnel 
practice, monitor their progress and ensure that their results were drawn to the 
attention of departments and agencies to whose work they were relevant. This 
new role for Treasury and the Board is discussed further in Chapter ii . and ii .6 
respectively. 
3.7.4 The Commission sees mobility of stall between the Public Service Board, 
functional departments and the Auditor-General as contributing to higher levels 
of performance in organisational and personnel matters.' The Commission is 
particularly concerned at the loss of efficiency which comes from the frustration 
and disillusion of disappointed staff, and believes that this loss is significant. It 
believes, therefore, that the Board should be encouraged to develop more actively 
its counselling and placement role. We envisage that officers who feel that their 
current work is unsatisfactory, that they have run against an insuperable barrier 
to promotion, or that for personal reasons relationships with their superiors are 
damaging to their effectiveness, could seek assistance to move to other 
posts—including to work outside the Service see Chapter 6.3.29). Similarly, 
departmental heads who may feel that individual members of their staffs are 
unsuited to the work in which they are engaged, or are in need of early retirement 
or simply are likely to do better elsewhere, might seek the assistance of this unit of 
the Board. The need for such aid to career development has been intensified by 
the organisational instability that has marked the changes of government in 
recent years. The possibilities of elective action in this placement function would, 
of course, be increased to the extent that employees of government covered by 
superannuation rights could resort to provisions to ensure adequate pension or 
superannuation benefits upon retirement before the minimum retirement age of 
6o years. The Commission is aware of the attention currently being given to 
voluntary early retirement (at age 55)  in association with the revision of the 
superannuation scheme. While this would be a move in the right direction, it does 
not appear to go far enough. The economy involved in the government's failure to 
grant this 'portability' of pensions is, in the Commission's view, grossly short-
sighted and results not merely in serious loss of efficiency but also in waste of 
personal capacity and damage to the general morale of government employees. 
This matter is dealt with more fully in Chapter 8 of this Report. 
3.8 INFORMATION FOR ACCOUNTABLE MANAGEMENT 
3.8.1 While the Commission strongly endorses greater devolution and 
See Chaptr 1 1.6 and Appendix 3.F, Mobility. 
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delegation of authority to make decisions, it is conscious that such delegation, if 
unaccompanied by clear policy directions, necessary knowledge at the local level 
and adequate means of providing management information flowing both 
downward and upward, could produce unworkable situations. In particular, our 
recommendations on accountable management cannot be fully and successfully R12 
put into effect unless they are coupled with action to ensure adequate flows of 
information which not only meet departmental needs but also the needs of control 
agencies such as the Treasury, the Public Service Board and the Auditor-General, 
and, of course, the government and Parliament. 
3.8.2 The Commission sees the essential control of the allocation of resources 
being based primarily upon the formulation and approval of the forward 
estimates (see section 3.3  above). Those estimates will provide a basis for action at 
various levels within departments and agencies. The development of appropriate 
guidelines in financial and personnel matters, and the precise formulation at the 
centre of principles on which day-to-day decisions are to be based, will allow 
effective action at lower and geographically distant points of decision. For this to 
be practicable, those exercising delegated authority must have ready access to the 
content of the guidelines and statements of principle. They must also be able to 
seek prompt clarification and guidance in matters of difficulty. There must 
therefore be an effective downward flow of information upon which delegated 
decisions can be made. 
3.8.3 Similarly, if the principles of accountable management are to apply at 
these levels of delegated decision making, there will need to be an upward flow of 
information necessary to the monitoring of performance, to the progressive 
modification of the principles and guidelines on which it has been based, and 
indeed to the review of the programs and policies being administered. 
3.8.4 Information in a variety of forms can now be moved rapidly from point to 
point and so make it less necessary for people to move. Such information can also 
be stored in an orderly way electronically or in miniaturised form so that rapid, 
selective and remote retrieval becomes practicable. 
3.8.5 The possibilities of selective and remote retrieval appear particularly 
important. The storage and presentation of information in printed or written 
form tends to flood officials with paper, requires them to absorb large quantities of 
data, at least sufficiently to be aware of its existence and its actual or potential 
relevance to their work, and to recall it to mind at the appropriate time. There is 
no doubt that efficiency could be greatly increased if the demands of this 'paper 
War' could be reduced and information presented at a time, and in a form, 
relevant and appropriate to the precise needs of decision makers. 
3.8.6 In the Report of the Commission's Task Force on a Regional Basis for 
Administration, reference is made to a preliminary analysis of the feasibility of 
developing an electronic information system designed to support delegated 
decision making and, at the same time, to provide necessary data for central 
Supervision and management. The Commission recommends that such a system be R13 
designed and set up on an experimental basis for a selected region or regions so 
that, to the greatest extent possible, its facilities are available to all departments 
and agencies represented in the region and to their respective head or State 
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offices.' The experiment should be monitored to judge its effect not only on 
manpower requirements but also on the effectiveness of delegated decision 
making and on the involvement and morale of staff. 
3.8.7 Systems of electronic information storage designed to facilitate access 
from departmental outposts and to provide the basis for delegated responsibility 
for decision could also feed the data on which planned innovation could be based 
into agencies such as the Public Service Board and the Treasury, as sources of 
stimulus and development. The consultancy services which we contemplate these 
agencies providing to departmental managers should have access not merely to 
this data but to the results of research in the behavioural sciences based upon it. 
3.8.8 It is not within the capacity of the Commission to judge whether these 
potentialities can in fact be realised. We are satisfied, however, that further study 
and, in particular, professionally designed experiment is warranted.' 
3.8.9 We have been struck by deficiencies in available information about many 
aspects of service personnel management. No detailed data on turnover or staff 
wastage rates or on comparative staff use in departments and statutory 
authorities was available to the Commission. We have referred to the need for the 
costing of staffing and general administration of various programs (see paragraph 
3.3.15). Insufficient data is available about staff attitudes. The analysis and 
surveys conducted by the Commission provide a beginning. We consider that 
there is room also for improvement in the recording and collation of information 
of this kind arising from joint studies conducted by individual departments, the 
Public Service Board or Treasury, particularly if it is to be used in the assessment 
of performance of individual members of staff. 
3.8.10 The Commission believes that there is much to gain and little to lose by 
allowing unions and staff associations to share much of this information. The 
solution of problems of low morale, high turnover and poor productivity are not 
solely a responsibility of management. A union movement concerned for the all-
round well-being of its membership will need to take an informed and responsible 
interest in such matters. Adequate information could promote such an interest. 
3.9 SUMMARY 
3.9.1 The achievement of efficient use of resources in government is at present 
handicapped by: 
(a) the lack of adequate and clear ministerial direction about the 
government's objectives and the priority to be attached to them; 
(b) a lack of clarity in the division of responsibility between ministers and 
officials; 
(c) a failure to identify clearly the responsibilities of departments and agencies 
and their constituent units and to provide means for holding them 
accountable for these responsibilities; 
(d) a failure to assess the adequacy with which these responsibilities are 
performed; 
I . This proposal could be linked with our recommendations in Chapter 7.3.8-I1 for a 
Commonwealth Government Representative. 
2. See Public Sector Management and Related Information Requirements, Appendix i .E. 
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(e) a failure to relate performance of departmental heads adequately to future 
status and rewards. 
3.9.2 The Commission believes that efficiency will be increased if: 
i. a Forward Estimates budgeting process is established 'within which ministers 
and their departments will negotiate for the financial and manpower resources 
they wish to use over the Forward Estimates period; and if these Estimates 
when approved by Cabinet are accepted as a basis for planning by ministers 
and their departments; 
2. departmental heads are and are seen to be responsible for management of 
government programs within limits set by Cabinet and ministerial direction 
including decisions involved in the Forward Estimates and are given by 
delegation from the Public Service Board, Treasury and other co-ordinating 
agencies adequate authority for this purpose; 
3. Treasury, the Public Service Board and other co-ordinating agencies organise 
to provide guidance and expertise on financial, organisational and personnel 
management practice and act as a source of stimulus and innovation rather 
than primarily as instruments of control; 
4. action is taken to ensure that departmental decision makers at all levels have 
access to the information upon which their decisions should properly be based; 
5. (a) regular audits of efficiency in terms of financial, organisational and 
personnel management are carried out by 
(i) departments themselves, 
(ii) the Auditor-General; 
(b) these audits form the basis of action to improve efficiency by heads of 
departments, ministers and Cabinet; 
(c) the content of audits of efficiency both those conducted within the 
department and by the Auditor-General are taken into account by 
(i) those making selections for promotion, 
(ii) Cabinet, when determining salaries and placement of departmental 
heads; 
(d) the Auditor-General's report on his efficiency audits are presented to a 
parliamentary committee on administrative efficiency. 
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Chapter 4 
	
Ministers and the 
Administration 
4.1 THE COLLECTIVE PROBLEM 
4-1.1 Ministers as a group have a twofold strength in our system of government. 
They are the most influential moulder' of the policy of the legislature as well as 
having powers of direction over the executive arm. In the Parliament, their 
strength begins with the fact that ministers are leading figures in the governing 
party or parties; but their collective hold on the executive machinery also 
provides them with unmatched initiatives and resources for proposing and 
preparing legislation, while the tradition of the Cabinet's solidarity in taking its 
majority decisions on policy into party discussions, combined with the other 
convention of party unity in parliamentary voting, gives the ministry a double 
leverage for exerting influence on legislative policy. Though this dominant 
position is certainly not absolute, especially in a bicameral system, there may be 
insufficient recognition that the Constitution, in making the executive responsible 
to Parliament by requiring a minister to be drawn from one or other of the two 
Houses, was helping to promote reciprocal conditions which would give the 
executive great strength in the legislature. This finds physical expression in the 
location of most ministers' working activity: while their offices comprise a 
substantial part of the available accommodation in Parliament House, it is 
comparatively rare for a minister to occupy rooms in his department. The 
Parliament itself offers no distinctive office of an opinion-leading kind in 
government (that is, apart from the Leader of the Opposition) to compare in 
status with that of ministers. The positions of President and Speaker in the 
respective Houses are not of this kind but rather quasi-judicial and adminis-
trative, while the designated Leader of each House, who arranges the order of its 
business, has invariably been a minister. By reverse token, an occasional former 
practice of including in the Cabinet members of Parliament who did not hold 
executive office, as honorary ministers' or ministers without portfolio, has never 
been very significant. 
4.1.2 While the collective power of ministers is much more far-reaching than 
the sum of their departmental responsibilities, the administrative machinery 
Supporting 
 them is not designed correspondingly to promote collective 
knowledge and consciousness among them but for the most part is naturally 
engaged in developing distinctive approaches bearing on items of policy. This is 
the more deserving of recognition as the increasing range and complexity of 
government affairs and the expansion in numbers of the ministry are reducing the 
Opportunities for intimate and fairly comprehensive contacts between ministers 
Which may have been available in the first few decades of Federation. The 
SOlTflewhat fortuitous circumstances which assign a minister to a particular 
Portfolio, the resources and interests of his department and the character of its 
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senior officers naturally influence his attitudes and occupy most of his attention. 
Regular thinking in aggregate terms is the specialised function of a few, notably 
the Prime Minister and the Treasurer; and the tendency to divert most 
ministers' attention from their collective role is given an air of normality when 
much of the body of analysed information acquired in the Treasury is treated as 
though it were the preserve of that department rather than a basic, necessary 
property of the ministry as a whole. 
4.1.3 Since departments are the most significant source of advice on the 
formulation of government policy and legislation, it is necessary to consider not 
only the details but also the overall implications of this aspect of their functions. 
Unlike ministers, the permanent heads of the various departments do not have 
political or other continuous cause to think collectively or to act in close concert. 
Differences between departments in the scope of their functions and relative 
power tend rather to promote a sense of competition among some of them, so that 
it may require a degree of conscious effort on the part of a minister to maintain an 
appropriate detachment from the consequences of departmental rivalries. The 
reality,  and force of any pressures which strain the cohesion of the ministry have to 
be acknowledged as a preliminary to considering how the machinery may be 
adapted to cope with the realities. The difficulty of finding neat and final answers 
is not a reason for neglecting the issue. The Commission's examination of the 
problem has pointed to one broad conclusion: that a proper solution lies in the 
direction of strengthening the content and the dissemination process of a common 
pool of background material for the whole ministry, rather than in attempts to set 
up a multiplicity of general intelligence units for each minister. 
4.1-4 As an illustration of the positive aspect of this proposition, the 
Commission's inquiries into some apparently separate issues in administration 
and policy formulation have tended to yield one converging result, as at least a 
partial answer to each, in that they point to a need for a purposefully developed 
system of forward budget estimates. This would require the regular attention of 
all ministers and particular study by groups of them to produce collective 
decisions. The exact details of an appropriate administrative machinery to 
underpin such an operation would be a subject for evolving review; but just as the 
essence of the operation is its collective, aggregating character, so must it engage 
administrative and advisory resources already available to ministers involved in 
co-ordination and, especially, the resources of the central agencies. Without 
contributions from the existing machinery, the operation would be abortive; with 
them, the necessary supplements would be marginal and gradual. 
4.1.5 The negative aspect of our broad proposition emerges when consideration is 
given to a question which has been brought to the Commission, concerning the 
extent to which a minister should develop the use of his department to assist him 
generally in his membership of the Cabinet and of Cabinet committees. While we 
recognise the need of ministers to look for briefing on many matters, we set 
ourselves firmly against any arrangements which would lead to substantial 
additions to the staff of departments simply to provide each minister with 
information and comments on proposals submitted by his colleagues, where these 
are not of direct relevance to the work of his own department. That is wasteful of 
resources and leads to a build-up in departmental capacity that may well not be 
needed by the next minister. Particularly when there are as many departments as 
exist in the federal sphere, it would be nonsense to allow every department to 
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develop staff to second-guess the proposals of other departments. Apart from the 
waste involved, Cabinet business would become extremely difficult to transact. It 
is doubtful whether many ministers would initially want to have this service, but 
once built into some departmental structures it would tend to spread and 
perpetuate itself regardless of need. Nor would such a development help to 
encourage a freer pooling of background information and ideas in advance of 
Cabinet consideration, by the central agencies or by departments initiating 
policy proposals. It could rather have the effect of strengthening narrowly 
possessive attitudes on all sides. 
4.1.6 Since ministers are collectively responsible for all Cabinet decisions, it 
would be foolish not to endorse the use of whatever resources their departments 
can provide in the interests of reaching a better collective decision. It has also 
been suggested that members of ministerial offices might be used to assist 
ministers in this area. In our view, some flexibility needs to be built into the system 
at each of these points, but not over much. On the one hand, ministerial staffs 
cannot without waste and duplication be built into mini-departments. On the 
other hand, it would certainly not be acceptable if a greater flexibility for 
departments in using resources within the constraints of forward budgeting were 
taken as giving any countenance to a multiplication of general advisory units for 
use partly in stale-mating one another. It is also apparent that the scope for 
developing a full-time research and advisory body to serve the ministry as a whole 
must be subject to limitations in its practicable size, range of expertise and 
tendency to duplicate work in the departments.1 It may be found that a small unit 
of this kind attached to the Cabinet secretariat could have some catalytic value. 
Fundamentally, however, the most significant advance that the ministry could 
make in the effective exercise of its strong powers as a group would be to open up 
for itself resources existing in the administration and to promote more use of these 
in a collective sense. This will not be done on the initiative of departments. It 
would require the active leadership of ministers. Each minister has a continuous 
teaching function to perform in his department, pointing out where and how his 
government needs to be served as a collective entity. A commitment to a regular 
system of complementary inter-ministerial and inter-departmental processes of 
examination, such as the Commission proposes in Chapter 11.2 of its Report to 
implement a program of forward budgeting, would be a significant first step in 
that direction. At the staffing level, the adoption of a system of rotation of 
personnel, particularly managerial officers, such as we propose in Chapter i 1.6, 
would effectively reinforce the sense of a collective entity. 
4.2 MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
4.2.1 It is through ministers that the whole of the 
administrationdepartments, statutory bodies and agencies of one kind and 
another-is responsible to the Parliament and thus, ultimately, to the people. 
Ministerial responsibility to the Parliament is a matter of constitutional 
Convention rather than law. It is not tied to any authoritative text, or amenable to 
judicial interpretation or resolution. Because of its conventional character, the 
Principles and values on which it rests may undergo change, and their very status 
as conventions be placed in doubt. In recent times the vitality of some of the 
I. Professor Cohn A. Hughes refers to this possibility in his paper for the Commission, Ministers 
and Departments. See Appendix i .H. 
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traditional conceptions of ministerial responsibility has been called into question, 
and there is little evidence that a minister's responsibility is now seen as requiring 
him to bear the blame for all the faults and shortcomings of his public service 
subordinates, regardless of his own involvement, or to tender his resignation in 
every case where fault is found. The evidence tends to suggest rather that while 
ministers continue to be held accountable to Parliament in the sense of being 
obliged to answer to it when Parliament so demands, and to indicate corrective 
action if that is called for, they themselves are not held culpable—and in 
consequence bound to resign or suffer dismissal—unless the action which stands 
condemned was theirs, or taken on their direction, or was action with which they 
ought obviously to have been concerned. 
4.2.2 Although some classical descriptions of the principle of ministerial 
responsibility may have been too simplified even for their time, it is true that in 
the formative period of the Commonwealth Constitution and governmental 
development—the late nineteenth century and early decades of this century—the 
activities of government, and especially central as distinct from local govern-
ments, were not so wide-ranging, complex or technologically sophisticated as to 
make it unreal to expect a minister of state to take an active part in the detailed 
administration of the affairs of his department, and to bring to its work a degree of 
expertise not significantly inferior to that of the more senior of his civil service 
subordinates. Nor was it impossible for Parliaments to exercise their supervisory 
functions with a degree of proficiency comparable with that of the administrators 
whose actions were being scrutinised. The circumstances of government today are 
very different. The range of functions undertaken by government has increased, 
and so have the numbers of individuals employed in the service of government 
and the financial and other resources at the state's command. More and more the 
work of government has come to depend on sophisticated technology and 
specialist skills. In the process there has been a marked change in the distribution 
of real power between Parliament and the executive, a change promoted not only 
by consolidation of political party influence, but by Parliament's own action in 
delegating wide and important decision-making authority to officers and 
agencies of the executive. 
4.2.3 There are special factors in the Commonwealth government setting which 
tend to limit ministerial involvement in administration. Many ministers have 
long distances to travel between their electorates and the principal seat of 
administration, to which they must also travel as the seat of government. They are 
subject to the personal and political circumstances which cause most members of 
Parliament to vacate Canberra when Parliament is not sitting. Practices in the 
Australian Parliament relating to the incidence of divisions and arrangements for 
question time require a more continuous attendance of ministers in the Houses 
than is the case, for example, in Britain. Again, a minister's sense of relative 
detachment from the running of his department may be influenced by a 
convention which appears to be associated with some interpretations of a sub-
section in the Public Service Act. The phrasing of this sub-section, 25(2) of the 
present Act, has been unchanged since the original enactment of 1902, and reads: 
'The Permanent Head of a Department shall be responsible for its general 
working and for all the business thereof, and shall advise the Minister in all 
matters relating to the Department.' 
4.2.4 This sub-section and the convention of limited ministerial power which is 
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sometimes associated with it were quoted by the former Prime Minister, Mr 
Whitlam, in a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Commission on 16 July, 
1975, requesting that the Commission 'consider the question of how power over 
and responsibility for departments should be divided between Ministers and 
Permanent Heads, consistent with the Constitution', and that it 'make 
recommendations on these matters'. This request followed the tabling in the 
House of Representatives of an opinion submitted at the request of the Prime 
Ministr by the Solicitor-General, Mr M. H. Byers QC., on 20June 1975. The 
effect of that opinion, the Prime Minister suggested, was 'to cast some doubt upon 
the convention that a Minister's power to involve himself in the administration of 
his Department is very circumscribed and consequently upon the power and 
responsibility of a Permanent Head for the administration of the Department'. 
The Solicitor-General had said that section 25(2) of the Public Service Act must 
be read subject to section 64 of the Constitution which provides, among other 
things, that: 
'The Governor-General may appoint officers to administer such departments of 
State of the Commonwealth as the Governor-General in Council may 
establish.' 
He quoted from and endorsed an opinion of Dr H. V. Evatt, as Attorney-General, 
dated January 1944. Dr Evatt had said: 
'The true position is that section 25(2) is intended as a general definition of the 
responsibility of a Permanent Head, but it must be read with the qualification 
that the responsibility is subject to the higher responsibility of the Minister and 
must be exercised subject to the Minister's direction and control. So construed, 
section 25(2) conforms to the undoubted constitutional position, and subject to 
that qualification it stands as part of the statute law of the Commonwealth 
(T)he section must be read so as to harmonise with the practical working of our 
system of Government. Therefore, although the section has the force of law as 
regards the internal organisation of Departments of the Public Service, it is, in 
relation to the Government, really an administrative provision and does not 
operate as a legal limitation on the Minister in the execution of his responsibility 
as head of the Department. 
Section 25(2) . . . is a long standing provision, it is part of the established 
administrative pattern, and . . . it consists with constitutional principle and 
usage and is not a legal iimitation on the Minister in his direction and control of 
administration.' 
4.2.5 The relationship between a departmental head and his subordinate 
officers on the one hand and the minister on the other is affected by both law and 
Convention.2 In a general sense, the department is the arm of the minister, and its 
administration is his responsibility, for which he must answer in Parliament, but 
Section 64 of the Constitution does not prevent the Parliament from vesting 
Statutory powers directly in departmental officers which may be exercised 
independently of ministers. The Commission does not dissent from the general 
Proposition that sub-section 25(2) of the Public Service Act must be read subject 
to the minister's general responsibility under section 64 of the Constitution for the 
administration of the department. It recognises that the sub-section was intended 
. 	 See Chapter 2.1.5 for the full text. 
2. Two consultants to the Commission, Dr Cohn A. Hughes and Professor R. N. Spann, have 
referred to the issues raised by Mr Whitlam's request. Relevant extracts from their papers 
appear in Appendixes i.H and ii. 
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not so much to define the permanent head's relationship with the minister, as to 
establish his position against any tendency to excessive managerial involvement 
by the central personnel authority—initially the Public Service Commissioner, 
and subsequently the Public Service Board. This interpretation of sub-section 
25(2) does not derogate in any way from the primary and direct responsibility 
which the sub-section imposes on the permanent head or from the particular legal 
powers the Act confers upon him in relation to personnel matters. 
4.2.6 This direct and primary responsibility is reinforced by section 17 of the 
Act which imposes a duty on the Public Service Board 'to devise means for 
effecting economies and promoting efficiency in the management and working of 
Departments'. The section provides that 'the Board shall in the first place advise 
the permanent head of the Department of its suggestions and proposals', and that 
if the permanent head does not concur, the Board may make a recommendation 
to the minister administering the department. If the recommendation is not 
approved by the minister within a reasonable time, the Board may report the 
matter to both Houses of the Parliament either in a special report or in its annual 
report. Thus, while the section presupposes the existence of an overriding residual 
authority in the minister to direct the taking of measures recommended or 
suggested by the Board, it also makes it clear that the permanent head has the 
primary responsibility for responding to the Board's proposals, and that the 
minister's authority should not be invoked unless the permanent head does not 
concur in or adopt the proposals, for reasons which the Board does not find 
satisfactory. Taken as a whole, the Public Service Act can be said to represent a 
deliberate decision by the Parliament to confine ministerial authority in relation 
to the employment and management of departmental personnel. 
4.2.7 In considering whether section 25(2) ought to be retained either in its 
present or in a modified form, we have had regard to the significance attached to 
it, particularly by senior officers. It does not on its face make clear that the 
responsibility of the permanent head for the 'general working' and 'all the 
business' of the department is constitutionally subordinate to that of the minister. 
Nor does it make specific the responsibilities of the permanent head for the 
efficiency of his department which are implied in section 17  of the Public Service 
Act. Further it was put to us that the provisions of section 2 5(2) are inconsistent 
with the powers and controls exercised by the Public Service Board over 
departmental staffing, for example through section 29 of the Act. 
4.2.8 We see difficulties in attempting to write into a statute a broad statement 
of the responsibilities of departmental heads over and above those implicit in 
provisions conferring on them specific powers, functions and duties. The main 
significance of the section seems now to be to emphasise the fact that, whatever 
are the functions vested in the Public Service Board or in ministers, departmental 
administration and advice to the minister are primarily the responsibility of the 
departmental head. Difficulties in attempting a reformulation of the clause also 
arise because a departmental head, while undoubtedly responsible to the 
minister, is under a continual obligation to take into account not only legal 
provisions such as those contained in the Public Service Act or in legislation 
administered by the department, but requirements which originate in the 
decisions of other ministers, not always under statute, for instance, Cabinet 
decisions, Treasury rulings and Board advice. One possibility would be to repeal 
the provision, but we do not favour this course. An alternative would be to draw 
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up a provision along the lines of section 25 of the New Zealand State Services Act 
1962 which reads: 
'In addition to any other functions and duties imposed by any other Ad, the 
permanent head of every Department of the Public Service shall be responsible 
to the Minister for the time being in charge of that Department for the efficient 
and economical administration thereof.' 
4.2.9 Although a provision in these terms has the virtue of making clear the 
responsibility of the departmental head to his minister, and also his duty to ensure 
efficient and economical administration, it may not fully take into account the 
obligations on a departmental head to comply with decisions referred to above 
which originate with other ministers (including the Cabinet) and which are not 
always based on statutory powers. Occasions can arise when a departmental head 
senses conflict between a proposal of his minister and the understood intentions or 
policy of the Cabinet, and we do not underrate the significance of such difficulties. 
Changes in sub-section 25(2), to include reference to economical and efficient 
administration and to emphasise the role of the minister are certainly desirable, 
and we recommend them. An attempt should also be made in the redrafting of this R14 
or other sections of the Act to indicate the broader setting of senior officers' 
obligations. There are, however, innate difficulties in making legislative provision 
to cover the shades of obligation owed by a department head to the minister and 
to other authorities, including the Cabinet, the Prime Minister and the Public 
Service Board. These difficulties have been an important strand in our 
consideration of the question whether there is a need to develop a recognised 
system of conventional procedures to assist ministers and officials in difficult cases 
where statutory provisions do not provide clear-cut answers. 
4.2.10 Conventions: It has been urged upon us that the Public Service may 
need more conventions than it has, and possibly rather fewer attempts to define 
duty by law and regulation.' On the other hand, there have been forceful 
expressions of the view that the concept of 'convention' is difficult to apply in the 
context of administrative arrangements which need great flexibility if they are to 
maintain effectiveness; and that in any case conventions develop rather than are 
made, and contain within them their own sanctions. Essentially, conventions 
have developed around longer term issues and the normative relationships 
between the important elements in the framework of government—Parliament, 
Governor-General, ministers, and to a lesser extent departments and statutory 
bodies. In a letter commenting on Professor Spann's paper, Sir Paul Hasluck 
expressed the view that while it is possible to recognise the existence of 
conventions such as those to which the paper refers, any formulation of them as a 
code would give a rigidity which might prove an impediment to new 
development. Sir Henry Bland expressed a similar warning and added the 
Suggestion 
 that general agreement would be likely to be secured only to 
Platitudes. Our views run in the same direction. A great deal of the day to day 
activities of ministers, and of departmental officers, would be inhibited by a 
Comprehensive statement of practices carrying an implication that they should 
be followed in circumstances such as those described. Administration and policy 
are so much interwoven that practice in one case could well prove stultifying if 
applied to another. 
'. See the discussion in Professor Spann's paper, Permanent Heads, Appendix 1.1. 
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4.2.11 Nevertheless, we remain conscious of the occasional need for the 
resolution of serious problems for which legislation cannot fully provide. It is also 
clear that such problems should not be treated on an entirely ad hoc basis as each 
one arises from time to time. A method is to be sought for preserving and helping 
to clarify a body of knowledge and experience of normative developments in 
administrative practice. Among the questions which have come to our notice has 
been the extent to which the resources of the public service should be used for 
'political' purposes at election times. It has appeared in some other cases that a 
minister has asked a departmental head to carry out an action which the 
departmental head believes may either be illegal or in conflict with Cabinet 
understandings. There have been occasions when ministers in a new 
administration have asked to see files containing Cabinet or other confidential 
papers of the earlier ministry. Again, ministerial private secretaries or members of 
their staff can find it difficult to decide what their response should be when they 
become aware in confidential circumstances of developments in the department 
or in the office to which the minister or the department is not privy. 
4.2.12 There should be well recognised procedures available for persons who 
find themselves in complex situations of this kind, enabling them to obtain 
guidance, and they should have the benefit of advice which is based primarily on 
R15 an acquaintance with previous case history. Accordingly, we recommend 
(a) that ministers, and members of the administration, recognise that one of 
the functions of three important holders of statutory office—the Chairman 
of the Public Service Board, the Solicitor-General and the Auditor-
General—is to be available to discuss with a minister or a member of the 
administration problems which emerge in the course of administration of a 
kind which, because of their sensitivity, cannot readily be handled through 
the normal machinery; 
(b) that the Public Service Board be responsible for gathering together and 
maintaining what might best be described as a body of administrative case 
studies to be available to assist when similar issues arise in the future. 
Although the Board would be expected to gather together and hold full 
details, it would not be necessary, or expected, that it should make these 
available when inquiries are made. The object would be to assist in 
identifying the range of responses which could be made to developing 
situations. 
The listing of the three statutory officers in (a) is not intended in any way to 
suggest that it would be inappropriate for ministers to discuss their problems with 
their colleagues and particularly the Prime Minister, or for officers to discuss their 
problems with other members of the administration, including perhaps on some 
occasions the Secretary to Cabinet.' We would expect these opportunities for 
collective deliberation to be taken in the normal course, and on many occasions 
that would suffice. Our concern has been to provide an understood channel for 
consultation when for any reason other means are not available. Insofar as there is 
a need to state more clearly what seem to be the appropriate relationships 
between ministers and their departments, or between the co-ordinating agencies 
and departments, or between members of the administration and the public, we 
have ourselves attempted in the course of this Report to state, as a result of our 
I . 	 Sec also our discussion of ethical problems in Chapter 2.4. 
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inquiries, the practices, procedures or principles which we consider exist or 
should apply. 
4.2.13 On the particular questions of how far a minister's authority and 
responsibility for the detailed organisation and administration of his department 
should extend, or how it should be divided with the departmental head, we are 
not persuaded that it would be useful to go further in terms of specific legislation 
than the changes we have recommended above in connection with section 25(2) 
of the Public Service Act. To some extent, other statutory provisions conferring 
specific powers on departmental heads already make a division of responsibilities. 
But to speak in practical terms, we consider it is appropriate for departmental 
heads to obtain the approval of their ministers for any significant changes in 
organisation. This would be no less the case when the new arrangements that we 
envisage for a greater delegation of authority to departments come into 
operation. Ultimately, it is the minister and Cabinet who determine what staff a 
department will have to carry out its functions, and over-all dispositions are 
therefore of some significance. In relation to appointments of senior staff, it would 
normally be appropriate for a departmental head to let the minister know what 
he had in mind so that he might take account in his final decisions of any views the 
minister might care to express. 
4.2.14 There has been some suggestion that the provision in section 25(2) that 
the departmental head is 'to advise the Minister in all matters relating to the 
department' may be intended to intimate to the minister that where he seeks 
advice from the department it should be obtained of and through the 
departmental head rather than of subordinate officers. Whatever the strict 
meaning or intent of these words, it is clear to us that while it is for the minister to 
determine, within the limits of his portfolio responsibilities, the character of work 
to be undertaken by the department and the order of priorities, the decision about 
which officers do what work rests with the head of a department, who must also be 
in a position to co-ordinate the advice offered to the minister. In practice, 
arrangements are best left to the good sense of each department, with the primary 
responsibility resting on the departmental head to make arrangements with the 
minister that will best suit the efficient working of the department. Particularly 
where there are differences of view within the department, we consider the best 
course is for practices to be adopted whereby the minister becomes aware of those 
differences. An associated issue brought to our attention concerns the 
responsibility a departmental head has to advise his minister in the added 
capacity of minister assisting in the administration of another department. 
Strictly construed, section 25(2) would exclude responsibility in such circum-
stances, and we consider that construction should be acted upon. Advice to a R16 
minister when he is acting in an assisting capacity to another minister should be 
regarded as the responsibility of the departmental head of the other department, 
although we would not, particularly where portfolio responsibilities are related, 
wish to preclude working arrangements being made at ministerial and 
departmental levels. The important objective is to ensure that functional lines are 
kept clear, and that one department does not interfere in the business of another 
On the inappropriate ground that its minister is for the time being assisting 
another minister in the exercise of collective ministerial responsibility. 
4.2.15 Although ministers may no longer have scope for the degree of detailed 
Control over their departments and the administration generally that they had in 
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the early years of this century, they continue to be a vital part of the 
administration. Having heavy duties outside their ministerial office which make 
repeated and insistent calls upon their time and energies, they are able to give 
only part of their time to their departments and are often greatly preoccupied 
with issues which are of little or no concern to those departments. By background, 
experience and qualifications a minister brings special attributes to his position 
which are more likely to complement than duplicate those of his staff and of his 
departmental head. It would be unrealistic to design a system of administration 
which, to operate effectively, needed the hour to hour and day to day leadership 
of the minister. At the same time, the structure should not be such that an 
energetic and able minister cannot, if he so chooses, play a very active role in 
departmental operations. Nevertheless, the more usual need seems to be for 
arrangements by which ministers can be relieved of some of the instant pressures 
of management so that they can provide general and political leadership and get 
on with their other jobs—and so that departments on their side are not 
continually hampered by being unable to proceed for want of authority. We can 
see no way by which the precise roles of ministers and departments can be defined. 
The arrangements must be sufficiently flexible to allow departments to operate 
effectively both with ministers who, of their own volition or through political or 
other necessity, become heavily involved in the working of their departments and 
with ministers who for often equally cogent reasons do not spend a great deal of 
time with their departments. 
4.2. 16 It was constantly put to us, and we agree, that it is not possible to 
separate 'policy' from 'administration'. We believe that departmental adminis-
tration is the concern of ministers: they need to be encouraged to concern 
themselves more with problems of administration and implementation, and to 
understand those problems better. This does not mean that ministers should 
become involved in all aspects at all times, and particularly in staffing matters, 
which in substantial measure are reserved for departmental management by the 
provisions of the Public Service Act. But it does mean that management, with its 
important consequences for the way in which programs are actually carried out 
and people receive the benefits of those programs, ranks in importance with 
'policy' issues. 
4.2. 17 One of the obstacles to ministers becoming more involved with their 
departments is that they have very little opportunity, particularly when 
Ri 7  Parliament is in session, to spend time in them. We suggest for consideration the 
possibility that arrangements might be made so that times when divisions would 
be taken in the two Houses would be determined in advance.' This would not 
only enable ministers to become a more effective presence in their departments, 
but also assist parliamentary committees, if given leave to meet during sitting 
hours, to proceed with their own business. 
4.2.18 It would hardly be appropriate for us to make formal recommendations 
for the conduct by ministers of their responsibilities. However, the lack of 
emphasis on their departmental management role may to some extent be a 
consequence of attitudes by departmental heads and their senior officers. We 
I . We understand that in the House of Commons at Westminster arrangements are made by 
which the times for divisions are planned in advance, or else divisions are taken at understood 
times, normally in the evening. 
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recommend that departmental heads and senior departmental officers review the R18 
content and style of their advisings, to ensure that ministers are not insulated from 
management problems and that their implications are brought fully to notice 
when 'policy' matters are under consideration. Factors contributing to the low-
key role of some ministers in the processes of administration may be a sense that 
their function is to oversee and be critical of the administration, and a feeling that, 
if they become involved in such matters, they are more likely to attract criticism 
when defects in the administrative process come to public knowledge. There may 
be something in this. But administration reflects and incorporates political values, 
and in a system of responsible government there is no way in which a minister 
should avoid answering for his department in Parliament and in public. It would 
be in the interests of good administration that he had a more detailed 
understanding of the processes. This would make it possible for him to come 
better informed to the problem and to improve awareness in the community of 
the difficulties of administration. 
4.3 THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
Flexibility of Structure 
4.3.1 The department of state is, under the Australian Constitution, the 
principal instrument of executive government. A department is nowhere defined, 
although its existence is explicitly assumed in section 64 of the Constitution.' The 
department is the only type of executive organisation to which the Constitution 
refers (apart from the Inter-State Commission), although the colonial govern-
ments had before 1900 demonstrated the practicability of other forms of 
organisation, especially for the conduct of business enterprises. The essential 
mark of a department in the Australian system is that it works directly to and for a 
minister and that it is, except where otherwise provided by legislation, subject to 
his direction. At the non-political level it is under the direction of a single 
'permanent head'. Departments can be created and abolished at the discretion 
of the executive and they share a common framework of control starting with 
ministers and Cabinet and extending through the Public Service Act and 
Regulations, the Public Service Arbitration Act, some specific staffing legislation, 
and the Audit Act and Treasury Regulations. 
4.3.2 Departments are usually structured according to the functional divisions 
that can be made in their work. The hierarchical organisation universally 
adopted in departments is described by the Public Service Board as follows, in the 
first of its Background Papers for the Commission: 
'Departmental organisations typically contain a number of common elements 
such as office, division and branch. The forms of organisation of departments 
vary considerably, however, according to individual circumstances and needs. 
In circumstances where the workload of general management and policy advice 
to the Minister is too great for a Permanent Head to carry, one or more positions 
of Deputy Permanent Head, e.g. Deputy Secretary, may be created. The 
occupants of these positions are intended to act as 'alter ego' of the Permanent 
Head, settling part of his workload. 
The basic organisational framework of a department is set by its top 
management structure, which is usually regarded as comprising the Second 
Division positions. The work done in each department at levels below the 
1. 	 See paragraph 4.2.4. 
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Permanent Head is organised into primary management responsibility centres 
called Divisions, formed by the grouping of related activities. Each Division is 
controlled by a Division Head (e.g. First Assistant Secretary), who is responsible 
for managing the affairs of his Division and advising the Permanent Head on 
matters affecting his Division. He is also expected to participate, under the 
Permanent Head, in the broader management of the department. 
Within each Division the work to be done is organised into Branches, so as to give 
the Branch Heads (e.g. Assistant Secretaries) areas of responsibility and volumes 
of work which are broadly equal within the department. The activities of the 
Branches are often grouped in Sections, each Section handling an aspect of the 
Branch's objectives. Below Branch level, however, there is a wide diversity of 
organisational forms from department to department. 
Additionally, various 'outrider' organisations somewhat separate from the main 
central office structure, are to be found in a number of departments. Most 
outriders comprise groups of positions established under the Public Service Act 
to service statutory bodies (e.g. the Australian Broadcasting Control Board and 
the National Library). 
State or regional activities of departments are typically carried out by 
establishments headed by Directors or Regional Directors, who represent the 
Permanent Head and normally report directly to him.' 
4.3.3 Although the number of departments is fairly small-25 at the date of 
writing—and their staff comprise about 155 000 (of whom ii 2 000 are 
permanent employees), out of the total Commonwealth payroll (including 
defence forces) of nearly half  million, they have never been shifted from their 
central position in the administrative system. Unlike organisations created by 
statute, departmental organisation possesses great flexibility. Their charters, the 
work they perform and the statutes which they administer on behalf of the 
minister may be and have been in the past subject to rapid alteration. They are 
the most adaptable of all forms of government organisation, and we would not 
have it otherwise. It is typical of this flexibility and adaptability that there should 
be no stereotyped picture of the 'department of state', nor is there any great body 
of literature on the department as an instrument of government, as there is in the 
case of public corporations. Departments perform a remarkably wide variety of 
work, which stretches from the classical functions of the civil service in law, order 
and defence to the provision of ever more sophisticated welfare services to the 
public, the collection of revenue, the performance of regulatory functions and 
productive and manufacturing activities. There is hardly an activity of 
government which is not, in some form or other, performed by a department. 
4.3.4 One of the Commission's central objectives is to achieve for de-
partments great flexibility in the management and organisation of their internal 
affairs. Attractively simple as is the uniform structure which now applies across 
departments, and helpful as a fairly standardised nomenclature is to those 
wishing to do business with departments—including ministers—we would not 
expect the present uniformity to endure indefinitely in the more flexible 
conditions we propose, but we also consider that firm decisions on restructuring 
should be undertaken only after examination reveals a clear functional need for a 
new framework, for example when the standard form has concealed the true 
nature of the operation. At present, it is possible to depart from the standard form, 
but only after the expenditure of considerable effort and the elapse of much time. 
The more flexible arrangements we envisage for the internal organisation of 
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departments are designed not only to allow them to change more quickly to meet 
their own functional needs but also to enable them to comprehend within their 
structures more of the functions currently carried out by separate 
bodies—statutory or otherwise. 
The Management of Departments 
A major part of this Report is concerned directly or indirectly with the 
promotion of vitality of thinking and efficiency within departments. As already 
indicated, the Commission believes these qualities will be developed if a 
combination of increased initiative and increased accountability enters into all 
levels of departmental activity. The first necessity is to make a conscious concern 
for defining, meeting and reviewing objectives the common characteristic of all 
departmental employees. Changes in organisational structure will not in 
themselves produce this result, but an inappropriate structure will inhibit it, and 
managerial arrangements can be adapted for its promotion. A rigid hierarchical 
stratification can certainly be inhibiting. While the Commission's proposals 
imply increased scope for the heads of departments, they equally require a 
transmission of powers of initiative from more senior to less senior officers, and 
they are inconsistent with the notion of the permanent head as a remote figure of 
authority. Specific evidence which the Commission has obtained on de-
partmental performances has shown that delegated initiatives and the involve-
ment of staff in the consideration of methods and goals are indispensable for 
administrative efficiency. The examples we have noted include some findings of 
deficient performance in welfare delivery made by the Commission's Access 
Research Program, the responses of some officers to the Career Service Survey 
indicating frustrations at under-employment and isolation from departmental 
objectives, and the evidence in some of the efficiency reviews which the Public 
Service Board sponsored in 1975-  On the other hand, the capacity of some 
departments to take initiatives without prompting from the central authorities is 
indicated, for example, in the report of a consultant to the Commission, Professor 
Cutt.1  
4.3.6 Some recent experience in overseas countries suggests that it is easier to 
devolve authority from central controlling agencies to departmental heads than 
to ensure that the process is followed through in departments. To a degree this has 
been due to the neglect of the former controlling agencies, when delegating 
authority, to maintain a monitoring role and lay down guidelines. The Canadian 
Auditor-General has described this type of unsatisfactory development as 
'decentralisation without effective central direction'. 2 A realistic program of 
delegation combined with accountability in departments must meet all five of the 
prerequisites discussed in Chapter : a clear knowledge of objectives; 
identification of all employees with the pursuit of objectives; maximum scope for 
decision making at all levels; managers' access at all levels to relevant information 
and expertise; and regular assessments of performance of all staff. The most 
appropriate arrangements for meeting the requirements will vary according to 
functions, costs, geographical spread and other circumstances of each depart-
ment, but there will be some common features. Within departments, there will 
1. J. A. Cutt, Program Budgeting, see Appendix iC. 
2. Supplement to the Annual Report of the Auditor-General of Canada, 1975, paragraphs 9.2, 
10.2-3 
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have to be strengthened capabilities both for positive managerial development 
and for the internal assessment of performance. For the first of these functions, a 
further development of the management services units already existing in 
departments would be appropriate; while the function of performance assessment 
could well become an extension of the present internal auditing sections, 
requiring additional skills. 
In whatever way these arrangements are formalised in particular cases, 
they will have to involve all sections of the department, providing for rotation of 
the personnel engaged in them and the representation of all facets of the 
department's activity. Management services units are rightly being given 
increased importance in many departments, and our proposals certainly imply 
further developments in that direction. This does not mean, however, that the 
development should take the form of simply elevating the status of a specialised 
unit within each department, as has been a trend in Canada. A more appropriate 
response is to ensure that the concern for managerial improvement is spread more 
widely throughout the operating divisions of the department. It also has to be 
recognised that in the cases of small departments and new departments, where a 
building up of management services units is difficult or inappropriate, the Public 
Service Board would have a particularly important supplementary role in 
promoting innovation and improvement.' 
4.3.8 Among other common elements to be expected in the future management 
of departments would be a concern for experiment, which clearly cannot be left 
simply to a specialised section. A further common factor would be the 
involvement of various sections in the preparation of forward estimates, which 
itself calls for the co-ordination of policy and management objectives. Another 
would be the preparation of annual reports by departments, in which 
performance is weighed against objectives. Externally, the indispensable 
common factor for the departmental operations will be the continual guidance, 
advice, monitoring and assessment from the central financial and personnel 
agencies and the Auditor-General. The central personnel agency, in particular, 
would be in a position to encourage experiments in organisation within 
departments on an ordered basis, so that objectives are clearly defined and 
outcomes monitored, with a view to making available generally the results 
(successful or not) and promoting a developing body of knowledge about 
organisation based on experiment. Clearly, the process of passing decentralised 
authority down the line will present difficulties for departments, and the Public 
Service Board could assist with advice and by arranging consultations between 
officers facing similar problems. 
4.3.9 Since the Commission's proposals relevant to departments range beyond 
matters of internal initiative and accountability and would involve not only 
departmental heads and senior managers, but officers throughout the service, it 
might be easy for some departments to become overwhelmed by the magnitude of 
the task of implementation. In recognition of this, our proposals for implemen-
tation in Part C of the Report entail not only that the task be approached on a co-
operative basis with the active engagement of the central agencies, but also that 
each department develop for itself a program of administrative review and 
adjustment that will over a period of time enable it to achieve the objectives 
I . 	 Sec also Chapter 9.5.1 1-16. 
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according to a determined order of priorities. It would be consistent with our 
general suggestions for ministers' involvement in administration of departments if 
they were to be fully consulted about each program of implementation, and the 
priorities it implies. 
4.3. io Departmental Boards: Our proposals to give greater autonomy to 
departmental management are not intended to concentrate authority and power 
in the head of the department. One person will less and less have the time or 
expertise to make decisions on the range of matters devolved upon departments, 
and debate about objectives and priorities will increasingly be desirable. For 
these reasons the Commission has been interested in recent attempts to establish 
consultative or advisory groups around the head of the department. It has been 
suggested that these groups, which have included senior members of the 
department, could also include any senior personal adviser the minister may have 
on his staff and in some instances the heads of statutory corporations for which he 
is responsible. At this stage, it is too early to predict how far these trends in 
departmental management will or should develop. 
4.3.11 The Commission had hoped to encourage two or three departments to 
experiment with departmental boards so that we could include at least a 
provisional assessment in our Report, but that did not prove practicable. 
Nevertheless, we note with interest that the Department of Environment, 
Housing and Community Development has continued the arrangements made 
by the Department of Urban and Regional Development for a Departmental 
Executive. The Secretary to the Department has commented that the executive 
panel: 
'is not an added burden but an absolutely essential technique which offers the 
following advantages- 
• regular and organised accessibility to the experience and collective wisdom of 
the department on a wide range of policy and administrative matters; 
• improved management of the department because of the common awareness 
of problems and objectives; 
• regular machinery fbr review of co-ordination and communication; 
• exposure of a wide range of staff to executive issues and stall training and 
development; 
• an easy device for delegation; 
• machinery for load sharing on a basis cutting across divisional structure; 
•• the tremendous convenience of knowing that once a week at a regular time in 
an organised way the Executive of the department will be available for 
whatever problems present themselves.' 
4
- 3. 12 We are aware also that less formal arrangements have been made in 
other departments, such as Foreign Affairs, to share the tasks of top management 
and policy. Such arrangements are made by the permanent head of a 
department, 
 and do not derogate from his responsibilities under sub-section 25(2) 
of the Public Service Act. We consider it undesirable to make any firm 
recommendation on such arrangements but we recommend that departments, in Rig 
Consultation with the Public Service Board, explore various methods of collective 
decision making, and that ministers, at least from time to time, involve themselves 
In the work of the groups concerned. 
4.3.13 We have considered whether such 'departmental boards' would benefit 
from the presence of members from outside the administration as do the boards of 
7' 
statutory bodies. On the whole we consider such a development unsuitable, 
because of the complications it would introduce into the relations between the 
department and the minister. There could however, be advantages in developing 
advisory bodies in association with departments. We have indeed proposed in 
Chapter 6 that an advisory board with local outposts be appointed in the Welfare 
area. We note also that there is a developing range of industry advisory panels 
associated with the Department of Industry and Commerce. We see scope for 
more widespread and effective use of such bodies. 
4.3.14 Chief Officers—a revitalised role: The increasing range, com-
plexity and sophistication of administration add to the pressures on the 
departmental head. These are intensified by excessive centralisation of 
administration within departments. Accordingly, we consider managerial 
responsibility should be more evenly distributed throughout the system. 
R2o 4-3.15 To this end, we recommend that the position of Chief Officer be revitalised. 
This is a position included in the original Public Service Act primarily to assist in 
the administration of departmental branch offices at a time when com-
munications were very much slower and less effective than they are now. Today, 
these offices could be made more effective and enabled to contribute more to good 
administration if responsibility were more evenly spread, and decisions were 
made as close as possible to the people directly affected by them. We have more to 
say on the spread of responsibility away from the centre in Chapter 7. The revised 
concept of the Chief Officer position set out below is designed to give departments 
an instrument for the delegation of managerial powers and the improved 
R21 operation of statutory bodies and other 'outriders' of departments. We iecommend 
that new arrangements be made (where necessary, by changes in the Public 
Service Act) to provide that: 
(a) the Chief Officer be responsible to the permanent head for the day to day 
management of those units of departments placed under his control and for 
the exercise of the Chief Officer and any other powers conferred on him; 
(b) subject to (a), the Chief Officer be vested with day to day powers in respect 
of personnel, with determination (within limits) of the number and 
distribution of staff, with allocation of available funds and with the exercise 
of financial powers under the Audit Act and Treasury Regulations (to this 
end he should have authority to delegate any of his powers); 
(c) permanent heads of departments and chief executive officers of other 
organisations staffed under the Public Service Act (including statutory 
officers currently exercising the powers of a permanent head) be ex officio 
vested with Chief Officer powers; 
(d) appointments of Chief Officers be made by the permanent head with the 
concurrence of the Public Service Board (the present position is that they 
are appointed by the Public Service Board on the recommendation of the 
permanent head). 
We do not suggest that a Chief Officer be given the full authority of the 
department over staff numbers and allocation, but rather that the departmental 
head would delegate to him the whole or at least a substantial part of his authority 
to decide on staff numbers and to make promotions within large branch 
organisations. 
4.3.16 We recommend in Chapter 7 the regular review of delegations given by 
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the central administration of departments to other officers in the department. 
That review would properly include an examination of appointments to Chief 
Officer positions, and of delegations made to them (and other officers) by 
permanent heads. Chief Officers might be appointed from: 
(a) heads of State and regional branches or offices of departments; 
(b) the heads of bodies, such as the Overseas Property Bureau, the Bureau of 
Meteorology, the Australian Government Publishing Service, the Aus-
tralian Information Service, which exercise managerial autonomy; 
(c) the heads of such bodies as the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, the 
Bureau of Transport Economics, the Bureau of Mineral Resources, 
Geology and Geophysics which are responsible for independent research. 
4.3.17 Common Services: All Commonwealth government departments 
have day by day to call on services and resources in addition to staff and finance. 
They will need buildings from which to operate, furniture and other fittings, 
equipment, stationery and other stores, and a variety of communication links. 
Transport may have to be supplied; staff may have to be provided with canteen 
services. Buildings have to be cleaned, maintained and modified to meet 
changing needs. The department's activities will require legal, statistical, library 
and other information services. There is a growing need for departments to have 
access to facilities for printing, publishing, advertising and computing. 
4-3- 18 Given adequate finance, individual departments and authorities could 
be left to find ways of meeting most of these needs by purchasing from or 
contracting with the private sector. However, there has been a strong trend 
towards providing many of them by government agencies, themselves centrally 
controlled. This trend reflects primarily the desire to guarantee availability, to 
control quality standards and to enable more rational planning for future supply 
against changing needs. 
4.3.19 Doubts have developed, however, as to whether in practice these benefits 
are sufficiently realised to offset the apparent disadvantages of central 
control—particularly the loss of flexible and prompt initiative by the department 
or agency which requires the resource or service concerned. 
4.3.20 A considerable discussion of the problems of decentralisation of 
'Supporting services' for government is contained in the 1962 Report of the 
Canadian (Glassco) Royal Commission on Government Organisation. That 
report assembled a number of arguments in favour of the centralisation of such 
services, stating as part of its conclusions that: 
'provided the administrators are able to control the level and quality of the 
supplies and services their programs require (subject to normal budgetary 
limitations and any general standards by which they may he governed), the 
actual management of supporting services may be left to others.' 
The proviso in this sentence is perhaps the most important consideration relating 
to provision of supplies and services to government organisations by a central 
agency. The management of services on a day to day basis is often difficult to 
distinguish from control of such services. 
4.3.21 
 The arguments for the centralisation of such services may be summarised 
as: 
Glassco Report, Vol. 2, P. 13. 
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(a) Economy: With the expansion of government operations in recent years 
there has been an increased need for supporting supplies and services. 
Centralisation of such services eliminates wasteful duplication, leads to 
economies of scale effected by, for example, bulk purchasing, and 
establishes guidelines and standards eliminating extravagance by in-
dividual departments. 
(b) Efficient Use of Resources: In many areas such as publishing and the 
negotiation of leases, there may be a scarcity of people with the required 
expertise. Centralisation creates a 'pool of expertise' on which departments 
can draw. 
(c) Career Structure: Where specialised skills are concerned, pooling 
arrangements permit the creation of more attractive career opportunities 
for professional and para-professional officers. 
(d) Decreased Burden for Administrators: Common service and supply 
agencies relieve program administrators from chores which may be 
undesired distractions from their central concerns. This argument is more 
relevant to smaller, policy making departments which have only 
intermittent need for many of the services in question. 
4.3.2 2 These arguments are compelling to the extent that they assert a need for 
the availability of central service facilities. They are less compelling as a 
demonstration that the use of such services should be made mandatory. The 
Glassco Commission itself refers to the success of the 'General Services 
Administration' in the United States, an omnibus service organisation which: 
has relied on the quality of service offered rather than on any compulsory power, 
to promote the use of its services by departments and agencies of the United 
States Government. By delegating substantial powers to its ten regional offices, it 
has been able to respond promptly and effectively to the needs of government 
operations throughout the country., ] 
4.3.23 Many of the services required by Commonwealth government depart-
ments and agencies are at present supplied by central agencies. The extensive 
range of such services covers: 
(a) office accommodation and other property; 
b) furniture, furnishings and fittings—designs, provision, maintenance; 
(c) land, engineering and topographical surveys; 
(d) building construction; 
(e) telecommunications facilities; 
(f) transport and storage facilities; 
(g) food services; 
(h) legal services; 
(i) printing, publishing and advertising; 
(j) purchasing policy and operations, and disposal of surplus goods; 
(k) fire protection advisory services. 
In addition, the need for central library and Automatic Data Processing (ADP) 
facilities has been suggested.2 We also discuss in Chapter ii .6 management 
consultancy services provided by the Public Service Board. 
Glassco Report, Vol. 2, pp. 14-15. 
See Chapter 10.7 and Appendix 4.1), 'Information Services'. 
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4.3.24 The Commission believes that in general central service agencies should 
support but not control. Except where control or regulation has been envisaged 
by the government as part of 'a central agency's role, and is clearly provided for by 
legislation or Cabinet decision, common services should be available supports 
rather than constraints on managerial initiative. Thus, as a general rule, we 
recommend that common service agencies: 	 R22 
(a) should have no control over the users of the services, provided the 
requirements accord with government determined general standards; 
(b) should, where practicable, charge for their services; 
(c) should, again when practicable, compete in the provision of services with 
'outside' sources. 
4.3.25 Departmental Reports: There has been a developing practice for 
departments to prepare annual reports. We recommend that the process be R23 
continued, with a view to each department preparing annually by a fixed date a 
report on its activities. There need be no prizes for the glossiness of covers or the 
length of the production. Our purpose is to ensure that departments make 
available for public information and discussion, material which would not 
otherwise be released. The annual report should be a vehicle by which 
departments furnish an account of their activity and performance in terms of 
ministerially approved goals and objectives. It should provide background 
information that is necessary for an understanding by Parliament and the public 
of the department's annual expenditure and forward estimates. A departmental 
report will necessarily be somewhat different in approach and content from the 
report of a statutory body. A department works for a minister, who is directly and 
publicly answerable for its activities, whereas a statutory body has a measure of 
independence (the reason for its creation) and is not in the same way answered for 
by a minister. There is, however, a great deal of information which departments 
can produce without engaging in the kind of controversy that may attract 
ministerial veto. We do not consider that the immediate responsibility of a 
department to a minister need preclude discussion of issues of real interest and 
concern. For example, there is no reason why the essence of findings of a trade 
delegation should not be discussed in the broader context of Australia's trading 
policy; why the activities of an important interdepartmental committee should 
not be the subject of some report by the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet; why experiments within Treasury or other departments and agencies on 
economic models should not be described; or experimentation in the Department 
of Social Security should not be given coverage. 
4.3.26 One advantage of preparing departmental reports would be that some of 
the innovative thinking which we have observed would become publicly known. 
This would not only promote a sharing of ideas among departments and with the 
private sector, but would also help to breakdown the prevalent image of stuffiness 
and remoteness. The report might also usefully include response to criticism. If 
departments 
 and their managers are to become increasingly accountable for their 
activities, they need a forum in which to be able to respond to those who have 
criticised them. It may also be possible for departments themselves to publish 
financial and descriptive detailed information at present contained in the report 
of the Auditor-General, thereby enabling his reports to concentrate more on 
problems and deficiencies he has identified. In this connection, we recommend that R24 
Treasury, the Auditor-General and suitable representation from departments 
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and the Public Service Board review the range of financial information available, 
and its content, and prepare alternative methods of publication which will reduce 
the amount of overlap, allocate relevant aspects to departments for report, and 
free the Auditor-General for his primary task of making critical comment where 
irregularity or inefficiency has been detected. 
R25 4.3.27 Without seeking to lay down in firm detail what the content of 
departmental reports should be, we consider that the following matters should 
normally be included: 
(a) information and comment on policy or management issues which would be 
of general interest or use, taking in the department's reviews of objectives, 
its delegating procedures and methods of internal assessment; 
(b) response to criticisms made by the Auditor-General, the Public Service 
Board or other critics. There may also be occasions on which departments 
wish to record dissatisfaction with the way in which other aspects of the 
administration are operating; 
(c) a report on the activities of the non-statutory bodies attached to the 
department, containing a record of membership and of activities and, 
where significant, reference to the annual report from the body or a survey 
of its activities; 
(d) reports from bureaux contained within the department and from statutory 
bodies responsible to the minister, wheic the bureau or body does not itself 
prepare and publish an annual report; 
(e) information about grants-in-aid provided to voluntary agencies, interest 
groups and the like (see Chapter 6) together with an account, where that is 
not available elsewhere, of the activities of such bodies; 
(f information and comment on 
(i) the forward estimates of the department, together with expenditures for a 
year or two years previously; 
(ii) staffing and organisation arrangements (noting significant transfers), 
including information about training and development; 
(iii) consultancy arrangements and an indication where practicable of the 
contents of consultancy reports; 
(iv) statistical material provided in response to requests from the Auditor-
General or the Public Service Board (where not published by these 
bodies); 
(g) a careful indication of the facilities the department provides for 
information-giving or participatory activities. This should include 
publications, papers available and subjects on which seminars can be 
arranged, and should indicate points of contact, describe the accessibility 
of libraries, etc. 
The Number and Size of Departments 
4.3.28 It is widely agreed that departments should be organised around a 
coherent function and that, as departments increase in number, the problems of 
co-ordination become more difficult. 'These views led both the Bland Committee 
in Victoria and the Corbett Committee in South Australia to recommend a 
reduction in the number of departments. The desire to do this is stronger among 
those who consider that a large department (like the Department of Defence or 
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the Department of Transport) is the best organisational form for giving effect to 
government policy. Accordingly it has been pressed on us that we should 
recommend that, over a period of time, the number of departments be reduced to 
about fifteen. This, it has been urged, would make possible a relatively small 
Cabinet and more effective co-ordination of related government activities. 
4.3.29 We are not tempted to specify an optimum number for departments or 
an optimum size. Administrative considerations are clearly important but, as we 
point out in Chapter 11.5.28, they must sometimes be subordinated to political 
factors. 
4.3.30 This is not to say that departments should be created, restructured or 
abolished lightly. Over recent years this has been done with insufficient planning; 
too many small and weak departments have persisted; and interdepartmental co-
ordination has become more difficult. Our Career Service Survey' showed that 
morale in departments which had been the subject of major change or 
reconstruction was disturbingly low. 
i It is sometimes argued that departments should as far as possible be 
brought to a relatively uniform or 'ideal' size. We see no particular benefit in such 
uniformity. Nevertheless, plans for reorganisation should take size into account. 
On the one hand, there is the inflexibility which tends to beset big organisations 
more than small, and the tighter espril de cops and greater capacity for 
concentrated effort characteristic of smaller units. On the other, the more diverse 
resources of large departments can be a source of strength, and can enable many 
conflicts to be resolved internally rather than by collective ministerial processes. 
4.3.32 On the whole our inclination is towards reducing rather than increasing 
the number of departments. But if ministerial control is to remain effective, there 
would in some large departments be a case for more than one minister. Australian 
orthodoxy has been that the Constitution does not allow the appointment of more 
than one minister to a department. We have been advised that there is probably 
no constitutional bar to this,2 though there remains an element of doubt. 
4.3.33 The Constitution does not stand in the way of creation of a number of 
different types of department, nor does it seem to preclude the adoption of a 
system whereby some of the ministers are required to administer their 
departments in accordance with the policies laid down by a co-ordinating 
minister. It seems that a minister in charge of a department could in effect have an 
assistant minister by the creation of a smaller department associated with the 
main department, for instance to oversee the activities of statutory bodies related 
to the main department.3 The Commission believes that the use of assistant 
ministers in large departments such as Defence and Transport would not only 
reduce the workload on Cabinet ministers but also provide a 'training ground' for 
Promising backbenchers. 
43.34 Sectoral groupings: Suggestions have been made to us that more 
effectively co-ordinated action could be achieved by the adoption of'sectoral' or 
cluster' groupings of departments. As an intermediate step in any move towards 
a reduction in the number of departments, or possibly as an alternative to that 
'. See Appendix 3.A. 
2. See the paper, Ministerial Arrangements, by Proflssor Campbell, at Appendix i.G. 
3 	 Appendix i.G, paragraph 32. 
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move, it might be preferable to group departments in functional clusters under 
the responsibility of one senior Cabinet minister, who would be in charge of one of 
the departments in the group. Alternatively, at the top of each such grouping it 
would be possible to create a Policy Board, consisting of the relevant ministers 
with support from their senior advisers. 
4,3,35 We have proposed one such grouping in the Health and Social Welfare 
area (Chapter 10.3) and in the broad area of industrial development policy 
(Chapter io.i); and others which mirror the composition of ministerial 
committees suggest themselves as appropriate for special functions from time to 
time—such as the allocation of resources between departments in the Forward 
Estimates budgetary process, or the development of staffing or regional policies. 
There would be times when such clusters would make a lot of sense, but we 
R26 hesitate to recommend them as a firm structure. Rather we suggest that 
departments generally, and particularly Treasury, the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet and the Public Service Board keep in mind the possibility 
that questions of administration, policy or resource allocation could sometimes be 
handled more effectively through structured meetings of the departments 
concerned than by either unilateral action by one of the central co-ordinating 
groups or by a series of separate bilateral negotiations. 
4.3.36 If possible an experiment, perhaps in the resources development field, 
might be tried as the system of forward estimates is being developed. The point is 
that we are seeking to open the way, in the long run, for flexibility with a variety of 
forms by loosening traditional methods—or, perhaps more accurately, by 
recognising openly that actual practices have frequently differed from the 
supposed model anyway. 
4.3.37 It would be desirable to involve representatives of statutory bodies in 
these arrangements, making some of those organisations more directly account-
able to ministers than they are at present. Major benefits from such arrangements 
would include the possibility of enabling the full Cabinet to concentrate on the 
more important and more difficult areas for decision. Of course, this could only 
occur if there were a devolution of Cabinet responsibilities for decisions to 
Cabinet Committees and to groups of ministers within specified bounds. 
Modes of Providing Advice to the Minister 
4.3.38 In this section we examine briefly the role of research bureaux and 
advisory bodies, and discuss proposals for a more far-reaching reorganisation of 
departments themselves to make special provision for the development of policy. 
4.3.39 Policy groups: The policy developing role has assumed increasing 
importance in the operations of departments, as a result largely of advances 
in the social sciences. Increasingly sophisticated analysis is required of possible 
policy options and their effects, and almost all departments now have policy 
groups of varying size to keep abreast of thinking in the community. The 
number of officers whose task is wholly or in large part the review and preparation 
of advice on policy matters for ministerial use is relatively small. In this sense, 
policy units within departments can be somewhat analogous to management 
units: specialised groups carrying out in concentrated fashion selected aspects of 
tasks which the department as a whole is designed to achieve. The first question is 
whether we should, as some have suggested, adopt a Swedish model of a still more 
absolute division between 'policy' and 'operational' units. The weight of evidence 
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makes us conclude that in the Australian context it would be inappropriate to 
recommend such a separation. The whole thrust of our thinking is rather towards 
reintegrating the management and the policy functions and using the flexibility of 
the departmental structure to avoid excessive resort to the creation of separate 
statutory bodies. 
4.3.40 The problem then becomes how to ensure that the department as a 
whole, and particularly its policy group, is adequately responsive to the changing 
policies of governments and the changing requirements of the community. Our 
answer is to emphasise the totality of the function of administration, 
comprehending both policy and operations, and to ensure that at the staffing and 
orgarisationa1 levels the lines are not sharply or firmly drawn. Paralleling our 
suggestion earlier that there be much greater movement of persons between the 
specialised management group and the operational parts of departments 
(paragraph 4.3.7), we look to more effective interaction between those in the 
policy area and the rest of the department. To this end, we recommend that those R27 
employed in policy areas of departments should occupy their positions on the 
clear understanding that at relatively frequent intervals, perhaps at the most 
three years, their continued occupation of such positions should be reviewed, with 
the presumption that after one or two terms, and certainly in the normal case 
before i o years have elapsed, they will be moved into operational or management 
areas of a department, even if later they revert to the 'policy' group. In achieving 
movement of this kind, the opportunity may often be taken of moving a person 
from a policy area in one department to an operational area in another. Mobile 
arrangements for the staffing of policy areas should go a long way towards 
reducing the tendency for hardened 'departmental' attitudes on policy, which 
may be remote from the general political approach of government or from 
community attitudes or the operational needs of departments themselves. 
4.3.41 It has also been put to us that departments should become more 
responsive through the appointment of outside experts to their policy groups. We 
do not express hard and fast opinions about this. To the extent that policy and 
administration are closely interwoven, 'politically oriented' experts are likely to 
find difficulty in operating within departmental units. In cases where there is a R28 
special need for 'political' input, it may be accommodated through task forces 
arranged by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Chapter ii.,). 
Alternatively, it may be desirable to appoint a person with special expertise as 
consultant to either a department or a minister or both. A central feature of the 
arrangements should always be that there is full exchange of information and 
views between the consultant and the department, so that the minister obtains 
advice which takes into account the views of both. 
4.3.42 Research Bureaux: We have given some attention to the organisation 
of research in departments. The difficulty is that the policy-oriented areas of 
departments, in which the research element is customarily located, are often hard 
pressed. They deal with the problems thrown up by the emergence of new policy 
issues, they provide replies to parliamentary questions and material for ministers' 
Use in parliamentary debates, speeches, articles and so forth. 
4-3-43 This is necessary work, but it means that many of those holding positions 
designated as 'research officers' are unable to conduct activities which would be 
regarded even as applied research in a university. To meet the need for a deeper 
and better organised research effort, a number of successful bureaux have been 
established: the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, the Bureau of Mineral 
Resources, the Bureau of Transport Economics and the Bureau of Roads. Where 
there is an identifiable need in the public interest for a substantial investment in 
research that is in general oriented to the area of a department's activity, but can 
R29 be separated from the department's day to day activities, we suggest that the 
bureau form of organisation could be adopted with advantage, and that the 
activities of such a bureau could be governed by the following considerations 
which are similar to the proposals of' the Commission's Task Force on Economic 
Polic 1: 
(a) the results of the research should in general be freely published, so that they 
may be widely used and promote an exchange of ideas; 
(b) the research units should be outside the normal departmental framework 
and be in the form of a 'bureau', as exemplified by the Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics, and under the charge of a director; 
(c) the bureau should have a close working relationship with the department 
whose work relates to its research activity but it should be largely 
independent of the department; 
(d) to ensure that the community has full confidence in the quality and 
professional integrity of the bureau's research output, the bureau should 
not be restricted in the choice of subjects which fall within its range of 
expertise, or in its methods of investigation; 
(e) an advisory board, consisting of representatives of the community affected 
by the bureau's work and of the related department, should assist the 
bureau in suggesting research needs and priorities; 
(f) in the long run, an increase in the number of research bureaux could create 
a need for a collective body, an Executive Committee, to bring together 
representatives of the various bureaux to discuss and rationalise common 
activities and interests (staffing, research, computer facilities, etc). 
4.3-44 We do not, however, recommend a statutory framework for bureaux of 
this kind. We believe that research bureaux are in general better left within the 
umbrella of the department, but with a degree of autonomy as recommended 
above. We add to the suggestions of the Task Force further proposals that, for 
reasons analogous to those applying to policy groups, the staffs of bureaux be 
appointed for relatively short, though renewable, periods, and that they be 
among those included in the staff rotation arrangements, so that there is a 
continuous infusion of fresh insights and operating experience into the research 
field (from departments, statutory bodies and outside the administration, for 
example from universities and relevant industry sectors) and a regular 
enrichment of the operating areas as a result of periods of research. 
4.3.45 Advisory bodies: We engaged Dr T. B. Smith as a consultant to 
provide us with a report on 'Non-statutory Bodies in Australian Government'. 
His report appears at Appendix i .L. In what is we believe the first work of its 
kind, he draws together information obtained from departments about 'non-
statutory' bodies. These do not operate under legislation, but at the same time, 
they are not a part of the departmental structure, although their existence and 
membership are often revealed in the Government Directory. We felt it desirable 
I . See Appendix 4.A. 
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to investigate this substantial group of bodies because they appear to represent an 
important link between departments and the community. 
4.3.46 It emerges that in mid-1975 there were approximately 245 non-statutory 
bodies. They often have more than one function, but Dr Smith was able to classify 
them into six main groups—advisory committees, government service agencies, 
Commonwealth-State consultative committees, executive bodies, research 
bureaux and regulatory bodies. Of the total of 245 bodies igg, or more than 8o 
per cent, are advisory committees and these are the group which are of main 
interest to us. Their predominant function is to provide advice on policy issues, 
and expertise in areas of uncertainty. 
The advisory committees can be identified as falling into one of five types: 
(a) Scientific and Technical Advisory Committees to enable governments to 
keep pace with rapidly changing technologies; 
(b) general purposes committees to advise on broad policy issues; 
(c) committees to protect or advance a special interest, such as in agriculture 
or industry; 
(d) committees constituted to perform specific tasks such as the allocation of 
research grants; 
(e) research or fact finding committees. 
4-3.47 There is an interesting overlap between Dr Smith's findings in relation to 
these groups, which are in most cases appointed by the minister or the 
department, and the 'interest groups' which are the subject of a paper by another 
consultant, Dr Trevor Matthews, which forms a basis for discussion and 
recommendations in Chapter 6.1  Dr Smith found that there was often inadequate 
secretarial assistance for the committees; that in more than one-third of cases no 
travel expenses were paid; and that in half of the cases no sitting fees were offered. 
We recommend that attention be given by departments, in consultation with the R30 
Public Service Board, to the basis on which non-statutory bodies are appointed 
and serviced. The review should cover: 
(a) the functions of non-statutory bodies, with special emphasis upon 
clarifying responsibilities so that they do not overlap with those of other 
bodies; 
(b) the continued need for the body; 
(c) the secretarial requirements. 
These reviews should also take into account our further recommendations arising 
from the discussion in Chapter 6.3. i7ff. 
4.4 STATUTORY BODIES 
Definition and Major Features 
4.4.1 Statutory bodies are an alternative organisational form to departments for 
achieving the purposes of government. In their functions, statutory bodies form a 
Continuum with departments, for while the two types of organisation are 
functionally distinguishable at the extremes, there are many intermediate cases 
where they carry out similar types of activity, and in some of these it is difficult to 
ascertain precisely why the statutory form has been chosen. 
I. Appendix 2.D. 
4.4.2 The Commission's proposals that greater flexibility be given to 
departmental operations and structural arrangements should make it possible to 
reduce the number of independently operating statutory bodies by using instead 
the established machinery available to departments. For all the variety of form 
among statutory bodies and the relative flexibility of their structures to meet 
given objectives, their legislative basis sometimes causes them and others to 
regard their objectives as unchanging, and makes the adjustment of their 
functions to meet evolving circumstances relatively difficult. 
4.4.3 We have regarded statutory bodies as including all public offices and 
agencies (incorporated or unincorporated) that are specifically established by or 
pursuant to Commonwealth law, whether an Act of Parliament or subordinate 
legislation. An explanatory note appears in Appendix i .K discussing the 
definition used and the exclusion from our investigations of such bodies as courts, 
territorial agencies, offices held by heads of department and certain ad hoc 
institutions. To illustrate the difficulty of applying a legal definition, Qantas 
Airways Ltd, because it remains incorporated as a company under State 
legislation is no more 'statutory' than a private company in legal terms, yet 
Qantas seems for many governmental and administrative purposes to be 
indistinguishable from a statutorily created business enterprise, such as TAA or 
the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories. On the other hand, some statutory 
bodies are effectively only a part of a department operating under more than 
usually formal structures created by legislation, as for example, the Repatriation 
Commission, the Commissioner for Employees Compensation, and Official 
Receivers in Bankruptcy, and they do not fully conform to the common idea of 
'separateness'. 
4.4.4 The definition of statutory bodies offered in paragraph 4.4.3 makes 
explicit the direct link between these bodies and the Parliament: the existence of 
such a body is the product of a deliberate decision not to use the departmental 
form, and to differentiate its functions from those of departments even when it 
operates within rather than separate from the department. Thus, the body 
usually possesses some degree of independence from the minister and department. 
4.4.5 Statutory bodies have other features which reflect their separate 
existence, but are not essential or universal characteristics. Many of them have a 
governing body, and one of the reasons for creating a statutory authority may be 
precisely to provide for governance by more than one person or to introduce at the 
corporate management level persons and skills from outside the departmental 
service. Stqffing arrangements vary greatly between authorities, and in some cases 
are not provided for in the legislation. 1inancia/ administration is often separate 
from that of departmental financing and accounting, and on some occasions 
statutory bodies obtain a single line rather than a normally itemised annual 
appropriation. Finally, rather more than half of the 170 bodies listed by Dr 
Wettenhall are either incorporated (89) or registered as companies (6). In-
corporation endows the body with a legal personality, separate inter alia from that 
of the crown in right of the Commonwealth; and an unincorporated body is 
necessarily less independent. However, incorporation does not of itself remove a 
body from what is frequently referred to as the 'shield of the crown'. In deciding 
which of these features should be present in a particular statutory body, the 
important consideration is functional effectiveness. 
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4.4.6 Statutory bodies range more widely in size than departments. The new 
Australian Telecommunications Commission employs more than 90 000 people, 
while the statutory Custodian of Expropriated Property involves only the part 
time services of two or three Treasury officers. In total, the statutory bodies other 
than the Postal and Telecommunications Commissions employ over 100 000 
people,1 and these two corporations employ a further 126 000. Thus the total 
numbers involved in statutory bodies are about double those included in the 
'career' public service. With so much of the total resources of the Commonwealth 
involved in their operations, it is vital to consider critically whether traditional 
modes of securing accountability and effective discharge of functions are 
satisfactory and whether the lines of communication and control are adequate 
between these bodies and ministers and their departments. 
4.4.7 In accordance with the definition given above, we identified more than 
200 bodies and made a classification of them in functional terms. Dr R. L. 
Wettenhall, the consultant to the Commission on statutory bodies, prepared a 
report based on the Commission's survey. He pointed out some of the difficulties 
in classifying the bodies functionally, and himself developed a classification based 
upon the relations of the bodies' staffing arrangements with government 
departments. Substantial extracts from Dr Wettenhall's report are reproduced in 
Appendix i.K. The Appendix also contains another classification prepared by 
staff of the Commission, based on staffing relationships to the Public Service 
Board. 
4.4.8 In further recognition of the difficulty of what amounts to a first attempt 
at a systematic approach to the study of Commonwealth statutory bodies, we 
invited representatives of each of those to whom our questionnaire was sent to 
attend a day-long meeting in Canberra to discuss the questionnaire and any issues 
the representatives wished to raise about the operation of statutory bodies. This 
was the first occasion on which such a meeting had been called, and it created 
some interest among the bodies themselves, many of which had been unaware of 
the range and number of Commonwealth statutory undertakings. We recommend R31 
that the Public Service Board with its proposed wider role in relation to 
Commonwealth employment as a whole (see Chapters 9.4  and I 1.6) convene 
meetings of groups of statutory bodies from time to time, selected on a basis that 
would permit useful discussion of mutual problems. For some meetings, function 
might be the relevant basis for selection, as in the cases of a commodity board or 
regulatory body, but in others it could be methods of finance, staffing provisions, 
type of governing board, relationships to ministers, and so on. A more ad hoc 
selection may be necessary in the case of the 'executive' group', which covers a 
Very wide range of bodies with interests which might not, on many issues, have 
much in common. In addition to the responses to the questionnaire, and the 
discussionsjust mentioned, we received about 90 submissions relating to statutory 
bodies, of which 20 were associated with departmental submissions or statutory 
body responses to questionnaires, and a further 15 came from unions or union 
groups. 
4.4.9 The work we have undertaken represents only the first steps in a task of 
Some importance. This is the identification, in consultation with statutory bodies, 
. Figure based on information contained in PSB Background Information Volume 8. 
2. Approximately one quarter of the functionally classified list. 
of areas where the provisions under which some of them are working are less 
effective than others. We consider the Public Service Board should follow up these 
matters and the suggestions for further studies made by Dr Wettenhall in his 
report. Notwithstanding the difficulties in finding an ordered basis for future 
work, useful comment can be made on some of the issues affecting statutory 
authorities in general, and particular types of statutory body. 
Creation of Statutory Bodies 
4.4. 10 It would be impossible to lay down in precise terms the circumstances 
justifying the establishment of a statutory body. Each tends to be a special case. 
The reasons for the creation of a new body often have a significant political 
element, and accordingly will vary from time to time and from government to 
government. It emerges from the evidence we have received that the two broad 
considerations leading to the creation of a statutory body are the need (of a kind 
which may vary) for independence and the desire (for reasons which again may 
vary) to provide the status which goes with establishment by legislation. The 
independence may be required: 
(a) to avoid political control or full political accountability, as when the 
function is quasi-judicial, regulatory, involves grants or subsidies, or entails 
higher educational opinion-forming or research activities; or 
(b) to avoid departmental procedures or control, for example when 
performance of commercial activities is required, particularly in com-
petition with private enterprise, or when a separate channel of advice or 
separate evaluation of policies is desired; or 
(c) to relieve ministers of responsibility for day-to-day administration of 
detailed and self-contained tasks. 
On occasions, legislation may be necessary to give the executive government the 
authority it lacks to carry out a function, or to provide suitable protections to 
those carrying it out; but for a statutory body to be created, other factors also 
would need to be present. They may be of the kind listed above, or others such as 
(a) a desire for prestige for research-oriented institutions; 
(b) the need for the body to be under joint government control; 
(c) the discharge of a specialised function, particularly where private funds are 
involved, for example, commodity boards and trustee functions; 
(d) a need to bring an 'outside' element into management of the activity in 
ways that are not practicable in a department: as for instance elements of 
special expertise or representation of interests or geographical repre-
sentation. 
Not all these factors will be present in any particular case, and they will not 
always have equal weight. Sometimes, there will be factors on the side of 
ministerial or departmental control that out-weigh the arguments for having an 
independent statutory body. These factors cannot be determined in advance: 
they must be weighed up when each case arises. 
4.4.11 Some degree of independence from ministerial and departmental 
control should in our view always be intended if there is to be a statutory body. A 
classic argument states that the more independent the body is from the 
responsible minister, the less accountable it is to him and ultimately to 
Parliament; but the independence of many existing authorities is more illusory 
than real, and this is to be seen as one reason for having rather fewer authorities in 
the future than we have at present. 
4-4- 12 When the possibility of creating a statutory body is under consideration, 
the onus of demonstrating that such an agency is required should be on those 
proposing such a body. We recommend that the primary consideration should be R32 
whether the function in question should be carried out by an organisation which 
is wholly or in some desired way separate from ministerial and departmental 
administration, as indicated in paragraph 4.4.10. If there is not such a need, the 
primary justification for creating a statutory body may well not have been 
established, and consideration should be given to alternatives, including in 
particular the possibility that the minister or a permanent departmental official 
be vested with statutory powers to carry out the function. Additional 
considerations, of an administrative nature, include: 
(a) what machinery is required to carry out the task, and why can the 
department not do it effectively? 
(b) does the purpose itself justify the additional staff, financial and other 
resources almost certainly required if a separate (particularly non-
departmental) body is to be established? 
(c) what precise powers, for instance over finance and staffing, and what 
responsibilities to the minister, the department and the Parliament, are 
required if the body is to achieve its purposes effectively, economically and 
responsively? 
(d) to what extent would the creation of a new body overlap with the activities 
of other departments or statutory bodies? Where there is overlap the 
implications should be made explicit and steps taken to avoid duplication, 
as a condition of creating the new body; 
(e) are the functions proposed coherent and capable of being exercised 
separately, and apart from the functions of a department? 
(f) does the inflexibility inevitably associated over time with the functions of a 
statutory body mean that the more adaptable departmental form is more 
appropriate? 
(g) in what ways will the new body be accountable to the minister, the 
department, the Parliament and the public? 
In relation to (d) and (e), the evidence available suggests that unless a statutory 
body has clearly defined and functionally coherent tasks which do not impinge on 
the operations of a department or another statutory body, it is likely to run into 
difficulties, either because of internal contradictions in function or because of 
clashes with other bodies. Once the body has been brought into existence, such 
difficulties can become acute: it is committed to the function by statute, and the 
normal processes for resolving conflict which are available to departments cannot 
readily be brought into operation. We conclude that new statutory bodies should 
be created only when the answers to these questions, and the decisions on the 
issues listed in the previous paragraph, show a clear advantage in using one of the 
forms of statutory body. 
4.4:13 While concern was expressed to the Commission about tendencies, 
Which some saw as 'ad hocery', towards a prolific creation of statutory authorities, 
few who made submissions or gave evidence oflered constructive suggestions as to 
how the number might be reduced, or recommended the abolition of specific 
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bodies. More often we received proposals which would involve the creation of 
additional statutory agencies or strengthening the authority and autonomy of 
existing agencies. Many of the proposals for establishing new agencies emanated 
from units within departments—especially research bureaux—who sought the 
status of a statutory authority mainly as a means of breaking free of the strait 
jacket imposed by public service and departmental rules and regulations, and 
obtaining greater managerial autonomy and freedom in the organisation of their 
work. Our general conclusion is that while many of the complaints made appear 
to be justified, the remedy proposed should not be adopted unless it is clear that 
the difficulties cannot be overcome by changes in departmental administrative 
arrangements—by, for example, greater delegations of authority within the 
department and possibly the use of 'Chief Officer' appointments.' 
4.4.14 It is possible that one consideration which has sometimes influenced the 
choice of statutory body rather than departmental form to discharge a particular 
task has been a desire to forestall criticism about the growth of the main federal 
bureaucracy, the Australian Public Service. In fact, the creation of statutory 
authorities staffed outside the Public Service Act may contribute to the growth of 
the service because of the work they generate for departments—in the provision of 
information, analysis of reports, or implementation of policies and programs 
developed by statutory agencies. This is one of the reasons for recommending 
caution in the creation of statutory bodies. The preference for the statutory form 
could also have been influenced in some measure by a belief that a government's 
innovations are made more visible, and perhaps more difficult to undo, if its 
executors are provided with a statutory base which until removed by 
parlimentary enactment virtually commits the political executive to continuation 
of support, financial and otherwise. 
Relations with Ministers and Departments 
4.4.15 Ministerial Direction: The fact that a statutory body has been 
brought into being frequently signifies that a deliberate decision has been taken to 
place the performance of a particular function outside the political sphere of 
influence or to relieve a minister and his department of immediate responsibility 
for it. But the fact that certain powers are reserved to the minister means that it is 
the Parliament's intention that the abdication of ministerial authority should not 
be complete and sometimes also that Parliament desires that the activities of the 
body should be subordinated to broad policies enunciated from time to time by 
the government. Which powers are given to ministers is obviously controlled very 
much by the nature of the powers and functions given to the statutory body, for 
example, by whether it is a self-financed commercial corporation, a regulatory 
agency, or an advisory body. 
44. 16 It has not been easy to devise statutory formulae which adequately 
express the desired balance of ministerial and agency powers and responsibilities, 
and there have, no doubt, been occasions when this difficulty has been 
compounded by the absence of any clear conception of what the minister's role 
should be. The more general the expression of ministerial powers, the more scope 
there is for disagreement between the minister and department on the one hand 
and the agency's management on the other, disagreement which in some 
instances can be due to a certain failure on the part of members of the board of 
I . 	 See paragraphs 4.3.14-16 above. 
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management to recognise significant differences between the circumstances of 
public corporations and public companies. 
4.4-17 The existing statutes for these bodies exemplify a wide range of formulae 
for conferring powers of direction on ministers. They include cases of ministerial 
power to give directions on policy and practices but not direction as to particular 
cases (for example, the Industrial Research and Development Grants Act); cases 
where it is required that the minister be kept informed of the body's activities; 
others where there is provision for ultimate direction in the event of disagreement 
between the body and the government (the Reserve Bank Act and National 
Capital Development Commission Act), and cases of a minister having powers to 
authorise specific activities (the Housing Loans Insurance Act). Where a 
minister's power of direction is limited to specific matters, the power to give 
directions generally or on matters of policy will normally be excluded by 
implication. Given such a wide range of possibilities, careful attention is needed to 
identify the matters on which the actions and decisions of the body should be 
subject to ministerial oversight. In some instances the minister may need to have 
power to intervene in particular matters, as in the carriage of cargoes by a 
shipping line to a particular port. In others it may be just this kind of specific 
intervention that is to be avoided, for example in the normal conduct of business 
by the Australian Industry Development Corporation. Again, the provisions 
governing the powers of statutory bodies or of ministerial direction may need 
reconsideration from time to time. The Commonwealth Bank Officers' 
Association drew our attention to limitations on the ability of the Commonwealth 
Banking Corporation to compete effectively in accordance with its 
charter—limitations which resulted from an unwillingness at ministerial level to 
agree that it should conduct certain activities;' and the Australian Broadcasting 
Control Board suggested that it may have been inappropriate to give the relevant 
minister a power of direction over the frequency and situation of a broadcasting 
station, as it involves highly technical issues. 2 Matters of this kind could desirably 
be the subject of consideration at the conferences we suggest between a minister, 
the department and the statutory body for which he is responsible (see paragraph 
4.4.24). 
4-4. 18 It seems, however, that the existing provisions for ministerial powers of 
direction have in general worked reasonably well. We note that a decision of the 
High Court3 draws attention to the importance of ensuring that when it is 
intended that a statutory body should be guided by government policy in the 
exercise of its statutory powers and discretions, that intention should be made 
clear in the enabling legislation. Otherwise doubts may arise not only about 
whether it is proper for the body to take government policy into account, but also 
about the weight that may be attached to it. 
4.4. 19 Where a ministerial power of direction is given, there is sometimes a 
statutory requirement that directions be in writing, and sometimes also a 
requirement that they be publicly notified. In some instances the requirement is 
that the minister table his direction in Parliament within a specified number of 
Sitting days (usually 15) of his having given it (examples being the Broadcasting 
1. Submission No. 475  and Transcript of Hearings, p. 1901. 
2. Submission No. 411 and Transcript of Hearings, p. 1799. 
3. R. v. Anderson; ex pane IPEC—Air Pty. Ltd. I965)/I 13/CLR/I77. 
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and Television Act, Australian Shipping Commission Act, Reserve Bank Act, 
Postal Services Act). In some others the requirement is merely that the directions 
given be set out in the authority's annual report, which the Minister is obliged to 
table (the Australian Housing Corporation Act, Australian Apple and Pear 
Corporation Act, Hospitals and Health Services Commission Act). In a few 
instances, the minister is obliged merely to publish his directions in the Gazette 
as in the Industries Research and Developments Grant Act, the Trade Practices 
Act 
4.4.20 It is difficult to discern any consistent and rational principle in these 
various arrangements and their adoption in some cases but not others. We 
R33 recommend that, for the purpose of clear and public identification of responsibility 
and accountability, the exercise by a minister of any power of direction to a 
statutory body should: 
(a) be required to be in writing and recorded in the annual report of the 
authority if the body is under a duty to publish a report; 
(h) be tabled in the Parliament within a specified time after issue. 
4-4.21 Statutory guidelines: The discretion of a statutory body to determine 
the policies it will pursue in exercising its powers and functions may be limited not 
only by the powers of direction given to ministers, but also by the statutory 
prescription of the body's objects or purposes, of considerations it should take into 
account, or of heads of government policy to which it must have regard. 
Prescriptions of this kind may be additional to or in lieu of the reservation of 
ministerial powers of direction. They seem to have been adopted mainly in 
relation to authorities whose activities have a significant impact on the working of 
the economy and its management; examples are sub-section 39(I) of the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act (prescribing a regard for the state of the 
national economy), section io of the Reserve Bank Act (stipulating the monetary 
and banking policy be directed to the greatest advantage of the people of 
Australia', with currency stability, full employment  and prosperity being 
mentioned as objectives), and section 22 of the Industries Assistance Commission 
Act (enjoining that body to improve and promote the well being of the people of 
Australia, with many factors being mentioned). 
4.4.22 The practice of incorporating policy guidelines in Acts constituting 
statutory bodies was commended to us by the then chairman of the Industries 
Assistance Commission, Mr G. A. Rattigan, as one which should be used more 
frequently. The Commission recognises that the practice can be of value when the 
powers and functions conferred on a statutory body allow considerable latitude of 
choice as to the purposes or objects, and also when it is clear that a body's actions 
or decisions will have a significant impact on, say, the economy. Further, a clear 
instruction by statute that an authority must have regard to government policy 
on particular matters may sometimes be preferable to reserving an open-ended 
ministerial power of direction, in that it obliges the authority to give weight to 
government policy without obliging it to defer to political dictation. in Britain 
such statement of purpose' clauses have recently been the subject of report by a 
committee appointed by the Lord President of the Council. While that committee 
did not address itself specifically to the question at issue here, we are in broad 
R14 agreement with its views. 1  We recommend that purpose clauses be used when the 
i. 	 S'e "I'll 	 PrpalatioII ()! lagilatioll', Lmnd 6053 1975: at paraglaj)lm ii .6-i 1.8. 
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factors mentioned earlier in this paragraph are present, but that they be used 
selectively, and when they are the most convenient method of clarifying the scope 
and effect of legislation. 
4.4.2 3 Relations with departments: The relationship between a depart-
ment of state and statutory bodies within the minister's portfolio obviously 
depends largely on the minister's powers with respect to those bodies. Other 
relevant factors are whether the body is funded separately from the department, 
whether it depends for its funds on annual parliamentary appropriations, 
whether it depends on the department for provision of staff, and how its activities 
parallel, impinge upon or are affected by those of the department. Submissions to 
the Commission suggest that problems have sometimes arisen concerning the 
departments role in advising the minister on matters falling within the 
responsibilities of statutory bodies, and also concerning the body's right of direct 
access to the minister. There appeared to be fairly general agreement that the 
minister was entitled to look to his department for advice on the exercise of his 
reserve powers in relation to bodies in his portfolio, and that accordingly there 
needed to be a capacity in the department to give informed advice. A special case 
has arisen with some new advisory bodies whose brief covers ground which a 
department can still regard as its responsibility. While the status of the body does 
not preclude the minister from seeking advice from other sources, there is a 
danger that unless clear guidance is given as to the department's involvement, 
and unless the body and the department establish a close working relationship, 
the department will continue to maintain and develop its advisory capacity in 
competition with the advisory body. In such cases, there is a special need for the 
minister to foster consultation and collaboration between the two agencies, and to 
give guidance on the role of each. If an acceptable delineation of functions cannot R35 
be achieved, it may be found necessary to specify the functions of the statutory 
body more precisely in its legislation, or to abolish it. 
4.4.24 Difficulties which non-advisory bodies have experienced in gaining 
access to ministers (the Bureau of Meteorology being a case in point) normally 
arise when the functions of the department and the statutory body are not clearly 
distinct. It is important that ministers establish lines of communication for a new 
body, or continue the lines used by their predecessors to existing bodies, and we 
suggest there is a case for regular conferences between departmental heads and R36 
heads of statutory bodies, which ministers might on occasions attend. 
4.4.25 A further means of ensuring the co-ordination of the work of department 
and statutory body is by appointing departmental officers to the governing 
boards ofstatutorv bodies. In evidence given to us, there was no unanimity about 
the capacity in which such officers are appointed. Some felt it was to represent the 
views of their departments, some understood they had been appointed in a 
Personal capacity. There are occasions when appointment of a departmental 
officer provides a useful link between ministers and departments on the one hand 
and statutory bodies on the other, and we see no a priori objection to such 
appointments where the statutory body has been established not so much to place 
the performance of a function outside the political sphere of influence as to 
Provide for administration of a fairly specific scheme of legislation (for example 
the Health Insurance Commission) or where the body is to include non-officials 
(such as the Repatriation Commission). However, conflicts of loyalties can occur 
Where a departmental officer is privy to decisions taken by a statutory body which 
the minister may veto. Likewise, knowledge of the influence of the departmental 
member on the minister may discourage candour among other members of a 
statutory body in deliberative processes. Although these risks are present, no 
evidence has been placed before the Commission which suggests that serious 
difficulties have in fact arisen from the presence of departmental officers on the 
boards of statutory authorities which are subject to ministerial powers of 
direction. 
Relations with the Parliament 
4.4.26 When Parliament entrusts statutory powers and functions to a minister, 
the normal intention is that he should be accountable to the Parliament for the 
exercise of the powers, and in his administration should be amenable to influence 
through parliamentary processes. The creation by Act of Parliament of non-
ministerial agencies represents a departure from this mode of safeguarding 
against the abuse of public power. Taken to extremes, it could represent a 
substantial modification of the constitutional system through the addition of what 
would amount to a fourth branch of government, separate from the executive 
branch and largely exempt from the operation of the constitutional conventions 
which harness the executive to the legislature. 
4.4.2 7 Things have not been taken to quite this length. Many Acts creating 
statutory bodies reserve some powers to ministers or give ministers powers of 
direction, and in relation to those powers, the conventions of ministerial 
responsibility apply. Further, the Parliament, in granting powers to non-
ministerial agencies has in most cases imposed an implied duty to account to itself 
for exercise of those powers by requiring the agencies to report annually through 
the minister, and, if they keep separate accounts, to submit annual financial 
statements. The imposition of a statutory duty to report is indicative of 
Parliament's desire to be kept inli iii id. Init of itself is no guide to Parliament's 
intentions as to how far the agency should be subject to the kind of political 
control and influence that can be brought to bear on ministers. 
4.4.28 Generalisations about the supervisory and censorial role of Parliament in 
relation to statutory agencies are hazardous. It does not follow that, merely 
because Parliament has chosen persons or bodies other than ministers as the 
bearers of statutory authority, it has resolved that the exercise of that authority 
should be removed entirely from the political domain. Likewise, it does not follow 
that because the Houses of Parliament have plenary powers of investigation and 
wide latitude to debate (Constitution, section 49),  it is proper for them to intrude 
into every aspect of the administration of statutory powers. Clearly there are some 
cases where parliamentary intention and practice, reinforced by judicial 
pronouncements, have circumscribed the modes by which Parliament may 
control the execution of statutory authority, as in the case of quasi-judicial and 
arbitral bodies. Unless Parliament's intentions are manifest, the fact that it has 
conferred authority directly on a non-ministerial agency may encourage the 
belief that the normal rules of accountability through the political process, 
including through ministerial responsibility, do not apply. If it is because of 
convention rather than strict law that the Parliament is asked to approve 
legislation setting up and providing the basic terms and conditions of operation, it 
may be possible that companies legislation could in some circumstances, be used 
as an alternative vehicle. However, we draw attention to the fact that where 
extensive use is to be made of companies legislation, not only the initiating and 
censorial, but possibly also the supervisory role of Parliament would be seriously 
eroded, unless an alternative means of accountability were developed. 
4.4.29 The notion that a body's independence of ministers means independence 
of Parliament appears to have gained some currency from the parliamentary 
practice of disallowing questions to ministers on subjects falling within the 
domain of statutory authorities over which the minister in question has no power 
of control. This practice has, however, been followed much less rigorously in the 
Australian Parliament than in the United Kingdom. In Australia ministers 
commonly furnish answers to questions about statutory agencies within their 
portfolios, after obtaining the information sought from the agency, but in so doing 
they tend to act as 'go-betweens', and do not, by furnishing answers, accept 
responsibility for action or inaction which their replies disclose. There have been 
occasions when ministers have queried the right of the Houses to insist upon the 
production of certain detailed information, for instance about some of the 
operations of commercial public corporations. The notion of independence is also 
modified by the practice of parliamentary committees, such as the Public 
Accounts Committee and the Senate Estimates Committees, in taking evidence 
from representatives of various statutory bodies. 
4.4.30 It is ultimately for Parliament to decide to what extent statutory agencies 
should be liable to account to it and should be subject to parliamentary control 
and influence. The resolution of Parliament's supervisory role is likely to be 
sometimes fraught with controversy, because it touches on issues of political 
philosophy and ideology regarding the province of government and of party 
politics. However, the review initiated by the last Commonwealth Parliament of 
its committee system has now proposed the establishment of a Standing 
Committee on Public Administration with jurisdiction over all government 
funded instrumentalities or organisations.' The report of the joint Committee on 
the Parliamentary Committee System stated: 
'Statutory corporations and semi-governmental authorities must fall within the 
jurisdictions of the subject matter committees of both Houses. This is an area 
which the Parliament has not properly overseen in the past. It is an area which 
deserves the immediate attention of Parliament.' 
It is not clear how far the Joint Committee considered the possibility of proposing 
the establishment of a standing committee, similar to the United Kingdom's 
Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, to make periodic inquiry into the 
activities of statutory corporations that are distinctively commercial and also into 
those government owned companies which are incorporated under State or 
Commonwealth Territories companies legislation. We believe a committee with 
that limited focus has considerably more to commend it than one empowered to 
scrutinise the operations of statutory corporations at large. Its main functions 
would be to investigate whether the activities of the corporations are in 
accordance with their statutory functions and in the public interest, and to assess 
the economy and efficiency of their management. 
4-4-31  In recent years the Senate has expressed the view that the Parliament is 
A New Parliamentary Committee System: Report of the Joint Committee on the 
Parliamentary Committee System, 26 May 1976, para. 164-166. See Chapter 5.1 br it 
further discussion of this report. 
entitled to investigate the expenditure of public funds by statutory bodies. While 
we do not dissent from this we express concern that the Houses of Parliament (and 
their committees) could, in the quest for details and explanations of expenditures, 
derogate from the independence and freedom that Parliament has deliberately 
accorded some authorities in the carrying out of their statutory functions with 
funds voted by the Parliament. If the bodies are not to have this degree of 
autonomy then, as we have observed elsewhere, it would be preferable not to 
create a statutory form which has that appearance: the use of departmental 
machinery would be preferable. The line is a fine one, and the drawing of it needs 
to be left to the judgment of members of the Parliament whose task is to scrutinise 
and criticise administration, but not to conduct it. 
4.4.32 One of the most important regular sources of information to Parliament 
about the activities of statutory bodies is their annual reports. No fewer than 16 
out of the io6 bodies from which we have data in response to our survey are under 
no obligation to submit annual reports. Most of these are either advisory or 
regulatory in character, but this does not in our view exonerate them from the 
R37 need to report, and we recommend that where a decision is taken to create a separate 
statutory body, it should be placed under obligation to report through the 
minister to the Parliament. Further, we find that only thirty out of the bodies 
surveyed use or contemplate the possibility of using their annual report directly or 
indirectly as an explanatory or informatory medium to answer public complaints 
or criticism, or to make comment on issues of concern to them. Given the 
R38 importance of informing Parliament about such issues, we recommend that the 
governing board of each statutory body, or its chief officer, include in its report to 
the Parliament an account of any issues of concern or an account of the nature of 
criticism it has received during the year of report. 
4.4.33 Our attention has also been drawn to two particular matters concerning 
the review of the financial administration of statutory bodies. The usual practice 
has been for the Auditor-General to be appointed by, or under the provisions of, 
the enabling act but some of the earlier legislation in particular is defective in that 
it does not spell out in sufficient detail the powers, functions and duties of the 
Auditor-General. 1  Further than that, it may not authorise the kind of efficiency 
audit we have proposed elsewhere in this report that the Auditor-General should 
R39 conduct (Chapter 3.6 and ii.). We recommend that the Audit Act be amended to 
allow the efficiency audit functions of the Auditor-General to apply to statutory 
bodies generally,  and on a basis that would permit new legislation establishing 
statutory bodies simply to invoke the relevant provisions of the Audit Act. This is 
a procedure followed in a number of countries, for example Canada and New 
Zealand, which could be followed here with advantage. Additionally, our 
attention has been drawn to a deficiency in the machinery available for bringing 
before the Public Accounts Committee matters relating to the financial affairs of 
statutory bodies, government owned companies and other government con-
trolled instrumentalities. Under section 8 of the Public Accounts Committee Act 
1951-1966 the duties of the Committee are to examine the accounts of the 
receipts and expenditure of the Commonwealth and each statement and report 
transmitted to the Parliament by the Auditor-General. As the accounts of these 
I . General Background information by Auditor-General, pages 8-9; supplied with Submission 
192 1(1) tile Commission. 
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bodies do not in many cases form part of the accounts of the Commonwealth, 
matters relating to their financial administration can only come before the 
Committee if the Auditor-General exercises his discretion under section 51A of 
the Audit Act to include material in his reports. We believe it should not be left to 
the discretion of the Auditor-General to determine whether reports upon duties 
carried out by him under Acts other than the Audit Act should be examined by 
the Joint Committee of Public Accounts. Accordingly, we recommend appropriate R40 
amendment either of the Audit Act or of the Public Accounts Committee Act. 
Membership of Governing Bodies 
4.4.34 Appointments to statutory bodies are one of the most important of the 
general controls exercised by the government over such bodies, and the 
procedures for selection deserve careful attention. The importance of this form of 
governmental control justifies the present practice of vesting the power in the 
Governor-General or a minister, with Cabinet in the more important cases 
having a say. Leaving aside cases where it is expressly provided that certain 
members be appointed from among persons nominated in some representative 
capacity, the Commission believes that the Commonwealth government should, 
where possible, develop a procedure whereby it has short lists of possible 
appointees, drawn up after thorough inquiry. (A parallel recommendation is 
made in Chapter i 1.6 about higher appointments' in the Public Service). A 
great many statutory offices carry responsibilities and salary entitlements as great 
as those for senior appointments in the Australian Public Service, and unless 
appointments to those offices are seen to be merited and to have proceeded from a 
determination to select primarily on the basis of relative merit from an open field, 
statutory offices may come to be regarded as little more than instruments of 
political patronage. 
4.4.35 Figures in a list supplied to the Commission, showing the number of full-
time members ofstatutory authorities atJunc 1975 as 175 and part-time members 
as in the vicinity of 790, are both probably too low. Thus the number involved, 
even allowing for the fact that some members are also officers of departments, is 
very considerable and still does not take into account the membership of non-
statutory bodies, ad hoc committees and commissions of inquiry. 
4.4.36 Typically, the power to appoint members and also to terminate their 
appointments is vested in the Governor-General, or more rarely in ministers. 
Qualifications for appointment are rarely prescribed by legislation, and 
regulation of the processes of selection is exceptional. Representative membership 
tends to be a feature of primary produce marketing bodies, and stall 
representation has recently been provided for some bodies such as the Postal 
Commission and the Australian Broadcasting Commission. In most cases, 
appointments are for fixed terms of years, prescribed by statute. Where the power 
of appointment is vested in the Governor-General, he is commonly authorised to 
terminate a member's appointment for misbehaviour or physical or mental 
incapacity, and in some cases for inefficiency. 
4.4.37 While we do not suggest uniform selection procedures, we recommend that R41 
where it is proposed to appoint to fill vacancies in full-time positions otherwise 
than by reappointment of a present incumbent at the end of his term, the normal 
course should be to invite applications and nominations by public advertise-
ments. Where special qualifications are required, these should be made public so 
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that the criteria of selection are understood. If there are occasions where public 
advertisement is not appropriate, perhaps because of conventions operating in 
the profession from which the appointee is expected to come, there may well be 
other methods of ensuring that the likely field of appointees is surveyed, for 
example by invitation of applications or nominations through professional bodies 
and particular institutions. Where there is a special need to inspire confidence in 
the choice made, an ad hoc advisory panel could be constituted including qualified 
persons from outside the department and perhaps from outside Commonwealth 
government employment. 
4.4.38 Careful attention needs to be given to the role part-time members are 
expected to play. Where demands are likely to be as great as those made on part-
time employees, alternative means of securing the contribution of outsiders 
should be investigated. The alternative might be the appointments of consultants 
or of additional staff so that less demands of time are placed on the members of the 
advisory council or committee. 
4.4.39 The legislation establishing the Postal and Telecommunications Com-
missions broke new ground by making provision for appointment to each 
Commission of a staff representative, after consultation with the relevant staff 
associations. In 1975 a representative elected by employees was appointed to the 
Australian Broadcasting Commission, but this was done without amendment of 
R42 the Broadcasting and Television Act. We recommend that experience with these 
appointments be evaluated. Subject to the evaluation and to an understanding 
that staff representatives are not appointed to act as delegates or agents who are 
bound to vote on instruction by those whom they represent, we consider requests 
for appointment of staff representatives merit sympathetic consideration, 
particularly when the organisation is the employing authority.' Staff repre-
sentation may be appropriate for those statutory authorities which are 
commercial or semi-commercial undertakings or public utilities like the 
Australian Broadcasting Commission. The issue is more complex in the case of 
bodies whose functions are regulatory or advisory or the determination of 
individual rights, liabilities and entitlements. In such cases staff representation 
would be undesirable in the determination of strictly policy issues, as distinct from 
management matters—to the extent that such separation is possible. This 
restriction should not be applicable to staff representation on promotions appeal 
committees and disciplinary tribunals. We deal further with this question in 
Chapter 9.6. 86-87. 
4.4.40 The procedures for terminating appointments of members of the boards 
of statutory bodies are, in our view, unsatisfactory. There is usually no 
requirement that there be a hearing before dismissal on grounds of misbehaviour, 
as is provided in the Public Service Act for first and second division officers, 
although there may be an implied duty to accord natural justice. We consider 
that, at least in the case of full-time members of boards, the procedure should in 
substance be modelled on that available to senior officers under the Public Service 
R43 Act. Accordingly, we recommend that no statutory officer or member of a statutory 
board be removable from office for misbehaviour except after inquiry and report 
by an independent board or tribunal. Further, we doubt the efficiency of the 
I . 	 For a discussion of legal issues involved in these forms of staff representation, see Street, J., in 
Beiine/ts v. The Board oJ Ejie Commosioners oJ j\ S. W. (1967), 87 \Veeklv notes. 
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procedures for removal which apply in the case of the Insurance Commissioner 
and members of the Industries Assistance Commission: these involve the 
possibility of reinstatement by resolution of either House of the Parliament. The 
procedures are not well designed to ensure a fair hearing and impartiality in what 
is essentially an adjudicatory process, and we recommend that consideration be R44 
given to providing procedures for holders of these offices similar to those we have 
recommended for the generality of statutory office holders. 
4.4-41 Our attention has been drawn to the situation of statutory office holders 
whose offices are abolished by statute before the expiry of the term of their 
appointment. Their situation varies according to whether at the time their offices 
were abolished they were persons to whom the Officers' Rights Declaration Act 
applied. Under the Act a public servant is, broadly speaking, entitled to 
reinstatement in the Public Service. But a person who does not come within the 
Officers' Rights Declaration Act has no legal right to be placed in employment 
elsewhere in the service of the government, and no legally enforceable right to be 
compensated for premature loss of office. While the authority of the Parliament to 
repeal the legislation creating statutory authorities is unquestioned, the position 
of the senior officers involved is clearly unsatisfactory. It could act as a deterrent 
to prospective appointees. 
4.4.42 We doubt whether it would be necessary or even wise to accord such 
persons a legal right to- be placed elsewhere in Commonwealth government 
service. Nor would we endorse without qualification arrangements suggested to 
us which would involve payment of a lump sum equivalent to the annual salary 
payable for the balance of the term: individual circumstances vary, as does the 
extent to which the officer is able to mitigate the loss. Accordingly, we recommend R45 
that general legislation be drawn up which establishes a right to compensation, 
with the amount being determined from case to case according to declared 
principles, by an independent tribunal—a right similar to that which a private 
employee has to obtain damages for wrongful dismissal. We believe, however, 
that the compensation payable in this way should be rather more generous than 
would be available if the common law remedies were strictly applied. The 
Remuneration Tribunal seems to us to be a body which could appropriately be 
charged with responsibility for assessing the compensation payable, and we 
Suggest it be given that responsibility. 	 R46 
4.5 HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS 
4.5.i From the outset of our inquiries the position of departmental heads 
attracted interest and discussion. Numerous submissions had a bearing on the 
functions or powers of departmental heads, the Public Service Board provided us 
with a memorandum on the subject, and in July 1975 the then Prime Minister 
asked that we consider how power over and responsibility for departments should 
be divided between ministers and departmental heads. The Public Service Act 
recognises the special position of departmental or permanent heads by providing 
Specific means for their appointment and dismissal and by including them 
automatically in the first division of the Service. Departmental heads constitute in 
effect the main link between the public service as a whole and the government, as 
represented by ministers. They are often key figures in relations between the 
government (including departments) and statutory bodies. They are of great 
importance to the government both in terms of the advice it receives from the 
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public service and in terms of the successful implementation of its policies, and 
therefore warrant special attention from the Commission. Much has already been 
said in this chapter concerning departmental heads, in their relations with 
ministers and in the enhancement of initiative and accountability in depart-
ments. it remains here to consider other questions bearing on their functions and 
powers, their appointment and their tenure of office. 
Responsibilities and Powers 
4.5.2 The Public Service Board, in its memorandum, said that it saw merit in a 
clearer definition of the responsibilities of departmental heads. Aspects which it 
thought deserving of consideration were: 
(a) specific mention of the departmental head's responsibilities for economical 
and efficient management of his department; 
(b) a recognised procedure for rcporting any differences between a minister 
and the head of department concerning the legality of a ministerial 
direction on a financial matter; 
(c) amplification of the departmental head's roles in policy advising and 
policy implementation and administration; 
(d) an established practice to cover his advisory functions in relation to other 
associated agencies within the minister's purview; 
(e) clarification of his role in matters outside his minister's portfolio where the 
minister is 'minister assisting' another minister; 
({ explicit relationships with his minister where the departmental head is 
exercising powers directly conferred on him by statute. 
The Board's first suggestion, for an explicit statement of the departmental head's 
obligation to promote efficiency, becomes the more necessary with our proposals 
for increased delegated authority to departments. It would be met by an 
amendment of section 2 5(2) of the Public Service Act on lines similar to the 
corresponding section of the New Zealand legislation, such as we have 
recommended in paragraph 4.2.8. The Board's remaining suggestions have been 
taken into consideration in this and other sections of our Report. 
4.5.3 Apart from these matters, material before the Commission indicates a 
need to clarify the division of authority and responsibility between the Public 
Service Board and departmental heads, which cannot be ascertained simply from 
a reading of the provisions of the Act. The principal powers which the Act reposes 
in departmental heads, and which indicate the scope of their managerial 
authority in matters of concern to the Board fall into the following broad 
categories: 
(a) departmental establishments and organisation; 
(b) promotion and transfer of staff; 
(c) discipline.' 
4.5.4 In relation to establishments and organisation the new arrangements the 
Commission proposes in Chapter 9. i mean that departmental heads would in 
future have considerably greater discretion to structure and vary the organisation 
of their departments. in place of the processes associated with the creation of 
I . The departmental heads powers in respect of discipline derive from the fact that he exercises 
chief officer powers. 
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offices under section 29 of the Public Service Act, we suggest a new process by 
which departmental heads are given authority each year to employ certain 
numbers and categories of staff. Within that overall limit, they will be free to 
organise the work of the department as they consider most efficient, subject to 
inspection by officers of the Public Service Board and also subject to efficiency 
audit by the Auditor-General (see Chapter 11  .4). It should be noted that the 
departmental head does not and will not bear final responsibility for determining 
what the tasks of his department are to be, or what priority should be accorded 
between them, though in his capacity as adviser to the minister he may well have 
been influential in shaping the objectives set for the department. He will 
continue, however, to have a major responsibility for ensuring that staffing 
proposals are developed to ensure the more economical, efficient or convenient 
working of the department. In relation to promotion, the provision of a statutory 
right of appeal in effect obliges departmental heads to exercise their power to 
select for promotion according to the same criteria as promotions appeal 
committees. We do not wish to change this, but in Chapter 8.4 we recommend 
that in future the sole criterion for promotion be efficiency. In relation to 
discipline, amendments of the Public Service Act proposed in 1975 have the effect 
of increasing the role of departments in the disciplinary process, and we endorse 
those changes. In Chapter 8.5 we discuss the question of appeals against penalties 
imposed for disciplinary matters. 
It is necessary to clarify the relationship of the head of a department to 
statutory bodies which are in the minister's portfolio. The fact of statutory 
creation expresses a legislative intent to remove matters within the responsibility 
of the statutory body from the concern of the department, yet some departments 
tend to maintain a capacity to monitor the work of the statutory body by 
substantial parallel staffing in the department. Such duplication is prima Jacie 
evidence of waste. The capacity of the departmental head to advise his minister 
on the relationship of the work of the statutory agency to his wider responsibilities 
should not depend upon such staffing. We would expect the Public Service Board 
and the Auditor-General to pay particular attention to the waste involved in such 
'parallel bureaucracies'. 
4.5.6 It is important that ministers should recognise that primary responsibility 
for the efficient management of the department in relation to staff performance 
should lie with the departmental head, and that staff should not be confused by 
potentially conflicting instructions from minister and departmental head. This 
will not prevent a minister indicating to his departmental head that he wishes, for 
example, to receive advice from individual officers or have them assigned to 
certain tasks, but the arrangement of these matters should clearly rest with the 
departmental head. At present departmental heads are not clearly responsible for 
financial administration within their departments. Their legal authority in 
relation to Accounting Officers within their departments is obscure and their 
powers of intervention unclear. We recommend that departmental heads be R47 
appointed Accounting Officers. This would not only recognise their primary 
responsibility, but would ensure that matters relating to financial management 
which arise from audit examinations are brought to the notice of those best able to 
take corrective action. The appointment of a departmental head as Accounting 
Officer would raise the formal possibility of conflict between his responsibilities in 
this role with directions he has received from his minister. We believe such conflict 
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would be rare, but the possibility requires that a department head have a 
statutory right to record with the Auditor-General and the Treasury his dissent 
from a ministerial decision which he believes conflicts with the law governing 
R48 flnancialadministration. We recommend accordingly, and suggest that if the need 
arises the head of the department should bring the matter to the notice of the 
minister in writing, stating his objections, so ensuring that the minister responds 
in writing, with whatever direction he decides to give. 
4.5.7 The Public Service Board invited our attention to the problems that have 
arisen where a departmental head is exercising powers directly conferred on him 
by statute. These difficulties were underlined by the decision of the High Court of 
Australia' concerning the right of the relevant minister to control the exercise of 
the discretion of the Director-General of Civil Aviation to permit the import of 
aircraft. The differences of judicial opinion which emerged in that case suggest 
that where it is intended that the exercise of a statutory power or discretion should 
be subject to ministerial control and direction, it would be preferable to vest the 
power in the minister with authority to delegate, or if the power is reposed in an 
officer, its exercise should be declared to be subject to the direction of the minister, 
either generally or in relation to policy. If this is not done it should then be 
reasonable to assume that the considerations justifying the exercise of the 
discretion are technical or in other ways of a kind requiring the officer to exercise 
independent judgment. 
Appointment of Departmental Heads 
4.5.8 Despite the proposals of the Boyer Committee and others, appointments 
to the key position of departmental head remain less regulated than do any other 
appointments within the Public Service. The flexibility that the government has 
retained in this area is epitomised by section 54  of the Public Service Act which, 
while envisaging that appointments might be made on the recommendation of 
the Public Service Board, provides alternatively that they may be made 'by the 
Governor-General without reference to the Board.' In practice the minister and 
the Prime Minister in most cases consult the Board, and recommendations receive 
Cabinet approval before being submitted to the Governor-General. 
4.5.9 In view of the importance of these appointments, the Commission 
considers it desirable that they should be the result of a process of consultation 
which would culminate in the collective approval of Cabinet. We consider it 
R49 unnecessarily inhibiting to legislate on this matter but recommend that when it is 
intended to appoint a departmental head: 
(a) the vacancy be advertised whenever circumstances allow, but with the 
concurrence of the Prime Minister; 
(b) a small panel be appointed to nominate and comment on a short list of 
suitable persons for Cabinet consideration: the panel being appointed by 
the Prime Minister and the minister after consultation with the Chairman 
of the Public Service Board; 
(c) ministers have the right to nominate a potential appointee or appointees 
for consideration by the advisory panel; 
(d) the short list, in order of preference, of the potential appointees resulting 
R. v. Anderson; ex parte IPEC-Air Pty Ltd (1965)/I i3/CLR/i77. See also paragraph 4.4.18 
above. 
from the deliberations of the panel, together with its comments, be given to 
the minister and the Prime Minister by the Chairman of the Public Service 
Board; 
(e) the relevant minister and Cabinet approve the ultimate selection. 
In Chapter i 1.6 we recommend that the Public Service Board should maintain a 
list of potential candidates for higher appointments and draw attention to 
impending vacancies. 
4.5.10 It is most probable that, as in the past, the majority of appointments to 
positions of head of a department will be made from within the Service. However 
the position of departmental head should not be 'closed', although we would be 
disappointed if the career service did not produce the best candidates in the 
majority of instances. 
ii We see no need to prescribe by statute the qualifications for 
departmental heads generally, or for heads of particular departments. Though in 
every case an essential qualification would seem to be proven ability to manage 
and administer, other attributes, skills and experience varying from department 
to department, and possibly from time to time, may be relevant. In the case of the 
Director-General of Health, who is also head of the Department of Health, it is 
provided by section 5  of the National Health Act that 'a person is not eligible to be 
appointed as the Director-General unless he is a legally qualified medical 
practitioner of not less than ten years' standing'. Consistent with ensuring the 
minimum of barriers between positions, with the increased managerial as well as 
advisory roles of departmental heads, and with the practice in relation to the 
heads of other departments having substantial professional groups, for example 
Attorney-General's and Construction, we recommend that this limitation to R50 
medical practitioners be removed from the legislation. It would then be necessary 
to review the statutory powers vested in the Director-General of Health for the 
purpose of determining whether there is good reason to retain the office in 
addition to that of departmental head, and if so whether the occupant should be 
qualified as a medical practitioner and whether any other powers now exercisable 
by him should properly be exercised by the head of the Department of Health, 
even though that officer may not be-medically qualified. 
Tenure 
4.5.12 A good deal of the discussion about departmental heads has been 
concerned with their tenure of office. Existing arrangements do not preclude 
changes in the occupancy of departmental head positions. Following the changes 
of government in December 1972 and December 1975, substantial changes were 
made in the structure and functions of departments, and a large number of 
departmental heads were displaced or relocated. There has been some disquiet 
about such changes. However, a departmental head whose department is 
abolished or who agrees to vacate his office does not thereby lose his position in the 
public service, but at present becomes an 'unattached officer', that is an officer 
not occupying an office created under the Public Service Act. 
4.5.13 There is a very strong body of opinion, especially among senior officers of 
the Australian Public Service, that departmental heads ought not to be 
removable from office at pleasure. The reasons given for this view are, in many 
cases, the same as those for opposing the suggestion that appointments to the office 
be for fixed, but renewable, terms. The case for according security of tenure 
depends heavily on prevailing conceptions about the nature of the office and the 
relation of the departmental head to the minister. Thus it is argued that since one 
of the most important functions of a departmental head is to give objective and 
impartial advice to his minister, he should not, in the public interest, be placed in 
a situation where he may be tempted, even subconsciously, to withhold or 
moderate unpalatable advice for fear of incurring displeasure and putting his job 
at risk. It is pointed out also that the advice departmental heads tender to their 
minister is confidential. By convention the minister assumes political re-
sponsibility for action taken on that advice, and departmental heads do not 
discuss or defend in public the advice they have given. 1  It is suggested that this 
anonymity strengthens the case for security of tenure: if departmental heads were 
publicly identified with the advice they give to ministers and were able to defend 
themselves, any removal from office for partisan political reasons would be 
apparent and likely to attract unfavourable attention. 
4.5.14 On the other hand, it has been put to us that it is vital for a government to 
be able to count on the wholehearted support of departmental heads, and that a 
minister needs as his closest adviser a person with whom he can work effectively 
and harmoniously. It is claimed that there is an increasing need for departmental 
heads to become publicly known and publicly accountable for the actions of their 
departments. It has also been suggested that procedures are necessary to deal with 
departmental heads who prove to be less than efficient, and that it is desirable, 
from time to time, that any departmental head should be transferred to another 
position. Such arguments have led to proposals that departmental heads be 
appointed for a term, or at least be removable from office. 
4.5.15 There are deficiencies in both extremes of the views set out above—that 
the departmental head should be assured of 'permanence' or that he should be 
removable 'at pleasure'. Arrangements are needed that will allow for flexible and 
efficient use of the talents available at this level, while also ensuring the necessary 
continuity in administration. In our view, it is appropriate that a government 
should have a power to transfer a departmental head where it sees a need. But it 
should have in mind its responsibility to make the best use of those working for it 
in the longer as well as the shorter term, and the effect low morale has on 
efficiency. It is necessary to reconcile the government's desire for flexible and 
responsive administration at the top; the general need for experienced 
administration; and the claims of senior officers, and the career service as a whole, 
to have appointments and movements made without caprice and after due 
process. 
4.5.16 We have canvassed opinion on the question whether fixed terms of office 
up to a maximum period should be prescribed for heads of departments. Besides 
drawing opinions from within the Public Service and outside, we have had the 
advantage of discussions with members of the Committee of Inquiry into the 
Public Service of South Australia, who in their report recommended appoint-
ment for terms of seven years. We have come to the conclusion that any 
advantages accruing from a system of fixed term appointments are outweighed by 
the disadvantages, and that rotation of departmental heads could be achieved 
more satisfactorily without such a system. A universal and mandatory system of 
fixed-term appointments would introduce a degree of rigidity into the staffing of 
I . 	 But see Chapter 5.1.37. 
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senior positions in departments which governments could find highly incon-
venient and an impediment to the execution of their policies. A fixed term may 
have the effect of lengthening the period a person should serve, just as it may 
arbitrarily cut a period of service too short. 
4.5.17 Nonetheless we are firmly of the view that it should be the practice for R51 
departmental heads to be moved and that, unless there are special reasons, they 
should not remain in the one department for more than seven years. Many 
departmental heads have stated to the Commission that five to seven years in one 
department was enough, and that it was then time to move on. To this end, the 
machinery we have described in paragraph 4.5.9 to advise on candidates for 
appointment to departmental head positions could be used periodically, to 
review existing appointments of departmental heads who had served in the one 
department for five or more years. The task of the committee on this occasion 
would be to consider and advise the Prime Minister on how departmental heads 
who had served their departments for five or more years might be relocated. It 
should be expected that generally a departmental head would remain in a 
particular office for not less than three years. This review might, of course, 
proceed alongside the preparation of short-lists of possible appointees to vacancies 
or impending vacancies. We believe that, in future, movement of senior officers 
between departments and statutory bodies should be seen not only as normal but 
as something to be planned. It would help to broaden the career opportunities of 
senior managers, to diversify their experience and improve the quality and range 
of talents of the pool of individuals from which senior appointments may be made. 
A related use of the advisory machinery on departmental head appointments 
could be to assist in the relocation of displaced officers. Relocation is just as much 
a responsibility of the government as initial appointment, and the advisory group 
could provide a useful means of assisting the Public Service Board and the 
government in its performance. 
4-5- 18 There will be cases where a minister may wish to change his 
departmental head before this would occur in the ordinary progression. There are 
in our view, valid reasons why this may be desirable but it should not be done 
lightly on the unilateral decree of the minister, but only after deliberation and 
through the agency of a moderator. We recommend that a minister wishing to R52 
change his departmental head should refer his request to the Prime Minister who, 
if satisfied that the request is reasonable, should give the departmental head the 
opportunity to accept a transfer. If the departmental head proves unwilling, the 
Prime Minister should, before recommending compulsory transfer by act of the 
Governor-General, refer the case to the panel advising on selections for its 
advice. It is not envisaged that the adoption of this procedure would in any way 
affect the operation or use of statutory powers to procure removal from office for 
misconduct, incapacity, disability or other such recognised causes. 
4.5.19 Appointments of heads of departments should not necessarily be 
reviewed as a matter of course on a change of government, independently of any 
review which must occur as a consequence of administrative rearrangements. No 
case has been presented to the Commission for the development of a system which 
Would, in effect, make a departmental head's tenure of office cotcrminous with 
the life of the government under which he was appointed. The unquestionable 
need for departmental heads to serve faithfully the government's aims does not 
Mean that a person's capacity to give such service can be judged on the simple 
basis of whether he owed his initial appointment to a government of the same or 
different political persuasion. Extensive changes in the headships of departments 
during the settling in' phase of a new government could prove disruptive, and 
could deprive the new ministry of knowledge and experience on which it should 
rely heavily during its early days in office. 
A Statutory Office of Departmental Head 
4.5.20 In many ways, the desired capabilities of departmental heads resemble 
those of statutory office holders: indeed, they are treated in this way for purposes 
of determination of salaries by the Remuneration Tribunal. Partly for this reason, 
we have recommended in Chapter 9.4  of the Report that there be greater 
movement between the Public Service and statutory bodies. To facilitate this 
development, and also to resolve present ambiguities about the office of 
R53 departmental head, the Commission recommends that the office of departmental 
head be made statutory, governed by terms and conditions of appointment 
specific to it which would provide that a departmental head be appointed by the 
Governor-General and that: 
(a) the Governor-General should have a power to transfer a departmental 
head to another suitable office; 
(b) departmental heads appointed from outside the service should be 
appointed on negotiated initial terms and conditions which would cover, 
among any other points, the terms of severance as indicated below in 
paragraph 4.5.2 i; 
(c) occupants of the office should not by reason of their appointment become 
officers of the Australian Public Service; but 
(i) those who already were officers of the Service should be assured 
continuation of their rights under the Officers' Rights Declaration 
Act (or the wider Commonwealth Administration Act recom-
mended in Chapter 9.4),  on the same basis as officers appointed to 
other statutory offices. 
(ii) a departmental head who is not protected by the Officers' Rights 
Declaration Act but loses office by virtue of abolition of a 
department should be treated on the same basis as a statutory officer 
who loses his office by repeal of the statute under which he holds 
office (see paragraphs 4.4.40-42); 
4.5.2 i Adoption of this recommendation would introduce a distinction 
between departmental heads appointed from the Commonwealth Public Service 
and those appointed from outside the Service, in that a person appointed from 
outside the Service would not be covered by the Officers' Rights Declaration Act, 
and would have no statutory right to he employed in the Public Service. 
Otherwise it is not envisaged that the terms and conditions of employment of' 
departmental heads appointed from outside the Service should be any less 
favourable than those coming from the Service. It has to he recognised that in 
practice a degree ofinsccuritv alreacl exists in the office ofdepartmental head, as 
illustrated by experience over the past loui' years. Our object is not to increase this 
insecurity, but to suggest that the processes for determining movement be 
regularised and that arrangements for relocation be clarified and made more just. 
Legislation to give eflect to our recommendations should be expressed so as not to 
affect the status of' departmental heads serving at the time it comes into force, 
unless they elect in writing to he subject to the relevant statutory provisions. 
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4-5.22 To mark the difference between heads of departments and heads of 
statutory bodies, we consider the statue should provide that departmental heads 
would ex officio have the powers of a Chief Executive Officer (which would be a 
new position analogous to but distinct from that of the revitalised Chief Officer 
position we have proposed in paragraph 4.3.15 above, and that those heads of 
statutory bodies in whom it was desired to vest 'permanent head powers' would in 
future be appointed as Chief Executive Officers. Thus they would have the legal 
powers provided for in the Public Service Act, just as do heads of departments 
under current arrangements, but they would not have the 'status' of a 
departmental head. To this end, we recommend that a new position of Chief R54 
Executive Officer be provided for, with the powers currently conferred on heads 
of departments by the Public Service Act: 
(a) heads of departments would have these powers ex officio and they would be 
conferred as appropriate on Chief Executive Officers of other organisations 
staffed under the Public Service Act; 
(b) Chief Executive Officers would have power to delegate their powers to 
Chief Officers and others, and to revoke those delegations. 
4.5.2 3 Following our review of the office of 'permanent head' we have felt it 
desirable to consider whether that designation continues to be appropriate. In 
our view, it does not. Neither theory nor practice suggest that the holders of this 
office are 'permanent', nor in our view should they be. The generic title 
'permanent head' appears to have been taken over from British practice to 
differentiate between the political head of the department, that is the minister, 
and the non-political head. We believe the retention of the title tends to 
encourage the mistaken belief that the occupant of the office has a right to remain 
in it indefinitely. The extension of what is called 'permanent head status' in recent 
years to the holders of statutory offices who are not heads of departments has 
further eroded the descriptive value and accuracy of the term. We recommend that R55 
the office be designated 'head of department', a term which fits current usage 
quite well, and that the incumbent be normally designated 'secretary' as at 
present. In this connection, our recommendation above for the use of the title 
'Chief Executive Officer' will meet the needs of those statutory officers who need 
to be able to use the powers of the Public Service Act, while not equating or 
confusing their position with that of the departmental head which, as we have 
indicated, occupies a special place in the administration. 
4.6 MINISTERIAL OFFICES 
The Role of the Minister's Office 
4.6. i The expansion in ministerial offices which took place following the 
general elections in 1972 focussed attention on their role and function, not only 
because of the increase in numbers of appointments from both inside and outside 
the public service but also because many of the appointees were at a more senior 
level than had previously been the norm. Hitherto appointments had been of 
relativelyjunior level officers and a private secretary of middle level rank (mainly 
class 6 to 8), the new range of officers up to the top of the third division provided a 
potential for introducing a source of advice from within the service, additional to 
the advisory appointments made from outside. There were some who suggested to 
the Commission that the new system was a mistaken departure from the earlier 
role of the minister's private office, and tended to isolate the minister from his 
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department. Others suggested that this was the first step in the development of 
substantial private offices around ministers, possibly along the lines of the French 
ministerial 'cabinets'. It was further said that a more highly developed ministerial 
office would protect departments from involvement in political matters. Another 
view was that the adviser role was a temporary phenomenon, associated with the 
advent of a Labor government after a long period in opposition, and that over 
time ministerial offices would tend to revert to the purely facilitative role. 
4.6.2 The central question raised by these developments is which functions the 
ministerial office should discharge. At the one extreme, the view could be taken 
that the minister's office should be simply a small section of his department, with 
officers assigned to it just as they are to any other special unit within the 
department. In the early years of the Federation, up to the insertion of section 
48A in the Public Service Act in 1930, this appears in effect to have been the basis 
for staffing the then very small offices. The 1930 amendment implied some 
separation of the ministerial office from the department, by authorising the 
secondment of career service officers to become the private secretary of ministers 
and, more importantly, guaranteeing their reinstatement in the Service on 
termination of the appointment.' At the other extreme, the view has been taken 
that the minister's office should be a unit designed to be the minister's primary 
source of advice on policy, thus both reducing the government's dependence on 
officials and insulating the administration from political matters. 
4.6.3 To assist us in considering the role of Ministerial offices we engaged as 
consultant Dr R. F. I. Smith from the Australian National University, and we 
have also benefited from the research of Mr Roy Forward of the University of 
Queensland.' Mr Forward based his report on a questionnaire addressed to 
nearly all of the 179 people who had been on ministerial staffs during the period 
April 1972 to November 1974. He found the ministerial staff surveyed to be a 
relatively young group, 85 per cent of them being under 40. More than two-thirds 
of the group mentioned an interest in high-level government work among their 
three principal reasons for joining a minister's office, and more than half of them 
considered liaison with the Public Service to be among their three main roles. The 
other important functions envisaged by him were general office administration, 
advising the minister on policy and 'general trouble-shooting'. Only 2 per cent of 
the working time of ministerial staffs overall was estimated to be spent in contact 
with extra-parliamentary political groups. This survey confirms a conclusion 
reached by Dr Smith that, although the work of ministerial advisers varies 
considerably, most of it is concerned with the running of the office and liaison with 
departments: participation in the policy advising process has been essentially 
limited and restricted. 
4.6.4 A minister is at the centre of a very complex network of interests, and in 
our view the arrangements for administrative support will vork best if they do not 
impair those interests' capacity to influence him. Thus the minister is an 
important focus for his departmental officers, his ministerial colleagues, members 
of Parliament of both his own party and the opposition, as well as for members of 
the public: interest groups or individuals concerned with the work of the 
Arrangements for staffing ministerial offices are discussed in Chapter 9.4. 
Extracts from Dr Smith's report appear at Appendix i .J. Mr Forward's work has been 
published in APSA Papers, Volume 2, 1975. 
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department and persons with electoral and other political interests. Given the 
pressures on a minister's time, the primary role of his private office should be to 
regulate and organise the minister's communication with these sources of 
influence. Attempts by ministerial staff to interpose their personal influence 
between these sources and the minister are likely to impair his capacity to respond 
to such sources and to use effectively the resources potentially at his disposal. 
4.6.5 However, the Commission is not insensitive to the need of ministers for 
better staff resources immediately available to them. Where the minister feels this 
need we consider that it can best be met by raising the level and status of the 
private secretary. He or she is the person most closely and continuously involved 
with the minister and, if of suitable wisdom, experience and maturity, can be a 
most valuable resource. At the same time, a minister will not necessarily wish to 
have a person of this calibre in a private office—he may prefer simply to have an 
effective secretariat which ensures that he has access as he needs to other sources of 
advice and support. It should therefore be possible to staff ministers' offices so as to 
meet the minister's requirements. Accordingly, we recommend that the grading of R56 
ministerial private secretaries be made sufficiently wide to allow employment of 
people who at the lower end of the scale are essentially office managers, while at 
the other end they may include persons capable of research or advisory 
functions. 
4.6.6. We do not rule out the possibility that a minister may wish to 
have advisers at more senior levels in his private office although generally we 
consider it preferable that such advisers, even if appointed for a limited term 
should be integrated with the staff of the department. If a minister feels he needs 
additional support in terms of the policy analysis or options submitted to him, or 
in terms of the administrative issues that come before him, it is preferable that he 
should take up these needs with his departmental head and arrangements 
satisfactory to the minister be made to meet them. This course accords with the 
view the Commission has expressed that ministers can and should be involved in 
the way their departments work. There will be occasions when an additional 
officer with special knowledge, experience or capacity will be required to assist 
the minister, but it will frequently be more helpful to him if the resources of the 
department are more effectively mobilised or stimulated to be responsive to his 
needs. 
Departments and Ministerial Offices 
4.6.7 Dr Smith observes that there is inevitably some tension between 
departments and ministerial offices. This tension arises essentially because a 
department regards itself as the chief servant of the minister, and the moderating 
influence ministerial private offices have to exert in the interests of the other 
claims upon a minister's time inevitably means that there are times when a 
department has to wait its turn. The problem can be further exacerbated the 
more the ministerial office becomes involved in policy issues. Dr Smith observes 
that: 
the problem with policy-oriented ministerial staff is that their presence disrupts 
accepted patterns of bureaucratic influence. They challenge both the formal 
responsibility and informal practices of senior public servants, and in doing so 
focus unwelcome attention on bureaucratic politics'. 
In this connection, Mr Forward found that ministerial offices are not in practice 
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as much politically oriented as has sometimes been claimed. We accept that 
finding. Senior officials in departments are inevitably involved in preparing most 
of the material on which a minister's 'political' decisions are taken, and in 
carrying out those decisions. Departments are therefore inextricably involved in 
the political process. It is their task to fashion into administrative form the 
political policies and programs of the government and their minister and it is 
normal for them to bring to the attention of ministers political issues arising out of 
the administration of those programs. If they are shielded from the minister by a 
powerful private office, they may be unable to give him the advice and counsel he 
needs, or to obtain from him the judgments necessary if they are to execute 
policies to his satisfaction. Ultimately, it is for the minister to divide responsibility 
between the private office and the department. If he is wise he will make full use of 
the capacities of each. 
4.6.8 Material received by the Commission suggests that opinion among senior 
departmental officials differs as to whether ministerial staff ought to be involved 
in departmental processes leading to the tendering of advice to the minister. 
Where a minister is receiving divergent advice concurrently from his de-
partmental head and his personal staff on matters of policy, he may think it 
desirable to bring the parties together to discuss their points of difference. In cases 
where the minister wishes to engage a person or persons to make inquir on a 
specific subject requiring special experience or expertise, his needs may in some 
instances be better served if the person is engaged through the department as a 
consultant or temporary employee. This procedure would seem to be particularly 
appropriate where the task is well defined and the adviser would not be expected 
to be 'on call' in the minister's office. It would also be advantageous where the 
adviser would, by the nature of his assignment, find it necessary to work within 
the department and in collaboration with departmental officers. We discuss the 
use of consultants for advisory purposes at paragraph 4.3.41. 
4.6.9 The role of the departmental liaison officer was brought specifically to our 
attention. These officers have been appointed particularly where the private 
secretary has not had departmental experience and is unfamiliar with the 
workings of his minister's department. The primary task of the departmental 
liaison officer is to ensure that the minister and his staff are kept in contact with 
developments within the department and are able to make contact with the 
officer concerned with any particular issue. They are also charged with the task of 
ensuring that the department is aware of issues with which the minister is 
concerned, so that it can give whatever assistance it can. There can be occasions 
when, because of his double loyalty, the departmental liaison officer is in a 
difficult position. It seems that such a situation emerged during 1974, following 
which a letter was issued by the Prime Minister indicating that officers seconded 
in this way are for the period of secondment full members of the minister's staff. 
R57 We agree that it is essential that the minister have full control over and 
responsibility for all members of his staff, including seconded officers. Similarly 
we have urged that it is the departmental head and his colleagues within the 
department who should have the immediate authority to direct officers who are 
serving in the department. Where difficulties arise on either side, these are best 
sorted out between the departmental head and the minister, or with their 
knowledge and on a basis that meets with their approval. 
Chapter 5 
	
The Administration 
and Parliament 
5.0.1 The Commission's terms of reference have directed it to give attention to 
the 'relationship of the Australian Public Service and statutory corporations and 
other authorities with the Parliament, Ministers and the community' and to the 
'parliamentary scrutiny and control of administration'. This chapter deals 
generally with the role of Parliament in the scrutiny and oversight of government 
administration and with parliamentary procedures for enforcing public 
accountability for the administration. Consideration is given also to the matter of 
appearance of public servants as witnesses before the Houses of Parliament and 
their committees, and to communications between members of Parliament and 
public servants otherwise than in the course of parliamentary proceedings. 
Arrangements for staffing the parliamentary departments, and stafi for members 
of Parliament are treated in Chapter 9.4. 
.i PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY AND CONTROL OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION 
Constitutional Aspects 
5.1.1 It is important at the outset to recognise what Parliament's role in the 
scrutiny and control of the administration is and is not. Only then can one 
proceed to evaluate the means that the two Houses have at their disposal to fulfil 
their proper role. 
5.1.2 Under the Constitution, the primary function of the Commonwealth 
Parliament is to legislate, and such authority as it has to scrutinise and control the 
activities of the executive government derives from that primary function. 
Because the Constitution treats the legislative and executive powers of 
government as different and separable, locating them in separate institutions', 
there is a point beyond which Parliament cannot go in its oversight of 
administration without arrogating to itself executive authority which the 
Constitution implicitly denies it. 
5.1.3 While the Constitution does not allow Parliament to exercise any part of 
the executive power—whether pursuant to its own enactments or otherwise—the 
legislative power that it has, and the auxiliary powers conferred on its constituent 
Houses, clearly place it in a dominant constitutional position over the executive 
government; and the more so by reason of the requirement laid down in section 64 
of the Constitution that ministers shall not hold office for more than three months 
unless they have become members of Parliament. In practice, as we have noted in 
Chapter 4.',  this requirement has had the reciprocal effect of contributing to the 
Ministry's effective influence in the legislature. The dominance of Parliament in 
the constitutional order arises principally because of the fact that the legal 
I. 	 See sections i and 61 of the Constitution. 
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authority which the executive government possesses independently of Acts of 
Parliament is nowadays not very extensive. The dependence of the executive 
government on Parliament for its legal authority, including its authority to raise 
revenue by taxation and to expend moneys of the Commonwealth whatever their 
source, is the ultimate legal foundation for parliamentary control over executive 
action. 
5.1.4 The auxiliary powers conferred on the Houses of Parliament' enable 
them to determine for themselves the order and subjects of debate and 
deliberation, and give them coercive investigatory authority: the power to 
require the attendance of witnesses, the giving of testimony and the production of 
papers and records, together with authority to delegate that power to committees 
of their members, and the power to try and punish for disobeying their processes. 
Although there is some question whether the investigatory powers of the 
Commonwealth Parliament are as extensive as those of the House of Commons, it 
is assumed in this Report that there is no constitutional limitation on the authority 
of the Houses to inquire into the activities of the executive government by the 
auxiliary means that the Constitution allows. 
5.1.5 Yet neither the power of inquiry granted by section 49  of the Constitution 
nor any other power given to the Houses by that section permits them to make 
legally binding orders or give directions concerning the execution of the laws. 
Attempts to assert such authority would be incompatible with the separation of 
powers embodied in the Constitution. It would, incidentally, be claiming greater 
authority than is possessed by the House of Commons. Erskine May wrote that 
the United Kingdom Parliament: 
'has no direct control over any single department of state. It may order the 
production of papers for its information and it may investigate the conduct of 
public officers and may pronounce its opinion upon the manner in which every 
function of government has been or ought to be discharged; but it cannot convey 
its orders or directions to the meanest executive officer in relation to the 
performance of his duty.' 
5.1.6 Despite this limitation, the Commission has taken it for granted that 
Parliament can call upon a minister to account to it for the administration of the 
department of state for which he is responsible. We discuss earlier in the Report 
the difficulties which confront ministers in giving reality, comprehensively and in 
detail, to their responsibilities for action taken within their departments. These 
difficulties have implied a corresponding decline in Parliament's effective power 
to scrutinise the administration. We consider that Parliament's role could be 
strengthened if methods of scrutiny and control could be developed within the 
administration itself in ways which would bring information before Parliament in 
a form which would assist the exercise of its investigatory authority over standards 
of administrative performance. 
The Instruments of Scrutiny and Control 
.
1 .7 At this point it is necessary to review briefly the principal means by which 
Parliament at present exercises its function of scrutiny and control. Opportunities 
to examine the executive's activities can arise in the course of debating legislative 
proposals, notably appropriation bills; but for the most part parliamentary 
attention to administration takes place outside the legislative 
 process Thus, it is 
i 	 Section 49 of the Constitution. 
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pursued by the questioning of ministers, by debates on the Address-in-Reply to 
the Governor-General's speech and on the adjournment of the House, by the 
introduction of grievances, by general business motions and motions dealing with 
matters of urgent public importance, by ministerial statements, by the 
presentation of reports and by the inquiries of select and standing committees. 
Despite their great value to a democracy, these procedures in many instances are 
hampered by lack of information, or by not being pursued in the systematic form 
necessary for an adequate probing of executive and administrative action. 
3. 1.8 Question time and questions-on-notice have long been regarded as a vital 
instrument for securing public accountability for executive action. Given the 
present legislative restrictions on disclosure of information by officials and the 
absence of legally secured public rights of access to official records, questions to 
ministers are often the only way of obtaining needed information. Nevertheless a 
number of informed observers have concluded that question time and questions-
on-notice are of very limited efficacy as a vehicle for critical scrutiny of 
administration and for ensuring public accountability, it has been pointed out 
that, given the short period of time set aside for questions without notice 
(approximately 45 minutes), the call system, and the absence of supplementary 
questions, members have little opportunity to pursue a line of questioning. 
Ministers cannot be expected to have all the relevant information at their 
fingertips when asked questions without notice about many departmental 
activities, and in any event are not held rigorously to the rule in standing orders 
that answers be relevant to the question. When members ask questions, 
particularly questions without notice, they not infrequently do so, it has been 
alleged, for party political advantage: to make assertions as much as to obtain 
information. Questions-on-notice are less open to such criticism, and do produce 
a substantial body of information in response to selective probing into the 
administration. 
5.1.9 A large amount of official information is conveyed to Parliament annually 
in the form of reports and papers, some of them in pursuance of a statutory 
obligation to report, some 'by command' of the Governor-General. Since 1973 it 
has been the practice to present annual departmental reports even though this 
may not, and usually is not, required by statute. Statutory obligations to report, 
where they exist, tend to be unspecific about what, apart from financial accounts, 
ought to be the subject of report, and parliamentary consideration of the reports 
has yielded little by way of guidance on what parliamentarians wish to have 
reported to them. Reports on departmental and statutory authority operations 
vary quite considerably in their presentation and content, and also in the extent 
to which the information they disclose provides an adequate basis for critical 
public scrutiny. To provide a basis for searching parliamentary reviews of 
administrative activity, and to receive the critical attention they deserve, the 
reports will have to contain relevant information. The content of the reports may R58 
therefore need to be more precisely directed, and Parliament may, need more 
expert advice than is now available to it. 1 In addition there has to be some real 
expectation that the reports will be perused and that their contents are possible 
subjects for parliamentary investigation and appraisal. We discuss the content of 
departmental and statutory body reports further in Chapter 4.3.25-27 and 4.4-32 
respectively. 
I. 	 Sce Chapter ii .4.8, on the relations of the Auditor-General to Parliament. 
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5.1 . io The most promising avenue for more effective parliamentary scrutiny is 
generally acknowledged to be the further development of parliamentary 
committees. The Commission shares this view, but also considers that the scope 
for development will be best realised if there is a recognition of the practical 
limitations in resources that Parliament faces when seeking to engage in 
investigative activity. 
5-1-11 The Commonwealth Parliament now has a number of committees which 
are exclusively or partly concerned with its scrutinising function. They include 
the joint Committee on Public Accounts and the Public Works Committee, both 
of which are statutory; the Senate Standing Committee on Regulations and 
Ordinances; the joint committees on the Australian Capital Territory, the 
Northern Territory, Foreign Affairs and Defence, and Prices; the Senate 
Estimates Committees and Legislative and General Purposes Committees; and 
the recently formed Standing Committee of the House of Representatives on 
Expenditure. Of the committees in existence, the two most active in the scrutiny 
ol administrationpos/ hoc have been the,Joiiii Committee on Public Accounts and 
the Senate Standing Committee on Regulations and Ordinances. 
5-1.12 The Public Accounts Committee is a long-established body. It was first 
brought into being in 1913, though its activities were suspended between 1932 
and 1951.  its duties are defined by the Public Accounts Committee Act 
1951-1973 as being: 
(a) to examine the accounts of the receipts and expenditure of the 
Commonwealth and each statement and report transmitted to the Houses 
of Parliament by the Auditor-General in pursuance of the Audit Act; 
(b) to report and comment to both Houses of Parliament, as it thinks fit, on any 
matters in those accounts, statements and reports, or any circumstances 
connected with them; 
(c) to report also concerning any alternation which the Committee thinks 
desirable in the form of the public accounts or in the method of keeping 
them, or in the mode of receipt, control, issue or payment of public moneys; 
(d) to inquire into any question in connection with the public accounts which 
is referred to it by either House, and to report to that House accordingly. 
Other duties may be assigned to the Committee by Joint Standing Orders 
approved by both Houses of Parliament. 
5.1.13 The Public Accounts Committee has not interpreted its functions as 
extending only to questions of financial regularity, and the Act entitles it to take a 
broader view. The Committee has indicated more than once that it regards its 
functions as including investigation to determine whether value has been 
obtained for money spent. 1 
 Its comments and recommendations are examined by 
the Treasury in consultation with the departments concerned, and replies to it 
take the form of Treasury Minutes. In its Sixteenth Report the Committee 
described the procedure it would follow on receipt of Treasury Minutes as follows: 
a 	 the 11(asurv i\1 iiIUtC in rcplV to the (ommitte(' Report should be 
subixiittcd to the Parliament as 5(OI) as possible alter it is received; 
1) 	 the (onmit tee should not 0S0llY make any comment on the lreasurv 
Minute other than to note recommendations not dealt with or subject to a 
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further Minute. In special cases where comment is thought desirable, the 
Committee would make it; 
(c) 	 the Committee would review a Minute, if necessary, when it again 
examines the department concerned.' 
In practice the Committee has not actively contested Treasury Minutes which 
are at variance with its recommendations. In accordance with the Committee's 
own advice, the practice is for debate on its reports to be deferred until the 
relevant Treasury Minutes are available, so that the Houses have before them a 
balance of information and opinion. It seems, however, that full and searching 
debate of the Committee's reports is rare, 
5.1.14 Its dialogues with the Treasury are undoubtedly an essential element in 
the system of parliamentary review which the Public Accounts Committee Act 
envisages and, given the main thrust of this Committee's charter, the choice of 
Treasury as the department to respond generally to its reports is not 
inappropriate. On the other hand, where the conclusions and recommendations R59 
of the Committee invite action which does not fall squarely within the authority 
and responsibility of the Treasury, it would, in our view, be preferable if the 
committee sought obtained responses directly from the department or statutory 
body immediately concerned and from any other co-ordinating authority which 
had both power and responsibility to take corrective action. This would be 
particularly advantageous in view of our recommendations for greater 
departmental flexibility in financial matters. 
5-1-15 A substantial enlargement of the Auditor-General's role and the scope of 
his reports on the administration, such as the Commission proposes in Chapters 
3.6 and i 1.4, would have an important bearing on the activities of any 
parliamentary committee concerned with his reports. Since the Auditor-General 
presents his reports to Parliament as a whole, the contents need not be the interest 
of one committee exclusively, though there is a need to avoid undue overlap in the 
active responses to matters which he raises. As we have noted, one of the duties 
laid down by legislation for the joint Committee of Public Accounts is to examine 
the Auditor-General's reports. Although no other parliamentary committee is 
specifically enjoined to do that, some very recent developments in the 
Parliament's discussion and formation of committees suggests that the structure 
and functioning of the committee system is likely to be more fluid than it has been 
in the past. Before referring to these new developments, however, it is appropriate 
to note relevant activities of some other long-established parliamentary 
Committees. 
5-1.16 The second major committee charged with review of administrative 
action has been the Senate Standing Committee on Regulations and Ordinances, 
which was established in 1932. All regulations laid on the table of the Senate, 
except those of the Northern Territory, stand referred to the Committee for 
consideration and, if necessary, report. The subordinate legislation which stands 
referred to the Committee is, effectively, that which is required by statute to be 
laid before each House of Parliament, and is subject to disallowance. The 
Standing Order establishing this Committee does not prescribe any principles or 
standards which it is expected to apply. But in the early stages of its existence the 
Committee resolved that it would not concern itself with the policing of 
regulations and ordinances, and that its reviews would be guided by the 
Principles suggested in the report of the Select Committee on the Standing 
Committee System of 1929. These were that regulations and ordinances be 
scrutinised to ascertain: 
(a) that they are in accordance with the Statute; 
(b) that they do not trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties; 
c) that they do not unduly make the rights and liberties of citizens dependent 
upon administrative rather than upon judicial decisions; 
(d) that they are concerned with administrative detail and do not amount to 
substantive legislation which should be a matter for parliamentary 
enactment. 
5-1.17 The Committee is assisted by an independent legal adviser to whom all 
subordinate legislation coming before it is referred, along with the explanatory 
memoranda of the departments concerned. The regulations and ordinances are 
then examined in the light of the adviser's comments. If they appear to offend 
against the agreed principles, the Committee may invite the responsible minister 
to tender a written explanation, or send witnesses to answer questions. Should the 
Committee then decide that the matter should be pursued further, it may seek to 
give the opportunity of withdrawing the offending legislation, or report to the 
Senate recommending disallowance. In practice the former course has proved 
most successful. 
5. i. 18 It is not necessary for the purposes of the present Report to describe in 
detail how the principles adopted by this Standing Committee have been applied. 
(A general description is contained in the Committee's 43rd Report.) Suffice it to 
say that, in the Commission's view, over the years the Committee has more than 
justified its existence. Its success is probably due in large part to the facts that its 
compass is modest and well-defined, and that the standards it applies have a 
settled core of meaning readily understood by most draftsmen. It may well have 
been assisted by the fact that the Committee has professional help in its work, 
5.1-19 Since 1970, the committees of the Senate have been augmented by the 
appointment of five Estimates Committees and seven standing Legislative and 
General Purposes Committees, each with a specified area of reference. 
5-1 .20 The Legislative and General Purposes Committees, as their generic title 
suggests, have several functions within broad subject areas. Each has been 
empowered 'to inquire into and report upon such matters as are referred to it by 
the Senate, including any Bills, Estimates or Statements of Expenditure, 
messages, petitions, inquiries or papers'. Insofar as they may be required to 
inquire into and report on the Estimates, their jurisdiction overlaps that of the 
Estimates Committees which were established contemporaneously, but only 
because opinion in the Senate was fairly evenly divided between those senators 
who favoured immediate introduction of specialised subject committees and 
those who preferred to proceed more gradually with Estimates Committees and 
await the results of their experience. In the event, only two Legislative and 
General Purposes Committees were appointed in the first instance. The 
remaining five were appointed at the commencement of the first session of 1971 
after receipt of a report on the operation of the Estimates Committees and the two 
experimental' Legislative and General Purposes Committees. All have been re-
appointed from one Parliament to the next. 
5.1.21 It is apparent from the terms of reference of the Legislative and General 
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Purposes Committees and also from the reports and debates that attended their 
creation that they were seen by senators not merely as an aid to the legislative 
process, but as a means of facilitating the 'discharge (of) Parliament's important 
duty to probe and check Government activities'. Reference was made to 'the 
inadequacy of opportunities and means on the floor of the Senate' to do this; 'the 
need for more question and answer sessions with Senate Ministers and 
departmental officers regarding Bills, policies and administration'; the need 'for a 
delegation to Committees of power to continue inquiries, and the investigation of 
Government activities during the period when Parliament is not in session; and 
the need, in an increasingly expert society, for Senators to be able to call upon 
scholarly research and advice equal in competence to that relied upon by the 
Government'. 
5.1.22 Judging from the references which the Senate has made to the 
Legislative and General Purposes Committees and from their reports to date, 
their activities so far have been more concerned with development of policy and 
examination of petitions and Bills than with scrutiny of administrative operations. 
The Estimates Committees, in contrast, have by the very particularity of their 
terms of reference, introduced into parliamentary consideration of expenditure 
proposals a degree of discipline not previously evident. While examination of the 
estimates in committee has undoubtedly assisted the Senate and perhaps even 
promoted more rigour in the preparation of expenditure proposals, there is still 
some scepticism about the efficacy of the Committees in exacting adequate 
answers and justification of outlays questioned. 
The Future of Parliamentary Committees 
5.1.23 In 1974 the Senate and the House of Representatives appointed a joint 
committee to undertake a comprehensive review of the parliamentary committee 
system. Its terms of reference were 'to inquire into, report on and make 
recommendations for: 
(a) a balanced system of committees for the Parliament; 
(b) the integration of the committee system into the procedures fbr the 
Parliament; 
(c) arrangements for committee meetings which will best suit the convenience 
of Senators and Members.' 
5.1.24 Alter presenting in October 1975 an interim report prepared by its sub-
committee, the Joint Committee presented its report to Parliament on 26 May 
1976. In the meantime, the government had in April 1976 established a new 
standing committee on public expenditure to be drawn from members of the 
House of Representatives. When announcing this proposal in the House on 8 
April, the Prime Minister said it was not proposed at that stage to make any 
change in the character of the joint Committee on Public Accounts but that the 
subject would be kept under review as its new expenditure committee developed, 
in recognition of the potential for overlap. The subsequent report of the joint 
Committee on the Parliamentary Committee System was presented too late for a 
detailed consideration by the Commission. We have however, noted with 
particular interest the Committee's recommendation that the recently tormed 
Standing Committee on Expenditure and the joint Committee on Public 
Accounts (along with other joint committees) be abolished, and that these two 
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committees be replaced by a Standing Committee of the House of Repre-
sentatives on Public Administration, concerned with administrative efficiency. 
While it is not for the Commission to express a view on this report, it believes that 
the existence of a standing parliamentary committee with terms of reference 
which enable it to scrutinise administrative efficiency would greatly strengthen 
the capacity of Parliament in this function. This would be particularly so if the 
changes affecting the role of both the Auditor-General and the Public Service 
Board which we have recommended are adopted (see Chapters 3.6 and 11.4). 
5.1.25 The effectiveness of any parliamentary committee concerned with 
administrative efficiency will depend, apart from the professional support which 
the Auditor-General can provide, on the personal involvement of its parliamen-
tary members. It is worth recalling the stimulus given to the work of the Public 
Accounts Committee by one dedicated and able chairman who remained long in 
R6o that office. We suggest for the consideration of Parliament and the government 
therefore that members of the committee chosen to scrutinise administrative 
efficiency should be given special incentive to develop skills in the work, and that 
its non-partisan function should be emphasised. Each of these purposes would be 
advanced if both the chairman (from the government party) and the deputy 
chairman (from the opposition party) received remuneration equivalent to that 
of a minister. Competition from persons of ability and professional standing could 
be expected for these posts, and members with such capacities might be 
encouraged to see promotion to them as an attractive alternative to ministerial 
rank. 
5.1.26 We note that parliamentary committees have on occasions drawn 
attention to the lateness or inaccuracy of information prepared by departments in 
response to committee requests. Effective preparation of material for parliamen-
tary committees is an aspect of relationships between the Parliament and the 
administration which requires constant attention, and we commend to 
departments and agencies the importance of thorough preparations for the work 
of these committees. 
Appearance of Officials before Parliamentary Committees 
5-1 .27 The rights of Parliament to obtain information from public servants 
touches on some significant issues of accountability of the administration, and 
these issues are potentially, and in fact, coming up for a degree of consideration, if 
not testing, with increasing frequency. The appearance of public servants before 
committees of the Parliament is nowadays a not uncommon occurrence, although 
their appearance before the Bar of the Senate or the House of Representatives is 
rare. Committees before which public servants regularly appear include the 
Estimates Committees of the Senate and the Joint Committee on Public Accounts. 
5.1.28 There is no question that the Houses of Parliament and their duly 
authorised committees have authority to summon public servants before them to 
give evidence and produce books, papers and records. And though the matter has 
See, for example, Report of Joint Committee on the Australian Capital Territory, 
1972—Parliamentary Paper No. 142, at paragraph ; two reports of the Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Public Works—the 38th General Report, 1975,  at paragraph 13 and 
the -1th Report of 1975 on the Australian Governmeny Centre at Parramatta at paragraphs 
54-55 and the 16oth report of the Joint Committee on Public Accounts (1976) on 
Expenditure from the Consolidated Revenue Fund for 1974-75, at paragraph 202. 
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not been finally resolved, there are grounds for believing that it would be in 
breach of parliamentary privilege for a minister or the Cabinet, for any reason 
whatsoever, to direct an officer not to appear in answer to the summons. There is 
still, however, some doubt about the application to parliamentary proceedings of 
the doctrine of Crown privilege, that is to say whether, as a matter of law, the 
authority of the Houses and their duly authorised committees to require the 
giving of evidence or the production of documents is qualified by a further 
requirement preventing the admission of evidence which it is not in the public 
interest to divulge. 
5.1.29 The doctrine of Crown privilege was developed and is applied by the 
courts of law. Normally a claim of Crown privilege is made by or on behalf of a 
minister of the Crown, but in circumstances where the privilege is known to apply 
the courts are bound to exclude evidence in respect of which privilege could be 
claimed, notwithstanding that neither a party nor a minister seeks its exclusion. 
Where the privilege is claimed, it is the responsibility of the court to decide 
whether the claim is well founded. It is not obliged to accept the minister's 
certificate as conclusive, and it may examine the evidence in respect of which the 
claim is made. If Crown privilege does apply in parliamentary proceedings there 
are obvious difficulties in transposing to that context in their entirety the practices 
and procedures followed by the courts. 
5. 1.30 Neither House of the Commonwealth Parliament has as yet formally 
determined whether it accepts or does not accept that its investigatory authority is 
legally constrained by Crown privilege. It is apparent that they are at least 
prepared to entertain claims, and in some situations not to insist on answers being 
supplied, but this does not necessarily signify acquiescence in any limitation on 
the legal powers of the Houses. The issue could be resolved by legislation, 
preferably legislation dealing generally with parliamentary witnesses. In the 
absence of such legislation, the most to be hoped for is some general agreement 
concerning principles and procedures to be followed, particularly in relation to 
the appearance of public servants and officers before parliamentary committees. 
5.1-31 Principles and procedures have previously been suggested by a former 
Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, and a former Solicitor-General, Sir 
Kenneth Bailey, in relation to inquiries by the Joint Committee on Public 
Accounts and the Senate Standing Committee on Regulations and Ordinances 
respectively. These proposals have not been formally endorsed by the Houses of 
Parliament but appear to have been used as guidelines. 
5.1.32 The Commission suggests that the government prepare for the guidance R61 
of officials and for discussion, a statement of the principles and procedures it 
would wish to be followed when evidence from official witnesses is sought, and a 
set of instructions for the guidance of officials whose attendance before parlia-
mentary committees might be requested or required. Having taken this step, the 
government might think it appropriate to move for the establishment of a joint 
select committee of Parliament to consider and report on the desirability of 
dealing with the matter by statute. 
5. 1.33 Without wishing to anticipate parliamentary consideration of the 
important constitutional question as to whether the executive government should 
be permitted to withhold certain classes of information and documents from the 
Houses of Parliament and their committees, the Commission takes the view that 
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since claims of Crown privilege have been made in Parliament and since the 
Houses of Parliament and their committees have shown a willingness at least to 
consider such claims, it is highly desirable that there be a commonly agreed 
procedure by which the claims are made and in what form. In particular there is a 
need for a clear understanding to be reached about the respective roles and 
responsibilities of ministers and their departmental officers. 
R62 5.1.34 The procedure suggested by the majority of the Commission for 
consideration is as follows.' Claims of Crown privilege should ordinarily be made 
by the responsible minister of state. To ensure that, ministers have adequate 
opportunity to determine whether a claim should be made, requests for the 
attendance of or summons to departmental officers should be notified to the 
responsible minister, with particulars of the matters on which evidence is sought, 
so that as far as possible a decision whether or not to claim privilege may be taken 
in advance of hearings. If, during the course of a hearing, a matter arises which is 
potentially a subject on which privilege might be claimed, the officer should be 
afforded an opportunity to consult with his minister before making reply. In a 
case where a committee desired to pursue a course of inquiry once a question of 
Crown privilege had been raised, it should be open to the chairman to consult 
with the minister to discover whether the evidence would be made available if a 
hearing in camera were held with suitable safeguards for the preservation of the 
confidentiality of the evidence. 
5-1.35 Irrespective of whether as a matter of law, the Houses of Parliament and 
their committees are bound to accept a ministerial claim of Crown privilege 
R63 without further inquiry, it is highly desirable that any such claim should disclose 
on its face reasons why the evidence in respect of which privilege is claimed should 
not be disclosed. The Houses or their committees may then satisfy themselves 
whether there is a substantial public interest which would justify their not 
pressing for disclosure. 
5. I .36 Principles and procedures which have previously been put forward as 
guidelines for the examination of officials appearing before parliamentary 
committees have laid stress on the need to respect and sustain the conventional 
role of the public service, and in particular the impartiality expected of it as 
between political parties, and confidentiality in the advice its members tender to 
ministers in both the formulation of policies and the taking C)! decisions for which 
ministers formally assume responsibility. Thus public servants have been advised 
that while it is proper for them to answer questions on matters of fact, and to 
explain what is government policy on a matter, it would not be proper for them 
to express opinions for or against government policy, or reveal considerations 
leading to a ministerial or government decision, unless these have already been 
disclosed or their disclosure has been authorised. The Commission is in broad 
R64 agreement with the proposition that a departmental official should not he 
required or expected to express a view before a parliamentary committee on the 
merits of a ministerial or government decision or policy. 
5-1-37 It accepts also as a general principle that officials ought not be required 
to divulge the nature of the advice they have tendered to their ministers, at least 
without ministerial approval. But advice to ministers in this context should not be 
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taken to mean all communications with ministers. The advice which should not 
be revealed includes opinions and recommendations involved in deliberative 
and policy-making processes, submissions to Cabinet, briefings to ministers in 
relation to matters before Cabinet, and consultations with ministers on matters 
relating to government policy. It would not ordinarily extend to factual data or 
analyses prepared for the purpose of informing deliberative and policy-making 
processes. At the same time the Commission believes that in many instances, there 
would be little justification for not disclosing the nature and content of advice 
proper, particularly when a decision on the matter to which the advice relates has 
already been taken. While it recognises the need to sustain and respect the 
confidential relationship between a minister and his departmental advisers, the 
majority, of the Commission considers that there is a need to reassess the proper 
ambit of that relationship, having regard not simply to the importance of 
promoting complete candour in communications between ministers and officials, 
but also to the essential conditions for effective public accountability. 
5. 1.38 The above recommendations relate mainly to the giving of evidence by 
departmental officers about departmental matters. Different considerations may 
apply where an official witness is appearing before a parliamentary committee to 
give evidence concerning the exercise of legal authority which is vested in him 
directly and which he is entitled to exercise independently. Such an official may 
be a departmental officer, a statutory officer, or a member of a statutory 
authority. While it is not impossible that Crown privilege might be claimed in 
such cases by the minister administering the Act from which the officer's 
authority derives, it would seem to the Commission that if the inquiry being R65 
pursued by the parliamentary committee does relate to the exercise of 
independent statutory powers and discretions, the repository of those powers and 
discretions may in some cases stand in a more direct relationship with the 
Parliament than does an officer of a department directly responsible to a minister, 
and that accordingly the considerations which aflect the giving of evidence by 
public servants do not apply with the same force. Even where the witness happens 
to be a member or officer of a statutory authority the principal function of which is 
to advise a minister, it should not he seen as necessarily improper for him or her to 
express or volunteer opinions on matters of policy, or to disclose and defend 
advice which has been given to the minister. The authority in question may have 
been established precisely fbr the purpose of providing the minister with 
independent and publicly stated advice. 
5.1-39 Quite apart from Crown privilege there are statutory provisions which 
impose on public officers duties of secrecy in relation to specific categories of 
information and data. Whether such provisions qualify the investigatory powers 
of the houses of Parliament and their duly authorised committees depends on the 
terms of the particular provision. Where the statute in question goes to the length 
of curtailing the power of the courts to require the production of information 
except for limited purposes, as does for example section 16 of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936-1973, it may be safely assumed that Parliament has, by 
implication, curtailed the investigatory authority of its Houses to the same extent. 
Where an officer appearing before a parliamentary committee has cause to doubt R66 
Whether evidence sought of him can be properly divulged consistently with his 
statutory duties, he should be permitted to make objection and seek legal advice 
on the matter. 
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5.2 MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
5.2.1 As part of its inquiry into the 'relationship of the Australian Public Service 
• . . with the Parliament, Ministers and the community', the Commission has 
examined the question of communication between members of Parliament and 
officers of departments of state outside the course of parliamentary proceedings, 
whether by written correspondence or otherwise. This examination has been 
addressed principally to: 
(a) the handling within departments of inquiries by members of Parliament; 
(b) departmental briefing of individual members and of party committees; 
(c) pre-election consultations with members of the Shadow Ministry. 
5.2.2 In this aspect of its inquiries the Commission has been assisted by studies 
undertaken for it by Professor Kenneth W. Knight of the Department of 
Government in the University of Queensland, and Dr Patrick Weller, Research 
Fellow in the Research School of Social Sciences in the Australian National 
University. Professor Knight's report on 'Parliamentarians and the Public 
Service' and Dr Weller's report on 'Public Servants and the Briefing of Party 
Committees' are reproduced in the Commission's collected papers on microfiche. 
Correspondence with Departments 
5.2.3 Some of the inquiries which members of Parliament make directly of 
departments or through correspondence with the responsible minister are on 
behalf of constituents concerning their individual problems. Others take the form 
of requests for information and sometimes information which might otherwise be 
sought by questions in Parliament. Professor Knight's study reveals that there is 
no consistent practice or expectation that members' requests be addressed to the 
minister and answered by him. Nonetheless the Public Service Board has 
suggested to the Commission that 'there would be merit in having well 
understood arrangements' regarding direct communication between members of 
Parliament and public servants. The Board has expressed its own views on the 
handling of members' requests for information as follows: 
'(a) 	 Much will depend on the nature of the request. There will, for example, 
be occasions when a request by a Member of Parliament amounts to no 
more than a request for available factual information equivalent to any 
request from a member of the public. in these circumstances, the 
information should obviously be provided; 
(b) there will be other occasions when the request is sensitive, or where 
answering it would necessitate the use of substantial departmental 
resources. In such cases, it would be appropriate to suggest that the 
member write to the Minister requesting the information; 
(c) the officer should, as appropriate, inform his Permanent Head or 
Minister of a request for information and of the outcome; 
(d) care should be taken to avoid unauthorised disclosure of classified or 
otherwise confidential information, for example, where a breach of 
personal or commercial privacy could be involved.' 
R67 The Commission endorses these guidelines. 
5.2.4 The question of how departments should respond to inquiries from 
members of Parliament cannot be divorced from the broader question of access by 
the public at large to official information, which is dealt with in Chapter 10.7 of 
the Report. Quite apart from the various statutory provisions forbidding 
disclosure of specific categories of official information, public servants are 
constrained as regards the information they may disclose by the regulations made 
under the Public Service Act. The relevant regulations are: 
34. Any officer shall not 
(a) use for any purpose other than the discharge of his official duties, 
information gained by or conveyed to him through his connection 
with the Public Service.' 
35. Except in the course of official duty, no information concerning public 
business or auy matter of which an officer has knowledge officially shall be 
given, directly or indirectly, nor shall the contents of olfical papers be 
disclosed by an officer or employee without the express authority of the 
Chief Officei. 
The Freedom of Information Act foreshadowed by the \Vhitlarn Government, 
and outlined by the Interdepartmental Committee on the subject, would have 
necessitated substantial revision of these regulations, so far as they relate to 
documents. At the time of writing, however, they stand unamended. 
5.2.5 While regulation 35 reposes in the Chief ()fficer the discretion to authorise 
disclosure, in practice the policy governing exercise of the discretion is 
determined by the Mitiistcr and ultimately the government of the day. It is, in the R68 
Commission's view, desirable that departmental officers he given clear guidance 
on both the policy to be pursued and the procedures to be followed in dealing with 
requests for information, but it doubts whether such guidance can be adequately 
given by rules' applying across departments. Each department needs its own 
rules, related to its individual circumstances, and approved by the responsible 
minister. This is not to say that there may not be common elements in the several 
Sets of standing departmental instructions. 
5.2.6 On the basis of the comments he elicited through interviews and 
correspondence, Professor Knight found little evidence of dissatisfaction among 
members of Parliament with the treatment by departments of their inquiries and 
requests. He did, however, find that members often experienced difficulty in 
locating the officer or section of a department responsible for the matter about 
which inquiry was made. He suggested that this difficulty was caused in part by 
an inadequacy of published, up-to-date information about the responsibilities of 
departments and the division of work within them. Professor Knight also found 
that members' dealings with the Public Service were sometimes impeded by their 
lack of familiarity with administrative procedures, and this was partly due to a 
lack of accessible information about those procedures. 
5.2. 7 The Commission sees merit in the suggestion that more systematic efforts 
be made to acquaint inexperienced members of Parliament with the organisation 
of government and its procedures, but it considers that the primary responsibility 
for initiating such action lies not with the executive government but with the 
parliamentary departments. We suggest that these departments give con- R69 
sderation to the following proposals, based on some of Professor Knight's 
recommendations: 
(a) the 'Government Directory' could be set out in a more detailed form so as 
to show more clearly the functional responsibilities of senior officials and 
organisational units; 
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(b) the proposed 'Commonwealth Record' or another suitable publication 
could be developed as a means for informing parliamentarians of 
administrative changes likely to affect the public, so that the advice given 
or taken by members of Parliament for their constituents is up-to-date and 
relevant. These two improvements would be of benefit to the public also; 
(c) action could be taken to acquaint new and inexperienced members with 
the organisation of government and its procedures through the prepara-
tion of a 'guide for new parliamentarians' showing procedures for 
obtaining information from the bureaucracy, library services etc, and 
through courses in the activities of government; 
(d) the improved Directory suggested in (a) could be supplemented by 
circulation of departmental lists showing who deals with particular issues 
within the department. 
We make further suggestions concerning the information needs of members of 
Parliament in Chapter 10.7. 
Briefings of Members and Party Committees 
5.2.8 Over recent years senior public servants in government departments have 
been brought more frequently into face-to-face contact with members of 
Parliament, not merely in parliamentary committees, but in committees of 
parliamentary parties and occasionally for briefing of individual members of the 
Opposition. The appearance of public servants before committees of the Caucus 
of the Australian Labor Party was a common occurrence in the period 
1973-1975. These appearances were always by ministerial direction or with 
ministerial concurrence, and were for the purpose of informing and explaining to 
members the background and significance of Cabinet decisions and legislative 
proposals, before their introduction in Parliament. In some instances, briefings of 
Caucus committees occurred before Cabinet took a decision. 
5.2.9 Such information and comment as we have received on this practice 
suggests it is desirable for the minister to be present on these occasions to accept 
the responsibility of dealing with policy elements in the questions asked of 
R7o departmental officers. Where the minister cannot attend, as for example in the 
period 1973-1975 when the government adopted a policy of allowing public 
servants to appear before parliamentary committees of the opposition parties on 
request and with the approval of the responsible minister, it would be highly 
desirable that a public servant attending before a party committee he 
accompanied by at least one other officer. 
5.2.10 In general, appearance by public servants before a parliamentary party 
committee should always be by ministerial direction or consent and on such 
appearances public servants should not be expected to conduct themselves 
diflerently according to whether the committee is one of the governing party or 
the opposition party or parties. In saying this the Commission recognises that 
some matters considered in committees of the governing party and on which 
public servants will be asked to speak will, at the time, be confidential and not 
known to the opposition. Nevertheless, the Commission believes that, because 
public servants employed in departments of state are primarily servants of the 
Crown and its ministers, they should not be put into a situation in which they are 
expected to tender advice, as distinct from providing briefings or background 
material, to members of Parliament not of the Ministry, notwithstanding that by 
party rule or convention, the Ministry or individual ministers are in some way 
subordinate to the collective will of the parliamentary party. 
5.2.11 It would, in the Commission's view, be appropriate for a public servant R7i 
who felt that he was under pressure to exceed the bounds of propriety to 
communicate his concern to his departmental head and the minister, and after 
that, if he feels it necessary, to the Public Service Board. 
Pre-Election Consultations with the Leader of the Opposition 
5.2.12 There has been some discussion of the desirability of establishing a 
practice whereby in the period immediately preceding a general election, the 
Leader of the Opposition and members of the shadow Ministry meet with senior 
officials to discuss possible changes in administrative arrangements and personnel 
should there be a change in government. The very considerable changes made in 
administrative arrangements following the change in government in 1972, which 
could not have been fully anticipated by even the most careful examination of 
pre-election statements of declaration and intentions, meant that the new 
government found itself under severe time constraints and with less preparatory 
work done within the administration than was desirable. 
5.2.13 In tabling the Annual Report of the Public Service Board for 1973, the 
then Prime Minister, Mr Whitlam, stated that he as Prime Minister intended that 
'The opportunity for such discussions ... (would) be made available to the 
Opposition in the periods before general elections'. The Prime Minister went on 
to say: 
'Naturally they will not embrace matters of a Party political nature. My object is 
simply to ensure that should there ever be another change of government the 
nation's administration will take place as smoothly as possible.' 
5.2.14 Before the general elections of May 1974 the Leader of the Opposition 
sought from the Prime Minister advice on how the proposed arrangements would 
be implemented and requested that he be permitted to confer with the Chairman 
of the Public Service Board on the structure and workings of departments. The 
Chairman subsequently wrote to the Leader of the Opposition to inform him that 
the Prime Minister had authorised the holding of discussions with the Board. He 
stated that: 
'Such discussions would be considered by the Board to be confidential to the 
parties with the proviso that if the Prime Minister required me to disclose to him 
the nature of the discussions, I would be obliged to do so. My understanding is 
that the Prime Minister does not intend to make any such enquiry.' 
We understand that, in the event, no discussions took place before the May 
election and that, because of the unusual circumstances before the general 
election in December 1 9 7 5, discussions between the Leader of the Opposition and 
the Board did not arise on that occasion. 
5.2.15 A practice whereby the Leader of the Opposition is afforded an 
opportunity, before a general election, to confer with the Public Service Board 
and with the Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
and shadow ministers with heads of relevant departments, is in the Commission's 
Opinion desirable. If adopted, the practice should be on the basis that the R72 
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discussions will be limited 10 changes in administrative arrangements con-
templated by the opposition and which might be necessitated by its policies.
Further, the Commission is of the opinion that it should not necessarily be limited 
to apprising the officials concerned of the oppositions iitcntions—the officials 
should he free to tender advice as if they were advising the relevant minister, it is 
important that an opposition developing its views on administrative arrange-
ments should do so with a sound understanding of administrative practice and 
practicalities. 
5.2. 16 The Commission agrees that such discussion should take place only after 
a request in writing has been made to the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister 
has acceded to that request. if the discussions are seen as an occasion on which the 
Public Service Board and the Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet might properly oiler advice and comment to the Leader of the 
Opposition, or departmental heads to shadow ministers, an assurance of 
confidentiality would be essential. Such an assurance would not, however, be 
incompatible with the recognition of the Prime Minister's right (or that of a 
minister in relation to his own department) to seek and obtain from the officers 
involved a report on the general nature of the discussions in order to satisfy himself 
that they had not been used for purposes beyond those agreed. 
The following reservation has been expressed by Commissioner Munro on the 
matters discussed in paragraphs 5.1-34-37: 
Parliamentary access to information possessed by the executive raises similar 
issues to those posed by community access to such information. The Commission 
is not unanimous in its analysis of recommendations concerning community 
access to information (see Chapter 10.7.22). Discussion of guidelines for 
application of Crown privilege to parliamentary investigations of administrative 
activity has resulted in a similar division of opinion. 
I question th value of seeking to apply the rule of law relating to Crown 
privilege in the context of the executive's obligation to disclose, or entitlement to 
resist disclosure of', information other than in adversary proceedings before 
courts of law. Generally speaking, courts have sought to determine claims of 
Crown privilege by weighing the public interest in 'efficient administration' 
against the public interest in 'proper administration of justice'. Increasingly 
courts have displayed a willingness to override claims of Crown privilege based 
on general assertions of the needs of efficient working of the administration. 
Thus, since the House of Lords decision in Conwy v. Riminer 1 the need to preserve 
candour in communications between officials could scarcely be regarded as 
sufficient in itself to prevent a court from forcing disclosure of particular 
information. Nevertheless, as a rule of law crown privilege connotes a residual 
presumption of executive autocracy and explicitly involves in the course of 
adversary proceedings a judicial balancing of competing interests in the 
administration ofjustice and the administration of the executive. When similar 
issues have been raised in a different legal form per medium of action to restrain 
breach of confidence, a capacity has been revealed for legal principle to be less 
constrictive of disclosure of information about executive activity. 2 Parliament 
might weil be able to exploit and expound the existing bocl\ of law relating to 
I. 	 1968A.C.9io. 
2. ;11Lorny—General v. Jonathan Cape 1975 3 W.L.R. 6u6; Pearce: The Courts and Government 
Information (Private Paper) ANU Law School, 1976. 
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crown 	 to produce a more SatifaCtOr\ basis {r dealing with claims of 
exccuti\c privilege iii the course of parliamentary investigations. However, 
legislation conforming with the policy bases of the draft Freedom of information 
Bill would be a surer means of producing a satisfactory system of access to the 
executives in{brmatiori not only for parliament but for the community.' 
1. 	 See Appendix 2.A. 
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Chapter 6 	 The Administration 
and the 
Community 
6.i INTRODUCTION 
6. i. i Historically there appears always to have been some tension, and 
frequently conflict, between the community (or at least parts of it) and 
governments and their servants. This tension is an aspect of the division of society 
between the governors and the governed; between citizens and the state; between 
those with and those without power. So long as the conduct of government results 
in these divisions, tension may well be inevitable. It is possible to conceive of 
government without such divisions probably only in societies which are small 
enough for decision by consensus to be practicable and natural. Certainly in large 
and socially complex societies in which governments perform widely ranging 
functions and provide a multiplicity of services, decision by consensus is in some 
matters impracticable, and highly organised bureaucracies with special skills are 
required. In such societies the gap between the citizen and the state is very 
apparent and difficult to bridge. 
6. 1.2 To some extent this difficulty reflects the fact that the gap is functionally 
necessary. Within a complex community there will be many interests and many 
opinions, often conflicting, to be considered in any decision affecting that 
community or a part of it. It is the function of government to resolve or overbear 
these conflicts and to make decisions. The affairs of the community could not 
proceed otherwise. Similarly the government, in providing services for the 
community, must contain its use of resources within limits which are real, 
although opinions will vary from time to time about the severity of these limits. It 
also has to allocate these scarce resources according to a set of priorities for which 
it must take responsibility and not necessarily according to the wishes of any 
particular individual or group. Again, it is the function of government to decide, 
but such decisions as are translated into practice inevitably demonstrate the 'gap' 
or distance between the government and the governed, and so invite tension. 
6.1.3 However it is the relationship of the community with the government's 
servants—with the administration—which concerns us primarily. Naturally, the 
community does not always differentiate sharply between the elected government 
and its officials. Dissatisfaction with one is likely to breed dissatisfaction with the 
other. Yet some of the tension to which we have referred is directed specifically at 
the administration and derives from a conviction that it acts as a barrier to, rather 
than an instrument of, communication between the community and its 
government. We have noted in Chapter 2a growing demand that the governed 
should participate in the work of the governors: that power should be more 
effectively and more widely shared. It is the power of the bureaucracy rather than 
that of Parliament or the government to which this demand is primarily directed. 
6.1.4 We noted also in that chapter that this demand is in part a challenge to the 
traditional exclusiveness of the relationship between officials and their minister in 
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the tasks of informing and advising him on matters about which he has to decide. 
But the demand is directed also to the power that officials exercise as managers 
and administrators of programs, services and other activities where officials act to 
a significant degree in their own right but also as agents of the minister. 
6. i . 
	
In terms of the stereotyped formulation of the doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility, it is only through the minister in person that public pressure is 
exerted on the administration. However, as indicated earlier in the Report, we do 
not consider this formulation an accurate description of the facts or that it would 
today provide effective ministerial responsibility. Nor would it provide a basis fbr 
an administration which performs its tasks effectively and in a publicly 
understood and acceptable way. Above all it will not satisfy the demands from 
sections of the community for a share in the power exercised by the 
administration. 
6. 1.6 The arguments on which this demand fbr power sharing rests are 
threefold. First, that it would make government more effective: that members of 
the community can bring knowledge which is more intimate than, and frequently 
an expertise which is superior to, that possessed by the bureaucracy; that 
programs managed without the participation of those to whom they are directed 
have a notorious record of failure. Second, that participation is a valuable end in 
itself and should be seen as an important, if subsidiary, objective of all 
government activities. Third, that by skilful devolution and decentralisation of 
administrative procedures and the use of modern technology it is possible even in 
large and complex societies to come closer than ever before to situations where 
decisions can be made substantially by consensus among those primarily 
concerned. The Commission believes there is some validity in all these lines of 
argument. 
6.1.7 Unfortunately the benefits of community participation must be weighed 
against other considerations. In the first place, participation is not easy to 
organise fairly and effectively. Those who seek it may be more concerned with 
their own interests than those of the community generally. Even those who are 
well motivated are not necessarily expert or well infbrmed. Those who speak up 
may have as little or even less effective communication with their inarticulate 
fellows than do officials. Secondly, 'participation' is sometimes used as a device to 
'buy off' independent sources of criticism and pressure fr changes in policy. 
Where this 'co-option' occurs there may be a net loss in the political vitality of the 
community. Thirdly, the demands fhr participation frequently lead officials to 
devote their ingenuity to devices which are imitations of or substitutes for 
participation—being designed rather to 'make people feel' that they are being 
consulted or are participating. The introduction of such pseudo-public-relations 
techniques can ultimately have the effect of seriously alienating the community 
from the bureaucracy. Finally, arranging effective participation involves costs in 
resources and in time. By what calculus can the benefits be weighed against the 
costs 
6. i .8 In the end the official must be guided by the weight his minister attaches 
to various forms of participation, but in turn it should be recognised that in 
making a judgment the minister will be influenced by departmental advice and 
that, in practice, much will be left to decisions by officials themselves. We suggest 
in Chapter 2 that an official should see it as proper to be 'responsive' to those who 
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seek to participate: at least to perform his tasks in more open style, to be accessible 
and to be a good listener; behaving in effect as if his accountability to the minister 
required also, as does the ministers, an accountability directly to the community. 
6.1.9 In this chapter we seek to explore the implications of such a style of 
behaviour of officials towards the community. In doing so we will be particularly 
concerned with its impact on the work of officials: 
(a) as managers and administrators of programs, activities and services which 
bring some of them into direct contact with those at whom these activities 
are directed (section 6.2); 
(b) in their role as sources of information and advice to ministers (section 6.3). 
In the subsequent chapter we look at the possibilities of increasing both efficiency 
and participation by greater devolution and decentralisation of the Com-
monwealth administration. 
6.1.10 To provide an adequate basis for its deliberations Commission has given 
high priority to studies of the relationship between the administration and the 
community. It obtained information in two complementary ways: one by 
examining the comments which many people conveyed to the Commission on 
their own initiative; the other by arranging for methodical studies of opinion, 
behaviour and influence of a range of clients and employees of the administration. 
6. 1. ii As part of the first method, public hearings of witnesses throughout 
Australia helped clarify the many written submissions made to us. Another series 
of meetings, on the lines of a public forum with consumers of Commonwealth 
government services, was organised at our request by the Australian Council of 
Social Service (ACOSS) in what was termed the ParticipACTION project. A 
task force investigating a regional basis for Australian government administration 
held discussions with many people in the four regions it studied. Each of these 
proceedings naturally tended in the main to uncover views highly critical of the 
administration, indicating the intensity, though not the frequency, of such critical 
Opinion. 
6.1.12 To obtain more broadly based quantitative evidence we engaged 
consultants to study the potential and actual influence of interest groups on 
departmental work and the views of those receiving welfare benefits about the 
delivery of these services and their access to them. Assisted by consultants, 
Commission staff investigated problems of individual access to five government 
programs and possible ways of overcoming them, while another staff project 
attempted to measure the relative responsiveness of Commonwealth departments 
to letters of inquiry. 
6.1-13 This range of investigations has led the Commission to the conclusion 
that many of the complaints made to us about the quality of the delivery of 
government services are justified, and, more fundamentally, that there is a need 
for officials to re-appraise their attitudes towards community opinions, pressures 
and demands for wider participation in the affairs of government and towards the 
responses and opinions of those for whose benefit services and programs are 
conducted. 
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6.2 COMMUNITY ACCESS TO SERVICES 
Improved Service Delivery 
6.2.1 Many, of the complaints and criticisms the Commission heard from the 
public about the administration concerned the quality of service that the 
administration gives. In these cases there was no specific demand for an increased 
role in decision-making or giving advice: people simply wanted to be assured that 
their benefit cheque would arrive on time, that they could appeal against a 
decision which affected them adversely, and that they understood the procedures 
they have to follow in order to receive a benefit or service. It was in an endeavour 
to quantify in the best way possible the experience and views of both sides--the 
public contact staff and the individual members of the public--that the 
Commission sponsored a program of access research'. 1  The theory of 'access' has 
been developed largely by Dr B. B. Schaffer of the Institute of Development 
Studies at the University of Sussex, who assisted the Commission in many aspects 
of its investigations. This theory is concerned with relations between the 
administrative allocation of goods and services and the people who use them or for 
whom they are intended. It reviews the way in which programs are translated 
into action through institutional rules and procedures, and the effects on the 
actual or potential clients of rules about significant matters such as eligibility and 
priority of handling requests. It is concerned also with the staff who actually meet 
the public, and with the situations in which those meetings take place-----offices, 
counters and so on. 
6.2.2 The Access Research Program consisted of a survey of staff and clients of a 
number of government offices which have substantial dealings with the public. 
Although the findings of this survey are largely related to assistance to individuals 
through welfare pI)gr11m we believe they have wider application. 
6.2.3 Possibly the most universal complaint from users of the services surveyed 
was about the time involved: time taken to receive attention; time taken to get 
matters sorted out when something had gone wrong; and time elapsing before the 
service applied for was delivered. It emerged that people are more likely to 
complain about the inadequacies of the underlying administrative arrangement 
of programs--the complexity of the forms, the slowness in processing and the 
delay in receipt of cheques, etc.—than about the public contact workers, 
although a fair proportion of the matters people 'would have liked to complain 
about but hadn't' included the behaviour of public contact staff. Apparently the 
public is able, within the limits of the information available to it, to discriminate 
between the individual public servant contacted and 'the system'. To some 
extent, this may simply be a result of the contact worker 'passing the buck' to the 
unseen management group, but it seems more likely to us that it represents an 
accurate perception of the inadequacies of the arrangements through which 
programs are carried out. 
6.2.4 This is not to say that there have been no complaints made to the 
I . The Report of the Access Research Program, which was conducted by Elizabeth O'Kccflc of 
the Commission's staff, assisted by D. Bcnsley and Associates and by Dr Schaffer, can be found 
at Appendix 2G. 
Commission about public contact workers. The ParticipACTION report' found 
that: 
'by far the greatest number of complaints related to counter staff, the point at 
which most people have direct contact with government. Counter staff were 
criticised on the following grounds: rudeness, intolerance; displaying sexist and 
racist attitudes; being intimidating; giving incorrect information; referring 
without any explanation.' 
But the report went on to detail other grounds of complaint more directly related 
to the mechanisms of service delivery, which were not the responsibility of 
individual contact officers: 
'offices closing up over lunchtime; lack of privacy at the counter; having to queue 
up in long lines; having to wait unreasonable lengths of time for service.' 
The recommendations of the families involved in the Brotherhood of St 
Laurence's Family Centre Project'—'prevent lost files', 'pay cheques weekly 
rather than fortnightly', 'advertise more openly'—were a further indicator of felt 
inadequacies in the system. 
6.2.5 Awareness of deficiencies is not confined to members of the public. Many 
individual public servants came to the Commission to tell of their own feelings of 
inadequacy and frustration at the standards of service they were able to provide. 
In their submission to the Commission, a group of social workers said: 
'In trying to deal with these matters on behalf of our clients, we have experienced 
the frustration of trying to deal with a large, inefficient system. We submit that 
much of this is the end result of inadequate structures and procedures for 
discharging the work of the department, rather than a deliberate attitude of 
personnel.3 
In the main Access Survey, 73 per cent of staff interviewed thought that 
'frustration with departmental procedures' would be a significant factor 
contributing to loss of staff. Staff also reported dissatisfaction with the support 
they received from their superiors. An efficiency review of the operations of the 
Department of Social Security benefits administration made by W. D. Scott and 
Co. Pty Ltd for the Department and the Public Service Board showed that a 
typical application for a pension or supporting mother's benefit, and the papers 
associated with it, is transported 27 times between different parts of the office 
before a decision is reached and conveyed to the individual concerned. Although 
there may be some extenuating circumstances, as when there is a need for the 
application of the special skills of an expert in the office, this cannot make for 
speedy processing. 
6.2.6 These findings suggest that more is needed than simply an upgrading of 
those who work in direct personal contact with members of the public. They 
suggest that the contact worker should be a person with authority to make 
decisions in the same way as can social workers, legal officers and medical officers 
in relation to their clients. In some cases this u.,111 involve an upgrading in the level 
of public contact staff and the provision of a career structure for public contact 
work. More often, we consider it will require a change in the internal 
i. Published by ACOSS, and available with the Commission's Collected Papers on microfiche. 
2. The report of this 1rojt is also available on microfiche. 
3. Submission No. 416. 
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administration of many offices, with the less experienced support staff working to 
the contact worker who is dealing with the client rather than being themselves the 
ones at the counter as at present. We believe that reorganisation of work along 
these lines should not increase the cost of administration, but instead will reduce 
the time and costs involved in public attendance at the office and the 
extravagance of multiple handlings of the kind illustrated in the Scott report see 
paragraph 6.2.5). Administrative arrangements for programs have too often seen 
members of the public as literally the end of the line rather than as the focus of 
attention. More senior people do not deal directly with the public, but simply 
make decisions': accordingly, the lowest and least experienced grades deal with 
the public and the higher grades issue the verdict, usually after the client has left 
the office. 
R 	 6.2.7 We 1(comn/c11(I that arrangements for all programs which involve direct 
contact between a member of the community as client' and a member of the 
administration he reviewed with the object of making the point of contact with 
ilie member of the public the point of decision also unless there are unusual 
considerations to be taken into) account. Where tho' officer meeting the client is 
simply a processor of infbrmation through such activities as ensuring the correct 
completion of forms, there is often criticism. It will persist until the officer dealing 
with the public has sufficient status to be able to reach the decision after 
consultation with the individual concerned in all cases which do not involve 
special or unusual fiatures. In the context of the review of departmental 
procedures, we commend fhr consideration the points made in the Access Report 
about ways in which such procedures could be improved to the benefit of both the 
hid iviclual and the administration. 
6. 2.8 To deal with members of the public requires p1rticulr attributes and 
skills. Despite this, 33  per cent of the inquiry staffquestionecl in the Access Survey 
answered in the negative the (juestion Do on feel von have had adequate 
preparation for the JoI) you now hold?'. A surprisingly small propoI'tion of such 
inc1uirv staff have any but 'on-the-job training, although those with higher 
educational qualifications have more often attended training courses. However, a 
quarter of those who were given training of some kind ftlt that it had not really 
helped them in their day to day dealings with the public. One of the 
recommendations made by clients of the Commonwealth Linplor ilient Service 
contained in the report Claimants or Clients by the Brotherhood o)f, 
 St 
Laurenc() was that: 
The Commonwealth Employment Service should get people who know iII 
about it and should not get nasty to people who cannot ieid and write. 
6.2.9 The comment reflects very succinctly the dual inadequacy of public 
contact staff training: the failure to equip staff' with a sufficient knowledge of 
departmental procedures and the failure to train them to deal with the people 
they will encounter in their work. 
6.2. 10 The Commission has also been made keenly aware of the central 
importance of information in the relationship between the community and the 
administration. People need information about their eligibility and entitlements 
so that the can get access to) services. They need information about l)rocedlires  so y  
that tho'y can understand what is going on wheu they are dealing with the 
bureaucracy. Public servants need information ii un their superiors when they 
are dealing with the public so that they can give a prompt service on the spot. The 
following quotation front a submission to the Commission illustrates well the 
feelings of public contact stall about inadequacy of information: 
In many offices there is no communication between higher and lower grade 
officers . 	 we have to confess our ignorance and the public assumes this isjust an 
example of our inefficiency. 
Regrettably, much of the information at present distributed by departments is of 
relatively little use. 1 he public does not need, fhr example, general pamphlets 
pointing out the existence of' a welfare benefit, but rather more detailed 
information about who might be eligible for benefits, where to go to get it, and 
what documents must be produced when an application is made. 
6.2.11 The Access Report, reproduced at Appendix 2.C, makes a series of 
detailed recommendations designed to improve the training and career 
opportunities of public contact staff, and to ensure better and more relevant 
information is given to clients. 2  It also discusses the special needs of people with a 
limited command of English, and the importance of the physical surroundings of 
the office. We generally endorse the reports conclusions (at paragraph 28) and 
inomrnemI that departments which are involved in service delivery and other R71 
contact with the public study 111cm carefully and take steps to achieve their 
purposes. 
6.2. 1 2 Ineffective communication between contact staft and other parts of the 
administration leads also to failures to adapt that administration So that it can 
perform more effecnvelv. The Access Report indicates that in the Melbourne 
city office of the Dej)artlncnt of Social Security which handles unemployment 
and sickness benefits, client difficulties arose prcdomninantivlroiin a high 
incidence of lost, late or disputed cheques. Ihe report sas that: 
'the Department's system of coping with the problems of clients with lost or late 
cheques is painfully slow, in some eases making it necessary for clients to come 
into the office for several days in succession 
Clearly, such delays must put strain on the ability of contact staff to deal with all 
types of applications and inquiries. The remedy must lie first in a prompt 
recognition by senior management that weaknesses exist in the system of issuing 
payments, followed hvaction both to improve the system and to alter the method 
of staffing at the point of contact so that business can more often and more 
effectively be handled at that point. The remedy lies second in ensuring that the 
public are aware of the machinery available for receiving and handling 
complaints.3  
6.2.13 Another example of such fitilurc to adapt is in the continuing high 
proportion of cases where appeals by clients against adverse decision on their 
original applications for benefits were upheld by the department in a first review. 
The figures were so high as to suggest inefficiency involving ineffective delivery of 
the services, and waste of' the staffs working time. It is distressing that while 
contact staff were aware of these problems they seemed unable to indicate action 
1. Suhmnission 68, )\ts E. v1o\sc, Nelson Ba, NSW. 
2. Sec also Chapter 8-4-5 1-  
3. Sec paragraphs 6.2. i L-26, and the recommendation in the Access Report for an olfice 
orribuclsrian 
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to solve them, and that more senior staff remained either unaware of their 
frequency or unconcerned or inhibited in gearing the organisation to deal with 
them. 
6.2. 14 Additional evidence of inadequate communication between contact 
staff and those who make decisions on the issues which in the first instance are 
presented to the contact staff is the apparent absence of 'feedback' of information. 
The Access Survey found that contact staff are too rarely informed directly of the 
outcome of cases they pass on for decision. Furthermore they seldom have an 
opportunity to report on the attitude of their clients to the content of programs or 
the procedures for administering them. More systematic procedures are necessary 
to involve counter staff and voluntary agencies in periodical reviews of procedures 
and facilities. 
6.2. 15 The Brotherhood of St Laurence advised that one of the problems felt by 
welfare beneficiaries is that they are unable, from their side of the counter, to 
obtain access to the administering department on a basis that will produce a 
review of policies or procedures. Although the incidence of such cases is not high, 
they are important to the individual and to the department. Accordingly, we 
R75 recommend that an advisory board, with local outposts, be appointed along the 
lines suggested by the Brotherhood, to assist departments involved in service 
delivery to respond more actively to weaknesses in procedure at the point of 
contact.' The board would investigate issues, question departmental officers, 
welfare workers, voluntary agencies and others and provide advice on changes 
desirable or proposed in legislation, procedures, etc. Its work could prove as 
important to departments providing services as, for instance, industry panels are 
to the Department of Industry and Commerce. 
6.2. 16 Another aspect of departmental dealings with the public which has been 
studied is the handling of letters of inquiry. Members of the Commission's staff 
conducted a pilot administrative responsiveness survey2 to compare the mailed 
responses to a group of identical letters sent to selected Commonwealth and State 
departments and to a selected group of large business firms. Delay was in all 
instances characteristic of the response. The survey found that Commonwealth 
agencies were slower to respond than both State government departments and 
business firms—but that the replies, when they came, tended to be more helpful. 
It seems also that there was a smaller proportion of replies to correspondence from 
women signatories than from men, and that Commonwealth (and State) 
departments reply to a smaller proportion of handwritten (that is not typed) 
letters than do private firms. 
6.2. i 7 In addition, the Commission itself had an opportunity in the course of its 
work to observe at first hand the standard of attention given to written 
communications. In the course of the public meetings arranged by the Australian 
Council of Social Service, a variety of criticisms and complaints was offered. The 
Commission staff brought together those directed at the work of various 
departments, which were given the resulting information. The departments were 
requested to inform us of their reaction and of any action taken. Only half of the 
I . In Chapter 10.3 we recommend the establishment of a Department of Social Welfare to co-
ordinate activities in the health and social welfare fields. This Department would be the 
appropriate agency to appoint such a board. 
2. See Appendix 2.E. 
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departments responded within a month, and several took upwards of three 
months. Some of the replies failed to provide an adequate answer: there was often 
a reference to another agency, but without indicating its views or offering to co-
ordinate inquiry or action. The Commission gained a strong impression of 
reluctance to entertain the possibility that complaints might provide grounds for 
review of original decisions, of policy or of procedures. Staffing problems were 
often mentioned as the main reason for poor performance but rarely the substance 
of programs or the rules and procedures by which they were administered. The 
Commission found departmental responses profoundly disappointing. We draw 
the results of the 'administrative responsiveness' survey and the Commission's 
own experience to the attention of departments, and recommend that they review R76 
the procedures by which correspondence from individual members of the 
community is dealt with and supervised, especially in instances where more than 
one department or agency may be involved. 
Grievance Procedures 
6.2. 18 In the previous section of this Chapter we have urged that experience 
derived from interaction with the community at the point of delivery of a service 
can be an important stimulus and guide to improved organisation and personnel 
practice. In this section we consider what non-departmental facilities should exist 
to ensure that clients seeking access to government programs or services in fact 
obtain the access to which they are entitled. 
6.2.19 Studies sponsored by the Commission make clear that this is an 
important issue and that there is much dissatisfaction with the present 
performance. Many of the visits that individuals make to departmental offices are 
to seek help in making an effective claim or to lodge a complaint about an alleged 
inadequacy. More than half those with complaints interviewed in the Access 
Survey expressed doubt about the usefulness of making a complaint, and a fifth 
said they did not know where or how to lodge a complaint. This is a large 
proportion, and the frustration it reflects must contribute to doubt about whether 
the department is really organised to care for those it exists to serve. Apart from 
the changes designed to improve departmental procedures referred to in the 
previous section of this Chapter, the Commission believes that there is a need to 
strengthen the means available to clients and potential clients to have their 
complaints heard and dealt with. In this section we consider the following 
possibilities: 
(a) a greater role for the local member of Parliament; 
(b) the appointment of an Ombudsman; 
(c) an extension of administrative appeals machinery; 
(d) reform of legal remedies for administrative defaults. 
6.2.20 Role of the local member of Parliament: The role that the local 
member can perform in assisting people having difficulty with the administration 
was emphasised by the results of the Access Survey. It showed that the clearest 
measure of priority is given to cases referred by members of Parliament. The 
overwhelming majority of staff (96 per cent) included in the Survey believed that 
people referred by members of Parliament are adequately catered for; 24 per cent 
of staff also believed that such people receive priority from the department. Yet 
the Survey showed that only i per cent of clients interviewed in fact sought 
assistance in this quarter. Surveys both in Australia and overseas suggest that less 
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than half the people questioned are aware of the role of the member of Parliament 
in taking up grievances on behalf of people in the electorate. It is likely that those 
most in need will be among the people unaware ol this role. 
6.2.21 It is not for the Commission to judge what reliance should be placed on 
this function of members of Parliament. But if this role is seen as an important 
element in enabling members of the community to make eflective complaints, 
then it is necessary that the members role in this respect should be more generally 
known and that he should be given sufficient support to enable him to perform it 
adequately. In this connection, we note the recommendation by the Re-
muneration Tribunal in its 1975 Review that research assistance be provided 
through the allocation to each of the recognised political parties of 'a reasonable 
number of research assistants for allocation to private members. A similar 
R77 provision relating to grievance' work in the electorate might also be considered. 
6.2-22 Role of die Ombudsman: Machinery to redress grievances can only 
be peripheral in its effects. Unless administrative procedures are working 
smoothly such machinery will simply drive resources away, from the main tasks. 
The suggestions we have made in the previous sections were directed to 
improving the procedures themselves and so reducing the probability of 
complaints. It is nonetheless important that there he well known, well 
understood, simple and expeditious machinery for receiving and dealing with 
complaints when they arise, and equally important that this machinery be 
utilised as a means of drawing attention to deficiencies in administrative 
R 7  8 procedures. For this reason we recommend that the Ombudsman Bill be debated-
without delay, and that an appointment be made as soon as possible after the 
legislation is passed. 
6.2.23 Administratiz'e appeals. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 
1975 has provided the framework for a comprehensive system of review, by way of 
appeal, of administrative decisions made in exercise of powers conferred by 
enactment. At present the jurisdiction of the Tribunal established by the Act is 
limited as regards the decisions capable of being reviewed by it, though this 
jurisdiction may he extended over time. It appears, however, that without 
amendment of the Act itself, the Tribunal can only be given jurisdiction to hear 
and determine appeals against decisions in exercise of powers conferred by 
legislation. This means that where a program, for example, for the provision of 
cash or other benefits, is introduced but is not fbunded on legislation (other than a 
parliamentary appropriation), decisions taken by officials administering the 
program could not be the subject of appeal to the Tribunal. We see this as a 
singular deficiency in the system of administrative appeals, particularly when it 
leads to a situation in which one class of beneficiaries is secured statutory rights of 
appeal, but another related class is denied such rights merely because the 
program which concerns it happens to be founded on Cabinet decision and quasi-
legislative administrative rules, fhr example, the National Employment and 
Training (NEAT) Scheme. While recognising that there are very real difficulties 
in adapting a statutory administrative appeals system to encompass programs of 
the latter type, we believe that where such programs are introduced which 
I . See Chapter 5.2.6-7 and I0.7.26-27 for discussions of the information needs of members of 
Parliament. 
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resemble programs founded on legislation under which applicants and 
beneficiaries do have the right to appeal against administrative decisions, the 
rules for the administration of those programs should provide avenues fbr the 
review of decisions. Specifically we recommend that where administrative quasi- R79 
legislation authoriscs the grant of benefits or services to persons satishing 
prescribed conditions of eligibility, it should also provide that persons aggrieved 
by decisions may appeal to a designated person or body. 
6. 2.24 If this change is made it will enhance the role of the Tribunal as an 
important protector of the rights of citizens in relation to decisions made by 
Commonwealth officials. It would appropriately broaden the senior membership 
of the Tribunal if the provision that only legal practitioners are eligible to become 
presidential members were to he modified to allow full membership of the 
Tribunal by those at present qualified for appointment only as non-presidential 
members. The trend to broaden the eligibility requirements for bodies with 
arhitral rather than judicial functions, illustrated by the recent change for 
presidential members of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, is in the 
Commission's view wise, and we recommend that a suitable opportunity be taken to R8o 
reise in this way the present ]unit on eligibility. 
6.2.25 Legal Remedies: \Vhile the establishment of the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal and the establishment of the office of Ombudsman are, in our 
view, necessary and welcome improvements in the machinery available to 
citizens to obtain independent and impartial review of administrative action, it is 
clear that there is still considerable scope for reform in administrative law as it 
affects the citizen in his relations with the Commonwealth government and its 
instrumentalities, and in the procedures for judicial review. The Commission has 
not taken upon itself the task of making a comprehensive and thorough review of 
this branch of the law. In relation to remedies available for seekingjudicial review 
of administrative action, it notes the recommendations of the Commonwealth 
Administrative Review Committee 1971 and those of the Committee of Review 
on Prerogative Writ Procedures (1973), and would itself recommend that action he R8  
taken without delay to simplify the procedures for originating applications for J 
	
review, so far as this can be done consistently with the Constitution. 
6.2.26 The Commission also received suggestions concerning a number of 
shortcomings in the substantive law governing the availability of remedies for 
administrative faults and excesses, arising in some instances from the application 
of private law principles and analogies which arc not always appropriate. 
Examples brought to notice include the so-called rule of 'independent discretion', 
according to which the Commonwealth is not held vicariously liable for torts 
committed by Commonwealth officers exercising independent statutory disc-
retions; and restrictions placed on the recovery from the Commonwealth of 
unauthorised exactions, or of property voluntarily delivered to the Com-
monwealth pursuant to invalid legislation. There is also the more general 
question of the availability of damages as a remedy for losses sustained through 
administrative action, notably action which is taken without legal authority. 
Matters such as these might, we believe, be the subject of investigation and report 
by the Law Reform Commission, and so far as they come within its terms of R82 
reference by the Administrative Review Council to be established under the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975- 
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The Role of Voluntary Agencies 
6.2.27 There are occasions when the purposes of government can be better 
achieved through the work of agencies which are non-governmental. Although 
there is a risk that governmental support may bring the voluntary agencies into 
the category of quasi-governmental bodies by the process of co-option mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, these agencies can, if they preserve an essential 
separateness, often afford greater protection of the privacy of citizens and 
introduce more flexibility and humanity into the administration of some 
programs than government agencies. 
6.2.28 The key question about the use of voluntary agencies is to determine in 
what circumstances they will perform a function better than any of the 
government agencies. Apart from work done by the Health-Welfare Task Force' 
we have been unable to make the inquiries necessary to establish definitive 
criteria for such a judgment. It seems probable however that reliance on 
RR: voluntary agencies is most likely to prove satisfactory when: 
(a) an agency that has reasonably wide coverage already exists, (for example, 
a national body such as the Australian Council of Social Service or an 
agency in close touch with clients, such as the Brotherhood of St Laurence) 
and is doing a part or the whole of the job the government wishes 
done—especially where there is evidence that it may bring to bear a 
dedication and involvement not readily achieved by officials; 
(b) aspects of the job to be done make it difficult for officials to perform: for 
example, when knowledge of the private lives of individuals is required or 
where the personal qualities required of those performing it can be found 
only among those with a special vocation; 
(c) knowledge and skills arising from membership of particular sections of the 
community are called for, for example, in bodies like the Regional 
Councils for Social Development and Marriage Guidance Councils; 
(d) it is cheaper to subsidise a community organisation rather than establish a 
government agency. 
6.2.29 If functions are to be entrusted to voluntary agencies, it will be necessary 
to consider: 
(a) how financial support is to be provided and reviewed; 
(b) how the work of the agencies is to be monitored; 
(c) how the essential character of the agencies is to be protected. 
6.2.30 To grant financial support in ways which meet the requirements of 
parliamentary control of expenditure and yet do not encroach on the essential 
independence of the voluntary agency involves a dilemma difficult to resolve. 
Much the same problem will arise in relation to the review' of the effectiveness of 
programs the agency administers, particularly as the voluntary agency may have 
a different order of priorities in relation to the program and those to whom it is 
directed than that of the government and its officials. The following objectives are 
suggested as a guide to practice in departmental dealings with voluntary agencies 
R84 to which functions are entrusted: 
(a) the independence of the voluntary organisation should be respected; 
I . See Appendix 4.0 
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(b) the purposes for which the grant is made, the standard of services expected, 
and the terms and conditions on which it is made should be clearly stated; 
(c) the finances of the agency should be audited by a professionally qualified 
auditor chosen by the voluntary agency, and the Auditor-General should, 
on request of the 'parent' department or the agency, conduct occasional 
checks or audits (in this connection we endorse the comments of the Public 
Accounts Committee in its 17th and 26th Reports about the need to 
publish the amount provided while leaving the agencies as free as possible); 
(d) details of grants should be made public. A full listing of grants by categories 
might be made in a special paper produced annually, for example, in a 
further section of the annual Budget Paper 'Payments to or for the States 
and Local Authorities', and details of recipients of grants might be 
included in the relevant department's annual report—for example, State 
or regional branches of the agency might be listed; 
(e) the parent department from time to time should make, or arrange for, 
reviews of the activities of the agency or agencies which receive grants, 
with an assessment of their effectiveness and compliance with the 
conditions of the grants. The department should include the results of these 
assessments in its annual reports. 
6.2-31 The Commission has received suggestions that a clearing house be 
established to receive applications for assistance from all voluntary agencies and 
ensure that the requests are considered by all relevant departments rather than 
only by the department receiving the request, as appears normally to be the 
position at present. It is not clear how far this need is related to the special 
circumstances of the past three years, during which the scope, direction and 
amounts of aid available for voluntary agencies have been subject to considerable 
change. This has produced some questioning and confusion among both the older 
established agencies and the newer bodies such as the Regional Councils for 
Social Development and those they assist. As indicated, we have not had the time 
or resources to make a proper inquiry into the important policy and 
administrative issues associated with the provision of government aid to 
voluntary agencies. These questions could well be explored more fully by the Ri5 
Department of Social Welfare which we propose (see Chapter 10.3) to co-
ordinate and rationalise the programs and administrations of the individual 
welfare departments and agencies. 
6.3 RESPONSIVENESS IN THE ADMINISTRATION 
6.3.1 It follows from our comments in the opening paragraphs of this chapter 
that we consider officials generally can and should make a betterjob of listening to 
members of the community, of advising their minister on what they hear and of 
responding to it themselves. In what follows, we address ourselves to ways in 
which this can be achieved. 
6.3.2 Generally there are two complementary approaches to this issue. The 
administration can develop special structures designed to facilitate the 
interaction or it can rely on better performance from departmental officers 
resulting from better motivation, training, and organisation. The special 
structures can take the form of statutory bodies such as the Universities 
Commission, the Industries Assistance Commission or the Grants Commission; or 
they can take the less formal shape of the non-statutory bodies we have referred to 
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in Chapter 4.3.  fr example, the nianv advisory committees associated with the 
Departments of Education, TraflSJ;)oIt and Ifl(lltStF\ and (ornnicrc. 
The Use of Special Structures 
I n SVStCflIS o!govcrnmcnt based upon the Westminster model the prinarv 
rncaiìs open to members of tIic community ofinfluencing the administration is I)v 
t'cprcsciitations to the local rnernl)('r OF to a rflinistcr. We have noted in Cliaptcr 
tlic increasing tcfl(1CIlc\' to orgaiuc groups to CX('rciS(' uch influenc(' nrc 
cflcctivclv and to iei'sucl'  otlici's to icud their support also. We not(, also that the 
government itsclf has over the ycais ('51 ablislud a varicty of iiistitutions (lcSiglU(l 
to enable some of these groups to function morc effectively. More recently thcrc 
has been a growing tendency on the part of government to depart more 
significantly from the simplicity of the relationship between the millister and his 
department and to establish other channels through which the minister can be 
infhrmcd and advised. In some important instances these changes have been 
designed both to bring to bear upon the problems of policy an expertise more 
professional than that of the departmental official and to involve those likely to be 
afiectecl, either as instruments or beneficiaries, in the policies themselves. The 
can therefore be seen as attempts to adapt the \Vcstmninstcr model to an increasing 
community desire to participate in decision-making procss's and also to draw 
upon a wider range of professional knowledge and skills than it is practicable or 
politic to maintain in the administration itself. 
6.. 	 The institutions established for these purposes vary \videl\. Factors which 
appear to have influenced their (hem and function are: 
a the field of policy conccl'n('(l: 
fu the degree of' professional skill involved: 
ci the importance of the groups and organisations affected: 
d whether such groups and organisations are concerned with national or 
regional issues. 
6.4.r 	 Not all these institutions have been equally successful. Certainly problems 
have ('merged between them and traditional departments about then' respective 
roles, about the degree to which the non-departmental institutions are free from 
the financial and other disciplines and constraints which bear upon departments 
and about the lines of their accountability to ministers. Nevertheless they 
represent significant experiments iii the machinery of government, and whatever 
the immediate future holds for them thcy will continue to influence the long-term 
development of' the bureaucracy. As an illustration of the range of' such 
institutions, we briefly, 
 look at the activities of the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission, the Universities Commission. the Schools Commission, the Social 
\Vellhre Commission and Regional Councils for Social Development. 
6.3.) (hauls (omnuisswn.' One of' the earliest of sudh institutions is the 
Giants Commission, established in 1933 to inquire into and report on 
applications by Stategovernments for grants of financial assistance to States 
which are ref'errecl to it by the ff'deral government, from 1973-1976 the 
Commission's functions were extended to the consideration of applications (hr 
grants from local governments made through approved regional organisatlons 
'Regional Organisations of Councils') . The 4-6 members of the Commissiomi are 
chosen to ensure objectivity and a range of expertise on the finances of the smaller 
states and of local government, though this is by custom rather than requirement. 
lh(' Commission conducts public hearings throughout Australia and, 6.3.7  
particularly since 1973, has heard many representations from members of the 
public and local government representatives ('1 36  in 1974-7,51)  on the level of 
fiscal equalisation grants. The Grants Commission itsellis aware of limitations on 
its system of 'public hearings----witnesses are required to travel to central points 
and Commissioners rarely have the opportunity to inspect problems in local 
areas. These limitations are caused by constraints of time and resources rather 
than unwllirigness to investigate the range of detail and idiosyncratic problems of' 
local councils. The Commission's recommendations to the government fbr 
financial assistance grants have always been accepted. 
6.3.8 	 11 //uTntlr.\ (oiiiini.s.sioii: 	 liw Lniversities Commission advises  the 
Minister 1dm Ed neat iou oii financial assistance and general policy matters relating 
to universities. It includes up to 8 part-time members: none of' these is officially 
representative of the client groups although a of the present board are from 
universities. In its repl to 0111' questionnaire sent to statutory bodies see 
Appendix i ,K the Commission replied that membership has been based in the 
first place on individual capacity to contribute to the work of the Commission'. It 
'lvi 'lit (in: 
"Hic ( ommission would 1101 favour inembers appoii ted as i'eprcsei itatives of 
special mi crest groups 	 repn'sentatiofl of sonic of these gr( ups 	 would lead 
to demands ilia( all groups he reprrsented and produce an unwoi'kahle 
sivation. 
l'he Commission visits universities in preparing reports but does not normally 
advertise for submissions, leaving it rather to the tilliversity to infbrm interested 
groups who might prepare stibmnissions. It does not hold public hearings, but in 
preparing its last report had discussions with about Goo people. 
6.3.9 SdiooI,c Coinmiss ion: 'I'll(, Schools Commission advises the Minister 
for Education on financial assistance fdr schools and on their needs and problems 
gei iera lly. Its Act contains no special provisions for representation of particular 
interest groups on the Commission but in practice influential State-based groups 
such as State education departments, teachers associations, independent schools 
and the Catholic Education Office are represented by part-time members. There 
have been unsuccessful attempts to establish State Advisory Boards as sources of 
suggestions and information. Some criticism has been made to the efh'ct that the 
representativeness' of the Commission is motivated more by desire to conciliate 
the established bases of power than to gain access to a wide range of expertise. The 
Schools Commission advertises for submissions in preparing its reports to the 
Minister but has not held pubic ITleetings. 
6-3-10 	 ocioI It'(/  fnn' (M11i/llioion: The Social \Velliire Commission was 
rovide advice to the government on social welfhre policy established in 1973 to p  
and to develop a basic social welfare plan. The Commissioners and stafi had a 
variety of backgrounds including social work, sociology, economics and statistics. 
Two Commissioners reflected in particular the interests of migrants and the trade 
union movement. The Commission did not make recommendations fhr grants of 
financial assistance and its policy proposals (for example, on the Care for the 
Aged were usually examined by the 'conventional bureaucracy befdre decisions 
went' made. The Commission invited suhniissions from the public on many of'the 
topics investigated and used outside consultants extensively. The Commission is 
at present being wound clown, preparatory to its abolition by statute. 
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6.3. ii Regional Councils 101  Social Development: An interesting experi-
ment in participative forms of planning and policy development arc the Regional 
Councils for Social Development set up under the Australian Assistance Plan. The 
Social Welfare Commission saw the Plan as providing rcsources to enable a 
community to plan and develop social services in a way which reflects community 
needs and priorities'. The Regional Councils include people elected from local or 
regional organisations. Particular interest groups are not automatically repre-
sented: the composition of any council tends to reflect the level of activity of the 
various groups in that region. The Councils recommend to the Department of 
Social Security grants for local social service development projects. The Councils 
have caused much controversy among local governments, since they are 
independent of local council control and provide a source of advice and expertise 
which competes with such bodies as the Regional Organisations of Councils 
which are composed exclusively of local government representatives. They are 
seen by some as a threat to the 'hierarchy' of tiers of government; by others as part 
of a development of a 'fourth tier'. 
6.3.12 Each of the organisations mentioned raises in some form important 
questions about the relationship between the administration and the community. 
One such question arises from the fact that the information and expertise that 
must be made available to bodies advising the government on policies and 
fundings is, in such institutions, frequently ensured by a careful selection of the 
members of the institution itself. However there are many dangers in trying to 
gain a wide and representative sample of interest groups in this way: the body can 
become so large as to be unmanageable; only the most powerful or well-
established might be represented; it is difficult to make a distinction between 
selecting a person because of his or her individual expertise and allowing a 
particular group thereby to gain privileged access to government. 
6.3-13 Secondly, there are frequently tensions with more conventional 
'intermediaries' or sources of power (whether federal departments or State or 
local government bodies) when an institution seeks deliberately to forge a direct 
relationship with clients' of the administration. To some degree such institutions 
by-pass the lines of responsibility which are seen as characteristic of a traditional 
representative democracy. 
6.3.14 To these two problems the Commission believes there are no universally 
applicable answers----attitudes towards the appropriateness of such institutions 
will vary according to the field of policy concerned and the importance of the 
groups and organisations affected. In all institutions where there is some form of 
R86 representation' of client groups it is necessary to keep the membership of the body 
under review both as to the groups formally or informally represented and the 
type of experience they make available. It is too easy for such bodies to become 
captive to particular interests or forms of expertise, so preventing other interests or 
forms of expertise being heard effectively. Despite these difficulties the 
Commission believes that these and other similar institutions constitute an 
important development within Commonwealth administration and have proved 
their value as a supplement to the normal departmental structure. They have in 
fact mobilised skills which would not otherwise have been otherwise available and 
have established more effective communication. 
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6.3.15 Acknowledgment of this success does not imply that their work should 
not be subject to scrutiny. This is especially so when they play an important role in 
advising on the allocation of resources. In allocating such resources governments 
must take account of other claims and their own priorities. It is therefore 
inevitable and proper that statutory bodies advising on resources allocation R87 
should be involved in the discipline of the fbrward estimating and budget 
procedure we outline in Chapters 3  and i i. These procedures both impose a 
discipline and provide an opportunity for these specialist organisations to advise 
on the allocation of funds to important activities in a way which enables them to 
plan their activities in a longer time frame. Forward rolling programs are already 
being adopted, although intermittently, in a number of such areas. We have 
recommended in Chapter 3  that the practice should be extended and made an 
integral part of the discipline of the Forward Estimate budget process. 
6.3. 16 We discuss in Chapter 9.4  the means of staffing statutory bodies. Here we 
observe that the ability of bodies such as we have been discussing to obtain 
research stall with recent experience and expertise in the non-government sector 
is inhibited by staffing under the Public Service Act. However that mode of 
employment does ensure the availability of people with a wide range of relevant 
experience in the bureaucracy. We believe a more appropriate way of obtaining 
the services of 'outsiders' than having separate staffing arrangements is by short 
term contracts or by adopting a system of staff exchanges with the private sector. 
We develop the proposal for staff exchanges in the final section of this chapter. 
6.3. i 7 Many statutory bodies and departments have attached to them special 
advisory bodies, often non-statutory (see also Chapter 4.3.45-47). Non-statutory 
bodies, being less formal than statutory authorities, are already used to provide a 
wide range of advice to ministers and their departments on issues where an input 
from the community is considered desirable. In large part, however, they 
represent relatively well-organised and stable sectional interests---labour, 
business, the professions or farmers. They have distinctly easier access to the 
administration than the less institutionalised and newly emerging bodies, 
currently concerned with issues such as conservation, housing, resident action 
and consumer protection. 
6.3.18 Of the 245 non-statutory bodies reported by departments to be in 
existence early in 1975, 199 were classified as advisory. On these advisory 
committees, 243 associations were represented: more than half(127) were trade, 
business or primary producer associations; nearly one-fifth were trade unions 
(); and only a little over one-tenth (3 1) were professional, governmental and 
educational associations. 
6.3.19 In a consultancy study prepared by Dr T. V. Matthews on the access of 
interest groups to the administration1 , it emerged that even where advisory 
committees exist, their membership tends to be fairly limited in scope and often 
relatively unchanging. Accordingly, where there are advisory groups, we 
recommend that attention be given by departments: 
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(a) to widening the range of their membership, especially by appointing as 
appropriate groups representing the public', consumers, welfare re-
cipients, ethnic minorities and women: to achieve this, interest groups 
I. See Appendix 2.D, Interest Group Access to the Australian Government Bureaucracy. 
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should be invited to submit a panel of names to enable the minister or 
department to have some say over the composition of advisory committees 
while at the same time taking account of the views of the group; 
(b to making appointments for fixed terms, staggered to permit change while 
maintaining a reasonable degree of continuity; 
(c) to including, where appropriate, representation from staff in contact with 
the public; 
(d) to payment of travel costs and sitting fees where the cost of attending 
meetings gives rise to hardship. (This is more especially so in the case of 
individuals representing the interests of the less affluent sections of the 
community. 
Many statutory bodies have provision in their legislation for the appointment of 
advisory bodies, fhr example, the Darwin Reconstruction Commission, the 
Australian Broadcasting Commission, the Schools Commission and the Postal 
RRq Commission. We ieconimend that, to achieve the same purposes of broad 
representation and responsive administration, other statutory bodies follow 
similar procedures where this is not inconsistent with their legislation. 
6.3.20) Newly emerging groups sometimes encounter special problems in 
gaining access to the administration to put their point of view or press their 
claims. They may be handicapped by unfamiliarity with channels of recourse and 
by lack of the skills and resources needed to present their case with any real 
prospect of its being seriously considered. It is often little' things like the ability to 
take time off work to attend on a minister or meet with his officers-which may 
involve travelling long distances---and the facility to prepare well written, well 
reasoned and documented submissions (in English), which make all the 
difference between having or not having the opportunity even to be heard. 
6.3.21 There is no easy way of overcoming the inequalities that exist in the 
capacities of different individuals and groups to communicate their views and 
grievances to the government and to seek to influence the course of decision. The 
Commonwealth government has to some extent recognised that these inequalities 
exist and has taken steps to remedy them. Grants of financial assistance have, for 
example, been made to conservation associations to help them present cases at 
public inquiries. Provision has also been made for granting legal or financial 
assistance to persons who have instituted or propose to institute proceedings 
before the Trade Practices Commission or the Trade Practices Tribunal, or who 
are entitled to participate in those proceedings. 
6.3.2 2 We believe that there is considerably more scope for the provision of 
assistance of this kind, and not simply in relation to participation in public 
inquiries or the preparation and presentation of submissions in response to 
invitations by public advertisement. There may be many cases where groups of 
individuals wish to take the initiative in putting their views to government but are 
effectively disabled from doing so by their lack of the necessary means. We 
Rgo recommend therefore that early consideration be given to the establishment of a 
fund, to be administered by a neutral agency, for the purpose of making small 
grants of financial assistance to associations which propose to make submissions to 
the government and which can show genuine hardship. It would be our intention 
that grants be made available primarily for the purpose of defraying secretarial 
and related expenses such as purchase of stationery, office accommodation and 
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travel expenses, and that the recipients be under an obligation to account for their 
expenditure. 
The Role of Departments 
6.3.23 In the constant pattern of interaction between the administration and 
the community many formal and informal channels of communication develop. 
Where the number of interests involved is large or the interests are substantial, 
there is merit in developing understood and publiciscd structures for com-
munication along the lines we have just discussed. However, the most frequent 
and widest range of contacts are made direct between the community and 
particular officers within the administration. We believe that in this area the 
Public Service should he ready to listen, and to respond. It could be objected that 
this would imply a politicising of the Public Service, but we would question that. 
The Public Service is a well integrated organisation and the tendency has been for 
it to be too isolated from the community rather than too involved. As a first step in 
the development of guidelines to allow officers in the public service to be more 
accessible to individuals or groups, we recommend: 	 Rq i 
(a) that departmental administrations encourage officers to respond positively 
to requests by individuals or members of existing or new groups for 
meetings with members of the department; 
(b) an officer meeting members of the public be free to discuss the issues, 
indicate what government policy is (if any) and be expected to assist the 
group or individual to prepare an effective case, though without 
necessarily becoming the advocate for the case, or becoming identified 
personally or departmentally with it; 
c) departmental lacilitics, for example libraries, departmental publications 
and, in some cases, relevant papers on files, be made available to the group 
or individual; 
(d) for the protection of both sides, a record of proceedings should be prepared 
and be available to both parties. This should be a recognised departmental 
responsibility unless the visiting individual or group offers to prepare the 
record. 
6.3.24 The view has often been taken that public servants making themselves 
accessible to individuals or groups in the way outlined above are encroaching on 
ministerial responsibilities and exceeding their normal course of duty. In our 
view, the climate of opinion on this matter is changing and, in some cases, has 
already changed substantially. Just as the minister may delegate powers 
conferred on him by legislation to officers working within his department, 5C) we 
believe it appropriate, and consistent with ministerial responsibility, for a 
minister to allow explicitly or implicitly discussions to take place between officers 
in his department and members of the community. By this means, ministers will 
ensure that officers who are responsible for preparing advice on matters requiring 
ministerial decision will have a better understanding of what is going on in the 
community and will bring reality and depth to the advising process. 
6.3.2 5 The development of improved and understood procedures for greater 
accessibility of departmental officers to members of the community will be seen 
only as a form of tokenism unless the administration is able to respond effectively. 
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R92 AccordinglyT the Commission recommends that, in parallel with the measures to 
improve such accessibility, departments take measures to ensure that: 
a) senior levels in departments demonstrate a willingness to take full account 
of what has been said, to respond to it or to obtain ministerial responses in 
appropriate cases; 
(b) clear lines of communication are established within the department 
designed to ensure that cases put by groups are reviewed and that decisions 
are made on them; 
c) the minister is advised from time to time, and as often as necessary, of what 
input departmental officers are receiving in this way--with departmental 
comment for or against as is considered appropriate. 
(d) provision is made for departmental facilities such as library, departmental 
publications and file material, to be more widely accessible; 
(e) replies to submissions from the public are promptly prepared and 
dispatched. 
6.3.26 It was put to us that departments should become more accessible to the 
community by becoming a 'learning resource' . That is, they should respond to 
the developing community interest in learning through other than recognised 
educational institutions by preparing themselves to assist members of the public 
wishing to make use of departmental libraries and, on occasions, to have 
discussions with relevant officers. Some departments are already moving in this 
direction. For example, the Department of Environment, Housing and 
Community Development is offering a telephone inquiry service. an advisory 
service for local groups, and an education liaison group to work with schools and 
to conduct seminars where there is public interest in matters related to its 
activities. Action along these lines will tend to break dcwn the 'we-they' attitude 
and encourage active and constructive interest by the community generally in the 
work of government. 
6-3.27 The Commission's firm conclusion on the question of access to and use of 
government information is that every reasonable attempt should be made to 
provide access to the community generally and, in particular, to interested 
community groups, to information which until now has been the privileged 
possession of public servants. Such improved access is critical to the greater 
responsiveness for which this chapter argues. The Commission reviews this matter 
in more detail in Chapter 10.7 in the context of an examination of government 
information in its widest sense. 
6-3.28 The new roles we have proposed for the Public Service in the preceding 
sections may from time to time give rise to problems. For example, public servants 
may either misrepresent what has been put to them, or be thought to have 
misrepresented it, or a senior officer may consider there has been too complete an 
espousal by an officer of a case put by a community group. To some extent, such 
problems can be overcome by ensuring that there is full communication between 
both sides and within the administration itself. The exchange of a record of 
proceedings as suggested in paragraph 6.3.23(d) will also assist in some cases. 
Given good sense, and a proper awareness of the importance of maintaining 
constructive dialogue between the administration and the community, the 
I . Submission No. 36, from Ms Rosemary Walters. 
'44 
problems should be capable of resolution. The difficulties that are bound to arise 
should not be made the excuse for a failure on the part of the administration to 
promote a sense of public service to the community among department officers 
and to work actively for meaningful interaction. We see the Public Service Board R 
as having a role in refining the guidelines for action we have set out above, and in 
resolving cases where an officer considers he has been unfairly treated by his 
department. 
Exchanges of Personnel 
6.3.29 Mutual understanding between the administration and the community 
could be promoted through the development of a scheme of staff exchanges with 
the private sector. Exchange schemes of this kind are not easy to develop, as 
experience in Britain, the United States and Canada shows. However, the 
proposed system of staff rotation within the departmental service and 
Commonwealth employment generally (see Chapter i 1.6) will make movements 
to and from Commonwealth employment a good deal easier to arrange than at 
present. The proposal is not for exchanges with private sector employees on a one 
for one basis. Rather it is envisaged that the Public Service Board would, in 
consultation with departments, be responsible for organising and administering a 
secondment scheme, along the following lines: 	 R94 
(a) the bodies with whom exchanges should be developed would include 
(i) State and local government services (see Chapter 7.4.17), 
(ii) larger firms in industry and commerce, 
(iii) academic institutions—schools, universities and other tertiary 
institutions, 
(iv) larger voluntary agencies; 
(b) the officers involved would normally be promising people in the middle 
grades—the higher ranges of the existing third division and equivalent 
levels in the private sector—although this should not preclude, in 
appropriate cases, secondment of people at higher or lower levels than this; 
(c) the period of secondment would normally be between one and two years 
though shorter periods, for example, six months in suitable cases, would 
not be precluded; 
(d) the host institution (the Public Service Board for secondments to 
Commonwealth employment) would be responsible for 
(i) ensuring that the program of work of the seconded officer is 
interesting and contains an adequate measure of responsibility, 
(ii) reviewing the progress of the seconded officer after say the first three 
months, and then at six monthly intervals, 
with an understanding that the arrangement could be terminated quickly 
and effectively if it has not worked out well; 
(e) the salary, cost of movement to and from the host institution, any 
allowances for housing etc, and superannuation arrangements for 
seconded officers, would continue to be met by their employers, but the 
seconded officer would during his period of secondment be subject to the 
same direction, working conditions etc, as employees of the host 
institution; 
( 	 the seconded officer would respect any confidences entrusted to him by 
either his employer or the host institution, and would not be expected, or 
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placed under pressure, by either to divulge these confidences this would 
not prevent discussion and reports on experience gained--an important 
pi of the program) 
(g) secondment would not be to the prejudice of the officer's prospects of 
advancement and he would he assured of reintegration on his return from 
secondment; 
h) the Public Service Board and the outside employer would avoid arranging 
secondments that could lead to a conflict of interests; 
(i) the Public Service Board would organise appropriate occasions for 
discussion between those seconded into and out of the Service under the 
scheme and other groups within the Service "and, as desired, with others 
from outside the Service). 
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Chapter 7 
	
Administration 
away from the 
Centre 
7.' INTRODUCTION 
7. i I The tendency of large organisations to concentrate power and authority 
at the centre' can lead to slowness in decision making, impersonality, and a 
tendency to inflexibility in procedures. The problem is compounded when there 
is a wide geographical spread in the organisation, giving variety in local 
conditions. In Australia large distances, the relative isolation of Canberra and the 
constraints imposed by traditional concepts of ministerial responsibility have all 
helped create problems for local administrators and communities. These 
problems were prominent in submissions received by the Commission and in oral 
evidence during visits to state and regional centres. As a result, we believe that 
there is both a strong public demand and an administrative need to get the 
business of government done as close as possible to the people and places which 
that business concerns, to spread decision making more widely and to reduce the 
time lags and rigidities which reflect central control. 
7.1.2 We do not attempt in this chapter to deal with policy making away from 
the centre1, although it should be noted that spreading authority outside head 
offices, and the offices of State capital cities, is part of the process of devolution 
which is one of the main themes of our Report. Here, our concern is primarily 
with those processes of administration which are set in motion by approaches 
from citizens or which affect them as individuals or as members of groups. We 
consider that there are several prerequisites for a satisfactory performance of such 
processes. First, it should be easy for citizens to make direct contact with those 
who can transact the relevant business with them. Second, the programs from 
which this business derives should be designed to meet the actual needs of those for 
whose benefit they have been prepared. Third, the local administration should be 
capable of responding to local needs. Accordingly, more authority to reach 
decisions needs to be given to the officers at local levels, especially to those who 
deal directly with the public. Finally, the resources locally available should be 
used imaginatively to avoid duplication of effort and waste of resources. 
7.' .3 These prerequisites indicate that this chapter is concerned with a special 
case of the issues dealt with in Chapter 6, The Administration and the 
Community. Here we are concerned to ensure effective interaction with disparate 
and at times isolated communities, and changes in administrative structures and 
practices to improve that interaction. We emphasise that effective action to this 
end must begin with a willingness by the co-ordinating authorities—the 
Treasury, the Public Service Board, and the Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet--and the top managements of all departments to take steps to 
I. 	 See Chapter 3  (particularly on the question of ministerial responsibility and staff participation 
in objective setting) 
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delegate authority to officers away from the centre. We deal below with three 
important forms that such delegation might take: 
(a) the delegation of authority within departments to officers at the local level 
(Section 7.2); 
(b) the delegation of authority and administrative responsibility between 
different federal agencies (7.3); 
(c) co-operative arrangements, including the delegation of authority and 
administrative responsibility, between the federal and other levels of 
government (7.4). 
7.1.4 Such delegations would make possible a more positive development of a 
regional structure for Commonwealth administration and a more systematic, 
regionally based co-operation between the different levels of government and 
with non-government voluntary agencies. As an illustration of this possibility we 
discuss in Section 7.5  the concept of the 'one stop shop', designed to provide in one 
location a comprehensive range of services from all levels of government and from 
the voluntary sector. 
7.1.5 Three-quarters of the people employed under the Commonwealth Public 
Service Act work outside Canberra. These are the people whom the community 
encounters directly. They are riot, however, the part of the administration which 
has the greatest prestige. Our examination of personnel records show that there 
are such identifiable differences between the 'Canberra' and 'non-Canberra' 
elements in the Service that one canjustiflably talk of 'two services'. In Canberra, 
for example, the proportion of all clerical-administrative positions in the third 
division which are class 8 or higher is about four times as high as the 
corresponding ratio outside Canberra.' Whereas nearly one half of those in the 
'Canberra' Service have had rates of salary increase in excess of i 6o per cent in the 
eight years since they commenced their service, less than one third of the non-
Canberra group had similar rates of increase.2 Those working in Canberra 
(particularly those in the third division) report a markedly higher degree of job 
satisfaction than do those in the non-Canberra Service .3  And those entering the 
non-Canberra Service have lower educational qualifications than those entering 
the Canberra group (nearly 40 per cent of those entering the third division of the 
Canberra Service have qualifications beyond the Higher School Certificate, 
compared to less than 20 per cent of those entering the non-Canberra section of 
the Service) .' 
7. 1.6 Too often, discussions of the Public Service (at least those which occur at 
policy levels or in the media) are conducted in terms of the Canberra section 
alone. This is reflected in the content of submissions to the Commission from 
departments, from officials and from external organisations concerned with 
government policy. It was less so in the submissions from staff organisations. On 
the other hand submissions and evidence from individual citizens, as well as the 
ParticipACTION and Access projects, were primarily concerned with officials at 
the 'interface', that is, characteristically outside Canberra. The emphasis both 
I . Public Service Board Annual Report 1975- 
2. Appendix 3.A, the Career Service Study, Paper 2. 
3. Appendix 3.A, Paper 5. 
4. Appendix 3.A, Paper 2. 
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within and outside the Service on the Canberra element sometimes gives the 
impression that there is little concern among those who work in the insulated 
atmosphere of the national capital for the needs of the community outside, and 
that those whose task is to serve the community locally can exercise little influence 
on policy or administration. 
7.1.7 Objections have been raised to the greater spread of authority away from 
the centre. Some of them are based upon real difficulties. For example, it has been 
argued that such devolution will break down the effectiveness, and indeed the 
principle, of ministerial responsibility. This objection is based on the notion that a 
minister does hav(' and caii have iespoiisibilitv for individual decisions. We have 
shown that his respoiisibilitv can only be more general and is in fact dependent 
upon an effective system of accountable management (see Chapter 3).  We believe 
it is possible to design such a system so that it devolves and decentralises authority 
and holds accountable for its exercise officials in whom the authority rests. The 
minister remains politically responsible for the general effectiveness of the system 
but also of course for the degree to which it permits local considerations to he 
taken into account when decisions are to be made. 
7. 1.8 Another objection to agreater spreading of authority is that it is more 
costly. The Commission's Task Force on a Regional Basis for Australian 
Government Administration judged that to provide regional decision makers 
with the information on which to base decisions would marginally increase the 
costs of making them. On the other hand the Access Survey provides evidence 
indicating scope for economies through greater delegation and attention to client 
needs. The Commission finds it hard to believe that devolution would not in fact 
be cheaper. Even with the existing systems, several departments, including Social 
Security, have shown that regional offices can operate at least as economically as 
larger offices based in central business districts—and with much improved service 
to the public. In addition, cross-delegations of authority from one department to 
another, agency arrangements and the use of State or local government 
administrative machinery all offer scope for economy. 
7.2 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY WITHIN DEPARTMENTS 
7.2. i We argued in Chapter 3.8 that better decisions will be made and better 
service given to people if authority and responsibility are devolved to officials 
close to where the action occurs and that the challenge to management which this 
presents can be met by the use of contemporary technology and computer based 
information systems. 
7.2.2 To test the practicability of greater devolution and to weigh the risks of 
loss of control and consistency which might be involved, we arranged for 
members of our staff to make detailed studies of the present spread of effective 
authority, of the extent of delegations, of consistency in practice as between 
departments, and of the frequency with which practice in these matters is 
reviewed. 
7.2.3 There are two broad types of delegation operating in the Public Service. 
I. See Appendix 2.1, Delegations in the Australian Public Service. 
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The most common is the delegation, often informal, of non-statutory powers 
which ultimately derive from the executive power of the Commonwealth. 
Officers at different levels in a department, or a unit within a department, are 
understood to be able to exercise certain powers and carry out certain duties 
without reference to higher authority. If something requiring action outside the 
understood range of authority occurs then the officer is expected to refer the 
matter for decision to someone at a higher level or seek approval of action 
proposed. The second type of delegation is delegation of powers conferred by 
statute or subordinate legislation: such as ordinances (in the Territories), and 
regulations. In such cases, the delegation is usually precisely worded, in writing, 
and is given to specifically designated officers. 
7.2.4 Greater delegation of authority can come through either the informal or 
the legal channels. A delegation of the informal type is generally both more 
important and more difficult to arrange, since it involves the voluntary handing 
over of authority from one person to another. Difficulties can arise if there are, or 
are felt to be, unstated reservations in the arrangements. 
7.2.5 We have received evidence that many officers are unwilling to accept 
responsibility because of the consequences they fear may follow from making even 
a relatively small 'error' or from the exercise of a discretion, for example, to grant 
a pension, in circumstances with which a superior may not agree. In part this fear 
of censure reflects an excessively rule-dominated quest for uniformity and an 
unwillingness of managers to allow subordinates to make juclgnients and decisions 
which they will support even though they themselves might have judged or 
decided differently. 
7.2.6 Reluctance to delegate is sometimes justified by the need to achieve 
consistency in program administration throughout the country. But 'consistency' 
does not mean 'uniformity'. A program is administered consistently ifiñdividuals 
or groups in the same circumstances receive the same treatment. The major 
argument for devolution is that the thf/erent circumstances of individuals and 
groups need to be understood if a policy is to be applied effectively. The Access 
Survey1 found that 8,5 per cent of 'public contact' staff found it necessary to 'cut 
corners' sometimes to get things done effectively. It is not sufficient to feel relief 
and even pleasure that so many public servants are prepared to cut corners: 
constant review of the adequacy of procedures is all important. As we have 
argued, constant review of program objedives is also necessary. 
7.2.7 Programs need to be devised with a greater concentration on these 
objectives and on allowing intelligent application in local situations, and less on 
mechanical uniformity. Program design would frequently benefit from the 
assistance of officials who have daily exposure to local needs and pressures. A good 
illustration of the tendency at the centre to give too little weight to matters 
important at the interface is the high proportion of complaints noted by the 
Access Report which related to delayed delivery of cheques and other formal 
communications. The Access Report found that despite this, there was no section 
of the department concerned which dealt specifically with such delays or sought 
to identify their causes. Greater influence on design and administration by local 
I . 	 Sec Appendix 2.C. 
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officers would, we believe, have led to changes in these matters, with savings in 
man-hour costs as well as improved client satisfaction (see also paragraph 7.1.8). 
7.2.8 If local administrators understand a program's objectives, have access to 
appropriate information and have authority to make decisions in fulfilment of 
those objectives they may well achieve greater consistency of result than does a 
centrally enforced rule dominated uniformity. If they are trusted there will be an 
increased risk of minor error and departures from uniformity. The present system 
with its limited acceptance of devolution and delegation 'with reservations' is 
dominated by reluctance to take these risks, so that the general unwillingness to 
delegate is reflected sometimes in a reluctance to act on delegated authority even 
when it exists. The Commission considers the risks exaggerated at the centre and 
believes that the dilemma should be resolved by a sturdy increase in delegations 
combined with standards of accountability in which an official's performance is 
judged in the aggregate rather than by narrowly selected points of detail. 
7.2.9 Another justification given for a reluctance to delegate is the conviction 
that only senior experienced officers, or those who have access to and are closely 
supervised by them can be trusted to make decisions. We believe this conviction to 
be mistaken. There is no reason to question the inherent calibre of officers outside 
Canberra nor their capacity, given clear directives and access to relevant 
information, to accept the appropriate responsibilities. 
7.2.10 The transfer of maximum responsibility cannot take place overnight. 
The ability to accept responsibility grows only from in fact accepting it. There is a 
need for more systematic attention to the information flowing to officers away 
from the central administration and to the graduation of responsibilities which 
they are called upon to bear as they become more experienced.' But 
responsibility must begin early. We have noted that third division officers serving 
outside Canberra express less satisfaction in their jobs than do similarly ranked 
officers in Canberra. This difference may in part reflect the differences in existing 
opportunities to accept responsibility and to exercise judgment. The proposals 
below should to a significant degree improve the job satisfaction of such people, as 
well as contributing to a better service for the public. 
7.2. ii We recommend that senior management in central offices of departments, R95 
and in State capital city offices as appropriate: 
(a) increase as rapidly as possible the level of delegation allowed to officers 
delivering services to the public; 
(b) involve these officers in the formulation and review of objectives and 
administrative guidelines. 
7.2.12 Officers away from the centre will need added training to equip them for 
added responsibilities as will managers required to delegate. We discuss the 
training needs of officers, including those in regional and local offices in Chapter 
8.4 in the section on Training and Staff Development. 
7.2.13. We also recommend: 	 R96 
(a) that the Management Consultancy group in the Public Service Board 
assist managers to achieve the changes outlined above (see Chapter 
11.6.19-22); 
I. See Appendix i.E, Public Sector Management and Related Information Requirements. 
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(b) that the new arrangements be the subject of report by the Auditor-General 
under the new power to conduct efficiency audits; 
(c) that the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, in the course of 
effectiveness reviews' (see Chapter 11-5.2o) assess the influence of the 
reforms on the effectiveness of the department's programs; 
(d) that departments review annually all allowances, delegations and 
authorisations having monetary limits with a view to adjusting them, to 
take account of changing monetary values and of the increased capacity of 
local staff, 
(e) that the Attorney-General's Department, in consultation with the 
departments concerned, examine existing legislation with a view to 
ensuring that power to delegate particular functions is located at suitable 
levels in the administration. 
7.2.14 Two aspects of the conditions of employment are pertinent to a 
discussion of devolution of decision-making. One relates to the major issue of staff 
working conditions when dispersal (that is movement of staff from a major 
employment centre in a capital city to outlying suburban centres) and 
decentralisation of government functions occurs. This subject was discussed in the 
submission from the Council of Australian Government Employee Organisations 
(CAGEO), and a number of proposals were made which stem from the 
experience of CAGEO and its affiliates and which also draw upon a report by the 
R97 Tavistock Institute." The Commission sees merit in these broad proposals and 
suggests that they be given detailed consideration. 
7.2.15 The Commission also received evidence on the need to improve the 
minimum standards of residential accommodation available to Commonwealth 
employees, particularly in areas where the climatic conditions call for design 
departure from South-Eastern Australian requirements. A report prepared for 
CAGEO by the Department ofArchitecture of the University of Queensland' has 
pointed to inadequacies of the present housing standards, and puts much of the 
blame on the multiplicity of bodies with overlapping interests in the research and 
implementation of tropical housing needs. 
7.2. 16 Responding to the CAGEO submission the then Department of Housing 
and Construction referred to the co-ordinating role of the Building Research 
Development Advisory Committee and to the amalgamation of three in-
terdepartmental committees to form the Australian Public Service Housing 
Scales and Standards Committee, as evidence of improved co-ordination. Despite 
this, co-ordination remains defective, as three bodies continue to have 
overlapping interests, namely: 
(a) the Australian Housing Standards Advisory Council; 
(b) the Australian Public Service Housing Scales and Standards Committee; 
(c) the Building Research and Development Advisory Committee. 
i. Report on the Location of Government—Human Aspects of Dispersal (Tavistock Institute of Human 
Relations: August 1972, 
  London). Some of the issues involved in relocating government offices 
are canvassed in a staff paper, The Location of Australian Government Employees. See 
Commission's Collected Papers on microfiche. 
2. B. S. Saini and S. V. Szokolay, Evaluation of Housing Standards in Tropical Australia; Department 
of Architecture, University of Queensland. 
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7.2. 17  None of these bodies has a special responsibility for the problems of 
tropical housing—all have a nation-wide commitment. We recommend that: 	 R98 
(a) either a single authority or a specialised group with a degree of autonomy 
be established for formulating and implementing a policy for Australian 
government housing in tropical areas; 
(b) minimum standards of housing be improved in line with those recom-
mended by the above-mentioned university report. 
7.3 REGIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND INTER-AGENCY DELE-
GATION 
i Concern within the Commonwealth administration for decentralisation is 
not new. The early federal functions were, and continue to be, effectively 
decentralised largely because those functions were taken over from the six States. 
As the federal government developed, and moved to Canberra the tendency to 
centralise became more apparent. Since then the prevailing pattern has been for 
few officers to be posted outside the Canberra or State capital city offices. In fact 
many departments when asked about the extent of their regional operations 
replied that their 'regional offices' are those in the State capital cities. 
7.3.2 For some purposes of Commonwealth administration a State may 
represent a useful regional unit. But for others a much smaller population or area 
would be appropriate if the service is to be effective. The relevant question is 
whether areas smaller than States will facilitate efficient Commonwealth 
administration: not whether another tier of government is needed. Indeed, the 
Commission believes that administrative regions need not coincide with the 
territorial boundaries of any one level of government but rather should be areas 
where all such levels can co-operate in the better administration of the services 
that each provides. 
7.3.3 Because of the complexity of the issues involved in developing a regional 
basis for Commonwealth administration, the Commission appointed a Task 
Force to investigate and report on them.' The Task Force report and a study 
made by staff of the Commission  found that greater use of delegations and 
agency arrangements between one department or agency and another offers one 
of the most promising avenues for improving administration at regional and local 
levels. We draw the attention of departments and agencies to these reports and 
recommend that departments explore more actively the scope for such 'cross- R99 
delegations'. 
7.3.4 In this connection, we invite attention to the willingness of the Australian 
Postal Commission to act as an agent for departments, and the wish of the 
Australian Postmaster's Association that their members be given such opportu-
nities. Australia Post has an unmatched range of offices throughout Australia, 
and is equipped to handle telex material and cash. We see no reason why many Rioo 
more departments should not use its services for the provision of advice, payment 
direct of relatively small amounts of cash, and the handling of inquiries. The use 
I. The terms of reference, membership and major conclusions of this Task Force can be found at 
Appendix 2.H. 
2. See Appendix 2.1. 
3. A facilitating amendment of the Australian Postal Commission Act may be necessary. 
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of its services could in some circumstances be an alternative to the appointment of 
additional officers in a region. 
Rioi 7.3.5 The possibilities of such agency arrangements and other forms of co-
operation would be increased by more effective consultation between officers of 
different departments represented in a region. A shared understanding of the 
problems of the region built up locally would feed back to central offices more 
complete and reliable information on which to base policy and administrative 
decisions. Such local groups of departmental representatives would provide 
invaluable support for task forces or similar groups studying specific problems of 
the region. Such consultation might also lead to the sharing in remote areas of 
support facilities such as typing and copying, communications and housing, the 
insufficiency of which frequently hampers the work of officers. 
R102 7.3.6 There is room for experiment in the means by which such groups of 
Commonwealth departmental representatives might co-operate with local 
agencies. Regional Councils for Social Development, assuming they continue to 
be funded by the Commonwealth, may in appropriate circumstances share their 
administrative facilities and act as a source of information about local attitudes 
and issues. 
7.3.7 Local and regional organisations could assist in providing the local 
community with accurate, precise and readily understandable information about 
federal government programs. Citizens' Advice and Aid Bureaux and Com-
munity Information Centres could assist people to obtain it. Regular contact 
would make it easier for departments to ensure that such organisations received 
up-to-date information and to assess from their comments what might be the 
needs of particular areas. 
7.3.8 Another possible development investigated by the Task Force is the 
appointment for a region of an officer who for purposes of discussion was called 
the 'Australian Government Representative'. This proposal was originally 
outlined in Commission Discussion Paper No. i, Regionalising Government 
Administration.' The Task Force records that it approached the concept with a 
degree of scepticism but, after extensive discussions in four regions, concluded 
that in an appropriate form it might: 
(a) help produce an effective response to the needs and problems of the region; 
(b) avoid undue expansion of departmental staff at the regional and local 
levels; 
(c) promote more effective service delivery; 
(d) provide a link for policy communications beyond the resources of any 
single department. 
7.3.9 Some reservations were expressed about the concept of a Commonwealth 
Government Representative both in the regions visited by the Task Force and at a 
seminar arranged by the Commission in Canberra. The scepticism was based on 
concern about the addition of 'another cog in the machinery'; and on 
apprehension, particularly in local governments, that such an appointment 
would lead to a 'takeover' of their functions. On the other hand, strong support 
I . See the collected papers of the Commission on microfiche. 
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for the proposal was also expressed, especially from community groups and from 
users of services provided by Commonwealth departments and agencies. 
7.3.10 The Commission recognises that there is a dilemma inherent in the 
concept of a Commonwealth Government Representative. If he has large powers, 
he will tend to become unacceptable to those responsible for particular functions. 
On the other hand, if he has no substantial delegations but relies solely on 
persuasion, he may be ineffective. Without actual experiment, the idea cannot be 
evaluated. The Commission believes that such a representative, carefully chosen 
and briefed, could both strengthen the Commonwealth government presence and 
improve its communication with and comprehension of the concerns of the 
region. To achieve these ends, such a representative should receive a ministerial 
directive, partly general in character and partly specific to the region. 
ii This directive would make clear that his role was not to determine 
matters which are the responsibility of individual departments with repre-
sentatives in the region but rather: 
(a) to act as the general administrative representative in the region across the 
spectrum of Commonwealth government activities; 
(b) to develop effective contacts with representatives of State and local 
government and community groups; 
(c) to form and convey to central offices, assessments of needs, priorities and 
problems in the region; 
(d) to watch over, and as desirable co-ordinate, the activities of Com-
monwealth departments and agencies within the region and to exercise 
defined powers in relation to local administrative issues, for example, local 
recruitment, minor maintenance; 
(e) to act on behalf of the departments not otherwise represented in the region. 
The Commission recommends as an experiment, the appointment of at least one, Ri 03 
and preferably more, Commonwealth Government Representatives on the 
foregoing basis, including one in a remote region and one in a city. 
7.3.12 While the Commission is satisfied that there would be clear benefits if a 
Commonwealth Government Representative were appointed in some, if perhaps 
not all, regions, it believes that his precise role could best be evolved in practice. 
The same can be said of other ways of strengthening the quality of the 
Commonwealth presence in the regions. Accordingly, the Commission recommends R104 
that experiments be conducted at least in the four regions visited by the Task 
Force, and along the lines it recommended. In summary form this would mean: 
(a) Alice Springs: the Regional Director, Department of the Northern 
Territory, Alice Springs, would convene on an experimental basis, a 
monthly meeting of heads of all Commonwealth government agencies, to 
which meetings representative members of the community might 
occasionally be invited; 
(b) Kimberleys: a task force would examine problems associated with the 
delivery of welfare services with special reference to Aboriginals, and 
recommend whether a Commonwealth Government Representative 
should be appointed for the region; it would seek to develop liaison 
arrangements with the State Regional Administrator in Kununurra; 
(c) Queensland Northern (Townsville): the heads of Commonwealth offices in 
the region would meet regularly, the chairman being chosen on a 
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rotational basis and having authority to convene meetings and to establish 
liaison with the co-ordinating secretariat in Canberra; 
(d) Western Region, Melbourne: a senior officer would be appointed as a 
Commonwealth Government Representative with authority to negotiate 
for the establishment of consultative machinery at the local administrative 
level for the federal, State and local agencies active in the region. 
7.3.13 Since the Task Force presented its report the Commission has had 
contact with the Moreton Regional Committee which was established by the 
former Department of Urban and Regional Development to investigate 
the possibility of a regional approach by elements of Commonwealth government 
administration to the Moreton region in Queensland. The Commission 
R 105 recommends that the Moreton Committee development be regarded along with 
those referred to above as providing a significant test of the practicability and 
value of greater regional emphasis in Commonwealth administration. 
7.3.14 Experience both in Britain and in Canada, where devolution of 
authority was recommended by the Fulton and Glassco Commissions re-
spectively, suggests that central offices of departments and agencies are unlikely 
actively to pursue such devolution. The traditional hierarchically organised 
administration in Canberra has no inbuilt dynamic capable of reversing the trend 
towards centralisation. 
Rio6 7.3.15 We therefore recommend that a co-ordinating unit for decentralisation be 
established as a separate entity in the relevant area of the Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet. A unit so placed would be better able to cut across 
entrenched departmental interests and to ensure that regional considerations 
were injected into policy judgments. It would be the function of this unit to make 
or arrange objective assessments of the regional experiments recommended above 
and to monitor other administrative changes. 
7.4 OTHER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT 
Co-operative Arrangements with the States 
7-4-1 Closely related to the need to give greater regional emphasis to 
Commonwealth administration is the case for making greater use of State 
administrations to assist in carrying out Commonwealth programs. Our 
inquiries, and the experience of many departments over the years, suggest that 
this use is practicable but that difficulties and resistance will be encountered.' 
The political relationships between governments sometimes make agreement 
difficult, especially when the program concerned is politically controversial. 
Nevertheless some existing arrangements, for instance in customs, quarantine, 
tuberculosis and the management of the waters of the River Murray, show that 
such agreements can prove efficient and can stand the test of time. Even more 
controversial schemes, including the administration of offshore oil and rural 
reconstruction, schemes, have survived and, despite criticism, have worked 
economically. 
7.4.2 The greater use of State administrative facilities is often resisted by 
Commonwealth administrators. They refer to the need for uniformity between 
I . See Appendix 2.G, Relationships between the Commonwealth and State Governments. 
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States and the difficulty of officers working for two masters, both of whom bear 
ministerial responsibility. Experience does not support the view that these 
difficulties are insuperable. The post-war housing and war service land settlement 
schemes are good examples, in addition to those mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, of effective, economical and publicly acceptable administrative 
arrangements. We note that uniformity between States may not produce 
maximum effectiveness: a federal scheme may in fact benefit from a degree of 
State and regional diversity, for example apple growers in Tasmania may have 
needs quite different from those in Western Australia and construction standards 
for aged persons homes may properly be different in Hobart and Cairns. 
7.4.3 The primary justification for the maximum use of State facilities is 
economy and the avoidance of administratively confusing overlap of operations. 
Such overlap is most probable when a federal program runs closely parallel to 
State programs. The Commission believes that in such instances the possibility of 
negotiated arrangements for State administration of the program should be 
explored before new federal organisations are established. We do not suggest that 
a Commonwealth government should abandon or qualify its right to establish 
such programs or to determine the principles on which they should be 
administered. But experience of the Commonwealth-State housing agreements 
suggests that with, if necessary, hard bargaining, this right is compatible with 
agreements under which State administrative machinery is effectively used. 
7.4.4 Agreed arrangements with the States need not be confined to new 
programs, nor need the traffic be wholly one way. There are instances, and there 
could be more, of federal agencies acting for the States. The function of meat 
inspection is one where commonsense appears to demand co-operative 
administration, as is the inspection of the observance of arbitral awards where 
already joint arrangements exist in some States. We are satisfied that with a R1o7 
sufficiently firm political direction those concerned could evolve satisfactory and 
amplified administrative agreements without great difficulty. Such agreements 
should: 
(a) retain the right of the federal or State government as the case may be to 
determine policy and broad principles of administration; 
(b) allow administrative discretion and flexibility to States and their officials 
or to federal agencies. 
7.4.5 Formal arrangements of this kind can be supplemented by ministerial 
action to assign functions to an officer of a different level of government. Thus the 
Customs Act, in an area where Commonwealth powers are, by the Constitution, 
'exclusive', authorises the Minister to appoint officers of Customs who need not be 
Commonwealth officers and frequently are State officers. Similarly, the 
Quarantine Act, in an area where the Commonwealth has concurrent legislative 
power, authorises appointment of quarantine officers, many of whom are State 
officers also responsible for administering State quarantine legislation. 
7.4.6 Suitable arrangements for use of staff could be achieved by the greater use 
of provisions in Division 9  of the Public Service Act which outlines arrangements 
by which the federal government can have work done by State officers (and vice 
versa). These provisions are little used partly perhaps because of the formality and 
complexity of the procedures involved. We suggest that consideration be given: Rio8 
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(a) to simplifying and making greater use of the provisions of Division g of the 
Public Service Act; 
(b) to extending the provisions to authorise arrangements involving the staff of 
statutory authorities (both Commonwealth and State). 
R  09 We suggest further that general supervision should be exercised by the Public 
Service Board over the terms and conditions under which State officers are 
employed to carry out federal government functions and federal government 
officers to carry out State functions. 
7..7 It is clear that arrangements with States can be diverse and their form 
flexible given the prerequisites stated in paragraph 7.4.4. There almost certainly 
exists a precedent for any kind of arrangement necessary to deal with a particular 
need for co-operation. The difficulties lie in finding a source of initiative, and in 
overcoming inertia and 'empire-consciousness' in the administrations concerned. 
The Commission considers that this source of initiative could be within the 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
R  io 7.4.8 Accordingly the Commission recommends that: 
(a) primary responsibility for stimulating greater use of State administrative 
capacities in federal programs be with the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet as part of its general responsibility for relations with 
the States; 
(b) the Department review proposals before Cabinet to ensure that 
(i) unnecessary overlap with State administration is avoided, 
(ii) opportunities for the use of State facilities are explored; 
(c) the Department recommend to the Prime Minister the establishment of 
task forces to explore such opportunities and progressively to review 
existing programs; 
(d) the Department be responsible for arranging and co-ordinating Com-
monwealth departmental action in negotiations with States arising from 
the reviews. 
Ri II 	 In such negotiations the Commission recommends that Commonwealth 
officials should be guided by the following general principles: 
(a) arrangements for the federal funding of State administrations for programs 
administered by them should be based on general principles of 
measurement, for example, percentages of officers' time, with an 
allowance for overheads etc, and should be reviewable on an agreed basis; 
(b) State administrations should be obliged to provide the information 
necessary for effective monitoring and evaluation of programs concerned. 
State-Commonwealth programs should be reviewed from time to time: it 
should be practicable to bring, or return, a particular area to direct 
Commonwealth administration, without excessive disruption; 
(c) while clear and mutually understood arrangements are imperative, undue 
emphasis need not be placed on the form of the agreement or 
understanding, and correspondence at official or ministerial level will 
often be sufficient. 
7.4.10 The policy of sharing administration where practicable with the States 
does not imply that the federal administration should aim for a total withdrawal 
from 'service delivery'. That would not be desirable. There are some programs for 
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which the Commonwealth will always want to be responsible and which it can 
most effectively and economically, administer itself: it is also important that 
administrators at the policy making levels of the Commonwealth government 
should be able to keep in touch with what is happening at the 'grass roots'. 
7.4.11 During the hearings of the Senate Select Committee on Offshore 
Petroleum Resources the point was made that if the administration of legislation 
is placed in the hands of the States, and the power of Commonwealth ministers to 
give directions is limited, to that extent the Commonwealth ceases to be 
effectively responsible. A similar issue arises when a separate body is set up by 
joint action of the Commonwealth and the States, as is the case with the River 
Murray Commission. Whether or not responsibility remains with the Com-
monwealth in any particular case must, in our view, be largely a matter of policy, 
and judgments will need to be made at ministerial level. However it is possible to 
include, in a Commonwealth-State agreement for the use by the Commonwealth 
of State administrative facilities, an express provision for the giving of directions 
on matters of policy and also for the exercise of that degree of supervision which is 
desired by the Commonwealth and is acceptable to the State or States. 
7.4-12 This is not to underestimate the difficulties which may attend the 
negotiation of mutually acceptable terms and conditions. Problems have arisen, 
for example, in relation to accounting for the use of specific purpose grants. The 
practice appears to be that the Commonwealth Auditor-General is entrusted 
with the audit of the expenditures, but accepts the certificate of the State Auditor-
General for expenditures by State agencies. For its limited purpose this practice 
appears adequate. Whether a similar practice should be followed in relation to 
efficiency reviews and program evaluation is more difficult since they could 
involve more detailed inquiries. It seems essential that the Commonwealth 
should be able to assess how a program is developing. Such assessments might be 
undertaken by a team including Commonwealth and State officials led by an 
agreed independent assessor, perhaps drawn from a firm of business consultants. 
The Commission believes that problems of this kind could usually be resolved in 
the negotiations leading up to an agreement, when the need for periodical 
assessment and the means by which it might be carried out would be listed for 
discussion. 
7.4.13 Similarly it may be useful in some circumstances to offer a special 
supplementary incentive to State officers to discharge delegations for the 
Commonwealth effectively. We note with interest the arrangements the Bureau 
of Customs makes under section 4(l)  (b) of the Customs Act to provide overtime, 
or a retainer as well as overtime, to State officers appointed as Customs officers 
(though we note that the retainer is relatively small in amount). The Commission 
recommends that in appropriate cases—and these should be looked for and R i 12 
identified—arrangements should be made with State administrations for the 
payment of additional amounts to State officers carrying out Commonwealth 
functions by way of recognition of the added responsibilities they carry. By such 
means, and others which might be devised, the officer could accept the additional 
responsibility more readily. He would be made more accountable to the 
Commonwealth if in the event of unsatisfactory performance the delegation (and 
retainer) could be terminated. 
7.4.14 The instances discussed above illustrate the Commission's conviction 
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that most of the difficulties involved in greater use of State administrative 
resources can be resolved in the bargaining leading up to an agreement. We do 
not necessarily expect the negotiations to be easy or non-political but nonetheless 
we believe they can lead to workable agreements with benefits to effectiveness and 
economy in the conduct of federal programs. just as we have been able to point to 
difficult problems, such as audit provisions, which have been resolved in 
individual instances, so we believe that continuing use of the technique of inter-
government agreement will progressively lead to the development of conventions 
and standard practices to which resort can be made in subsequent negotiations. 
Such conventions and standard practices will lead to agreements making possible 
a proper responsibility and accountability, as well as providing an effective 
service to the public. 
The Services of Local Authorities 
7.4- 15 Just as there is scope for greater use by the Commonwealth of the 
administrative capacity of the States, it is likely that similar if more limited scope 
exists for the use of local government resources. The Commission's Task Force on 
a Regional Basis for Commonwealth Government Administration urged that this 
scope be explored more systematically, particularly in remote localities where the 
Commonwealth government may have minimal, if any, representation, and 
where State representation too may be small. There is a clear advantage in using 
local government bodies in any area, since in administering their own locally-
based programs they are likely to develop a more intimate understanding of the 
needs and demands of the local people than is possible for a centrally based 
administration. The Social Welfare Commission in a valuable research paper, 
The Role of Local Government in Social Welfare (January 1976), concluded that 
there is a consensus that local government bodies should be more involved in the 
provision of welfare services, although the precise form and extent of the 
involvement cannot always be anticipated: 
'The proposals range from those which advocate for local government a primary 
role in the planning and provision of personal social service to those which 
envisage more of a limited role for local government, where the authorities do not 
undertake direct provision of welfare services but are encouraged to take a 
'catalyst' role acting as a banker, organiser and landlord for community groups. 
The views of State welfare authorities suggest that whichever direction is taken 
on expanding local government welfare involvement, there will continue to be 
certain major welfare activities outside the scope of local government 
On the evidence so far, the Commonwealth government might postulate that 
local government could be, given State concurrence: 
(i) an appropriate point for the delivery of information services, for example, 
Citizens Advice Bureaux etc; 
(ii) the organisational point for certain capital intensive services to the entire 
community such as accommodation for the aged, full day care, pre-school 
education and possibly sheltered workshops for the handicapped; certain 
other generic services such as home help services for the house bound could 
also be provided by local government, sometimes in association with a 
local hospital; 
(iii) an appropriate point for community development. . 
7.4- 16 If local government is to be more involved in the extension of such 
federal programs, there is the same need for the development of clearly 
understood and viable arrangements with the local authorities as those covering 
the use of State government facilities. This point was made especially clear in the 
course of a study of the establishment and operation of the Perth Metropolitan 
Region.' Because local governments are created under State legislation the 
agreement of the relevant State will always need to be obtained before 
negotiations with local governments are begun. The Commission therefore 
recommends that the group within the Department of the Prime Minister and Ri 13 
Cabinet concerned with co-operative arrangements with the States (see 
paragraph 7.4.8) be given responsibility also for negotiations leading to the use of 
local government officers in carrying out federal programs. In many respects, 
agreements along lines similar to those drawn up with State governments could 
be sought, but they would necessarily be more limited in scope. 
Exchanges of Personnel 
74-1 7 It is a small step from proposing the administration of some federal 
programs by other levels of government (and by voluntary agencies—see Chapter 
6.2) to considering the benefits to all levels if it were possible to arrange for officers 
in the federal administration to gain experience by working in the service of State 
governments and local authorities and vice versa. 2 The Commission recommends that RI 14  
the Public Service Board, in consultation with the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet and officials from State and local governments examine the 
United States Inter-governmental Personnel Act and any other relevant overseas 
legislation and practice with a view to making it possible for personnel to be 
exchanged between the three levels of government on a basis that would not 
involve loss of rights, would widen the range of opportunity for officers in all three 
services, and would encourage more effective co-operation in administrative 
matters. 
7.5 THE 'ONE STOP SHOP' 
7.5.1 In the foregoing section we have considered co-operative arrangements 
with other levels of governments as one means of improving the service given by 
the Commonwealth government to the community 'away from the centre'. 
During its work the Commission sponsored an experiment to test the value of a 
special form of such co-operation, namely, the 'one stop shop'. The object of the 
'one stop shop' is to provide as nearly as possible a complete service (including if 
possible the power to make decisions) in one place, at one visit, and with members 
of the public having to deal with not more than one or two different officers. There 
are various forms which a one stop shop can take: there can be simple co-location3  
of a number of officers of different federal agencies or a mixture of officers of 
various levels of government and representatives of voluntary and community 
groups. There can be extensive uses of delegation so that with representatives of 
one or very few agencies at the shop there is still the authority to provide the 
services of other agencies, or there can be a more simple referral or inquiry centre 
arrangement. The one stop shop which the Commission sponsored was the 
Northwest One-stop Welfare (NOW) Centre in Coburg, a Melbourne suburb 
and it does not fall exactly into any of the categories above. Here officers of federal 
and State departments, local government employees and representatives of 
i. See Wood and O'Meara, in Lollies, Mother and Strangers in Flash Cars: the Strugglefor the Loyaltjt of 
Local Government in the Perth Regions, 1970 
2. See Chapter 6.3.29. 
3. See paragraph 7.5.4. 
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voluntary groups are trying to work together as a team to provide a 
comprehensive social welfare service.' Although we had hoped to conduct some 
experiments in the Centre with increased delegations both to lower level officers 
and acros agency boundaries, these have not been put into effect at NOW. 
7.5.2 It has also come about that NOW started its life with a focus primarily on 
social welfare activities, yet it has not been our intention that the service provided 
should necessarily be limited in this way. Already the Centre has begun to expand 
into other fields, such as legal aid, and we hope that in response to community 
needs, it will continue to expand the service it offers. NOW has enabled those 
involved and thereby the Commission to learn a number of lessons not only about 
improving service to the public but about experimental organisation structures 
and non-hierarchical patterns of work. Reference is made to those matters 
elsewhere in the Report. 
7.5.3 The Commission's Access Report shows that there is good reason to 
believe that NOW offers a marked improvement in service delivery and we are 
optimistic that centres like NOW can contribute to more effective administration. 
However two points about the experience are worth attention. The first is that 
departments were reluctant to invest resources in an 'experiment', particularly 
one involving the three tiers of government and voluntary agencies. Without the 
Commission's intervention no one department would or could have taken the 
initiative. 
7.5.4 Similar reluctance or incapacity faced the Regionalism Task Force in its 
attempts to have the public contact staff of the main welfare departments in Alice 
Springs (all, we note, Commonwealth departments) located in the one place—the 
ground floor of the major new block of Commonwealth offices. In the event, the 
co-location seems likely to occur but has been severely delayed largely it seems 
because there was no recognised source of authority and advice at the centre or in 
the region which could take the matter up in the interests of the citizens of Alice 
Springs and of Commonwealth administration generally. 
7.5.5 The absence of any agency at present which can properly concern itself 
with the needs, in a particular location, of Commonwealth administration 
generally or of the clients of the various departments and agencies will inevitably 
handicap the development of more effective co-operation under other levels of 
government and with voluntary agencies. It gives added weight therefore to the 
Commission proposals for a focus in the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet to stimulate and monitor experiments in regionally based administration 
(see 7.4.15). 
7.5.6 Our second observation is that the NOW experiment introduces new 
factors into arrangements for co-operation between the Commonwealth and the 
States. A new entity has been established whose actions are to a degree 
independent of any one level of government, and which includes staff drawn from 
several levels of government and from several departments. In the past when a 
new entity has been created, for example, the River Murray Commission or the 
Albury Wodonga Corporation, it has usually had a statutory basis for its 
independent staffing arrangements, but this is not the case at NOW, where no 
staff are employed by the Centre itself. This has meant that the staff in the NOW 
I . Sec the NOW Centre Report, Appendix 2.F., and the Access Report, Appendix 2.C. 
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Centre have had to work out experimentally their own answers to problems 
where lines of responsibility were obscure. While the ultimate resolution of these 
problems will take time, experience so far suggests that a stronger link between 
the NOW and organised regional bodies might assist. 
7.5.7 We consider the NOW experiment already promises valuable results, 
although further time is needed before a definitive evaluation can be made. It 
provides an excellent example of co-operation between Federal and State 
governments and we understand it has already given impetus to a wider program 
in Victoria of co-operation between the Department of Social Security and the 
State Social Welfare Department. The Commission recommends that the NOW Ri ij 
experiment be continued for at least two years. During this time it should be 
studied by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet as a possible model for 
future co-operative administration on a regional basis, and its results and relative 
costs should be assessed by independent consultants. Meanwhile, we recommend INWE 
that the Commonwealth government indicate its willingness to help establish 
other 'one stop shop' centres experimentally where local and regional 
organisations wish to sponsor them and the State government concerned is willing 
to participate. 
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Chapter 8 	 Staffing the 
Administration—I 
Efficiency and 
Equity 
8. i INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
Introduction 
8. i .1 The quality of administration is a function of the quality of the people who 
undertake it. No system of administrative structures and procedures can perform 
at its best unless it recruits and retains appropriately skilled and motivated men 
and women. We have argued that, as prerequisites of efficiency, managers should 
be given the scope to act entrepreneurially and should be held accountable for 
the results, and that staff should be effectively involved in determining operation-
al objectives and communicating them to the point of action or decision (see 
Chapter 3.2). To achieve these prerequisites, long established personnel policies 
and practices will need to be modified. Necessary reform is already under way in 
some areas, initiated by management, staff and unions. Apart from the 
achievement of efficiency, staffing policy must be directed also towards the 
equitable treatment of staff and potential recruits. The Commission is concerned 
in this chapter to examine the possible conflicts between equity and more 
efficient, responsive and accountable administration and the means whereby 
such conflicts may be resolved. 
8. 1.2 Success in recruiting and retaining skilled staff demands a willingness to 
vary terms and conditions of service to suit the role of the part of the 
administration involved and the environment in which that role is to be 
performed. Increasingly, diversity will be needed to match the manifold 
functions, roles and forms of government agencies. Thus, staff are unlikely to be 
equally attracted to, motivated by, or grateful for the same terms and conditions 
of service in areas as different as clerical administration, research and commercial 
enterprise. 
8.1.3 Two concepts, the obligation of the government to be an enlightened 
employer and the idea of government employment as a community instrument of 
policy, have a significant influence on the administration's response to staffing 
needs: the first because of the large numbers of people employed by the 
government and the importance of the public sector; the second because both 
citizens and governments have at times seen government employment as a form of 
resource capable of use in policies such as the reduction of unemployment, or the 
development of a National Capital and the accumulation of growth in regional 
centres. Both notions suggest that access to government employment should be 
open to all without unfair impediments.' Governments have varied in their 
commitment to these ethically based notions but they are sufficiently persistent 
with all governments to be accepted as important, if subsidiary, objectives of 
i. These ideas are more relevant to public service employment than to that of most statutory 
bodies. 
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staffing policy. We see some value in endorsing and maintaining their relevance 
to contemporary administration. 
8.1.4 Fundamental changes in the Australian government administration have 
occurred since Federation and since the last major revision of the Public Service 
Act in 1922. The role of the federal government has expanded in scope and 
significance especially with the development of its activities during World War II 
and the inception of uniform taxation. This growth in the range of functions 
has been associated with a doubling of the number of departments and more 
extensive use of various forms of statutory agencies. In consequence, the roles 
perfoimed by Commonwealth government staff have progressively become more 
complex, diverse and potentially influential. 
8.1.5 There is an associated diversity in governmental employment authorities 
and categories of employment. The Commission has identified at least 8 i distinct 
employing authorities made up of: 
(a) the Public Service Board, the sole employing authority for all staff under 
the Public Service Act (including staff in 24 departments and 23 statutory 
authorities staffed under the Act); 
(b) 34 statutory authorities which are not governed by the Public Service Act 
but under the terms of their establishment have some kind of statutory 
relationship with the Public Service Board; 
(c) 46 statutory authorities, staffed outside the Public Service Act inde-
pendently of the Public Service Board. 
8. j.6 The people who work for the Commonwealth government excluding 
ministers, judges and members of the defence forces may be categorised as 
follows: 
(a) Full-time officers and employees 
(i) officers and employees under the Public Service Act (permanent, 
temporary and exempt), 
(ii) statutory officers, including full-time members of statutory autho-
rities, 
(iii) non-statutory officers appointed under the residual power conferred 
by section 67 of the Constitution or the royal prerogative, for 
example Royal Commissioners, 
(iv) officers and employees of statutory agencies employed outside the 
Public Service Act, 
(v) officers of statutory services, such as Trade Commissioners, teachers, 
police; 
(b) Part-time holders of public offices 
(i) officers of State public services or instrumentalities appointed to 
occupy federal offices (a number of court officials fall into this 
category), 
(ii) State officers performing federal government functions pursuant to 
Commonwealth-State agreements under the Public Service Act, 
(iii) statutory officers and some members of statutory authorities such as 
the Universities Commission, 
(iv) members of non-statutory federal agencies, such as advisory bodies, 
Royal Commissions, committees of inquiry; 
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(c) Independent contractors 
These are people contracting to supply work or services rather than people 
engaged under contract of service (The width of this category defies 
classification. It includes those described by the Public Service Board as 
consultants, private medical practitioners who do work by arrangement, 
private messenger and taxi services, construction companies, printers, 
barristers, loans brokers.); 
(d) Recipients of government grants 
The conditions on which some government grants are given may place the 
recipient in the category of a person or organisation serving government. 
(The recipient of a scholarship or bursary may be bonded to join 
government service. Bodies such as Good Neighbour Councils or a citizen's 
advice bureau may receive assistance from government on such exacting 
conditions that they are virtually in the employ of government.) 
8.1.7 Until the transfer of staff from the Australian Post Office to statutory 
commissions in July 1975, the administration was predominantly staffed by 
people employed under the Public Service Act. Following that transfer the 
proportion of employment under the Public Service Act fell from 70 per cent to 39 
per cent of total federal government employment (excluding non-civilian 
employees). Table i sets out the proportions of civilian staff (including 
Postmaster General's Department) according to employment authority at 30 
June 1975, and Table 2 indicates the trend in the distribution of categories of 
employment under the Public Service Act (excluding Postmaster-General's 
Department) over a period of 16 years. 
Table i People in Australian Government Employment: 30 June 1975 (Permanent, 
temporary and exempt civilians) ' 
Public Service Act Other Acts Total 
Departmental Non-Departmental 
277 455 25770 93 130 396 355 
70.0% 6.% 23.5% 100.0% 
(Excluding PMG - 
155 489-39.2%) 
Table 2 Proportions of permanent temporary and 
exempt staff employed under the Public Service Act 
(Excluding Postmatcr General's Department) 1 
1958 	 1962 1966 	 1970 1972 	 1974 
11=76137 
	
1i =80124 n=97536 	 n=121859 n=132557 	 n=146300 
Permanent 50.4 	 55.5 58.6 	 63.7 68.7 	 71.6 
Temporary 19.9 	 17.6 14.7 	 12.8 9.4 	 7.8 
Exempt 29.8 	 26.9 26.7 	 23.4 21.9 	 20.6 
n: total number. 
8. 1.8 The Commission's terms of reference direct it to give particular attention 
to: 
I. 	 Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics Employment and Unemployment Bulletin. 
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(a) personnel policies and practices and conditions of service of members of the 
Australian Public Service, both generally and in relation to particular 
classes of persons; 
(b) the determination of salaries, wages and other conditions of service of 
persons in the service of the Australian government, including those 
serving overseas; 
(c) the principles applicable to staffing of statutory corporations and other 
authorities; 
(d) the rights of public servants as citizens. 
The terms of reference give greatest emphasis to employment within the 
Commonwealth Public Service. Most of the published information about federal 
government employment refers to employment under the Public Service Act. 
Furthermore the principles applied to this employment are seen as relevant to 
most forms of public employment. For these reasons the Commission has 
concentrated primarily on that sector of the federal workforce. Shortage of time 
and lack of information have precluded comparable study of the staffing of 
statutory bodies (but see Chapter 9.4). 
8.1.9 It was not possible for the Commission to deal exhaustively with all 
matters covered by its terms of reference. Some selection was necessary. The 
Commission therefore directed its attention and resources to issues raised in 
submissions and oral evidence. The comments by staff made in replies to the 
Commission's Career Service Survey have confirmed that these issues cover those 
of greatest concern to individual members of staff.1  
Functions of Staffing Policy 
8.1.10 A desire at federation to avoid friction with the newly formed union of 
the States, the continuous public scrutiny of its activities, an awareness of its 
responsibilities as the largest employer, and the levelling influence of industrial 
arbitration have led the federal government to emphasise equity in its dealings 
with its own employees. This emphasis led to a high measure of uniformity in the 
conditions of service and the patterns of management in government employ-
ment. It has been urged upon us that such uniformity imposed by central 
authority today does not necessarily lead to equity, that it tends to obstruct 
flexible and efficient conduct of government business and to impose excessive 
social uniformity on the composition of the government workforce to the 
detriment of disadvantaged groups and individuals and of its own capacity to 
respond to changing community and government attitudes. 
8.1.1 1 To test these and other judgments about government employment the 
Commission brought together available statistical data and conducted additional 
surveys. 2 Studies of this material show that: 
(a) the work force in the Commonwealth Public Service has been becoming 
progressively younger and less experienced; 
(b) employees, on the average, have tended to remain for shorter periods; 
(c) advancement (as measured by promotion and salary increases) has been 
I . For a discussion of sources of information and research done, see Appendix i A, Review of 
Work. 
2. See Appendix 3.A. 
increasingly concentrated in central departmental units and especially in 
those located in Canberra; 
(d) work associated with policy advice has been given increasing importance 
and status compared with other types of work; 
(e) there is decreasing mobility between occupational categories which 
particularly affects movement between departments—leading apparently 
to significant 'inbreeding' in some of the most important policy units; 
(1) there are poor career opportunities resulting in lowered morale for large 
segments of the work force; 
(g) the decision in 1966 to allow married women to hold permanent positions 
markedly reduced the resignation rate for female staff but evidence of bias 
against women persists; 
(h) there is evidence consistent with arbitrary changes in the weighting of 
components of a selection test producing an (unintended) sex bias in the 
proportion ofjob offers; 
(i) many 'exempt' and 'temporary' employees have, in some departments, a 
high degree of permanence. 
To some extent at least, these conclusions tend to support doubts about the 
adequacy and effectiveness in present circumstances of existing staffing policies. 
The Commission believes therefore that a review of the principles which underlie 
those policies is called for as a basis for continuing reform. 
The Career Service—Principles and Practice 
8.1.12 In the Commonwealth administration, the general concept of a career 
service has come to mean 
(i) recruitment by merit (however defined and determined) to a 
(ii) unified service (intended to mitigate the evils which result from a 
fragmentary service) subject to 
(iii) independent, non-political control of recruitment and of the conditions of 
employment; and where the rights of career public servants are 
protected by 
(iv) regulations which discourage the recruitment of  'strangers' to positions above 
the base grade, and by 
(v) legislated protection against arbitrary dismissal (termination being only for 
cause and by due process). 
This unified service is characterised by 
(vi) a hierarchical structure of positions defined by 
(vii) a regular system of position classification of salaries (with incremental 
advancement within the salary ranges of particular positions), with the 
career public servant rising through this hierarchy of positions 
according to 
(viii) a system of promotion by merit subject to 
(ix) a system of appeals against promotions (designed to ensure that justice is 
seen to be done)—the final reward for long and loyal service being 
(x) a distinctive retirement and pension system. 
8. i. 13 The Commission feels that various elements of the 'career service' 
concept have over time mistakenly been allowed to become inflexible dogma of 
Public Service employment. We feel that there arc cases where these 'principles' 
have come to be used to justify practices no longer relevant to any discernible 
need; or which produce results in fact inconsistent with the objectives to which the 
principles were directed; that no assessment has been made in contemporary 
conditions of the costs incurred in terms of reduced efficiency and unfair 
treatment of certain categories of staff by the uniform application of these 
principles. The Commission, having studied submissions and other material 
before it, believes that there is justification for a reconsideration of these 
characteristics of a career service as a necessary and sufficient basis for the efficient 
staffing of the Commonwealth administration in contemporary conditions. 
8.1.14 The Commission sees a need for a number of inter-related changes in the 
structure and practice of personnel administration. This will entail substantial 
amendment of the Public Service Act, and to an extent justify its repeal and the 
enactment of new legislation less wedded to rigidity. An overall movement to 
establish responsibility for management initiative in departments and agencies 
rather than the Public Service Board is a central element of rearrangement of the 
system to produce flexibility and accountability. 
8.1.15 In addition to enhanced departmental powers over the determination of 
duties, classification and discipline there should be a strengthening of the 
measures to scrutinise and stimulate adherence to the basic tenets of personnel 
policy laid down in the legislation. Machinery for the protection of staff rights 
should be enhanced by statutory provisions, and arrangements for staff influence 
in the administration of work and the work place should be promoted. 
8. 1 . 16 In general terms, the Commission feels that more flexible recruitment 
practices should be adopted so that agencies and departments are allowed wider 
discretion to specify the experience and skills appropriate to work requirements. 
Machinery to overhaul existing selection procedures should be established. These 
changes would need to be made gradually on a systematic basis. In association 
with more open systems of staff appraisal there should be more emphasis placed 
on rational procedures for selection for promotion while retaining the promotion 
appeals system as a safeguard. Greater mobility between government agencies 
and other sections of the workforce should be promoted and barriers to it reduced. 
8.1.17 In this and the following chapter the Commission outlines the proposed 
changes in detail, the present chapter dealing mainly with changes affecting the 
individual employee and the next with changes in the structure and management 
of departments and agencies, which in its view would make personnel policy more 
flexible and less centralised, and so offer greater scope for initiative and creative 
innovation. 
8.2 RECRUITMENT 
Recruitment by Merit 
8.2. i Recruitment in the Commonwealth administration has been based upon 
the 'merit principle'. Originally this principle was seen as a counter to the 
practice of political patronage and therefore to the inefficiency resulting from it. 
8.2.2 Application of the merit principle is widely believed to guarantee that 
objectivity, rationality and equality of opportunity prevail in recruitment to 
Commonwealth employment. The Commission's attention has been drawn to 
circumstances where this belief may not be justified. It has been argued: 
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(a) that restrictions have been placed on eligibility; 
(b) that personal rather than objective tests determine what constitutes merit 
for particular work; 
(c) that procedures for selection and the choice of the tests of merit introduce 
effective, if unintentional, discrimination against members of particular 
groups and in some circumstances against individuals. 
8.2.3 The Commission's attention has been specifically directed to the bearing 
of these issues on the way in which the merit principle is applied to women, 
Aboriginals, migrants, the handicapped, the educationally deprived and people 
over a certain age (see section 8.3). 
8.2.4 The Commission upholds the concept of recruitment by merit, but 
believes there is cause for concern in the areas referred to in the previous 
paragraph. 
8.2.5 The Board has the power of appointment and recruitment and is 
authorised: 
(a) to determine age limits for appointment (Public Service Act, section 42); 
(b) to conduct examinations and selection lists for the purpose of recruitment 
(sections 44, 45); 
(c) to prescribe professional or technical qualifications for particular positions 
and types of employment (sections 37, 40); 
(d) to allow (in defined circumstances) limited exemptions from required 
qualifications (section 38). 
8.2.6 In some respects however the authority of the Board is precisely limited: 
(a) the Public Service Board is required to call for application for appointment 
by public notice indicating the office to be filled, the requirements for 
appointment and the means whereby priority for appointment will be 
determined (section 46); 
(b) persons who do not meet a number of conditions relating to nationality, 
character and health are ineligible for appointment (section 34); 
(c) only persons who have met the prescribed educational, technical or 
professional qualifications (subject to limited right of exemption) may be 
appointed (sections 35, 39). 
8.2.7 While the Public Service Act does not specifically define 'merit' it does 
embody the principle of open competitive entry, and this is seen as providing an 
implicit definition and a means of measuring merit. Thus the Public Service 
Board cites the following elements as basic to the application of the merit 
principle: 
'adequate publicity-job openings and requirements to be made known so that 
interested persons have a reasonable opportunity to know about them; 
opportunity to apply—persons who are interested should have an opportunity to 
make their interest known and receive consideration; 
realistic standards-qualification standards to be reasonably related to the job to 
be filled and to be applied impartially to all who make their interest known; 
absence of discrimination-the standards and processes used should embrace only 
matters related to ability and fitness for employment; 
ranking on the basis of ability—ranking of candidates to be on the basis of a relative 
evaluation of their ability and fitness and a selection process which gives effect to 
this ranking; 
'7' 
pro bit) of the process—public to be able to find out how the process works and to 
have the opportunity to make representations relating to selection'.1  
8.2.8 The Board has devolved on the Public Service Inspectors the re-
sponsibility for administering the processes of recruitment by merit. Inspectors 
publicise and set the dates of selection tests, administer them, formally offer 
appointments on a provisional basis to candidates selected on their relative 
performance in such tests, conduct interviews and finally confirm the 
appointments. If a department wishes to recruit from outside the service to a 
position above the base grade, approval of the Inspector is necessary before the 
position can be advertised. A representative of the Inspector has the right to sit on 
any selection committee, and technically the approval of the Inspector is required 
before an appointment can be made. 
8.2.9 This central control on the application of the merit principle does not 
apply to statutory authorities independent of the Public Service Board. The 
Commission has not made a detailed study of the recruitment practices and 
principles of such bodies. It appears that a significant number of such authorities 
have legislative restrictions on eligibility similar to those applying to the Public 
Service. The recruitment provisions of a number of authorities do not however 
embody any principle of merit determined in open competition. 
8.2.10 As stated in paragraph 8.2.4 above the Commission endorses the 
principle of recruitment by merit but believes the practices at present followed to 
define and determine merit open the way to significant discrimination and 
injustice. We review some of these practices in the following paragraphs. 
Restrictions on Eligibility 
8.2. ii Several general restrictions on eligibility to enter Commonwealth 
government employment limit the range of persons to whom the merit principle 
applies. These restrictions also work against the administration becoming more 
representative of the society in which it exists (see also section 8.3). Furthermore, 
it was stated by several departments that these blanket restrictions slow up the 
process of selection so much that valuable potential appointees are lost or the 
department appoints the ineligible applicant but with a temporary or exempt 
status. 
8.2. I 2 Nationally: One important restriction which excludes all applicants 
who are not British subjects is laid down in Section 34(a) of the Public Service 
Act. The requirement is consistent with overseas practice and is not precluded by 
international conventions relating to discrimination in occupation and employ-
ment, or by the Racial Discrimination Act. Nevertheless, it operates as a 
discrimination against many persons resident in Australia as a result of the 
immigration policy which Australian governments have pursued since 1945- 
Submissions to the Commission suggested that it was inconsistent for a 
government which sought immigrants to exclude them from employment in its 
own service, or permit their employment only on inferior terms and status. 
Perhaps more important from the Commission's point of view is the narrowing of 
the range of choice open to the government as an employer and the increasing 
disparity between the social composition of the government workforce and the 
community generally. 
r. Public Service Board Background Information to RCAGA Volume 4, pp. 7, 8. 
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8.2.13 Many of the critics of the British subject requirement have suggested the 
substitution of an Australian citizenship requirement and this was favoured by 
the Public Service Board in its recommendation to the Commission.' However, 
given the high number of non-Australian citizens in the labour force, this 
alternative would limit still further the field from which the government can draw 
its employees. The fact that non-Australian residents occupy a substantial 
proportion of temporary and exempt positions suggests that no valid purpose is 
being served by their present ineligibility. 
8.2.14 The Commission recommends that the nationality requirements for Ri 17 
permanent appointment be abolished except where the Governor-General in 
Council prescribes Australian citizenship by regulation as a qualification (not a 
condition of eligibility) for particular positions, for example in the diplomatic or 
security services. 
8.2. 15  We recommend also that the legislation providing for the staffing of Ri 18 
statutory authorities (for example section 2 i () (a) of the Science and Industry 
Research Act 1949-1973, section 68(a) of the Reserve Bank Act 1959-1966) 
should include a similar provision. If the Executive Council is authorised to 
prescribe Australian citizenship as a qualification for certain positions we 
recommend that the Public Service Board be required to list in its annual report to 
Parliament the number, status and location of any positions so affected. 
8.2. 16 If Section 34(a) is amended as we propose, temporary or exempt 
employees thus made eligible for permanent status should be advised of their right 
to apply for permanent status and we recommend that the Office of Equality in Ri 19 
Employment (see section 8.3) should take action to this end. 
8.2. 17 Health: Other restrictions on eligibility for permanent appointment are 
concerned with health. Applicants are required to satisfy the Public Service 
Board as to their health and physical fitness (Section 34(b) of the Public Service 
Act) and in practice this usually means passing a medical fitness examination. 
This requirement presumably derives from the desire to avoid the costs of 
excessive sick leave with its resulting disruption of work, and to protect the 
superannuation scheme from the burden of early retirements on grounds of ill-
health. The latter consideration has in our view tended to assume undue 
prominence. Section 19 of the Commonwealth Superannuation Act 1922-1974 
effectively requires that permanent officers be members of the Superannuation 
Fund or Provident Account. Hence eligibility for one or other of those funds is 
indirectly a condition of eligibility for permanent appointment (Superannuation 
Act, section 5(2)). 
8.2. 18 In practice this has meant that the requirements of the Public Service 
Act have been merged with requirements prescribed under the Superannuation 
Act, and the one medical examination has been used to determine both 
eligibilities. Medical examinations have been used to reject on medical grounds 
persons who are less than first class risks for life insurance purposes. Since 1937 the 
inception of the Provident Account Scheme has permitted the government to 
mitigate the severity of the requirements to demonstrate sound health although 
these reforms have not been made fully effective. 
i. Public Service Board Memorandum No. 7. 
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8.2.19 It would be beyond the terms of reference of the Commission to examine 
the general provisions for superannuation of Commonwealth employees. 
Furthermore, significant changes are being made in those provisions. However 
the Commission considers it important that the influence of superannuation 
requirements should not operate unnecessarily or unjustly to restrict eligibility for 
appointment. We see no reason why a single medical examination should not 
serve to determine the health status of recruits both for employment and for 
superannuation provided these two issues are separately determined on relevant 
and appropriate grounds. We consider it necessary that the standards and 
guidelines used for these purposes should be subject to critical checks. 
R 120 Accordingly we recommend: 
(a) that the Office of Equality in Employment (see paragraph 8.3.29) be 
empowered to obtain and advise on such guidelines, which should also be 
examined from time to time by the committee recommended at paragraph 
8.2.37; 
(d) that the Public Service Board publicly notify the details of any standard of 
fitness specified as a qualification for particular categories of work; 
(c) that a decision that a recruit has failed to comply with medical or fitness 
requirements be subject to review by the proposed Personnel Appeals 
Tribunal.' 
(d) that standards required be realistically related to the needs of the 
categories of work concerned and that the Public Service Board build up 
objective assessments of real needs.' 
8.2.20 Character tests: A third condition of eligibility for appointment is that the 
Public Service Board be satisfied that the applicant is 'a fit and proper person' for 
appointment (section 34(c) of the Public Service Act). In practice, this 
requirement has two components. First, Public Service Inspectors conduct 
character checks on prospective employees. Commonwealth police staff and 
records are used in these checks on all male applicants 18 years of age and over. 
No checks are made on female applicants. Secondly, security checks are also 
conducted on all persons seeking employment in the second and third divisions 
and in certain fourth division positions where a department so requires. The 
Commission has not given close attention to this latter aspect as it falls within the 
terms of reference of another Royal Commission. Adverse reports on an 
applicant's character (serious criminal record, background of social or security 
risk) may be considered grounds on which to annul appointment during the 
probationary period or in some cases to withhold appointment. 
8.2.21 The criteria applied in the character assessments are obscure. Until 
recently little attention appears to have been given to these criteria and an 
exaggerated secrecy surrounds them. Much potentially relevant information is 
hidden by the fact that probationary staff who are assessed as unsuitable may be 
given an opportunity to resign. Furthermore, files of unsuccessful applicants are 
normally destroyed. The Commission believes this obscurity makes it possible 
Sec section 8.5. This recommendation is broadly consistent with a recommendation of the 
Committee on Administrative Discretions (1973) and Public Service Board Memorandum 
No. 9,  Probationary Appointments. 
Aspects of recruitment and career planning for handicapped people are discussed in section 
8.3. 
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that personal bias can influence the use made of this test of eligibility. We think it 
important that recruitment authorities should be explicit and forthright when 
rejecting applicants on character grounds. 
8.2.22 Many Public Service Inspectors would welcome a review of the present 
system. One alternative canvassed proposes the abolition of the check, but 
retention of a general assessment of character in the normal selection or 
placement process. Under this proposal information about 'doubtful back-
ground' might then be sought from candidates themselves. If any failure to 
disclose convictions or other relevant facts were later revealed, this could be 
assessed in association with the person's work performance before a probationary 
appointment was confirmed. 
8.2.23 This procedure however could accentuate rather than reduce the 
tendency to confuse judgments about character with those relating to other 
criteria of suitability for particular work. We believe that any character 
considerations that have influenced a decision should be explicitly identified and 
an opportunity provided for their validity or relevance to the work in question to 
be tested. We recommend that the requirement for good character as a condition of R121 
eligibility for appointment be revised to provide that: 
(a) the appointing authority must be satisfied that the applicant is a fit and 
proper person to undertake work of the kind for which he or she is 
applying; 
(b) if an appointing authority in making a determination is influenced by an 
opinion that an applicant is or may not be a fit and proper person for any 
particular work, then the applicant should be notified of the opinion; 
(c) an applicant so notified may apply for a review of a determination; 
(d) the review should lie, at the option of the applicant, with the Public Service 
Board or the proposed Personnel Appeals Tribunal, except that where a 
question of national security is involved the appropriate review process 
should be that for dealing with adverse security reports by the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation. 
8.2.24 Considerations of national security as they affect staffing practices fall 
properly within the terms of reference of the Inquiry into Government 
Intelligence and Security Services. The Commission has consulted with Mr 
Justice Hope. The scheme outlined in the preceding paragraph is in our view 
compatible with proposals which we understand are likely to emerge from that 
Inquiry. We recommend that: 	 R122 
(a) routine security checks on applicants for appointment or promotion be 
limited to cases where certain security requirements are specified as a 
qualification for appointment to a particular position or specific type of 
work; 
(b) such a qualification be stated and publicised in the same manner as any 
educational or specialist qualification; 
(c) security checks no longer be a prerequisite for appointment to all second 
and third division positions. 
8.2.25 Gr( duo/c )ec)ui,me7/: Another restriction on recruitment is the 
requirement that no more than io per cent of the year's non-specialist intake into 
the Commonwealth Public Service may consist of graduate recruits (section 36 of 
the Public Service Act). In today's conditions of generally higher levels of 
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education and a more professionalised public service, the Commission considers 
that the above restriction on graduate intake represents an outdated and largely 
unsuccessful attempt to ensure equity between graduates and non-graduates. The 
restriction takes no account of the increasing number of people with degrees from 
Colleges of Advanced Education, nor does it restrict the entry of graduates under 
a variety of cadet entrance schemes. The spirit of the 'merit principle' in 
recruitment will be better upheld by specifying more precisely the skills necessary 
to perform particular jobs than by undue emphasis on the possession of formal 
academic qualifications. The Commission agrees with the proposal by the Public 
Service Board (Memorandum No. 8) that the io per cent restriction on graduate 
R123 recruitment should be abolished and recommends accordingly. 
8.2.26 Pnj'ience to ex_senicemen: The special statutory provisions for the 
appointment of ex-servicemen are, in the view of the Commission, anachronistic 
R124 (Public Service Act, Section 47). We recommend that this provision be not re-
enacted when the Public Service Act is amended. 
Selection Procedures 
8.2.2 7 Supplementing the statutory criteria of eligibility area series of statutory 
prohibitions, enabling the Public Service Board to establish guidelines as to what 
constitutes merit for appointment. These guidelines need however to be 
supplemented by procedures to determine an 'order of merit'. There have been 
several attempts since federation to find a basis for such determination. At various 
times selection has been based predominantly upon comparative results in public 
examinations conducted by the States. Difficulties about lack of uniformity and 
'the problem of establishing a single merit list' led the Boyer Committee in 1959  to 
recommend what is effectively the current system: that for entry to the second and 
third divisions, possession of the Leaving Certificate should be a qualifying 
standard only, and that the order of merit for base grade selection should be 
determined by the results of a special test conducted by the Public Service Board. 
This test (at first called the Commonwealth Selection Test) was to 'be carefully 
devised to discriminate among applicants according to their intellectual ability, 
specific aptitude and potential capacity for undertaking the higher classes of work 
in the third division.' 1  
8.2.28 Following the Boyer Report, the Board arranged for the Australian 
Council for Educational Research to construct for it a series of tests including the 
Clerical Selection Test (CST), the Graduate Selection Test and the Clerical 
Assistant Test, designed to assess the suitability of applicants for appointment and 
to grade them in order of merit based on fair and open competition. 
8.2.29 Scepticism as to the professional acceptability of the current selection 
tests was expressed in a submission to the Commission from the Senior 
Psychologist of the then Department of Labour and Immigration who contended 
'the CST measures the person in the abstract because it has not been validated 
against the demands of specific jobs'. The Commission considered it appropriate 
to subject these tests to a critical review, and engaged DrJ. Antill to examine and 
evaluate the testing system.' 
8.2.30 Until the reorganisation of the tests in 1971 the CST had been examined 
i. Boyer Report, paragraphs 148-149. 
2. Dr Antill's report is at Appendix 3.B. 
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in at least ii validation studies carried out by officers of the Board. Of these 
studies, Dr Antill says: 
'The eleven 'validity' studies which followed the test's introduction are of 
generally poor quality and provide little evidence which could be claimed to 
support the test's continued use.' 
In his report he also draws attention to the fact that since the introduction of a 
new form of the test, implemented in 1971, no validity information has been made 
available. 
8.2-31 Perhaps the greatest cause for concern as to the adequacy of the CST 
arises from a consideration within the Commission of the comparative total and 
sub-test scores for male and female examinees for the New South Wales CST in 
December 	 CST sub-tests concerned with quantitative and critical thinking 
are most successfully undertaken by persons with higher levels of proficiency in 
mathematics, almost the only discipline in which males tend to do better than 
females at matriculation level. In evaluating CST scores a differential weighting 
is applied to these two sub-tests, magnifying their contribution to the overall test 
score, and producing an overall better performance by male examinees than 
would have been the case were it not for the differential weighting. 
8.2.32 After consideration of a defence of this practice by the Board (see 
Appendix 3.A, Paper 7), Dr Antill has concluded that 'it would seem. . . that 
although there is some obscurity surrounding the precise basis used to weight the 
sub-tests one effect that it has had is to increase the (score) difference between 
males and females. The evidence here suggests that while no sex difference existed 
previously, there is little doubt that it does now. The onus at present would 
appear to be on the PSB to demonstrate that a 'corresponding' difference exists in 
terms of job performance.' 
8.2.33 The Commission is concerned also about the effects of the tests on the 
opportunities open to minority groups and other less culturally favoured or less 
standard in our society (see section 8.3). There can be no doubt that these tests, as 
well as those based on traditional academic performance, are culturally biased. 
The result is to handicap and in many instances effectively to exclude members of 
substantial groups. Migrants and Aboriginals are especially affected. We note in 
this connection Dr Antill's comment: 
'that tests such as the CST might well now be outlawed in the USA under the 
recent Equal Employment Opportunity Act which states that rather than 
measuring individuals in the abstract tests must measure them for a particular 
job. A demonstrated lack of bias, however, could possibly be used to support such 
a test's continued use.' 
8.2.34 It seems desirable to the Commission that the commitment to merit in 
recruitment and promotion should be declared by statute in a form which does 
not depend on particular techniques of measurement and leaves scope for the 
Public Service Board to adapt its procedures in the light of growing knowledge 
and experience. A possible form of words might be: 
'The Board shall develop recruitment and promotion procedures which rely n a 
careful assessment of those personal qualifications and capabilities likely to 
contribute to the efficient working of government administration, and which as 
far as possible preclude patronage, favouritism or unjustified discrimination.' 
Such a declaration would make clear the basic objectives of the merit principle 
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while leaving the precise techniques by which it is applied to evolve rather than to 
become ends in themselves. 
8.2.35 While noting the scepticism of many about general aptitude tests or even 
about more job directed tests, the alternative of reverting to the use of school 
leaving certificate results seems unacceptable. The earlier difficulties would now 
be compounded both by the heavier emphasis in some States on assessment and 
by the difficulty of equating qualifications obtained in different years and the 
results obtained under Australian and other systems of education. Accordingly, 
what seems to be required is improvement of the existing tests. On the evidence 
available to us, there is room for scepticism as to whether the current selection 
tests are either equitable or effective. The basic question which needs following up 
is whether it is possible to make the tests more effective in indicating relative merit 
in the sense of 'value to the service'. Such an approach should conduce to both 
efficiency and fairness especially in relation to the recruitment of Aboriginals, 
migrants, handicapped persons and others whose value to the service may not be 
adequately measured by the current aptitude tests or selection interview criteria. 
8.2.36 The Commission believes therefore that not only is more rigorous 
scrutiny and research necessary into the application of the merit principle in 
recruitment but that in carrying out the necessary research the Public Service 
Board would benefit from the advice and direction of a body outside the Service 
reconstituted from time to time and drawn from representatives of interested 
community groups and professional social scientists. The Commission does not 
accept the proposition that contributions to the scrutiny of recruitment selection 
are appropriately the preserve of the necessarily select group of persons with 
professional interest in such matters, whether drawn from within or without the 
Service. The Commission believes that a standing body, having once performed 
its task in a comprehensive way, might well lose its critical zeal. 
R125 8.2.37 We recommend therefore: 
(a) that commitment to the merit principle should be stated in terms which 
allow the Public Service Board progressively to adapt its procedures to give 
effect to it; 
(b) that at regular intervals, say three to five years, the government set up a 
committee with membership which would include both experts in the 
relevant social sciences and persons with wide experience of ethnic and 
other minority groups to examine and report on existing selection 
procedures and in particular 
(i) the scientific bases for the CST tests, 
(ii) the cost effectiveness of the tests as a means of determining merit 
among applicants for Commonwealth employment, 
(iii) their impact on the social composition of the Commonwealth 
workforce, 
(iv) means by which the then existing procedures can be improved; 
(c) that the committee have authority to examine aspects of the promotion 
process as necessary (see also paragraph 8-5- 16 (c)); 
(d) that for such a body to be effective in its inquiries, it should have a statutory 
right of full access to information relating to recruitment procedures and 
such other data as it may consider relevant; 
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(e) that the Board conduct and support continuing research in these and 
related matters; 
(I') that the Office of Equality in Employment (see section 8.3) be given 
continuing responsibility for monitoring the conduct of recruitment and 
selection for promotion with special concern for its freedom from bias or 
discrimination and be required to report its findings. 
8.2.38 Whatever means are used to assess merit for recruitment, they are 
frequently supplemented by interviews. This technique is of special importance in 
graduate selection or appointment to particular positions. The technique, 
however, is of uneven value as a means of determining relative merit. Frequently 
the purposes of a particular interview are imprecisely formulated, those who 
conduct it are inexperienced or for other reasons unskilled, and its outcome is 
determined by irrelevant personal attributes of the candidates or the prejudices of 
interviewers. It should therefore be seen as providing only a marginal component 
in the final choice. To minimise the risks involved the Commission recommends: 	 R126 
(a) that before the candidate is interviewed the interviewing committee 
review jointly the recorded information about the candidate and design 
the lines on which the interview is to be conducted; 
(b) that thc Public Service Board arrange training opportunities and prepare 
guidelines for interviewing officers; 
(c) that the composition of a selection committee reflect some diversity in 
experience, cultural background and age, and include from time to time a 
member chosen by the Office of Equality in Employment to monitor the 
equity of its procedures; 
(d) that a record of the interview be made including opinions and judgments 
taken into account; 
(e) that applicants be informed as soon as practicable of the assessment made 
and that the Public Service Board have authority on the application of a 
candidate or on its own initiative to direct a further interview; 
f) that records of interviews be preserved for some years and be used as a basis 
for systematic research, including research by the Office of Equality in 
Employment on the effectiveness of this component in the means of 
selection. 
8.2.39 Role of departments and agencies: A number of submissions 
proposed the transfer of the recruitment function to departments and agencies, 
and evidence was presented that the Public Service Board has been responsible 
for unacceptable delays leading to waste and loss of efficiency and that it pays 
inadequate attention to departmental needs in the placement of recruits. 
8.2.40 While we believe there was validity at times in these criticisms we do not 
think they outweigh the need for the Board to bear responsibility for the 
maintenance of quality generally in the staffing of the Service or for economy in 
recruiting procedures. The centralisation of this responsibility with the Board is 
not in our view incompatible with greater delegation to departments and 
agencies. We believe the Board should use such delegations more extensively, R127 
building up procedures by which departments and agencies can act for or jointly 
with the Board while the Board retains its concern to monitor recruitment and 
placement procedures to satisfy itself that they meet the requirements of equity 
and the merit principle. 
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Lateral Recruitment 
8.2.4 I The Commonwealth Public Service is predominantly a closed career 
service, but outside recruitment to positions above the base grade, or above 
recruitment points at which careers normally commence, occurs. Such lateral 
recruitment, as it is called, involves choice between available serving officers and 
outside applicants. Despite widespread misconception, there is no specific 
constraint in the Public Service Act on lateral recruitment. Lateral appointments 
may be made by the Public Service Board under three sections of the 
Act—sections 35, 37 and 38. Section 35  provides for the lateral appointment of 
non-specialists to the clerical /administrative area. Section 37 permits the lateral' 
appointment of officers to professional and technical positions. Where the person 
is ineligible for appointment under section 35  because he does not have the 
necessary educational qualifications the Board may make the appointment under 
section 38. Despite these provisions, constraints do arise in practice from the 
acceptance of the idea of a career service and from the provisions of section 46 and 
regulation io8, which require the approval of the Public Service Board before 
positions can be advertised outside the Service and limit appointments to persons 
responding to such advertisements.' The Public Service Board in its Memoran-
dum No. 2 to the Commission has proposed that heads of departments, as a rule, 
should decide whether vacancies should be advertised as open to outsiders, with 
the Board retaining a reserve power to direct the department in this matter. 
8.2.42 Despite an increase in lateral recruitment to the clerical/administrative 
(second and third division) positions in the 197os, it accounts for a small 
proportion of total recruitment to the Service, in 1973  lateral appointments 
represented 8.9 per cent of the total intake into this area. Further. even where 
positions art advertised outside the Service, the majority (75 per cent in 1973) are 
filled from within the Service. 
8.2.43 Lateral recruitment oflers both benefits and disadvantages. It can bring 
into the Service persons with different experience and a fresh approach to old 
problems. it can diversify and extend the range of skills available. It can help 
correct a distortion in the age profile of those employed On the other hand 
lateral recruitment, if unbalanced by outside opportunities to insiders, can 
narrow the promotion opportunities of 'career' officers. Used to excess, it can 
lower the morale of the work force with damaging effects on efficiency. 
8.2.44 The Commission does not consider the objections to lateral recruitment 
of great weight. Serving officers will generally be preferred even if considerations 
other than !amiliaritv with the Service are given equal or near equal weight, and 
they therefore have little to fear. On the other hand the occasional infusion of 
different experience can benefit serving officers as well. At the same time the 
opposition towards lateral recruitment would be eased if superannuation and 
I . 	 The waiving of education qualifications under section 38 however is treated as a 'special case' 
requiring the permanent head to furnish a report to the Board indicating that there is no officer 
available in the Serviec who is as capable as the proposed apponlee 0! filling the oifIce. 1 his 
restriction, intended to be a safeguard against the entry of excessive numbers of officers who fail 
to meet the minimum education standards for entry into the third division, has been extended 
dejacto by the Board to cover all lateral appointments. This test is specified in section 38, but is 
also used for other lateral appointments (Public Service Board Memorandum 2, 'Lateral 
Appointments' p. 2). 
2. 	 See paragraphs 8.4.I0 I-I02. 
other factors did not inhibit serving officers from seeking outside opportunities 
more freely. It is also important that procedures adopted should accord strictly 
with the requirements of the merit principle. The Commission recommends that: 	 R128 
(a) it be the responsibility of the head of the department or agency to decide 
whether a position should be opened to outside application with the Board 
retaining a reserve power to direct that this should be done; 
(b) the Public Service Board and Commonwealth agencies plan to avoid 
becoming unduly dependent on lateral recruitment by providing 
opportunities for 'career' officers to acquire, through study leave, skills and 
knowledge which they anticipate will be required within the Service; 
(c) in the selection of lateral recruits, consideration be given to the 
involvement of staff and outside experts as well as the Board in selection 
processes for positions open to lateral recruitment; 
(d) the appointment of staff from prescribed statutory authorities should not 
be regarded as lateral recruitment but should be subject to normal 
promotion appeal processes. 
8.2.45 Closely associated with the opposition to lateral recruitment is that 
towards leaving the Service and then seeking to return. This practice is restrained 
by loss of major benefits after a break of more than one year. The Commission 
considers this penalty unnecessary and indeed unwise. There is benefit to the 
vitality of the Service if the career patterns of senior officials contain a period of 
employment of a different character. Consequently, we suggest that the Board 
explore the possibilities of restoring benefit entitlements to officers with more than 
three years initial service who return to Commonweaih emplomert. 
Educational Qualifications 
8.2.46 The Public Service Act gives the Board the power to determine 
minimum qualifications necessary for appointment to a particular office (sections 
37, 40 and 53).  In 1943 the Bailey Report on Promotions and Temporary 
Transfers noted that the Board had exercised this power widely, rather than using 
its authority to conduct examinations. The Public Service Board also exercised 
this power frequently during the 196os as a by-product of the major 
reclassifications which followed the 1961 Engineers Case. 1  In practice the Public 
Service Board specifies minimum requirements, generally leaving departments to 
specify 'desirable' requirements above the minimum. 
8.2.47 There is some reason to believe that undue importance tends to be given 
to the possession of formal educational qualifications even to the point of 
regarding them as the only acceptable evidence of capacity. The Commission's 
examination of service records has indicated that an officer with a university 
degree tends to progress further in his career. Thus 58 per cent of third division 
officers with degrees who have joined the Service since 1962 received salary 
increases in excess of 8o per cent within four years ofjoining while only 38 per cent 
of the third division as a whole had received similar increases in that period. 
There is a risk that an anxict\ to raise the general educational level of the Service 
i. The Professional Engineers Cases of 1961 and 1962 involved major work value reviews by the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission of professional engineering work in public and 
private employment. These judgments provided the impetus for a series of salary claims by 
other professional groups within government employment; in many cases the salary reviews 
were preceded by revision of classification structures. 
can cause other sources of knowledge and skill to be ignored and penalised. Other 
institutions acknowledge the potential relevance of these sources. Thus, in recent 
years Australian universities have liberalised their entrance requirements 
especially in relation to mature age students and students from other 
communities. We also note recent developments in the United States in the 
assessment of knowledge and skills derived from non-academic experience. 
8.2.48 Similarly there is a risk that the personal advantage at recruitment of 
having a good academic performance before entry may be multiplied in 
subsequent promotions irrespective of actual performance. The initial advantage 
is warranted as a means of ensuring to the Service a fair proportion of the good 
performers at secondary school standard. The advantage to the recruit should 
however from there on be reflected in demonstrated capacity at work. To this 
capacity of course other factors contribute also—native ability, on the job 
experience, departmental and other training, the influence of non-work 
experience. Promotion should therefore be based on merit as demonstrated in 
performance, actual and potential. Thus, while the Service should seek its share of 
matriculants and graduates, this should not restrict competition for promotion, 
for instance from para-professionals and other currently fourth division staff.' We 
R130 recommend therefore that the Board consider taking into account previous 
experience as a possible qualification for entry to occupational groups, with a 
view to giving less extensive weight to formal qualifications. 
8.2.49 The tendency to attach undue importance to educational qualifications 
can lead also to formal qualifications being stipulated for positions although the 
skills and knowledge associated with them are not essential (or even desirable) for 
the work. Several recent reviews of departmental efficiency conducted by groups 
led by private consultants commented adversely upon the recruitment of staff 
over-qualified for particular tasks. The tendency has apparently strengthened 
since the Professional Engineers Case of 1961.2  The Association of Architects, 
Engineers, Surveyors and Draftsmen of Austra1ii, which is primarily an 
association covering technical grades believes that the skills of their members are 
not being adequately used because of undue emphasis on formal qualifications.' 
The Association contrasted the position in the public service with that in the 
private sector, where opportunities to advance into professional work are often 
open to able technicians and similar workers without formal qualifications.' 
This point is developed further in the section on 'Occupational Career Structures' (see 
paragraphs 8.4.17-31). 
See paragraph 8.2.46 
'For a long time the situation has been that you have draftsmen or technical officers working side by 
side with professionals. Prior to 1961 if the individual showed an ability to carry out a higher level of 
work he had the opportunity of promotion but following 1961 with the creation of the professional 
engineers structure it was no longer possible for anyone without the full academic qualifications to 
move into this area and the area of promotion disappeared for what I would call, for want of better 
words, unacademically qualified people. They were cut off from attaining that level, salary-wide, 
and classed as second class. We see therefore the need for some development here—it might even 
appear to be regressive—the development of technical structure which allows the utilisation of the 
skills of people whether they happen to possess professional qualifications or not.' 
(Transcripts 29.1.75 p. i 16o) 
'One of the very big problems we are confronted with is an emphasis on qualifications without an 
escape clause allowing people into it provided they can prove their bona fides. In the private industry 
field we have the draftsmen's, technical grades, award. For the higher category, of those outside 
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8.2.50 The problem is not new, in his 1920 report. Commissioner McLachlan 
alleged that the arrangement of the Service into divisions, combined with the 
prescribed methods of admission to the divisions, created anomalies. An example 
was: 
'the appointment of persons to the Professional Division whose duties could not 
even under a most liberal interpretation be considered as professional in 
character, but who by reason of the examination barrier, or because of age, could 
not be appointed to the Clerical Division.' 
The abolition of divisions proposed in Chapter 9.2 of this Report provides both a 
need and an opportunity to ensure that currently prescribed qualifications permit 
the promotion of the most efficient officer and do not prevent the recruitment of 
suitably capable personnel. 
8.2.5 I For some classes of work, such as that of librarian and accountant, there 
are recognised external qualifications. For others there will be practical 
requirements for knowledge attainable only by experience or departmental 
training. In these cases the options are: 
(a) to specify qualifications as essential; 
(b) to specify desirable qualifications; 
(c) to make no specifications since determination of the most suitable 
candidate will automatically take account of necessary and desirable 
qualifications. 
The new Postal and Telecommunications Commissions, with the agreement of 
staff associations, have grouped designations (from both the previous third and 
fourth divisions) into three categories: 
(a) no mandatory qualifications, but qualifications may be specified as 
desirable; 
(b) special category groups (for example Accountant, Postal Clerk, Plumber) 
requiring prescribed qualifications; 
(c) clerical /administrative designations requiring a minimum of matricu-
lation or equivalent education. 
8.2.52 This approach makes a commendable break with earlier practice; the 
first group (no mandatory qualification) includes a variety of positions up to 
senior management; the special category group includes positions with external 
legally or departmentally required qualifications; the third group (minimum of 
matriculation education) is the most debatable, given the principle of using the 
selection and promotion process to secure the most suitable people in higher 
positions. 
8.2.53 The Commission believes that selection and advancement can usefully 
be linked more closely with actual performance. The Commission therefore 
recommends.' 	 R1 31  
draftsmen it specifically does have a prescription of 'a certificate plus a number of years experience 
but then it alwa\s has the escape clause that if a person is capable of doing the work then he shall be 
classified, and it does allow movement into the structure of people who have acquired their ability 
from a wide variety of areas ... In private industry the position is totally reversed. The normal 
position is that if any man has the ability--he may even have come from the trade ranks as the 
majority do in private industry—he moves up and the next thing you know he is out either as a 
salesman or has moved into some other higher level of position in the company. He is not held back 
because he has not a particular academic qualification.' 
(Transcripts, 29.1.75, pp. i 161—i 162) 
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(a) that mandatory qualifications be specified only for positions where 
(i) similar qualifications are prescribed or required by external 
authorities for comparable work, and/or 
(ii) qualifications specified are essential for the work involved. 
(b) that the same principle be applied so far as practicable to specification of 
qualifications for occupational groups now in the fourth division. 
8.2.54 A desirable consequence of the recommended shift away from prior 
detailed specification by the Public Service Board of minimum qualifications is 
that it will minimise any divergence between formal requirements for a position 
and the skills necessary for effective task performance. In order to expedite and 
R132 render more likely the achievement of such a goal we recommend that the Public 
Service Board should delegate to departmental management the power to specify 
the minimum qualifications for the work being carried out.1 Departmental 
managers are familiar with the work and are thus in the best position to determine 
what is required. Also they should be accountable for any over-specification of 
qualifications. Specification of qualifications for particular work should be a for-
mal act publicly notified, and be open to review by the Public Service Board, 
either on the initiative of an individual officer or applicant, or by the Public 
Service Board as part of its review of the integrity of departmental salary 
classification practice. Where a review is sought by an individual the Public 
Service Board powers should be the same as those available to it in relation to 
review of classifications. On the other hand we believe that the question of 
determining what is an 'equivalent' qualification (that is, of interpreting the 
relative worth of various types of learning) is a function best exercised by the 
Public Service Board in the interests of avoiding major inconsistencies throughout 
R133 the Commonwealth Public Service. We therefore recommend that the Board 
continue to be in full control of this aspect of the determination of qualifications. 
8.3 EQUAL OPPORTUNITY OR EQUALUIY 
8-3-1 Our terms of reference require us to report on 'personnel policies and 
practices . . . both generally and in relation to particular classes of persons'. 
Representatives of several classes of persons, all minorities in the administration, 
claimed that they were being unfairly, if not deliberately, discriminated against, 
or that present employment practices tended to consolidate disadvantages from 
which they at present suffer. That is, as we mentioned in section 8. i, there is a 
conflict between social equity and the principles on which present practice is 
based, particularly in respect of recruitment and promotion on the basis of 
assessed merit. 
8.3.2 As we have noted, these practices were adopted to proscribe nepotism and 
patronage in recruitment and advancement. However, to avoid these undesirable 
features, reliance was placed upon educational attainment and performance in 
tests which purported to measure genetically based intelligence or aptitude. Such 
reliance substituted an objective procedure for one in which personal preference, 
prejudice or whimsy might predominate. However, it created a position in which 
differing educational opportunity and cultural environment could themselves be 
sources of discrimination. No educational or aptitude test can be free of cultural 
bias, and their new importance created a position in which access to sources of 
I . 	 Salary classification, in which rcicrcnce to qualifications may he a factor, is discussed in 
Chapter 9.2. 
success in them became essential to obtain or protect privilege and in which 
privileged groups were best placed to secure that access. 
8.3.3 There is no scientifically based evidence that would lead us to expect that 
the distribution of genetically based skills and aptitudes between the persons in 
any one social group will differ significantly from the distribution for the 
population as a whole. From this it follows that any test the result of which gives 
greater success to members of any group or groups may well be biased in some 
way, and that to distribute benefits in accordance with that test could well be, 
even if unintentionally, discriminatory. The only acceptable evidence that 
genuine equality of opportunity is being offered will therefore be that equality of 
result is seen to be achieved. The fact that any significant group of citizens is 
seriously under-represented in the proportionate make-up of government 
employment or any substantial part or level of it must be regarded as prima facie 
evidence of discrimination or disadvantage or, at the very least, of a matter 
deserving investigation. If therefore educational and related tests are to continue 
to be the bases for recruitment, and in part for promotion, equity requires that 
those responsible should continually: 
(a) work to reduce the cultural, social and other biases in the tests; 
(b) choose as the basis for such tests factors indicating or relevant to capacity to 
perform the functions actually involved (see section 8.2 above); 
(c) take positive action to identify the handicaps which tend to disadvantage 
identifiable social groups and to provide members of them with the means 
to overcome those handicaps; 
(d) diversify the sources of any elements of personal judgment which persist in 
the recruitment and promotion processes. 
8.3.4 It has been submitted to the Commission that women, Aboriginals, 
migrants, the handicapped, homosexuals, older people seeking late entry to the 
Service, the educationally deprived and people living in remote areas all suffer 
from disadvantage in seeking employment or promotion in the service of the 
Commonwealth government. The available evidence in our view supports this 
submission. Each of these groups has its individual problems but there is much in 
common. Lack of time to examine the circumstances of all these groups has led the 
Commission to concentrate its limited resources on matters particularly affecting 
women, Aboriginals and the handicapped. However, we believe our conclusions 
are capable of substantial application to the problems of the other groups. 
8.3.5 Our work on the particular pr9blems of these groups, as well as the 
general considerations to which we have just referred, leads us to believe that the 
composition of the government work force should continually be reviewed by the 
Public Service Board and, in collaboration with the Board, by large employing 
departments and agencies. Accordingly, the Commission recommends that policy R134 
in relation to that composition should be guided by the following principles: 
(a) a bureaucracy which is composed of able members of all substantial social 
groups is likely to provide the most vital, responsive and efficient service to 
the government and the community; 
(b) employment within the various government services represents a source of 
training, occupational experience and personal fulfilment which should be 
open equally to all with the requisite potential; 
(c) the government has a special responsibility to act as a wise and enlightened 
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employer in providing such opportunities widely as an example to other 
employers. 
The Commission has sought to apply these principles in its analysis of the 
problems of the three minority groups discussed below and in the recom-
mendations which it has based upon that analysis. 
Women 
8.3.6 In Western industrial societies women entering the workforce have been, 
until recently, either of working class backgrounds, with few skills, and thereby 
mainly in low status 'support' jobs, or middle class women, mainly single, with 
education and training, to be found in service professions. Their work in these 
professions was considered secondary to the primary role of housewife and mother 
to which they were expected to retire on marriage. In many professions, such as 
teaching, this expectation was enforced by a marriage bar. 
8.3.7 Particularly since World War 2, in a society increasingly affluent and 
requiring a wider range of skills than available from traditional male sources, 
there has been a marked change in the role of women in society.' Women have 
entered the workforce in much greater numbers, but only recently and 
marginally have they moved into roles traditionally performed by men. 
Declining birth rates, control of fertility and increasing educational opportunities 
attendant on increasing affluence have accelerated this trend. 
8.3.8 In Australia the private sector was able to make good a deficiency of 
available skills by drawing on hitherto unused pools of female labour. Even so, the 
increase in numbers of women has not been matched by any increase in 
participation by women in the higher levels of skilled 'non-service' occupations. 
8.3.9 This situation in the private sector contrasts with that of public 
employment where progress towards equal rights for women has, until quite 
recently, been inhibited by legislation debarring women from pursuing a career 
after marriage. Skilled women, however, were frequently permitted to remain in 
the Service after marriage as temporary employees though generally at lower 
levels of salary. These legislative provisions were repealed in 1966, some time after 
the de facto acceptance by Australian society that women, including married 
women, should have the right to pursue a career. As recently as 1973, age 
restrictions effectively debarring older women returning to the workforce were 
removed. Nevertheless the earlier restrictions and the values expressed by them 
have had profound implications for female employment in the Commonwealth 
Public Service. Thus while women constitute over 40 per cent of the Australian 
workforce, they constitute only 30 per cent of staff employed under the Public 
Service Act. 
8.3.10 The Commission's attention has not been focussed only on the numbers 
of females employed. It has considered also the numbers of women in positions of 
responsibility. The Commission notes that a substantial majority of the 
complaints of sex discrimination in Commonwealth employment referred to 
statutory authorities, particularly those business undertakings where employ-
ment practices are like those of private enterprise. Precise information about such 
authorities has not been available to the Commission. For the Commonwealth 
Public Service however a special series of statistics relating to male and female 
I . Sec also Chapter io.6 and Appendix 3j. 
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recruitment and progression has been collected and analysed. The Commission's 
views have been based primarily on a consideration both of these statistics and the 
Public Service Board's computerised personnel records. 
8-3-1 1 These indicate that women are to be found predominantly in 
occupations which offer lower rewards and limited career prospects.' Women 
employed under the Public Service Act are to be found predominantly in service 
occupations and in service oriented departments, and tend to be grouped largely 
in the lower levels of nearly all occupational structures. Their exclusion from a 
number of specialist occupations is often attributed to the residual effect of the 
marriage bar. However detailed analyses of the progression of males and females 
with similar qualification and service attributes strongly suggests that the lack of 
female representation at the top levels of occupational structures owes more to the 
continued operation of prejudice than to history or the lack of ability on the part 
of women recruited. 
8.3.12 Thus while women in the third division in classes 5-IT and in all age 
groups have a higher proportion of degrees than men, their distribution at each 
level within the third division demonstrates that they serve longer before 
obtaining promotion. The promotion of women appears to be hampered, among 
other things, by lack of experience in managerial or supervisory roles, which 
apparently is difficult for them to acquire. Staffing patterns of several selected 
departments support the claim that while men supervise both men and women, 
rarely do women supervise men, even at the lower levels of the third division. 
Women rarely number among promotees to non-advertised positions or among 
staff chosen to attend training courses. Female promotions when they occur tend 
to be internal to a department rather than between departments. All these facts 
suggest that pre-1966 attitudes continue to influence decisions affecting the career 
prospects of women. 
8.3.13 Consequently the Commission has concluded that, while prejudice may 
gradually decline, it would be unjust to rely solely on time to remedy 
discrimination. The initiatives taken by the Public Service Board since 1972 and 
some encouraging subsequent advances in employment of women are not yet 
sufficient to generate the necessary momentum. At least in the interim, special R135 
recruitment, training and career development programs designed to overcome 
the adverse effects of past discrimination and to combat remaining prejudice are 
in the Commission's view necessary. 
8.3.14 Also the Commission considers that a special unit within the Office of the 
Public Service Board will be necessary to stimulate and monitor such programs 
and to identify and study problems in female employment. These functions would 
be appropriate to the Office of Equality in Employment which is recommended 
in paragraph 8.3.29. 
Aboriginals 
8.3.15 The Public Service Board in Circular 1973/46, 'Employment of 
Aboriginals: Further Measures', requested departments to review promptly their 
organisations and establishments in locations and in respect of functions, in 
i. Statistics on matters referred to in this section are to be found in Paper in of the Career Service 
Study at Appendix 3.A. 
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which services are provided to significant numbers of Aboriginals. This review 
was intended to identify existing jobs or potential jobs for which an Aboriginal 
background could be a significant factor in the efficient performance of the duties 
concerned. From information available it seems that departments have not 
actively or effectively carried out this review. 
8.3. 16 The Commission recognises that Aboriginal descent, unsupported by 
adequate education, training and experience, will not equip a person to deal with 
the complex problems that arise in the administration of Aboriginal Affairs,1 and 
in relation to Public Service work more generally it cannot be doubted that it 
would widely be regarded as a handicap. Special and urgent action is needed to 
train Aboriginals for this work if it is not to remain substantially closed to them. 
The Commission is satisfied, from the experience of other countries (and of Papua 
New Guinea in particular), that a bold and imaginative program of special 
recruitment, training and experience could achieve substantial Aboriginal 
participation in departmental work within a few years and thereafter ensure in all 
government departments and agencies fair and reasonable opportunities for 
Aboriginal Australians. Negligible numbers of Aboriginal Australians are 
employed in the Public Service and few in government employment generally.' 
This reflects primarily the fact that access to the sources of educational 
qualifications necessary have in the past not been open to them. 
R136 8.3.17 The Commission recommends, therefore: 
(a) that the government authorise the Public Service Board to design and put 
into effect a 5
-10 year program of special recruitment and training of 
Aboriginals in 
(i) the Department of Aboriginal Affairs, 
(ii) other departments with significant Aboriginal to total client ratios, 
(iii) the administration generally; 
(b) that this program take the form of traineeships of limited but adequate 
duration designed to enable successful trainees to apply for base grade and 
lateral appointment to the relevant levels and section. of the Public Service 
and other agencies; 
(c) that departments, with assistance from the Office of Equality in 
Employment (see paragraph 8.3.29), should immediately undertake the 
review proposed by the Board in its 1973 circular, amending duty 
statements as appropriate and preparing relevant guidelines for the use of 
personnel sections in departments when they are recruiting persons to 
positions for which an Aboriginal background is a significant factor in the 
efficient performance of the duties concerned; 
(d) that appropriately designed programs of general education, specialised 
training and graduated experience be developed to equip different 
categories of trainees to enter, at various levels, Commonwealth 
government employment and Aboriginal incorporated organisations; 
(e) that formal educational programs required for this purpose be provided as 
far as possible by institutions outside the government service by special 
arrangements where these are necessary; 
1. See Chapter 10.5, The Administration of Aboriginal Affairs. 
2. For statistics, see Appendix 3.1. 
(f) that the Office of Equality in Employment within the Public Service Board 
and the Department of Aboriginal Affairs be responsible for the 
development and supervision of these programs; 
(g) that the Office of Equality in Employment report annually to the Board 
and to the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs on progress achieved. 
The Handicapped 
8-3.18 The term handicapped is used to describe a person with a 
disability—physical, mental, social, emotional or academic—which limits his 
activities. A handicap need not, however, be a barrier to employment, and it has 
been the policy of the Commonwealth government and of the Public Service 
Board to provide employment opportunities for handicapped persons.' 
8.3.19 The handicapped are not a homogeneous group; each has actual or 
potential individual skills and competences. All jobs can be considered as 
potentially open to some handicapped person, subject to careful individual 
selection and placement. The administration contains such a range of jobs that 
handicapped people could be matched with positions within it. Despite this, entry 
poses particular problems for many handicapped applicants, problems which 
derive from selection techniques, medical standards and, in some cases, the 
identification of appropriate vacancies. 
8.3.20 The Commission considers that the policy of providing for employment 
of the handicapped in the administration has not been put into effect as 
energetically as necessary. Precise assessment of the opportunities which have 
progressively been opened for handicapped people is impossible, since uniform 
statistics are unavailable. We recommend that, in order to provide better data, R137 
persons requiring special placement be defined as handicapped, and that uniform 
statistics be collected by special placement officers for submission to the Office of 
Equality in Employment. 
8.3.2 I An effective policy to promote employment of handicapped people 
requires new and more flexible procedures for recruitment, placement and 
advancement. The Commission recommends: 	 R1 38  
(a) that a wider range of selection tests be designed to enable greater numbers 
of handicapped staff to be offered permanent employment and that 
adequate performance in a temporary position should also provide a basis 
for permanency; 
(b) that greater guidance be given to medical officers on the application of the 
thre -,car standard for permanent appointment to the Service, and that 
handicapped people be examined by a practitioner with specialised 
knowledge of their disability; 
(c) that specialised training be provided for placement officers appointed to 
counsel and assist in placing the handicapped and that the position be 
recognised as full-time, to enable such officers to monitor the success of 
placements and to liaise as necessary with departments, agencies and 
relevant community groups; 
I. The Commission arranged for a special study to be made of employment opportunities for the 
handicapped in the Public Service. Extracts from the consultancy report, and from responses 
to it, can be found at Appendix 3.H. 
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(d) that training practices be developed to alert personnel officers and 
supervisors to the range of abilities of the handicapped and the difficulties 
they encounter in employment; 
(e) that greater attention be given to the training needs of the handicapped; 
(f) that all buildings occupied by the Commonwealth government be 
progressively adapted by the Department of Administrative Services to 
meet the needs of handicapped people; 
(g) that action be taken by the Public Service Board to collect statistics on the 
employment of the handicapped for the use of the Office of Equality in 
Employment; 
(h) that the Office of Equality in Employment provide advice to departments 
and agencies on the implementation of government policy to provide 
employment opportunities for the handicapped. 
Action to Promote Equality in Employment 
8.3.22 The Commission has concluded that some apparently neutral recruit-
ment, selection and promotion processes serve to perpetuate the results of past 
discrimination and to compound existing inequalities. Special programs will in 
some instances be necessary to correct such long-standing patterns of inequality. 
The Commission is conscious, however, that special programs can be most 
effective in dealing with problems which persist or emerge despite a general 
climate of opinion and despite patterns of organisation which favour and are 
intended to achieve equality. The Commission has given careful thought to the 
following questions which seem to bear upon these tasks: 
(a) is the achievement of equality advanced by legislation which proscribes 
discrimination? 
(b) what organisation within the government administration should have 
responsibility for designing and giving effect to special programs to 
promote equality; and what powers and resources should it have? 
8.3.23 Legislation against discrimination: The Public Service Board has 
endorsed the principle of equal opportunity and has established an Equal 
Employment Opportunity Section within its Personnel Management Division. 
Nevertheless, the Board has told the Commission that it is opposed to legislation 
to prohibit discrimination in government employment of the kind which exists in 
the USA and the United Kingdom. It argues that discrimination is 'of its nature 
extremely difficult to define and prove' and that the inclusion of an anti-
discrimination clause in the Public Service Act 'would require the development of 
complex administrative and review machinery specifically for the Public 
Service'. 
8.3.24 Underlying these arguments is a concern which has been expressed to the 
Commission from other sources also whether legislation is an appropriate means 
to counter the effect of deeply-seated prejudice or whether, to the extent that it 
imposes unwilling compliance, it does not serve to exacerbate and embitter that 
prejudice and delay its gradual elimination by persuasion and social pressure. 
This is a difficult issue. Nevertheless the Commission feels it must give weight to 
the declaratory value of legislation on important social issues. A law which 
proscribes discrimination can be seen as a moral judgment by the community as a 
whole and therefore a powerful instrument itself of persuasion and social pressure, 
strengthening those who wish to resist discrimination, stiffening the resolution of 
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the waverers and giving those inclined to discriminate reason to pause and 
reconsider. The Racial Discrimination Act, of course, goes some way towards 
meeting the problem. Pragmatic evidence from experience in other countries, in 
particular from Canada and the USA, where a need is acknowledged for special 
machinery relating to the Civil Service, and from Britain, where the Sex 
Discrimination Act of 1975 covers all employment, appears to the Commission on 
balance to support a judgment in favour of such legislation where the purpose 
accords with the moral and political principles on which the society concerned is 
based, and where it is backed by widespread and disinterested support. We 
believe these conditions exist in Australia. 
8.3.25 In the light of what we have said above we recommend that Parliament R139 
legislate to require all agencies of the Commonwealth government to exercise any 
powers or discretions they possess in a manner which does not discriminate in 
employment on grounds of race, creed, sex, age, marital status, political belief, 
security record or educational qualifications, except where reasonably and 
justifiably required for the effective performance of the work to be undertaken. 
The law should however provide that this requirement should not prevent action, 
taken with the approval or on the direction of the Executive Council, to confer 
rights or advantages on members of a group designated as disadvantaged. 
8.3.26 The proposed categories of prohibited discriminations are for the most 
part self-explanatory. It is important to understand that discrimination 
reasonably related to work requirements is not proscribed. Thus for instance 
discrimination on grounds of security record or lack of educational qualifications 
could be sustained where it was reasonably justified by the nature of the work to 
be undertaken. 
8.3.27 Groups designated as disadvantaged could include those already 
referred to (see paragraph 8.3.4 above) but might also include ex-servicemen, 
victims of natural disasters, or others for whom, from time to time, the Executive 
Council approves special concern. The establishment of programs for such groups 
is consistent with and indeed may be required for the effective elimination of 
discrimination from government employment. 
8.3.28 A statutory duty to avoid discrimination of the kind we recommend 
could impose new responsibilities upon heads of departments and agencies, and 
others with managerial responsibilities and even more importantly on the Public 
Service Board as the central personnel authority. Reasonable time should 
therefore be allowed after the enactment of the relevant legislation to permit these 
and other authorities to modify existing practices. It would also impose upon the 
Public Service Board, as the central personnel agency, the duty of promoting 
equality in employment. 
8.3.29 An Office of Equality in Employment: The Commission is conscious 
that anti-discrimination legislation alone can do little to correct the consequences 
of past discrimination, to achieve real equality in access to the sources of the skills 
upon which success in government employment increasingly depends, or to bring 
under sharper notice discriminations which are built into the system which 
otherwise are likely to be ignored. Consequently, the Commission recommends also R1 40  
that, within the ambit of the Public Service Board, there should be established an 
Office of Equality in Employment with a wide ranging charter to pursue these 
purposes. 
'9' 
8.3.30 We envisage that the Office will replace the existing Equal Employment 
Opportunity Section but that it will remain within the Board, and have access to 
the Board's functional services and information including Mandata. The need for 
a conscious effort to deal with discrimination of the types we have outlined is still a 
novel feature of personnel management. This and other aspects of the problem 
distinguish discrimination from other personnel matters and, therefore, while the 
unit concerned with equality in employment should work closely with the 
R 14  Personnel Management Division, to ensure that adequate weight is given to this 
problem, it should be outside this Division and its Director should have direct 
access to the Commissioners of the Board. 
8.3.31 The Office of Equality in Employment should collect information about 
discrimination which is built into the ways government employment is 
administered, and having identified the source of bias, should consider and 
R 142 recommend means for correcting it. To do this the Office must be able to require 
reports from all agencies, including in such reports any statistics on recruitment 
training and promotion it may require and indicators of progress towards 
equality. 
8.3.32 We envisage that the Office will establish firm links with all statutory 
authorities, not only to facilitate the collection of comprehensive statistics but also 
to identify and study their problems relating to the employment of minority and 
handicapped groups, and to assist the authorities in special recruitment and 
training programs. 
R 14  8.3.33 We endorse the proposal by the Public Service Board (Memorandum 
No. i 8) that Equal Opportunity Liaison Officers be appointed in each 
department, and suggest that such appointments be made also in statutory 
authorities. Such appointments would improve formal and informal lines of 
contact, for example, between the Director of the Office and departmental and 
agency heads, between staff of the Office and personnel and training officers. 
Liaison officers should work through the normal staff communication and 
consultation channels; consultations on a representative basis should follow the 
pattern of consultation on industrial relations questions. 
8.3.34 The immediate task of the Office would be to oversee the implemen-
tation of policies in relation to Aboriginal Australians, women and the 
handicapped, as well as people previously discriminated against by the 
nationality bar (see section 8.2), while special programs for them continue to be 
necessary. One measure of the success of the Office will be the speed with which 
such programs become unnecessary. The Commission would therefore wish the 
organisation of the Office to be flexible enough to redirect efforts in response to 
changing circumstances. However there would be advantages if particular 
programs were the responsibility of identifiable sections of the Office, staffed by 
officers who could build up a background of knowledge and effective 
communication with the disadvantaged group with which the program was 
concerned. Programs will of necessity be experimental. Not all will succeed, and 
some will succeed only after patient effort. Short term appointments to the Office 
may be desirable to maintain vitality and freshness of approach. The Commission 
R144 recommends therefore that the staff of the Office have limited tenure in their 
particular positions. This could be achieved by fixed term secondments from 
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other sections of the administration, and by contract appointment of outsiders 
with relevant experience or expertise. 
8.3.35 Means of redress: The Commission has not recommended action to 
make specified employment practices unlawful, or to provide for civil actions on 
breach of the proposed statutory duty to avoid discrimination (see paragraph 
8.3.25). We do consider, however, that there is need for a clearly identified system 
of review of alleged breaches. It is not enough, in our view, to leave such matters 
to the expensive and complicated processes ofjudicial review. Some more readily 
accessible grievance mechanism is necessary. We consider it appropriate that the 
Office of Equality in Employment should have a role in relation to individual 
complaints of discrimination. This role is complementary to the broader one of 
surveillance which also will alert the Office to cases of discrimination. 
Consideration of complaints about discrimination or about decisions considered 
contrary to the spirit and intention of the equality in employment program will 
focus attention on areas of special difficulty and perhaps on the need for special 
programs. Investigation, counselling, and conciliation would provide opportu-
nities for the Office's staff to gain insight into practical difficulties, and to engage 
in constructive discussion of the aims of the program with people throughout the 
administration, leading to better mutual understanding. The lessons learnt from 
settlement of cases would provide a foundation for improved policy. 
8.3.36 The Commission recommends therefore that complaints of unjustifiable R145 
discriminatory action made to the Office or referred to it by the Board be 
investigated by the Director. Procedures generally applicable to grievances of 
staff would appear to offer an appropriate framework for the initiation and initial 
examination of such complaints by agencies (see section 8.5 below). In cases 
where, after investigation, the Director considers a complaint is justified, 
conciliation between the individual affected and the agency involved should be 
attempted. Such conciliation, the proposed statutory obligation on managers to 
avoid discrimination, and the possibility of public censure of any unwillingness to 
implement equal opportunity policies, should in most cases lead to satisfactory 
resolution of the difficulty. However, in cases where conciliation is unsuccessful, 
the aggrieved person would be free to appeal to the Board or go to the 
Commonwealth Service Ombudsman (see section 8.5). 1  Those employed outside 
the Public Service Act would of course also be able to avail themselves of the 
Commonwealth Service Ombudsman. It is also open to complainants in cases of 
alleged discrimination on racial grounds to go to the Commissioner for 
Community Relations for such cases to be investigated. 
8-3-37 The difficulty of establishing discrimination in individual cases is widely 
acknowledged. The Commission considers therefore that an appropriate 
administrative practice for determining whether complaints are well-founded 
would be for the Director of the Office of Equality in Employment to require the 
agency concerned to establish that discrimination has not occurred and that no 
form of indirect or systematic discrimination has prejudiced opportunities open to 
the individual complainant. 
8.3.38 Finally, we emphasise that the role of the Office of Equality in 
Employment in such investigations should not detract from its activities in policy 
I . A minority view by Commissioner Munro on this matter can be found at the end of section 8.3. 
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development or the conduct of positive programs to assist particular groups. 
Moreover, it must be recognised that special investigatory skills are not 
necessarily possessed by staff employed to undertake policy and program work. 
R146 The Commission recoinmeiids therefore that the Office of Equality in Employment 
have staff resources appropriate to both functions and that it be organised in such 
a way that the performance of neither suffers. This suggests two streams of staff, 
each expert in their particular field. The Director of the Office should, however, 
have responsibility for both functions. To enable him to perform these functions 
Ri47 effectively we recommend that the Director have direct access to heads of 
departments and agencies. 
The following reservation has been expressed by Commissioner Munro on the 
matters discussed at paragraph 8.3.36: 
While acknowledging the importance of conciliation and counselling in 
grievance resolution, I press for acceptance of the need for some ultimate 
sanction and enforcement of the duty imposed upon management and staff to 
avoid discrimination. An authority external to the Public Service with power to 
enforce a suitable range of remedies in appropriate cases is necessary to reinforce 
the work of the proposed Office of Equality in Employment. The Racial 
Discrimination Act illustrates one means of linking enforcement provisions to an 
anti-discrimination clause. The United States Civil Rights Act provides a 
possible model and relevant experience in the context of public employment in a 
federal system with some similarity to our own. Without either enforcement 
provisions or continuing detailed oversight by a body external to the employing 
authority, institutional pressure in Commonwealth employment against 
inequality in employment is likely to continue to lag behind overseas practice 
and what is necessary to change attitudes.1  
8.4 MOTIVATION, REWARDS AND PENALTIES 
8-4-1 Whatever may be the value or influence of career service principles in 
shaping the recruitment process and its outcome, career service expectations and 
security of tenure are believed by many members of the public to be destructive of 
efficiency, organisational dynamism and individual ambition. 
8.4.2 The Commission does not believe that career service entitlements lead to 
inefficiency. Rather we are convinced that where there is inefficiency the causes 
lie in management practices and employee attitudes which tend to develop in any 
large, relatively specialised and stable workforce. In such conditions it is difficult 
to provide effective motivation for work and the problems of management 
become more complex. 
8.4.3 During one of the Commission's inspections2 a lower ranking third 
division officer said: 
I . For an exposition of the inhibitions of a Central Personnel Agency implementing a policy of 
equality in employment, see the Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights,July 
1975: The Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort, 194'.  The Report critically reviews the 
performance of the United States Civil Service Commission whose functions generally parallel 
those of the Commonwealth Public Service Board in relevant respects. 
2. 	 See Chapter 1.2.5. 
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'No matter how good you are you don't get anywhere. I won't be fired if I am a 
bad worker; I won't be promoted if I am a good worker.' 
He clearly felt the lack of effective motivation. Although exaggerated, the 
comment reflects the feelings of many career service officers particularly those in 
more routine functions outside the Australian Capital Territory. 
8.4.4 Not everyone who enters government employment at the bottom can 
expect to be promoted to the top. Nor can it be expected that government 
employment will be free of inefficient staff, or that management will always 
exercise effective discipline. However, it is often urged that inefficiency and 
indiscipline are encouraged because managers and employees have been too 
sheltered. In this section of the Report the Commission explores some problems 
related to motivation, advancement and discipline within the career service and 
their relevance to efficiency, accountability and the rights of employees. 
The Relevance of Rewards to Recruitment and Performance 
8.4.5 All government employees derive two major kinds of benefits from their 
employment as public servants: 
(a) benefits contingent only upon membership of the Service (for example, sick 
leave, security of tenure, superannuation, variety ofjob opportunities); 
(b) benefits contingent upon performance in the Service (for example, salary 
level and rate of promotion). 
8.4.6 While the benefits of the first kind presumably attract new recruits to the 
Service, they have little bearing on the effort or enthusiasm displayed in work. 
Good performance is more likely to be encouraged by rewards that are clearly 
related to an employee's contribution. 
8.4.7 The evidence available to the Commission suggests that too little 
attention is given to the differing effects of different types of reward for working. 
Moreover, effects of any particular reward' are likely to differ for different types 
of public servants. For example some people are for good reasons interested only 
in the financial rewards of working and are unlikely to respond in the same way to 
increased opportunities for participation and challenge in their work as are those 
who are most deeply involved in the work they do. 'Challenge' is not considered 
as a 'reward' by both types of worker. 
8.4.8 Even where something is valued by employees (that is, is a potential 
reward), it is still unlikely to encourage improved performance unless it is seen to 
be contingent upon improved performance. Fortunately, modern theory and 
research suggest that both job satisfaction and performance can be simul-
taneously increased by relating rewards directly to job performance.' The 
importance of clear links between performance and rewards has also been 
emphasised to the Commission by one of its consultants. 2 
8.4.9 In practice however it will not always be easy to link unambiguously 
individual contributions and individual rewards. Difficulties include: 
Sec for example. E. Lawler Py and (.)ig(inisalional Ejjeclieeness: A Psychological View, McGraw 
Hill, 197 1. 
Mr B. F. Jones see the recommendations from his report, Salary Classification in the 
Australian Public Service, at Appendix 3.C)) 
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(a) the measurement of the contribution of individuals to some classes of work; 
(b) the differing perceptions of the links between performance and rewards; 
(c) the desire of unions to protect previously won concessions. 
In effect it is primarily by promotion that performance is directly rewarded, and 
opportunity to reward it therefore becomes important at times and in parts of the 
Service in which growth is rapid. In theory, increments are granted under section 
31 (i) of the Public Service Act subject to satisfactory performance but, except in 
isolated cases where a qualifications barrier exists, they have become nearly 
automatic. Thus no distinction is made between mediocre and above average 
contribution to work in terms of salary received.' 
8.4.10 A reward system which relied lesson promotion would be welcomed by 
officers in occupations with a limited career structure. It would also reduce the 
costs in areas where at present good work can be rewarded only by promoting the 
officer out of the work he is doing efficiently. A classification system with a large 
number of grades or levels having fixed salary ranges will cause frequent changing 
ofjobs as officers strive to gain promotion. This in turn can mean more frequent 
interruption of work and more time spent learning the job compared with the 
time spent being fully effective on the job. 
8-4-1 i The section of this chapter dealing with occupational career structures 
(paragraphs 8.4.17-3 i) shows that the size of salary ranges differs between 
occupations within a particular class. Although the number of work levels in the 
clerical-administrative area has been reduced over some decades the salary 
ranges within levels remain relatively narrow. Staff organisations generally 
oppose proposals for a further reduction in the number of occupational grades, 
predominantly, we believe, because of general staff resentment towards the 
uncertainty and disturbance for individuals associated with broad-banding 
classifications. There are, however, precedents within the service for wider salary 
ranges, for example Medical Officers and Legal Officers. 
8.14.12 A submission by the Australian Government Lawyers' Association 
argued for personal (that is, performance based) classification, asserting that, 'the 
present incremental range for the Legal Officer is too long' and: 
'that in recognition of the fact that legal officers who perform duties at the top of 
the Legal Officer or Senior Legal Officer scales for long periods because of lack of 
promotional opportunities develop a degree of expertise far in excess of that 
normally to be expected from occupants of such positions in the ordinary course 
of events, a system which allows a reclassification of such positions on a basis 
personal to the occupant should be introduced.' 2 
We commend the flexible arrangements which have been introduced for such 
occupational groups as Research Medical Officers and Research Scientists and 
R 14 recommend that similar arrangements be extended to other professional areas 
where there is scope for personal initiative. A need for such measures has already 
been recognised to some degree, and the principle is embodied in a 
recommendation of the joint Public Service Board-department Engineers 
Review Team which proposed the creation of a system of reserve pool 
promotions. 
I . Section 3 i 
 () allows the permanent head to defer an increment, and there is a statutory right of 
appeal to the Public Service Board against such a decision. 
2. Submission No. 739, paragraph 35. 
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.4- 13 The reintroduction of discretionary increments for clerical-
administrative positions is attractive in principle, but past experience of their use 
is not encouraging. In 1920 McLachlan listed the following criticisms: 
(a) different views on the part of Chief Officers (of departments) as to 'the 
importance and value of officers' duties', seniority, or personal con-
siderations, conflicted with the Commission's policy which sought to 
'secure uniformity of treatment and of variation of work'; 
(b) the Chief Officers did not have the power to make the final decision, but 
merely made a recommendation to the Commissioner. The Report noted 
that frequently their recommendations had not been accepted; 
(c) the discretion created discontent amongst officers, in particular because 
(i) departmental management could blame the Commissioner for the 
decision not to grant advancement, 
(ii) the failure to recommend was not accompanied by any explanation: 
the system was not open, 
(iii) it 'establishes a sense of grievance in a fairly large section of officers, 
as it is inevitable that, in discriminating by efficiency and value of 
work at one time or another, many officers will be denied one or 
more increments which rightly or wrongly they think they should 
have obtained.' It was further argued that this unsettling effect upon 
officers was reflected in their work and fostered a spirit of antagonism 
towards those administering the Act which was not conducive to 
'efficiency and contentment in the Service'.' 
8.4.14 Furthermore the Commission is aware that there is such a widespread 
conviction that reintroduction would be only temporary that this expectation 
would be self-fulfilling. Certainly the Commission would not favour rein-
troduction in the absence of reforms it proposes in staff counselling, assessment 
and more effective consultation and participation, and unless: 
(a) officers concerned were advised of the decision and the reasons for it; 
(b) responsibility and power in relation to increments rested in the one person. 
Given these conditions reintroduction should be seriously considered. Effective-
ness would be helped if the Board were to give broad guidelines to departments, 
suggesting, to take an example, that it would be exceptional to recommend more 
than 8o per cent of increments be granted and could lead to examination of the 
standards being applied. We recommend that the Board examine these possibilities R 149 
and have them referred to Joint Council for consideration and advice. 
8.4.15 Pay and performance could be more directly linked if department heads R150 
had discretion to classify certain positions according to the qualities of the 
successful applicant, for example, a position could be classified as either class 6, 7 
or 8 depending upon the experience and skills of the incumbent. This procedure 
would resemble the private sector practice of advertising positions with the 
proviso 'salary negotiable'. Authority for such discretion might be sought from 
the Board by departments and agencies in relation to individual positions or 
classes of position. The use of this flexibility would need to be adequately justified 
or would lead simply to a lowering of standards. 
8.4.16 Some types of work lend themselves more readily than others to the 
design of rewards linked with performance. Those in close touch with such areas 
i. Report of 1920 Royal Commission, p. 41. 
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(including those who work in them) are best placed to identify such opportunities. 
We believe that the more frequent recognition and use of these opportunities will 
be one of the 'entrepreneurial' benefits which could flow from the delegation of 
greater authority in personnel matters to departmental heads and other 
managerial staff. 
Occupational Career Structures 
8.4. 17 Not surprisingly the Commission received a large number of submissions 
asserting deficiencies and injustices in the salaries of particular occupational 
groups. Because of this we have made a special study of career prospects for 
members of certain groups.' 
8.4.18 This study examines the apparent influence of the occupational category 
on career opportunities, excluding the effect of other factors such as divisional 
status, geographic location and educational qualifications. The occupational 
groups studied were Clerical Assistants, Technical Officers, Nurses, Typists, 
Steno-Secretaries, Clerical-Administrative, Engineers, Scientists, Legal Officers 
and second division officers. Various indicators of career opportunity were 
examined for each group: 
(a) salary ranges; 
(b) proportion of group receiving highesf and lowest salary level; 
(c) salary increases apart from promotion; 
(d) staff growth rates and separation rates. 
We examine each of these in turn below. 
8.4.19 Salaiy ranges: Within the third division there are not significant 
differences in salary ranges between different groups, whereas in the fourth 
division the ranges in the Technical Officer and Nursing structures are much 
wider than those of Clerical Assistants, Typists and Steno-Secretaries. In other 
words, the former two provide a career structure in some ways comparable with 
the third division groups although they do not offer proportionately as many 
positions in the higher levels. 
8.4.20 Salarp levels: All groups studied showed a decline in the proportion of the 
group receiving the lowest grade of salary. 2 However the opportunities actually 
available to move to higher levels varied widely from group to group. Least well-
off in this respect are the predominantly female occupations of Nurse, Typist and 
Steno-Secretary. In the professional groups a high proportion reach the highest 
salary level within the occupational structure, although evidence from the study 
suggests that generally it would be likely to take longer to reach that level than it 
would within the clerical-administrative structure. 
8-4.21 Sa1ay increases. Salary increases awarded by the Public Service 
Arbitrator or granted by the Public Service Board are the sole sources of increase 
to an individual officer if he remains at the same work level. Even more important 
in determining actual pay increases is the scope for promotion. Of the groups 
studied, those for whom such opportunities are greatly limited have received the 
highest percentage salary increases excluding the effect of promotion. This result 
I . 'Comparative Career Opportunities'. See Commission Document 873, on microfiche. 
2. When this upward drift in the distribution of positions occurs without associated changes in the 
work being performed, the phenomenon is referred to as 'classification creep'. 
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reflects in part the influence of reviews applying the principle of equal pay for 
women. Those who fared relatively badly were Technical Officers and second 
division officers. The limited information available about the relationship 
between salary increase and length of service indicates a relatively favourable 
position for non-professional graduates compared with professional graduates. 
Reference to data on median length of service suggests that a given percentage 
salary increase is realised more quickly in the clerical-administrative structure 
than in the clerical assistant structure. 
8.4.22 Growth and separation rates: Growth rates in staff are related to an 
expansion in various types of work. Increases in rates of growth lead to greater 
promotion opportunities, thereby influencing the rate at which an individual 
may move through an occupational structure. Staff growth rates are thus a 
significant determinant of increased pay resulting from promotion. Separation 
rates, that is, vacancies arising from resignation, retirement, or death, also 
influence promotional opportunities. In other words the expansion of certain 
types of work creates a special demand for relevant skills, leading to a 'sellers 
market' for those skills. This is true of the public as well as the private sector. Such 
a market for particular skills can lead by 'flow-on' procedures to general upward 
moves of salary rates and the costs of government. 
8.4.23 An employer, in this case the Public Service Board, cannot be held to 
account for differences in opportunities and achievement which are the result of 
government policies and the general state of the labour market. There are 
however, a number of long run personnel policies which may well simultaneously 
increase career opportunities and lead to a more efficient use of human resources 
thus benefiting both employer and employee. Some of these are reviewed below. 
8.4.24 Occupation restructuring: One policy which can contribute to these ends is 
that of consciously changing the content of traditional occupations to transfer 
skills between different jobs, thus eliminating dead-end jobs and increasing the 
opportunities for movement to other classes of work and for promotion. 
8.4.25 The need and the potential benefits from such restructuring can be 
illustrated by reference to the position of typists and steno-secretaries. These 
employees have very limited career opportunities, with the overwhelming 
proportion of typists concentrated at or near the base grades and with steno-
secretaries' advancement halting at Personal Secretary status, which 5  per cent 
attain, at a salary level no higher than a Clerk Class 4.  This is a career pattern 
which developed at a time when the working life of most typists and secretaries 
was expected to be limited. Even then it involved waste and personal injustice but 
in present circumstances it appears utterly indefensible. All of these employees are 
skilled to some degree and some at a high level of competence. Many acquire wide 
experience, good judgment and a capacity to manage small organisations. To 
widen the scope for their advancement would bring clear benefits to the Service. 
This can be achieved by: 
(a) establishing new positions combining typing and secretarial work with 
clerical work; 
(b) offering wider opportunities for training in clerical and other skills; 
(c) breaking down unnecessary educational barriers to entry to other grades, 
at least where work performance has demonstrated adequate capacity. 
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8.4.26 There appears to have been resistance to such changes. This reflects in 
part simply inertia, but in part the belief that the changes may affect the privileges 
and opportunities of more senior staff. The Commission believes that the changes 
R151 are long overdue and recommends that the Board act promptly to achieve them. 
8.4.2 7 Opportunities for the restructuring of occupations are not confined to 
the typist and secretarial group. They can be particularly important when 
technological change affects the conduct of the administration's work. The 
R152 Commission recommends that the Public Service Board arrange studies of the work 
of occupational groups which tend to be heavily weighted in the lower grades and 
which have limited promotional opportunities, with a view to restructuring those 
occupations. 
8.4.28 The creation of job ladders and career paths: The terms 'job ladders' or 
'promotion ladders' refer to patterns ofjobs which indicate possible progressions 
and can incorporate horizontal as well as vertical movement, especially where the 
more senior positions require a broad base of experience. The existence of explicit 
job ladders, clearly understood by stall) can encourage people to enter the Service 
R153 and to commit themselves to a career within it. We recommend that the Public 
Service Board assemble and publicise characteristic patterns of promotion which 
are open to different categories of employees. The assembly of such patterns may 
provide valuable information on which job restructure can be based. 
8.4.29 Eligib ill tyjorstudy assistance: To make the best use of its human resources 
and to offer the greatest scope for promotion and self-fulfilment, government 
employment should offer generous access to training opportunities. The criterion 
of eligibility for training for higher level positions should be successful 
performance in a lower level position. 
8.4.30 The present practice by which help is given to employees to improve 
their capacities seems to be biased. Opportunities are more freely open to third 
than fourth division officers and preference is given to university study compared 
R I 54 with technical college courses. The Commission recommends that these discrimi-
nations be reviewed. 
8.4.31 Other posibzlities: Recommendations made elsewhere in this Report 
would also serve to improve the use of staff capacities and thus to offer wider and 
more diverse opportunities. In particular we refer to: 
(a) increased mobility between the Public Service and statutory authorities 
and with the private sector (see Chapters 9.4, 6.3 and i 
(b) the abolition of divisional barriers (Chapter 9.2); 
(c) the review of qualifications required for particular work (section 8.2 
above). 
The Commission has given some thought also to: 
(a) establishing a single salary schedule with more significant incremental 
ranges; 
(b) the integration of certain specialised occupational groups. 
R 1 55 However it believes that these possibilities require further study. It recommends that 
thc Board examine them as changes occur in the wage and salary structure. 
Assessment of Performance 
8.4.32 Methods of assessment of individual performance are basic to any 
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adequate system of merit advancement, work motivation, or performance 
accountability, and are therefore of intense interest to individual staff and 
managers. Some form of performance appraisal will occur with or without 
conscious guidance: the question is whether it should be informal and casual, or 
systematic, that is, undertaken and recorded regularly on the basis of agreed 
guidelines. 
8.4.33 The use of staff assessment systems in the Commonwealth Public Service 
has generally been haphazard and few resources have been devoted to their 
development. Most departments which have assessment schemes have in-
troduced them without much detailed research or experimentation. They have 
often been informal and unrecorded and, as a consequence, subjective and 
unreliable. Only thirteen departments or instrumentalities are currently 
operating schemes, compared with seventeen in 1969 and eleven in 1960. 
Regrettably there is no information on the use of staff assessment in most statutory 
authorities where significant numbers are employed. 
8.4.34 Recently there has been greater recognition of the need to devote more 
resources to staff assessment. In 1974 the Public Service Board, in response to the 
initiative of the Council of Australian Government Employee Organisations, 
issued draft guidelines to departments and staff organisations. The majority of 
departments who responded to the Board's guidelines were in favour of increased 
formality in their staff assessment schemes, although some reservations were 
expressed as to whether scarce resources should be diverted into their 
development. The Commission recommends that the Board pursue the initiative it R156 
has taken in offering guidance and assistance to departments and agencies in the 
development of staff assessment schemes, and that departments respond more 
actively to that initiative. The Commission considers that formal staff assessment 
is critical to improved selection for promotion. It will also provide the officer 
being assessed with the opportunity and the basis for improvement in his 
performance. 
8.4.35 Stafi assessment schemes sometimes have several potentially conflicting 
objectives. To management their primary purpose may be to improve efficiency 
by assisting the person assessed to improve his or her performance. To staff they 
may be seen primarily as an instrument to confer or withhold reward through pay 
or promotion. This concentration on monetary rewards is not surprising in a 
Service in which at least 70 per cent of the workforce is in the fourth division and 
earns salaries less than $g000 with little prospect of significant improvement in 
income or status. Improved assessment schemes are not likely therefore to lead to 
general satisfaction with the assessments themselves, but if implemented carefully 
they can provide positive benefits. In particular they might lead to a reduction of 
the number of frivolous appeals against provisional promotions. 
8.4.36 The Commission agrees with the Public Service Board's warning against 
the introduction of a uniform, Service-wide assessment scheme. The Board has 
stressed the importance of leaving decisions about the introduction and use of 
such schemes to the discretion of department heads. The stated policy of the 
Board has been based on two main considerations: first, that the abilities and skills 
required for positions in a variety of departments are not sufficiently 
homogeneous to allow a uniform system to be installed; secondly, that the positive 
involvement of senior departmental officers is essential to the success of any such 
scheme. We would add that in our view, the thoughtful participation of staff in 
the development of the criteria and mode of assessment is equally essential if the 
purposes of performance assessment are to be met. 
8.4.37 It seems to be generally agreed that for a staff assessment scheme to be 
successful: 
(a) both management and stall must be involved in its design and committed 
to its success; 
(b) its objectives must be simple, its techniques clear and well understood, and 
its results capable of being expressed quantitatively; 
(c) conclusions drawn from assessments should be acted upon promptly; 
(d) it should be subject to periodic review by staff and management. 
8.4.38 There is less unanimity on the question of whether members of staff 
should have access to the assessments. A persistent complaint in submissions and 
oral evidence from staff representatives to the Commission was the lack of 
knowledge on the part of officers of how they were being assessed, and a belief that 
secret and possibly adverse reports existed. These complaints are a serious source 
of frustration and resentment. In the Commission's view, secrecy is not justified 
and is detrimental to good stall-management relations. 
8.4.39 The benefits which a carefully implemented scheme can provide will 
depend on discussions of the assessment between the assessor and the person being 
assessed, in which the strengths and weaknesses of each other's performance can 
be discussed and improvements sought. We note and commend the idea, 
developed in the Corbett Report on the South Australian Public Service, that 
supervisors be reminded constantly that their own performance is also under 
scrutiny, not only by their superior officers but also by subordinates. The mutual 
character of the discussions could also contribute to a more democratic and 
satisfying life at work. They may require, however, fundamental changes in 
attitudes and values among assessing officers. 
8.4.40 The assessment of staff is not easy, and those responsible need training 
and experience. Departments which have experimented with open assessment 
systems have noted the tendency for supervisors to report favourably on almost all 
of their staff. Appropriate training in staff assessment methods can reduce this 
R157 tendency. We therefore recommend that all assessments be recorded and that 
officers be accorded the right to have access to the details of those which refer to 
them. 
R158 8
.4-41  We endorse the Public Service Board's guidelines on making assessments 
available to Promotion Selection Committees and Appeal Committees: 
Reports should be made available to Prcmotions Appeal Committees, when 
sought, to enable them to make full inquiries in terms of Section 50 (8A) of the 
Public Service Act. It is considered that staff reports would provide Committees 
with more comprehensive and standardised advice on the job performance of 
parties to an appeal than is available under current practices in which 
documentary staff reports are not available.' 
It is desirable that assessments for appeal processes be in a standardised form, but 
R 159 we recommend also that appeal committees should be empowered to obtain copies 
of original (and complete) staff assessments if they consider that would assist their 
deliberations. 
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8.4.42 Many of the deficiencies associated with present assessment schemes 
arise from inadequate assessment. The development of Individual Work Plans 
(see Chapter 9.2) will provide a sounder basis for a more effective system as well as 
identifying where the need exists to redefine and redesignjobs. Assessment is more 
likely to be accepted when it is the final link in a participative process in which 
positions are defined by a set of objectives, and employees are involved in the 
formulation of individual plans of work. 
Training and Personnel Development 
8.4.43 An essential part of any system of motivation, assessment and reward is 
ensuring that individual officers have the opportunity to receive training for their 
present and future work. 
8.4.44 Since World War 2 training has increasingly been seen as an instrument 
for social and organisational change, and there has been a corresponding increase 
in in-service training facilities in many public administrations throughout the 
world, and in opportunities offered to their staff members to take advantage of 
external facilities. More recent work suggests that the allocation of these greatly 
increased resources to training has rarely met the expectations which led to its 
accelerated growth. 
8.4.45 It was difficult for the Commission to form any confident judgment from 
departmental and other submissions about the effects of training activities in 
Commonwealth employment, where a similar expansion has occurred.' The 
Commission therefore initiated a wide range of research studies on training in the 
Commonwealth Public Service. An extensive questionnaire-based 'census' was 
designed to obtain information about the nature, extent and cost of existing 
programs, and three reports were commissioned from consultants: one was a 
survey of the 'users' of training (that is, primarily line managers) about their 
expectations and the effects of programs; the others discussed recurrent or life-
long learning and management training.2 
8.4.46 These studies have demonstrated to the Commission the complexity of 
the language and concepts in which the subject is enveloped. We are equally 
impressed by the need to adhere closely to basic principles in thinking about 
training, and to look for more serious attempts to evaluate training programs than 
have so far been undertaken in most Commonwealth departments and agencies. 
8.4.47 The 'census' on existing training facilities led the consultants to conclude 
that much of the training conducted in the Commonwealth Public Service is not 
linked in any way to the objectives of the organisation in which it takes place. The 
Commission believes that this reflects inadequate effort to integrate training with 
manpower planning, recruitment and programs for organisational change. It 
seems that training courses and programs are seldom prepared with the full 
participation of 'line' managers and staff. As the report of the census comments: 
'The involvement of the line manager is more on the basis of what he is prepared 
to accept from a given list of activities than what he believes his staff need or 
want.' 
i. In the financial year 1974-75, at a conservative estimate, $8om was spent on training and 
personnel development. 
2. See Appendix 3.E, Training, for extracts from the reports of the four research Pr(9ects. 
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8.4.48 Moreover a number of findings from the research revealed the basic 
uncertainty that exists concerning the objectives of training programs and 
activities themselves. Objectives, where they were stated, rarely dealt with the 
question of whether the training was directed to improved or adequate 
performance in the present job or to developing future potential. 
8.4.49 It is also apparent that individual line managers assert that they will 
support their staffs attempts to 'further their education', but they will frequently 
resent their absence during busy periods of work. When supervisors are asked to 
nominate people to attend courses, too often the 'most expendable' are chosen, 
while some worthy individuals, due to pressures of work, are denied opportunities 
to attend programs to prepare themselves for longer term personal development 
and advancement.1  
8.4.50 A number of other areas of concern emerge from the research. For 
instance, less than half of the staff employed under the Public Service Act in 
recent years have undergone any formal induction training, and many have 
received it too late to be of much benefit. The research team also found 'on-the-
job training' to be neglected and conducted unimaginatively, without taking 
advantage of opportunities provided by the work being done. This lack of interest 
in on-the-job and procedural training programs probably reflects: 
(a) the sensitivity of training officers and 'line' managers to 'encroachment' in 
one another's areas; 
(b) the lack of 'glamour' of procedural training, compared with human 
relations, management skills and other typical training course subjects; 
(c) an unwillingness among training officers to learn enough about the specific 
tasks of the organisation to relate training effectively to them. 
8-4-51 The 'census' also revealed an undue concentration of training 
officers and facilities in central offices, which may in part be responsible for the 
inadequate training of public contact and counter staff to which the 
Commission's Access Survey referred (see Chapter 6.2). Although the problems 
of service delivery to the public are not primarily problems of training, but rather 
of structures and procedures, we suggest that courses can and should be devised to 
ensure that public contact officers acquire at least basic communication skills and 
are familiar with the procedures and structures through which services are 
delivered, and with the attitudes of the clients towards those services. Our 
experience of the NOW Centre (discussed in Chapter 7.5)  leads us to believe also 
that stall members from different levels of government have some common 
training needs. The growth even of limited co-location experiments may offer 
opportunities to expand the range of the experiment to the joint training of staff. 
8
.4-52  Other sections of this report have proposed training for other special 
groups or purposes. We have suggested that the training of recruitment 
interviewers needs continuing attention (paragraph 8.2.38). In section 8.3 we 
have stressed the capacity of training to help counter the disadvantaged position 
of women, Aboriginals, and the physically handicapped. We also emphasise the 
need for training in management (see Chapter 9.5). 
8.4.53 Comment has already been made (see paragraphs 8.4.29-30 above) 
I . See the report, The Users View of Training, an excerpt from which appears in the Appendix. 
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about the apparent biases in the application of the Study Assistance Scheme. The 
Commission holds the view that training should provide opportunities for the 
personal development and fulfilment of individual potential and that the 
objectives set for training and development programs should be stated 
accordingly. Of equal concern to the Commission is the need to ensure that 
opportunities to participate in training programs, embark on study courses and in 
other ways enhance individual abilities are equitably available and that selection 
should be on the basis of ability and willingness to benefit from the opportunity 
provided. 
8.4.54 The Commission considered suggestions made to it that a public service 
training college be set up, possibly modelled on the Administrative Staff College 
established at Henley, England, following the report of the Fulton Committee. 
Differing views on this matter are expressed by several of the Commission's 
consultants on training (see Appendix 3.E). Professor Richardson and Dr 
Wettenhall from the Canberra College of Advanced Education suggested in 
evidence' that the Service itself should more consciously focus on and develop 
'nuts-and-bolts' training and give more status to the training function (not 
necessarily specialised), and that 'strategic' training could be provided by 
existing institutions outside the administration. They referred to the specialist 
courses being developed at various Colleges of Advanced Education, for example, 
for computer programmers and local government officers, and to the availability 
of more academically oriented courses at universities. 
8.4.55 The Commission concludes that although there is a clear need for 
improved training effort, a case has not been substantiated for the establishment 
of a separate Public Service training college. In the Australian context, at any 
rate at present, it seems preferable both to develop the training resources of the 
Public Service itself, particularly through on-the-job training or specialised 
courses, and to make use of the rapidly expanding tertiary educational 
institutions. 
8.4.56 The Commission's conclusions, based on the studies referred to above, 
suggest that a far more disciplined effort is required to provide more realistic 
objectives for training and personnel development activity. Specifically, the 
Commission recommends that: 	 R1 6o 
(a) the Public Service Board concentrate on providing services to departments 
and agencies of a consultancy nature designed to upgrade training 
capability and expertise within operating organisations. It should act as a 
resource bank, providing special training courses where needed, for 
example, instructing training staff in training skills, suggesting and 
propagating new techniques, assisting with evaluation studies, and in 
negotiating training courses with educational institutions; 
(b) departments and agencies establish Staff Training and Development 
Committees (suitably decentralised) whose prime functions should be to 
direct the objective study of needs (through staff assessment schemes, etc.), 
the development of comprehensive programs directed to those needs and 
the evaluation of the effectiveness of programs (Despite the heavy 
expenditure on training the census revealed little evidence of either cost 
consciousness on the part of those responsible for training or any 
I . 	 Transcript pages 2826ff. 
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widespread evaluation or validation of the outcomes of this expenditure.); 
(c) there be a greater diversification of training objectives away from the 
traditional and fashionable management and skills courses to provide 
appropriate attention to such needs as 
(i) induction training (not necessarily formal courses) for all recruits, 
(ii) more intensive training for counter staff and other staff who have 
contact with the public, 
(iii) an extension of study assistance and other forms of personnel 
development to the bulk of staff currently comprising the fourth 
division, 
(iv) greater use of 'on-the-job' methods combined with staff rotation 
schemes, 
(v) special courses to meet the needs of minority and disadvantaged 
groups (for example, language assistance to ethnic groups); 
(d) more attention be directed to the training of staff in remote locations and of 
agents performing bulk functions; 
(e) opportunities to undertake training directed to general personal develop-
ment, and the acquisition of educational qualifications likely to provide a 
basis for future advancement, be available to all categories of staff and 
selection be based on willingness and capacity to benefit from the proposed 
course of study. 
The Promotion Process 
8.4.57 Promotion is, and is likely to continue to be, the major monetary reward 
and incentive in the service. Apart from the possibility of genuinely discretionary 
increments, referred to in paragraphs 8.4.13-14 above, promotion is probably the 
only tangible financial incentive which can be offered to public servants. The 
comparatively large number of short salary ranges which characterise the third 
division accentuates its importance. Even if a review of existing salary 
classification level leads to a reduction in the number of grades by a process of 
'broad banding', the promotion process will still be of fundamental importance if 
merit, including efficiency, is to be rewarded and the inefficiencies and inequities 
attendant upon promotion by reference to other factors avoided. 
8.4.58 Responsibility for promotion, and for the assessment and training 
processes associated with it, should continue to be a matter for the department. It 
is the departmental head's responsibility to ensure that selection processes within 
the department are undertaken impartially and in a manner that will receive 
acceptance by the staff as achieving the objective of promotion according to 
merit. It will be for the Public Service Board, the Office of Equality in 
Employment and the selection procedures committee (see paragraph 8.2.37) to 
monitor the department's activities. Much of the dissatisfaction with the 
promotions appeal system appears to stem from inadequate procedures for 
promotion and we believe the real interests of members, as well as the efficient 
working of departments, would be well served if the Public Service Board and 
staff organisations were to concentrate upon the development of acceptable 
promotion procedures and internal measures of relative efficiency, which the 
R16r Commission believes should be the sole criteria for promotion. 
8.4.59 In a discussion paper on the promotions appeal system recently issued by 
the Public Service Board, a number of features are mentioned as desirable in an 
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effective selection process for promotion. We generally endorse these, which we R162 
summarise as follows: 
(a) vacancies should, wherever practicable, be advertised (see paragraph 
8.4.79); 
(b) selection should be by committee, which should be chosen for its 
competence and impartiality and might well include on its membership a 
staff representative and on some occasions a representative from outside 
the department; 
(c) selection committees should handle or supervise all action relating to an 
advertised vacancy; 
(d) applicants should have ready access to adequate information relating to 
the job advertised; 
(e) applications should be prepared in such a way as to enable the selection 
committee to assess the applicant against the specification for the position; 
(1) applicants not selected for interview and applicants interviewed but not 
selected for provisional promotion should be notified without delay, with 
reasons where practicable.' 
8.4.60 The Commission's recommendations are designed to reinforce the trend 
towards greater emphasis on the efficiency criterion in promotion.' This lends 
added importance to the quest for acceptable measures of efficiency, particularly 
because, in the absence of such measures or acceptable guidelines, there is a 
danger that departments and promotions appeal committees will turn to other 
possible indicators, such as relative educational qualifications or experience, 
which might be considered objective'. As has already been noted, the 
Commission believes that undue emphasis is already placed on educational 
qualifications in some cases. Nevertheless it is only realistic to acknowledge that 
those responsible for decisions will feel the need for objective criteria. These 
considerations lend weight to the Commission's advocacy of a more open and 
adequate system of staff assessment. 
8-4.61 We agree with the proposal in the Public Service Board's discussion 
paper that the definition of the factors constituting efficiency should be changed 
to give emphasis to suitability for the work to be performed, having regard to: 
(a) aptitude for the duties of the position; 
(b) extent of relevant experience; 
(c) training, including formal training; 
(d) capacity for development; 
(e) relevant personal qualities. 
The Commission believes that the increase in precision attaching to this 
definition, and an acknowledgment that weighting of the factors may vary 
significantly between jobs, are changes which should contribute both to better 
and to better understood selection decisions. We recommend that the changed R163 
definition be adopted. 
8.4.62 The promotions appeal system: Access to an appeal process for the 
review of promotions is widely regarded as an element of the career service 
concept necessary for the protection of the principle that merit should be the basis 
I . 	 See also paragraphs 8.4.71-2 below. 
2. 	 See also paragraph 8.4.77. 
of advancement throughout the Service. On the other hand, it has been argued 
that the appeal system is overloaded, costly and a source of delay, confusion and 
inefficiency in the promotion process. An appeal system will reflect and bear the 
burden of inadequacies and faults in personnel practice generally, and will 
become the vehicle for the expression of frustrations and discontents originating 
in them, perhaps in the form of 'frivolous' appeals, that is appeals with little 
prospect of success. Prominent among explanations offered for this tendency for 
the system to be clogged were: 
(a) the fact that advancement can be achieved only through promotion (see 
paragraphs 8.4.1-3 i); 
(b) the lack of adequate facilities to deal with other grievances (detailed 
proposals for the handling of grievances are set out in section 8.5 below); 
(c) dissatisfaction with promotion selection processes (see paragraphs 
8.4.57-6 I); 
(d) the absence of an acceptable staff assessment procedure (see paragraphs 
8.4.32-42). 
8.4.63 Accordingly the Commission has paid special attention to the appeals 
process, and the following paragraphs of this section consider important aspects of 
it. In this examination we have been assisted by the report of our consultant, Mr 
W. J. Byrt', and by the valuable review being conducted by the Public Service 
Board and a Joint Council sub-committee. 
8.4.64 Although records of the bases of promotion do exist, it seems that there 
has been a shift from the objective criterion of seniority to the more subjective 
criterion of efficiency. Appeals against provisional promotions on grounds of 
'superior efficiency', which represented 22 per cent of all appeals in 1953 had, by 
1973 (the latest year for which figures are available), increased to 37 per cent. 
There has also been some change in the percentage of original selection decisions 
reversed by appeal committees. Successful appeals as a percentage of promotions 
appealed against have fluctuated, being between 7 per cent and 15  per cent for 
the second and third divisions and 13 per cent and 21 per cent for the fourth 
division, with the lower figures occurring in more recent years. It is difficult to 
interpret these figures—they may reflect either an improving departmental 
performance in selection or a bias in promotions appeal committees towards 
confirming departmental decisions. 
8.4.65 The evidence before the Commission indicates that staff and their 
associations believe that despite its weaknesses, the promotions appeal system is 
the best available way of protecting the interests of the staff. The Commission had 
before it: 
(a) submissions which emphasised the lack of adequate measures of 
performance as a basis for promotion and appeals; 
(b) submissions criticising the secrecy surrounding selection committee or 
appeal committee reports; 
(c) the comments made by respondents to the Commission's Career Service 
Survey among which the promotion and the promotions appeal system 
was the most common subject of complaint (an estimated 20 per cent of 
respondents had some complaint about the promotion or promotions 
appeal system). 
I . His report, The Australian Public Service Promotion Appeal Committee System, is available 
with the Commission's Collected Papers on microfiche. 
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This material is evidence of significant staff dissatisfaction with the promotion 
and promotions appeal system. That some of the evidence derives from 
disappointed applicants or appellants does not necessarily invalidate it. 
Furthermore, other relevant submissions and independent reports confirm the 
need for reform. 
8.4.66 The lack of confidence in the promotions appeal system is reflected in 
some responses from the Career Service Survey despite the fact that the 
Commission did not include a specific question testing overall attitudes to the 
promotion and appeal system. Respondents were asked to indicate how 
importantly they regarded 17 listed reasons for promotion. These reasons ranged 
from 'doing the job well' to 'playing office politics'. The complexity of the 
responses can only be fully appreciated by reading the tables at Appendix 3.A, 
Paper i, tables D6(a)—(q). It was found for example that a high proportion of 
respondents in the third division gave importance to 'doing the job well' 	 per 
cent of them regarding this as 'very important' and 36.7 per cent as 'somewhat 
important'); and a high proportion also gave important to 'getting on well with 
senior officers' (35.1 per cent and 46.4 per cent respectively). Again there are 
marked differences in the distribution of responses between divisions and within 
divisions between different sectors. 
8.4.67 To help illuminate the survey results, factor analyses were carried out on 
the data.' In the factor analysis carried out for the second, third and fourth 
division, four factors were clearly identifiable. The first factor involved the 
general notion of 'playing the system', defined by such responses as 'playing office 
politics', 'having the "right" contacts', and 'getting on well with senior officers'; 
the second revealed the weight given to 'doing a good job'; and the third the 
weight given to 'qualifications'. In the second and third divisions, in addition, a 
further factor of 'luck' was perceived as an independent element in the promotion 
process. The first factor was the strongest of the four. It is noteworthy that public 
servants located outside the ACT were more likely than ACT based staff to 
endorse strongly the view that 'playing the system' is the best path to promotion. 
This finding perhaps reflects the greater use made of the appeal system by non-
ACT staff. 2 
8.4.68 Among the third division respondents, a disproportionately high 
number of those who expressed the view that 'playing the system' is the way to get 
on rated their career progress as better than was warranted by their ability alone. 
It would appear that neither the successful nor the unsuccessful see the present 
promotion and promotions appeal system as ensuring that promotion goes to the 
'best' person for the job. There is also evidence that it uses an increasing quantity 
of resources and causes inordinate delays. 
8.4.69 These criticisms inevitably raise the question whether the promotions 
appeal system should be discontinued. We recognise that even if the criticisms are 
I . Factor analysis endeavours to reveal those items significantly associated with one another in a 
statistical sense, the underlying assumption being that such statistically related items are not 
linked to each other by chance. Thus, if one group of respondents answers each of five questions 
within a set of 20 questions in an identical manner a factor analysis of the responses will reveal 
this intensity and identity of association. This enables the researcher to seek an explanation for 
the common factor behind this uniform pattern of responses. See Appendix 3.A, Paper 3. 
2. See Appendix 3.A, Papers 2 and 4. 
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wholly valid, it could be counter-productive of real reform to destroy a system so 
embedded in the culture of the administration without an adequate alternative. 
The system, whatever its faults, allows some recourse against error and bias in 
promotion. We have mentioned the importance of improving selection 
procedures as the most significant way of reducing use of the promotions appeal 
system. 
8.4.70 One particular cause of overloading of the appeal system is the 
management practice, in some circumstances, of effectively transferring the 
promotion selection process to the promotions appeal committee. This is most 
likely to occur where many promotions must be made to the same level in a 
department, and our recommendation for removal of seniority as a primary basis 
for promotion (paragraph 8.4.77) should assist in eradicating this practice. It is a 
dereliction of management responsibility for departments to abuse the 
promotions appeal system in this way: it abdicates the important role of 
management in assessment and staff management, it brings into disrepute a 
system not designed to handle loads of this kind and it measurably increases staff 
dissatisfaction. We note the report of the Joint Council sub-committee that 
appeals are sometimes lodged in expectation that promotions appeal committees 
'will subject the appellants' claims at times to a more thorough-going 
examination that appeals to have been undertaken by the initial selection 
committee'. We endorse the view of the sub-committee that improved selection 
procedures: 
would leave Promctions Appeal Committees in a position to review what 
has taken place, and tc avoid lengthy interviews where time is absorbed by a 
need lo establish facts which should have been provided in departmental 
ciocumentation, and in a counselling function which should have been 
dis barged by departmentai management in the first place: 2 
8
-4-71  The Joint Council sub-committee refers to the counselling functions of 
promotions appeal committees. We endorse that, and note that there is also a 
need for counselling after completion of the initial selection process. It seems that 
the Public Service Board has in recent months begun to investigate departmental 
practices in courselling unsuccessful applicants for positions. The Commission 
R164 recommends that departments take the initiative by establishing a practice of 
informing unsuccessful applicants of the reasons for their non-selection and, if 
relevant, explaining why an interview was not granted. The adoption of careful, 
open selection procedures will guarantee that there will be far less resort to the 
appeals process. 
8.4.72 The Commission considers that the promotions appeal system needs 
reform, but that such reform can be achieved only with the goodwill and 
R 165 participation of staff organisations. We recommend therefore that those organi-
sations be invited to study objectively the attitude of their members to the present 
system, and to explore the possibilities of replacing it by an alternative which 
provides for: 
(a) improved assessment procedures; 
(b) staff participation in the selection processes themselves; 
c ) improved counselling and career planning involving staff participation. 
I . Paragraph 67 of the sub-committee's report. 
2. Paragraph 69 of the sub-committee's report. 
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Pending this study, the Commission recommends that the present system continue R166 
but that the Pubiic Service Board carry out such improvements in related matters 
as are within its capacity, taking into account the proceedings of the Joint 
Ceuncil. 
8.4-73 Functions and procedures of appeal committees: 1 Section 5o(8A) 
of the Public Service Act requires that the committees 'shall make full inquiries 
into the claims of the parties to the appeal proceedings, and shall determine the 
appeal'. The statute thus enjoins committees to decide appeals as if they were 
deciding at first instance. Although the legislation stipulates full investigation of 
all appeals, no further guidance is provided on the process of hearing appeals, 
except for the direction in Regulation i o9F that it shall be the duty of committees 
to make their inquiries 'without regard to legal forms or solemnities'. As a matter 
of law the obligations upon a committee would be to observe the rules of natural 
justice, correctly direct itself as to the meaning of its statute, and have regard to 
relevant matters when making its determination. While the Committee would be 
obliged to allow a party to state a case it would not be likely to be under a general 
duty to grant a hearing. 
8.4.74 The Bailey Report on Promotions and Transfers defined the task of the 
committees in the following way: 
'the Service representative, equally with the other members of the Committee, 
will be ther to see that the statutory tests are applied knowledgeably, 
competently, and without discrimination as between all the candidates 
concerned. He represents, in a special sense, not the provisional promotee only or 
the appellants only. 2 
This comment appears to be assigning a role of reviewing the procedures 
surrounding the original selection decision. In recent times it has been suggested 
that the committees should merely review the procedures involved in the selection 
process, that is examine the original process for faults, bias or incompetence. We 
do not believe that the function of the committees is merely to audit the 
procedures of the original selection decision. It would be almost impossible for 
appellants to provide necessary evidence of some impropriety: we reiterate the 
view that the committee should, as stipulated by the Act, conduct a second, even 
if limited, selection process, and agree that: 
'This emphasis is preferable to the rather naive approach, suggested at times in 
the past, that appellants should be required to point to a valid criticism of the 
particular selection process as a ground for appeal. Apart from the virtual 
impossibility for candidates to obtain the evidence to prove any such criticisms, a 
system based on criticism and recrimination would surely founder on the 
bitterness and mutual distrust which it would generate.' 
8-4-75 Criticism has also been directed at the 'self-imposed' course of conduct of 
Public Service Regulation Io9D (i) prescribes that 'A Promotions Appeal Committee or a 
Central Promotions Appeal Committee shall be constituted by: 
(a) a Chairman appointed by the Board, who, while acting as Chairman, shall not be subject 
to direction by any person or authority under the Act; 
(b) an officer nominated bi the Permanent Head of the Department in which the provisional 
promotion has been made; and 
(c) an officer nominated by the appropriate organisation'. 
Paragraph i 51. 
Submission No. 768. 
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committees. In 1943, the Bailey Committee asserted that 'the procedure and 
practice of committees should be left for their determination in the light of the 
guiding instructions of th 	 'e Board . . . . During the early years when appeals were 
heard by Public Service Inspectors, the Board issued detailed written instructions 
concerning procedures to be followed, but during the last decade there have been 
no instructions or guidelines. 
8.4.76 In the remainder of this section we consider a number of possible 
improvements some of which could throw light on desirable characteristics of any 
alternative to the present system as well as on improvements in personnel practice 
more generally. 
8.4.7 7 Grounds of appeal: Section 50(3) of the Public Service Act requires that in 
selection consideration shall be given first to relative efficiency, and in the event of 
a judgment of equal efficiency, then to relative seniority. By Section 50(6) an 
officer may appeal on the ground of: 
(a) superior efficiency; 
(b) equal efficiency, and seniority. 2 
In view of the definition of efficiency recommended at paragraph 8.4.61, the 
R167 Commission recommends that appeal on grounds of seniority be abandoned. 
Selection for promotion (and temporary transfer) should be on the grounds of 
superior efficiency alone. This is in accord with views expressed by the 
Administrative and Clerical Officers' Association and the Public Service Board. 
8.4.78 Information about the appeal process: While promotions appeal committees 
are enjoined simply to decide appeals as if they were deciding at the first instance, 
that is, to correct what they judge to be mistakes in provisional appointments, 
their experience brings to their notice a wealth of data about appointment 
processes, successful and unsuccessful basis for appeal, sources of dissatisfaction 
leading to appeal and other matters. There is at present no means whereby this 
data can become either the basis of a kind of 'case-law' which might be valuable 
to potential appellants and2 a source of guidance for the reform of departmental 
practice or fbr revising the Public Service Board guidelines on selection 
processes.' Nor is there a means of contributing to the better working of the 
promotions system by provision of reasons for decision in selected cases. We 
Ri68 recommend that promotions appeal committees be given authority to: 
(a) describe their methods of conducting their inquiries; 
(b) give and publish their reasons for decisions in cases which they consider of 
continuing importance as 'leading cases'; 
(c) offer comment on selection procedures and other personnel practices 
which in their view have relevance to their work; 
(d) prepare reports on the above matters for consideration by departments 
and the Public Service Board. 
R 169 We further recommend that, in addition to any other arrangements which the 
committees might make, the Public Service Board, in consultation with 
promotions appeal committee chairmen, periodically publish summaries of 
matters covered in these reports. 
I . 	 Bailey Report paragraph 168. 
2. Fourth division officers only have to demonstrate that they are the senior efficient officer. 
3. See submission No. 405 from Mr K. J. Potter, Chairman, Promotions Appeal Committee, 
Melbourne. 
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8.4.79 Advertisement of vacancies. Public Service Regulation io8 gives discretion 
to the department head to notify vacancies in the Gazette. Only limited 
information is available on the extent to which positions are advertised, but we 
believe that many are not advertised outside the department concerned. As a 
guide, a complete tally of each department's notified vacancies and provisional 
promotions and transfers was taken from the 1972 Volume of Gazettes. There 
were major differences between departments in the ratio of provisional 
promotions to notified vacancies, ranging from 6.o: i to o.8: i with an average of 
2.3:1. Failure to advertise the initial vacancy brings in non-applicants only at the 
stage of appeal against a provisional promotion. When non-applicants appeal the 
committee is in fact functioning as a selection body, and the time and efiort 
involved in their work is greatly increased. We recommend that departments - Ri 70 
advertise in the Gazette all vacancies except where they relate to categories of 
employment unique to the department concerned, and that the Public Service 
Board should be empowered to direct departments to advertise specified 
vacancies or classes of vacancies. We suggest to the Public Service Board that time 
expended by staff in study of the Gazette could be reduced by grouping vacancies 
by occupation. 
8.4.80 Appeal b non-applicants: Our recommendation in the previous paragraph 
should assist in placing more reliance on the initial selection process. Accordingly, 
we recommend that promotions appeal committees be given a discretion not to hear R171 
and decide appeals by appellants who did not apply for promotion to advertised 
vacancies. Our expectation would be that such appellants be required to show 
cause why they did not apply for promotion. 
8.4.81 Documentation: The time taken to deal with appeals could be reduced by 
better documentation. We recommend: 	 R172 
(a) that departments require officers or committees responsible for selection 
for promotion to support their nomination in a form likely to assist the 
appeal committee; 
(b) that appellants be required to lodge a supporting statdment within the 
time set for lodging an appeal (a period of grace could be extended to 
officers in isolated places). 
8.4.8 2 Interviews: The Joint Council sub-committee expressed a belief that the R173 
effectiveness of the appeals system would be unimpaired if interviewing is not 
expected as a normal or necessary practice. We agree that the appeal committee 
should exercise its right to conduct interviews only when it is satisfied that this is 
necessary to ensure that justice is done. 
8.4.83 Term of office fia chairman: The wisdom of the current practice of 
apparently regarding appointments to positions of chairman of a promotions 
appeal committee as continuing indefinitely, has properly been questioned. We 
recommend that greater use should be made of secondment of departmental officers Ri 74 
as chairman and for a short (say, three-year) term. The Commission sees value in 
developing the influence of chairmen on personnel practice, and to this end 
recommends that legislative provision be made for one chairman to be appointed at R1 75 
a more senior level who could in consultation with his fellow chairmen be 
responsible for the reports referred to in paragraph 8.4.78 above and for 
arranging consultation with the Public Service Board arising out of them. 
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Penalties for Inefficiency' 
8.4.84 No system of employment can wholly eradicate mistakes in selection of 
staff, bad performance by staff or over-staffing. Commonwealth government 
employment is no exception. The means by which inefficiency is discouraged or 
penalised is therefore of public and professional interest. 
8.4.85 Efficiency should of course be sought positively by measures directed 
towards better motivation, assessment of performance, wise counselling, planned 
training and the stimulus of opportunities for advancement. However where 
these fail sanctions against inefficiency must be used, including ultimately the 
termination of employment. This section examines the means by which these 
sanctions are applied. It considers procedures in employment under the Public 
Service Act, but the conclusions and recommendations are, the Commission 
believes, more widely applicable. 
8.4.86 Probation: Appointments to the career service in the first instance are 
generally on probation for a period not to exceed one year during which the 
appointment may be annulled by the Public Service Board after report from the 
Chief Officer of a department (Section 47, Public Service Act). The Act specifies 
no limits on the grounds on which appointment may be annulled. Where 
annulment of appointment is recommended, the Board has required that adverse 
reports be shown to the appointee? Annulment may also follow discovery that an 
appointee does not meet character or health standards (see paragraph 
8.2.17-19). In 1974 about 5 per cent of appointments were annulled. 
8.4.87 Probation is a valuable protection against errors of judgment in the 
selection process, and reliance on it is likely to increase. This makes necessary 
adequate assessment during the probationary period. The Public Service Board 
has suggested several reforms which form the basis of the Commission's 
R176 recommendations.3 We recommend that, within guidelines prescribed by the 
Public Service Board, the power to annul probationary appointments be 
delegated to departmental management, subject to review by the Public Service 
Board which would, if necessary, reverse a decision to annul. Board guidelines 
should aim to develop explicit grounds of annulment to ensure that as far as 
possible objective criteria of assessment are applied, and are known to appointees. 
Where annulment is based upon an assessment of character or of physical fitness, 
an appeal should lie to the Personnel Appeal Tribunal (paragraph 8.5.31). 
Statutory authorities with compatible systems of tenured appointment should be 
brought within the same appeal system. 
8.4.88 Disciplinary action: The disciplinary process, whether leading to fines 
or dismissal, requires adherence to a statutory procedure of charging a person 
with an employment ofience' of a kind enumerated in section 55  of the Public 
Service Act. Matters regarded by management as minor off ences may be dealt 
with summarily. Serious offences must be dealt with by written charge allowing 
opportunity to the accused employee to present a defence. At present the Public 
I . A reservation concerning this and the following section of the Chapter has been expressed by 
Commissioner Munro, whose reservation is published at the end of the Chapter and at 
Appendix 3.M- 
2. But see Grievance Case Study No. 4,  summarised in Appendix 3.D. 
3. Board Memorandum 9,  Probationary Appointments' p. 9. The main proposal is repeated in 
the Board Discussion Paper, Griemnce Processes in ilie Australian Public Serrice, March, 1976. 
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Service Board alone has power of dismissal. Lesser penalties may be imposed by 
the Chief Officer of a department. An appeal against all penalties exceeding $4 in 
value lies to a specially constituted tripartite Appeal Board. 1  
8.4.89 Formal disciplinary action can be seen as indicating a failure of more 
positive personnel practice. At the same time it constitutes a protection against 
arbitrary 'informal' action directed to enforcing resignation. It is therefore an 
important component in action to discourage inefficiency. 
8.4.90 The Public Service Board, in conjunction with Joint Council, has 
recently reviewed the disciplinary process. While the Commission sees a need for 
some specific changes to the arrangements proposed by the review (see 
paragraphs 8-5-  18 and 8.5.3 i), we generally endorse the changes proposed and 
recommend that prompt action be taken to amend existing legislation. 	 R177 
8.4-91 Redundancy and early retirement: In some instances it may be 
considered necessary, if inefficiency is to be avoided, that an officer be 
compulsorily retired. At present this differs from the termination of service by 
disciplinary process because it secures some form of employer contribution to the 
retired officer's superannuation. In both processes the final power to approve 
compulsory separation of career service staff has been vested in the Public Service 
Board. The enabling powers for compulsory retirement of career service staff 
under the Public Service Act are: 
(a) where the Public Service Board finds that there is an excess of officers over 
the number necessary for the efficient working of a department or branch, 
it may transfer any officer found to be in excess to an equal or lower 
position in the Service, and if none is available, retire the officer (section 
20); 
(b) an officer, if he 'appears to the Board or the Chief Officer to be inefficient or 
incompetent or unfit to discharge or incapable of discharging the duties of 
his office efficiently . . .' may be retired by the Board after report from the 
department and investigation. Considerable use of retirement for 
'unfitness' has occurred but the grounds of 'inefficiency' and 'incom-
petence' have never been invoked, perhaps because of diminution of 
superannuation entitlements where a retirement is for other than 
invalidity (section 67); 
(c) the Board may retire an officer who has attained the age of 6o years at any 
time before attaining the statutory maximum retirement age of 65 years. 
No grounds for the exercise of the discretionary power are specified. This 
power has not been used during the last io years, and perhaps not at all 
(section 85(2)). 
It is consistent with the themes of our Report to entrust departments and agencies 
with greater responsibility and authority over such matters. 
8.4.92 We recommend that the power to diagnose any excess of staff and to R178 
identify and take action regarding particular redundant officers under section 20 
be delegated to departmental management. The Auditor-General and the Public 
Service Board should aid departments in such diagnosis. However departments 
should only have power to retire such staff provisionally. The department should 
certify that no suitable alternative employment exists within the department. 
I . See also Appendix 3.D, Case Study No. i. 
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Before retirement is confirmed, the Public Service Board should see if there is any 
suitable alternative employment for the officer available within the Service. 
When an officer is judged redundant because of an assessment of relative worth or 
efficiency, appeal should be allowed through the promotions appeal committee 
procedures. 
8.4.93 The Commission endorses the view of the Public Service Board in its 
Second Submission that the primary responsibility for compulsory retirement of 
staff because of inefficiency or limited efficiency should rest upon departmental 
R 179 
	
	
management. We recommend that by delegation of the Board's powers under 
section 67, the responsibility and authority for compulsory retirement on the 
grounds referred to in that section be given to the Chief Executive Officer of the 
department concerned. There should be provisions for review of and appeal 
against such decisions (see paragraph 8-5-17) 
8.4.94 Furthermore, we agree with the Board that particular attention needs to 
be given to dealing with stafi of 'limited efficiency', that is those who are no longer 
able to measure up fully to the requirements of the positions they occupy, even 
though it might be unjust to describe them as inefficient'. The assessment as to 
when efficiency has deteriorated to such a degree that action is necessary involves 
difficult and very delicate judgments. Up till now the reduction of super-
annuation benefits related to the dismissal of officers has been regarded as too 
harsh to be invoked in relation to officers who are of 'limited efficiency'. However, 
new superannuation regulations recently introouced to Parliament have been 
designed to provide similar benefits whether early retirement is voluntary or 
involuntary.' 
 The categories of n tirement deemed involuntary expressly include 
retirements under sections 20 and 67 of the Public Service Act, with additional 
benefits attaching to 'invalidity' retirements. Retirement will not only be allowed 
but may be compelled after attainment of the minimum age. 
8.4.95 Thus to enable introduction of a scheme providing for compulsory or 
voluntary early retirement, little more is now required than an extension of the 
powers and rights in section 85 of the Public Service Act to a minimum retirement 
age or ages of less than 6o. An appropriate course would be to allow the Public 
Service Board to prescribe a minimum retirement age by regulation. 
8.4.96 Different considerations must be taken into account in assessing the 
value of provisions for voiuntary early retirement as distinct from extension of 
existing provisions for compulsory early retirement. But clearly the two are 
interrelated. Acceptance of extended powers of compulsory retirement will be 
helped by changing the provisions for voluntary early retirement. 
8.4.97 Submissions by staff organisations argued that voluntary early retire-
ment would allow officers whose capacity had diminished to retire before they 
became a hindrance to the efficiency of the Service. We do not disagree with that 
proposition but believe that self-awareness aione is not a sufficient stimulus to 
early retirement unless there are measures to compel retirement. We have not 
found evidence to substantiate staff association claims that an increasing number 
of private industry schemes provide for retirement at age 55. However the 
widespread practices employed by private superannuation schemes of discount-
ing pensions, or paying interest in addition to accumulated contributions to 
I .)tIt rannuation Bill I976 sections 58-62. 
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employees who resign, is recognised as providing a degree of flexibility akin to 
that provided by voluntary early retirement. 
8.4.98 A number of beneficial effects of options for earlier retirement have been 
argued. From the staff viewpoint the most important is that the introduction of 
voluntary early retirement would afford officers and employees greater flexibility 
in organising their working lives. The opportunity would be available to 
exchange portion of expected pension entitlements for an earlier age of 
retirement. This increased flexibility would therefore recognise that people age at 
differing rates, and thus provide to officers and employees the right to retire at an 
age when they still retain the mental and physical abilities necessary for an active 
retirement. 
8.4.99 Reservations concerning the introduction of an earlier retirement option 
derive from considerations of cost, and its effect upon staff wastage rates. The 
Commission has had access to advice prepared by the Public Service Board in 
close consultation with Treasury on the financial implications of an option for 
voluntary early retirement at 55.  On the basis of this advice, it believes that the 
nett cost of an early retirement scheme would not be great enough to deter its 
introduction. 
8.4. 100 The introduction of voluntary early retirement must necessarily result 
in increased wastage (separation) rates. Replies to the Career Service Survey 
indicate a high level of interest in an option for earlier retirement: it was favoured 
by 68 per cent of a sample representative of the Service as a whole, 43 per cent of a 
sample of officers over 50 years of age and 51  per cent of a sample of second 
division officers. Enthusiasm for early retirement may fade as it comes closer, but 
a significant number of mature age staff expressed a speculative preference (as 
distinct from a firm intention) to retire on reduced pension benefit before current 
minimum or maximum ages. 
8.4.101 Officers and employees who would be eligible to retire constitute a high 
proportion of senior auministrative, professional and technical staff. The 
proportion of older officers occupying relatively senior positions is currently 
higher than normal. The intake of ex-servicemen after World War II is the 
primary cause of a 'hump in the age distribution of the service compared with the 
outside work force. This skewed age distribution is even more pronounced in 
State and regional offices. 
8.4.102 The over representation of officers aged 4-55  and the under 
representation of officers aged 35-45  seem likely to cause manpower shortages in 
some levels of the Service, in the next to years. The high proportion of officers 
aged 45-55  reflected in an older second division will result in high wastage rates 
for the second division: approximately 40 per cent of current second division staff 
will have retired within the next 10 years. In branch offices, approximately 6o per 
cent of current second division staff will have retired. The loss over a short period 
of time of a large number of senior officers will cause difficulties in selecting and 
developing staff from the 'feeder levels', that is, senior third division officers aged 
I . Respondents replied to the question: If the possible retirement age were lowered with reduced 
pension benefits under a new superannuation scheme, at what age would you prefer to retire?'  
Details of the level of reduced benefits were not available to respondents. See Appendix 3.A, 
Paper 1. 
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35-45. The shortage of officers aged 35-45 however means that even if there was 
sufficient time to select and develop officers in the 'feeder levels', shortages would 
still occur. 
8.4.103 These shortages could be intensified by the introduction of voluntary 
early retirement before the age hump has passed through the Service. However, 
the adverse effect of those shortages can he minimised by the immediate 
introduction of voluntary early retirement which would permit some officers in 
the 'age hump' to leave the Service now, thus spreading the manpower shortages 
ir a number of years, and perhaps aiding career placements. Substantially 
postponed or a phased introduction (that is, a reduction in minimum age of 
retirement over a number of years) would result in a simultaneous peak in the 
number of 'age' and 'early' retirements. Increased use of lateral recruitment 
would help overcome the shortage of officers in the 'feeder levels' whether or not 
there is extended voluntary early retirement (see paragraphs 8.2.41-45). 
8.4.104 The Commission has concluded that efficiency at all levels of the 
Service would be enhanced if early retirement from the Service were easier. We 
R18o therefore recommend. 
(a) that section 85(I) of the Public Service Act be amended to allow minimum 
voluntary retirement ages to be set by regulation; 
(b) that consequent upon such amendment, regulations be introduced to 
provide for a generally applicable minimum retirement age of 55 
(c) that the power under section 85(2) of the Public Service Act to retire from 
the Service on a provisional basis any person who has attained the 
minimum retirement age be delegated to the Secretary or Chief Executive 
Officer of a department; 
(d) that where retirement is compelled under section 85(2), some additional 
severance benefit be paid, perhaps analogous to the lower rate of reduction 
of the pension benefit to be applicable to involuntary retirement between 
age 6o and 65 (a severance benefit less than the full pension entitlement 
would seem desirable to distinguish involuntary retirement of staff whose 
performance has been less than satisfactory from, on the one hand, those 
who merely exercise an option to retire or, on the other, those who are 
found to be incapable to the degree required to satisfy section 67 of the 
Act); 
(e) that section 86 of the Public Service Act (prescribing a maximum age for 
retirement) be retained, subject to removal of the time limit for which the 
Public Service Board may direct an officer to continue in the Service after 
65 (the option should not be closed for exceptional cases to continue 
beyond 12 months); 
(I) that procedures relating to early retirement be developed by the Public 
Service Board in consultation with departments and staff organisations for 
embodiment in the Public Service Regulations (the sequence of 
procedures might well follow those adopted in the U.K. Civil Service in 
1971: that is, an informal warning in order to encourage improvement in 
performance which if not successful is followed by a formal warning; a trial 
period in a different position; and finally six months formal notice before 
retirement); 
(g) that compulsory early retirement not become effective before satisfactory 
procedures for appeal and review along the lines proposed in the next 
section have been developed. 
8.5 GRIEVANCES, RIGHTS AND DUTIES' 
The Present Grievance Machinery 
8.5. I Grievances reflect aspects of the employer—employee relationship in a 
state of stress, and often throw light on critical qualities of that relationship. 
Grievance studies can provide valuable checks on personnel practices and on the 
attitude of employees and officers to them. An emphasis on harmonious working 
relationships, greater sensitivity to the need of all employees to retain their 
dignity, and the provision of constructive counselling would avert problems, 
especially those related to promotions and to a feeling of victimisation. Often, 
after a series of unsuccessful attempts to obtain promotion even after appeal, an 
employee begins to feel victimised. 
8.5.2 Improved staff assessment, adequate counselling and sensible staff 
rotation may avert the need to retire, discipline or dismiss the officer concerned. 
These ways of coping with the problems are within the competence and 
responsibility of individual departments and agencies. 
8.5.3 Over 40 per cent of the submissions to the Commission were made in a 
personal capacity by people employed in the Service. The majority of these 
expressed dissatisfaction with some aspects of the administration, and some were 
made confidential by authors who feared recrimination or victimisation. 
8.5.4 The Commission's terms of reference were not construed as a charter for 
the Commission to act as an ombudsman. Rather the Commission saw individual 
submissions outlining grievances as a basis for a better understanding of the 
problems between employees and management. Accordingly: 
(a) seven cases involving complaint by officers or ex-employees were chosen 
for detailed study of all relevant files which were summonsed from 
departments or the Public Service Board. This work was undertaken by 
research staff and in one case by a member of the Commission; 
(b) relevant government agencies were asked to provide comment and 
information on matters raised in some i oo individual submissions; 
(c) further inquiries were carried out in relation to several submissions which 
raised questions of serious maladministration. In one such instance in 
which it was alleged that political considerations had improperly 
influenced certain appointments, counsel was retained to advise the 
Commission on whether sufficient evidence was available to justify a 
judicial inquiry; 
(d) responses about rights and processes in relation to grievances recorded in 
the Career Service Survey were examined. 
8.5.5 The case studies referred to in the previous paragraph proved to be 
particularly helpful and instructive to the Commission in developing an 
understanding of existing grievance machinery and also the apparent weaknesses 
in established processes. The most significant case study concerned Mr W. 
I . A reservation concerning this and the previous section of the chapter dealing with penalties for 
inefficiency (paragraphs 8.4.84-104) has been expressed by Commissioner Munro, whose 
reservation is published at the end of the Chapter and at Appendix 3.M. 
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Toomer, a Senior Quarantine Officer with the Department of Health, which 
raised wide and important considerations for the Commission. 
8.5.6 Careful consideration has been given to the wisdom of publishing one or 
more of the case studies and whilst it could be particularly valuable to do this, the 
Commission has reluctantly decided not to publish any of them in full because 
they might be seen to reflect adversely on individuals who did not have an 
opportunity to appear before the Commission to explain their actions. A 
summary of the most useful cases appears in Appendix 3.D. The full case studies 
have been referred to the Public Service Board and the departments concerned in 
each case so that the analysis and conclusions can be taken into consideration in 
the development and administration of future personnel management policy. 
The Public Service Board and the departments concerned have been authorised 
to make the case studies available, on a limited access basis, for genuine research 
purposes. 
8.5.7 The Commission is not competent to determine the merits of these cases, 
and its study of the procedural aspects of the Toomer case falls short of a broad 
ranging and balanced inquiry which the case may well justify. The Commission 
notes that current aspects of Mr Toomer's case are under examination by the 
Public Service Board. Under the grievance machinery which the Commission 
recommends, Mr Toomer would have access to a Personnel Appeals Tribunal in 
respect of certain aspects of his case. As it is unlikely that the machinery 
recommended by the Commission will be available before significant aspects of 
R i8 i the case are decided, we recommend that if the need arises the Public Service Board 
give consideration to the establishment of an appropriately constituted body of 
inquiry outside the Public Service to review the Toomer case.' 
8.5.8 The Commission is conscious that a false impression of the Service can be 
created by excessive concentration upon complainants, and the processes of 
redress. In the Career Service Survey. 58 per cent of the sample of third and 
fourth division staff responded that they had not had a serious grievance. Similar 
proportions of staff responded with favourable comment about the attitude of 
personnel sections when approaclle(l with work problems. Nevertheless, our 
inquiries suggest that departments do encounter difficulties in handling 
grievances. Often considerable time is needed to attempt to resolve a problem 
which may be unimportant from the department's point of view. some 
complainants seem unwilling to accept decisions taken by the department or the 
Public Service Board and continually appeal against them. Such long drawn out 
wrangles between aggrieved officers and departments involve disproportionate 
costs. However, many of these problems could be minimised by improved 
grievance procedures. 
8.5.9 Under the existing Public Service Act and Regulations rights of appeal 
exist to the following bodies: 
a) Promoliom Appeal Committees: appeals against promotions (section 50), 
temporar\ performance (regulation i 16" with final decision by the Public 
Service Board above prescribed salary level); 
I 
. The Chairman's reservation concerning this matter is set out at the end of the chapter. 
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(b) Appeal Boards': appeals related to charges on certain public service offences 
section 55); 
(c) Public Serzzce Board: appeal on deferment of salary increment (section 31). 
8.5.10 The Public Service Board may also he approached by officers in the 
following circumstances: 
(a) right of reply in section 67 and section 85(2) retirement cases; 
(b) right of objection to officer's own promotion or transfer (regulation iii); 
(c) right of review of study assistance cases; 
(d) right of reply on recommendation for annulment of appointment. 
8.5.11 in addition there are two avenues of redress open to public servants with 
a complaint or grievance where no specific appeal or review rights are provided 
under the Public Service Act or regulations. An 'application' or 'appeal' can be 
made under Public Service regulations 6 and 33 respectively ,2 to senior officers of 
the employing department and thence to the Public Service Board through the 
Chief Officer of the department. The legislation does not instruct or direct the 
Public Service Board about the basis for determination of such cases, nor does it 
give the Board power to vary or reverse a departmental decision on a matter 
within the departmental heads' powers. If the Board concludes that an injustice 
has been done it must rely on persuasion to have it corrected. The Commission's 
study of grievances suggests that there is an ambiguous division of authority 
between the Board and departments in grievance resolution, which should be 
resolved. Some of the cases studied suggest that the Board was more concerned to 
satisfy itself that statutory obligations or legal requirements had been met rather 
than to review the merits of the case. Thus one regulation 33 appeal against the 
content of a direction was disallowed on the ground that the direction was given 
by the senior officer who had authority to issue the direction. 
I . 	 Section 55(5)  of the Public Service Act prescribes that: 
'an Appeal Board constituted under this section shall comprise: 
(a) a Chairman who shall have the qualifications of a Stipendiary or Police Magistrate, and shall be 
appointed to the office by the Board of Commissioners, but shall not while sitting as Chairman of an 
Appeal Board be subject to direction by any person or authority under this Act; 
b) an officer of the Department to which the appellant belongs (not being an officer concerned in the 
laying of the charge against the appellant), appointed by the Chief Officer for the purpose of the 
particular appeal to be heard; and 
(c) an officer elected as prescribed, by and from the officers of the Division in which the appellant is 
included in the State in which the appellant performs his duties, as the representative for that State 
of the Division in which the appellant is included or an officer appointed in pursuance of sub-
section (6) of this section. 
Any two members of an Appeal Board may by consent of the parties concerned exercise all the powers of 
the Board for investigation and decision. 
6 
	
	
Except where otherwise provided in these Regulations the application of any officer upon any matter 
affecting him as an officer of the Service shall be made by that officer through the head of his branch, 
to the chief officer. Where the matter is one which the officer desires shall be considered by the Board, 
the application shall be addressed to the "Secretary, Commonwealth Public Service Board", and 
shall be forwarded by the Chief Officer, with any remarks considered necessary, to the Inspector for 
transmission to the Board.' 
33 
	
	
(i) If any officer considers he has grounds of complaint arising out of any official instruction, or 
from any other cause, he may appeal, in regard thereto, to the Chief Officer through his immediate 
superior officer, who shall forward the appeal forthwith to the Chief Officer, but he shall nevertheless, 
as far as possible, carry out any instruction given him until it is countermanded by competent 
authority. 
(2) If an officer, having appealed to the Chief Officer, in pursuance of this regulation, is dissatisfied 
with the decision, the Chief Officer shall on request forward the appeal to the Permanent Head, who, 
if the appeal is not allowed, shall transmit it to the Board for determination.' 
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8.5.12 The Board has been examining the administration of regulations 6 and 
33 with a view to: 
'(a) 	 the possible need for clearer definition of procedures in terms of avenues 
or approaches available to officers, definition of the stages of the 
procedures, and rights to 'hearings" 
(b) the need to ensure speedy handling of grievances 
(c) the possible need for review of the Board's powers to enable it to achieve 
equitable solutions, and 
(d) the extent of dissemination of information on the procedures.' 
The Commission has identified several particular areas of concern. 
8.5. 13 ignorance of rights: Submissions to the Commission and research data 
point to a lack of understanding by staff of their right of access to grievance 
procedures. Eighty-five per cent of third and fourth division staff surveyed were 
unaware of, or did not believe there were 'grievance procedures' apart from 
promotion and disciplinary appeals. Recent action by the Board to develop an 
index of conditions of employment will improve staff information, but this should 
be supplemented by union and management action to counsel and inform staff on 
R182 a continuing basis. We recommend that Joint Council act to develop the means to 
provide such information and counsel. 
8.5.14 Increased awareness by staff of their rights under the grievance 
procedures would go a long way to eliminating the many instances of delays, 
inadequate framing of charges, and other weaknesses in procedures. It would also 
help to allay fears of adverse reactions from departmental superiors against the 
use of such procedures expressed in a number of submissions. In one case, it was 
suggested that staff who resorted to promotion appeals prejudiced their chances of 
future promotion. While the Commission has no basis for assessing the accuracy of 
such reports, it seems to be widely believed among officers that there are penalties 
for the use of these procedures. Increased awareness of staff rights and the 
reommendation below (paragraph 8.5.29) relating to intimidation should go 
some way towards alleviating these difficulties. 
8.. I 5 Renew of complaints related to discrimination or favouritism in appointments: 
One of the cases examined leads the Commission to stress the great difficulty in 
monitoring adherence to the merit principle. A submission alleged improper 
influence systematically applied in appointments and promotions in one office. As 
the allegation was likely to excite public controversy, it would not have been fair 
or responsible for the Commission to pursue the matter further in the absence of 
prima jace evidence supporting the allegation. Such information as was available 
did not lend itself to any worthwhile use in testing the allegation, and there were 
practical difficulties as well as the risk of unwarranted controversy in pursuing 
additional evidence. 
8.5. 16 This case gave the Commission great concern because we were conscious 
that, even if the allegation had been justified, it would have been profoundly 
difficult to investigate it adequately without considerable invasion of the privacy 
of officers and of applicants for employment and promotion. There remains 
therefore a risk that the application of the merit principle could be systematically 
invalidated by the introduction of prejudices or bias into decisions, and that this 
i. Memorandum No. 19 paragraph 41. 
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prejudice once introduced into a relatively self-contained staff unit could become 
increasingly dominant. We believe that the Public Service Board should be 
vigilant in guarding against this risk. We suggest that: 	 Ri83 
(a) prompt investigation of any complaints be undertaken by persons external 
to the office concerned; 
(b) selection committees and promotions appeal committees be constituted as 
far as practicable so that they include nominees from other parts of the 
Service; 
(c) the selection procedures committee recommended at paragraph 8.2-37 be 
invited to study present procedures where these are brought into doubt in 
consultation with the Office of Equality in Employment to devise better 
protection against any systematic bias. 
8.5. 17 Decisions to compel retirement: Several submissions and two of the case 
studies give rise to concern about the procedures involved in and the use of power 
under section 67 of the Public Service Act compulsorily to retire officers on 
grounds of incapacity or unfitness to discharge the duties of office. The need for 
the introduction of a means of 'review' of such decisions has been highlighted by 
Case Study No. 2 (see Appendix 3.1)) which illustrates the difficulty of operating 
the existing system in a manner which makes it manifest that justice is done. 
Another deficiency observed in current compulsory retirement procedures is the 
lack of a satisfactory power or incentive to rehabilitate staff who have been 
retired. There is no clear responsibility to advise retired staff of rehabilitation 
opportunities. Nor is there adequate provision for trained independent 
counselling of staff whose continued employment may be in jeopardy. Pre-
retirement training schemes of any kind operate in only 23 per cent of 
Commonwealth government employing authorities. We recommend the extension R184 
of pre-retirement training programs to all Commonwealth government employ-
ing authorities. Our recommendation at paragraph 8.4.104(1) is directed towards 
meeting the other deficiencies. 
8-5-18 Procedures relating to disciplinary offences: The Commission received a 
number of submissions concerning disciplinary appeal board proceedings, one of 
which is discussed in Case Study No. i (Appendix 3.D). On the basis of that 
study, other submissions, and research, the Commission concludes that the 
procedures for dealing with disciplinary offences proposed in the recent review 
completed by Joint Council, adopted by the Public Service Board, and awaiting 
implementation in the Public Service Act should be promptly applied, especially 
since the Postal Commission Act provisions appear to have been modelled on the 
outcome of that review. Action is also necessary to ensure that persons charged 
with offences are acquainted with the procedures which will be followed in 
hearing the charges and with any rights of appeal. This is also necessary when 
persons are called upon to show cause why a decision detrimental to them should 
not be taken. We suggest that Joint Council prepare a booklet setting out these Ri 8 
procedures clearly, for issue to all persons charged. Guidelines issued to 
departmental management or appellate authorities in such matters should not be 
confidential. Case Study No. i showed deficiencies in the formulation of the 
charge. Care should be taken to ensure that charges are framed in a manner 
which fairly states the case to be made, and places the emphasis upon the respects 
in which specified conduct is alleged to be improper. 
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8.5. 19 Charges against public servants by citizens: In submissions to the Commission, 
the Public Service Board has confirmed that there are unsatisfactory features 
about the provisions and practice associated with section 56 of the Public Service 
Act which allows any person to charge a first or second division officer with a 
disciplinary offence under the Act. 1  As part of the Public Service Board's review 
of disciplinary procedures it is intended that second division staff be treated on the 
same basis as third and fourth division staff, to whom section 56 does not apply. 
Separate provision would be retained for charges against first division officers 
entailing suspension of the officer by the minister and the establishment of a board 
of inquiry to investigate the charge. 
8.5.20 The Public Service Board has noted that whereas section 56 was 
probably intended to allow members of the public to initiate disciplinary charges 
it has been more often used by officers of the Service 'displeased with' decisions of 
senior officers. The Board considered the arrangement to be dubious and 
proposed its virtual elimination. More recently, the Board has pointed to the 
merits of the Ombudsman (should provision be made for one) becoming the point 
to which complaints are lodged by members of the public making allegations 
against particular officers of the Commonwealth Public Service. 
8.5.2 1 The Commission agrees that the provision in section 56 of the Act, 
permitting disciplinary charges against second division officers to be preferred 
Ri 86 and prosecuted by any person, should be repealed. However, it believes that there 
should be established procedures whereby members of the public who have 
serious complaints to make about the conduct of public servants have some 
assurance that their complaints are properly investigated and that where there 
are grounds for suspecting that a disciplinary offence has been committed, 
appropriate action is taken. As the power to charge and proceed against public 
servants for alleged disciplinary offences is limited to chief officers or, in the case of 
charges against chief officers, to the minister, the Commission believes that it 
should still be open to any person to lodge complaints about an alleged 
misconduct and that there ought to be administrative procedures to ensure that 
such complaints are recorded and investigated. It would seem that if the office of 
Ombudsman is created there would be many cases in which complaints on this 
ground would be directed to him in the first instance, or else referred to him by the 
minister or chief officer, and that the investigations of the Ombudsman might 
lead him to recommend the laying of disciplinary charges. 
8.5.22 Representations to ministers as a means of renew: A public servant can write to 
the minister of his or her department (or to another minister) to make allegations 
of maladministration or victimisation. The general practice in such cases is for the 
minister to ask his department to investigate the complaints. A complaint 
involving another department is usually referred to that department for advice. 
In either case, it is the complainant's department which is asked to investigate. 
Cases examined suggest that in some instances only superficial investigations were 
carried out after allegations of maladministration or victimisation were made, 
and call into question the belief that one's minister or local member of Parliament 
is always able to ensure that any allegation will be impartially investigated. The 
minister has to rely entirely on his department and the member usually has to rely 
upon the minister. An organisation cannot always be relied upon to investigate 
i. PSB Memorandum No. 19, paragraph 24. 
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satisfactorily allegations made against itself. The machinery recommended in 
paragraphs 8.5.2 i and 8.5.34-37 should allow a complainant more effective 
means of having such grievances examined. 
8.5.23 Renew procedures in statutory aut/iorities. Commonwealth government 
employees, other than those in the Postal and Telecommunications Commissions, 
do not for the most part enjoy formal rights of appeal similar to those outlined in 
paragraph 8.5.9, irrespective of whether the Public Service Board has power to 
approve their conditions of employment. Where legislation covering employment 
of non-Public Service Act staff makes provisions for rights and procedures of 
appeal, these usually relate specifically to promotion and discipline. It is notable 
that in very few cases is there provision for specific grievance machinery of the 
kind contained in Public Service Regulation 33. Authorities tend either to have a 
staff manual incorporating reference to any forms of review of management 
decisions, or to rely on managerial discretion, subject to union representations. 
Appeal rights available to these Commonwealth government employees outside 
the Public Service vary widely. The Commission is aware of examples of delay, 
confusion and lowering of staff morale occasioned by failure, especially in smaller 
authorities, to establish channels for dealing with staff grievances and appeals. 
The recommendations which follow in the next section attempt to provide a 
framework appropriate for ensuring fair employment practices in all forms of 
Commonwealth employment. 
A More Integrated Grievance Machinery 
8.5.24 In formulating an integrated system of grievance machinery the 
Commission has followed the following principles set out in a discussion paper1  
circulated by the Public Service Board in March 1976: 
i. to the greatest extent practicable commensurate with management 
responsibilities in the public sector, staff are entitled to have reviewed, at their 
request, decisions affecting them as individual staff members; while the primary 
concern must ultimately be that of effective administration, what is required is a 
reasonable balancing of interests between effective administration (including 
discipline) of the Service and fair consideration of legitimate staff grievances; 
2. grievances should as far as possible, be resolved at the work face or at least 
within departments, rather than by seeking to pursue more formal grievance 
processes involving influences external to departmental management; 
3. grievance processes should thus be seen as a complement to other 
management processes of supervision, leadership and staff counselling, and, 
provided they strike a reasonable balance, have benefits for management as well 
as staff—they should be clearly seen as administrative processes, separate in form 
from channels for complaint by members of the public about the administration; 
4. grievance processes should be as fair, equitable, speedy, simple, informal, 
efficient, flexible and economical as practicable—access should be readily 
available to the staff member without requiring a knowledge of the complexities 
The discussion paper, titled Grievance Processes in the Australian Public Service was 
prepared by Board officers and circulated to heads of departments. staff organisations and 
other interested parties as a basis for consultation and discussion. At the time of circulation, the 
Board had not itself reached any firm views on the matter but indicated that it intended to 
formulate its attitudes, and proceed to detailed proposals, in the light of views expressed by 
departments and staff organisations on this discussion paper, and in the light of any views the 
Royal Commission may express'. 
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of the total administrative processes to deal with complaints that may have a 
number of facets; 
5. the emphasis in grievance processes needs to be on what might broadly be 
called individual personnel management decisions, or the consequences for an 
individual staff member of personnel management decisions, with separate 
channels remaining available to deal with other matters; 
6. in particular, the availability of grievance processes should not deny the right 
of a staff member to apply to the central personnel authority to ascertain whether 
he has an entitlement under his conditions of service—given the problems of 
definition it would be for that authority and those involved in grievance 
processes to ensure appropriate handling of requests according to their true 
nature; 
7. whilst an appropriate role in the overall grievance processes should be 
reserved to the central personnel authority, there are sound philosophical 
historical and practical reasons for a degree of separateness of the formal 
machinery—but it is essential that there be a free flow of advice to the central 
personnel authority based on real knowledge of any difficulties being 
encountered in practice, to allow it to form an overview which may cause it to 
initiate changes in policies and processes.' 
8.5.25 The machinery proposed by the Commission envisages clear roles for: 
(a) departments and agencies; 
(b) the Public Service Board; 
(c) a Personnel Appeals Tribunal; 
(d) a Commonwealth Services Ombudsman. 
8.5.26 The definition oJ the terms 'review' and 'appeal' in the grievance context: In its 
consideration, the Commission has borne in mind the different forms of review 
available. These are: 
(a) review, by the body which has delegated its power, of the decisions made 
by its delegate. The body delegating does not by delegating forfeit its 
power to exercise the power delegated, in many cases it can override 
decisions taken, by the delegate. However if the delegate has validly 
exercised his delegated authority so as to confer rights, for example, to 
grant an allowance, the benefit so conferred cannot be taken away; 
(b) review by a body whose consent or approval is needed to make a decision 
effective, for example, review by the Public Service Board of provisional 
compulsory retirements by departments; 
(c) review by way of appeal. A true appellate body is one having power to 
overturn the decisions appealed against and substitute its own decision. 
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal is a good example. It is of course 
possible to limit appeals jurisdiction, for example, to questions of law; 
(d) review involving power only to investigate, report and recommend for 
example, review by an Ombudsman. 
8.5.2 7  Role oJ departments and agencies: The resolution of staff grievances forms 
part of the management responsibilities of heads of departments (Chief Executive 
Officers). Nevertheless it would be consistent with the standard-setting role for 
the Public Service Board to issue guidelines to assist them in this responsibility. 
8.5.28 In broad terms, the Commission considers that intra-departmental 
grievance procedures should have the following features: 
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(a) Inforinolzly: informal counselling and explanations of departmental 
requirements should be relied upon; 
(b) Flexibilf)y: the approach should be 'tailored' to fit the particular problem 
encountered; 
(c) Openness: the staff member should be advised frankly of the reasons for the 
initial decision and any subsequent internal review; and where approp-
riate, the possible consequences of non-compliance; 
(d) Access: decision-makers should be identifiable, and accessible at known 
contact points; a staff member should have access to officers at appropriate 
levels outside his own working unit; a staff member's complaint should, if 
he wishes, be submitted to his department head (or a senior officer 
authorised by the department head to deal with the matter on his behalf); 
(e) Speed: wherever practicable, time limits should be set for stages in the 
process consistent with adequate attention to the matter; 
(f) Deczszon: replies to written complaints should be in writing, even where 
the staff member advises orally that he is satisfied following discussion or 
that he wishes to withdraw his complaint; to avoid possible misunderstand-
ings it may be appropriate for any withdrawal to be recorded in the written 
response; it is a more open question whether oral complaints should be 
replied to in writing; 
(g) Publicity: stall members should be made aware, for example through 
documentation and induction processes, of grievance procedures available 
to them. 
8.5.29 It is at the operational levels of the Service that adequate grievance 
processes should have greatest effect. We agree with the Public Service Board that 
the attitudes of staff are influenced by their views of management behaviour 
especially that nearest to their work levels. If an atmosphere of trust and frankness 
can be established then stall and management are more likely to talk out their 
difficulties at the workplace. We recommend that departments and authorities act R187 
to improve the knowledge of their staffs about grievance procedures and 
conditions of employment generally. Staff at all levels should be involved in 
making such knowledge generally available. It is particularly important that top 
management resist any tendency to treat resort to grievance machinery as 
improper. 
8.5.30 Role of the Public Service Boord: The Commission envisages that the Public 
Service Board should continue to review individual personnel decisions taken in 
exercise of powers it has delegated. The Commission suggests that regulations 
should prescribe the procedure to be followed when an officer or employee desires 
a matter to be dealt with by the Board. The Commission considers that in the 
review of Regulations 6 and 33 being considered by the Board, a right of appeal to R188 
the Personnel Appeals Tribunal should be provided also, but the appellant 
should have to choose between the two procedures: 
(a) where probationary appointment is annulled on the ground that the 
probationer is not eligible for appointment; 
(b) where an application for appointment is rejected on medical or other (non-
security) grounds. 
8
-5-31 Role of (I Personnel Appeals Irzbunal: The Commission sees the need for a 
Personnel Appeals Tribunal, which would supersede the ad hoc disciplinary R189 
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appeals boards provided for under the Public Service Act, and would be given 
jurisdiction to hear and decide appeals against the following: 
(a) a determination that an applicant for appointment to the Public Service is 
not eligible for appointment; 
(b) a determination that the probationary appointment of a person to the 
Public Service be annulled on the ground that he is not eligible for 
permanent appointment; 
(c) a detrmination that a person be retired from the Public Service on th' 
ground of incompetence, inefficiency or incapacity; 
(d) a determination that a person is guilty of a disciplinary offence under the 
Act (in this case appeal would be on the ground of innocence of the charge 
or excessive severity of the punishment). 
Some appeals lodged under (a) and (b) above may involve questions of national 
security and hence may need to be dealt with by any special tribunal 
arrangements which flow from the report of the Royal Commission on 
Intelligence and Security. 
8.5.32 The Commission envisages that the Personnel Appeals Tribunal should 
make use of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal membership and supporting 
orgarlisation, involving some members of the latter Tribunal as members of the 
Personnel Appeals Tribunal and sharing common administrative resources. 
8.5.33 It should be noted that whilst the disciplinary appeals boards would be 
superseded by the Personnel Appeals Tribunal, the promotions appeal 
committee structure provided under section 50 of the current Public Service Act, 
would remain in its present form but would have added to its function cases 
relating to retirement for redundancy involving consideration of relative 
efficiency (sec paragraph 8.4.92). 
8.5.34 Role oJ a Coniiiioiaea/tIi SO-vices Ombudsman: The Commission recognises 
that there arc likely to be situations in which neither the internal processes for 
review and resolution of staff grievances nor provisions for appeal to independent 
tribunals will prove entirely adequate for the investigation of complaints or for 
their satisfactory resolution. It is particularly mindful of the fact that in a number 
of statutory bodies which do not employ staff under the Public Service Act, 
machinery for redress of staff grievances is either non-existent or deficient. 
R190 8.5.35 Consequently the Commission believes that there is a strong case for the 
establishment by statute of an office of Commonwealth Services Ombudsman, 
similar to that proposed for the Defence Forces in the Defence Forces 
Ombudsman Bill 1975-  We would envisage that the Commonwealth Services 
Ombudsman would have authority to investigate and make recommendations 
with respect to complaints by officers and employees of the Commonwealth 
Public Service and by officers and employees of public authorities established by 
or pursuant to laws of the Commonwealth, concerning their service as such 
officers or employees. 
8.5.36 But we would also envisage that the Commonwealth Services Ombud-
sman should have a discretion not to investigate or not to continue with an 
investigation when he forms the opinion that the complainant has a right to cause 
the action which is the subject of the complaint to be reviewed by a court of law or 
tribunal established by enactment, or has a right to seek redress elsewhere, for 
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example the right to seek review by the Public Service Board. (We note that 
similar discretions were to be giver to the Defence Forces Ombudsman.) 
8.5.37 If both the office of Commonwealth Services Ombudsman and of 
general Ombudsman are established, we would see advantages in an arrange-
ment whereby the premises and staff of these two offices, both in Canberra and the 
States, were shared, and delegations made under both Acts to the same 
investigating officers. 
8.5.38 Sumrny of revised grievance machinery s tincture: It is envisaged under the 
structure recommended by the Commission that where a grievance cannot be 
satisfactorily resolved at departmental or agency level then further review or 
appeal recourse would rest in the following directions:'  
.Jatnre c] Grievance 	 Renew Body 
i. Rejection of appliccition for cppointmenl on ground of ineligibility 
under section 34—determInation of eligibitity- 
(a) medical grounds 	 Either Public Service Board 
or Personnel Appeals Tri-
bunal 
(b) other (non-security) grounds 	 Either Public Service Board 
or Personnel Appeals Tri-
bunal 
(c) security grounds 	 As recommended by Royal 
Commission on Intelligence 
and Security 
2. Aniulmeni oj probation on ground of ineligibility 	 Either Public Service Board 
or Personnel Appeals Tri-
bunal 
3. Qualflca/ions]or positions 
Determination 	 that the 	 complainant is not qualified for 
position Public Service Board 
4. Classification of a position 
Application by complainant for re-classification of position 
held by him Public Service Board 
5. Compulsoqretiement 
(a) provisional retirement by department on grounds of 
incompetence or incapacity Public Service Board 
(b) PSB confirmation of provisional retirement on grounds of 
incompetence or incapacity Personnel Appeals Tribunal 
c li 	 retirement 	 br recluiidiiiev 	 \\ here a deterniination has 
been 	 mack 	 concerning 	 the 	 complainant's 	 relative 
efficiency Promotions 	 Appeal 	 Com- 
mittee 
6.. Wrongful discrimination in employment Office of Equality in Employ- 
ment*, 
 Public Service Board, 
Commonwealth 	 Services 
Ombudsman*  
7. 	 Conditions of emplojrneiit 
Determination regarclmg complainants entitlements under 
PSB determinations, 	 under 	 FS 	 Act or regulation 	 made 
thereunder Public Service Board 
The bodies marked * in the table have the power to investigate, report and recommend. All the 
others are appellate bodies having powers to set aside decisions appealed against, and 
substitute their own decisions. 
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8. Discipline 
(a) determination of breach of discipline 	 Personnel Appeals Tribunal 
(b) penalty imposed 	 Personnel Appeals Tribunal 
9. CoinplairiLs in general concerning employment 	 Public Service Board (in re- 
lation to reg. 6, 33, iii), 
Commonwealth Services 
Ombudsman*  
8.5.39 The Commission acknowledges that the complexities associated with the 
definition of grievances which often involve more than one issue are such that it is 
extremely difficult to set down an exhaustive formula for future machinery. 
However we believe that the structure and guidance outlined above will provide 
an adequate indication of the detailed machinery structure that the Commission 
recommends. 
Statutory Rights and Duties 
8.5.40 Rewards, discipline, termination of service and resolution of grievances 
are integral parts of the management process. But they are more than that. The 
procedures governing them also constitute some of the rules within which 
management and staff must operate and form part of the contractual relationship 
between them. That relationship at times demands a degree of certainty and 
precision. The contractual relationship so established expresses the needs of both 
management and staff for fair dealing, and concerns the rights and duties of both 
parties. These rights and duties can be so formulated that they can become 
instruments of improved performance and of resistance to subservience and 
slavish conformity. They can therefore help expose managerial inadequacy and 
contribute to innovation in organisation, as well as revealing incapacity and poor 
performance by employees. 
8-541 It has seemed important to the Commission therefore to attempt to give 
greater precision to the explicit and implicit content of that relationship. This 
content covers more than the processes described above relating to disciplinary 
action, termination of service and the processes of grievance review. It 
comprehends also a system of rules and entitlements governing the conduct of 
employer and employee over a wide range of matters: rules and entitlements 
resting partly on legislation but also on common law, modified and augmented by 
administrative practice. 
8.5.42 It has not been possible, despite thoughtful work by the Public Service 
Board in this field,' to categorise rights and obligations or to describe them 
exhaustively. This has led us to emphasise the need to clarify and make explicit 
the essential elements in the contractual relationship between the government 
and its employees and so far as possible to give them binding legal force. In the 
succeeding paragraphs we seek to identify these essential elements and to review 
their relevance to important problems arising from the exercise of managerial 
authority in staff matters. In these matters the Commission sees its recom-
mendations as supplementing the valuable work done by the Public Service 
Board and Joint Council. 
8.5.43 Statutory prescription of certain conditions of employment in all forms of 
Commonwealth employment has a number of advantages. Perhaps most 
r. Memorandum No. 19, The Rights and Obligations of Public Servants. 
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importantly, it is the only way to qualify the uniquely privileged position of the 
Crown as employer. Legislation also means that employees righ.ts cannot be 
altered because of administrative expediency or managerial convenience, with-
out formal parliamentary approval of any proposed amendments. Thus Par-
liament is able to require a more effective accountability from the various parts of 
the executive. A number of other advantages have been identified in the course of 
Joint Council consultations.' 
8.5.44 However, the Commission has not been able to discern any dominant 
principle which in the past has determined whether a particular condition of 
employment ought to be dealt with by statute. The statutes establishing services 
and authorities differ greatly in the provisions relating to employment. Section 67 
of the Constitution envisages that Parliament has responsibility for conditions of 
employment of government employees. It would generally be agreed that 
partisan political activity should be avoided over employment issues, and that 
Parliament should limit its intervention to such matters as long service leave, 
superannuation, maternity leave and compensation legislation (see Chapter 
9.4.5). However, the Commission believes it to be desirable that statutes relating 
to Public Service and other Commonwealth employment should establish certain 
rights, duties and remedies for those employed which Parliament wishes to place 
beyond reach of easy variation. The Commission emphasises that such legislation 
should cover duties as well as rights, and should ensure access of the parties to 
independent grievance authorities. What we propose is an extension and 
refinement of provisions which are already in the Public Service Act. 
A Framework of Rights 
8.5.45 it may not be practicable to establish for all government employees a 
common framework of basic rights and privileges, although such a framework 
represents an ideal which should be further investigated and pursued. At present 
attempts to achieve it may well be distracted by the diversity of employment 
agencies, the variety of working environments, and the different expectations of 
both managers and employees. Implementation of the proposals in Chapters 9.4 
and i 1.6 for a closer integration of the Commonwealth government workforce 
will provide an opportunity to develop such a framework. 
8.5.46 The Commission recommends that a statutory framework of rights be Ri9i 
incorporated in the Public Service Act (or its replacement) along the following 
general lines. 
8.5.47 Servzces for which engaged: We recommend that an employee be entitled to R192 
receive a statement in writing, prepared and if necessary varied by the Chief 
Officer or his delegate, of the work which he is to perform. The statement should 
detail the objectives and the nature of the work to be performed. It should be 
effective for both management and employee, unless formally varied. The 
statement of duties could then serve as the basis for scrutiny of the agency's 
classification and selection processes by the Public Service Board, Auditor-
General and other bodies and, in processes related to discipline, promotions 
appeals and compulsory retirements, as primary evidence of the duties for which 
the person is employed. 
i. See particularly Joint Council Report of the Discipline Sub-Committee, May—November 
1973. 
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8.5.48 A number of the common law obligations of an employee relate to the 
particular duties for which he is employed. Failure to perform such duties is the 
basis of disciplinary action under section 55  of the Public Service Act. On the 
other hand, under common law a servant is not bound to do something not 
properly related to the character or capacity for which he was hired.' Under the 
Public Service Act, responsibility tor the determination and expression of duties is 
imprecise. By contrast, section 42(5) of the recently enacted Telecommunications 
Act 1975 places express authority in the Commission or Managing Director to 
direct duties but does not establish a process by which duties are embodied in a 
form which can be communicated to the employee. The process of determining 
and varying work statements can and should be flexible but the resulting 
statement should be one upon which the worker and manager can both rely and 
liich provides a basis be classification. \Ve discuss duty statements further in 
Chapter 9.2. 
Ri93 8.5.49 Tenure of employment: We recommend that the employing authority should 
provide a person at the time of appointment with a statement in writing of the 
minimum term of employment and the circumstances and procedure under 
which it may be terminated. This statement should include reference to any 
procedure open to the employee for review of such termination. In most instances 
tenure would be established under the Public Service Act, sections 57-59,  which 
in substance provide for an officer's continuance in employment until 6, unless 
retired or dismissed for one of the causes stipulated in the Act. 
8-5-50 It is not uncommon for persons engaged under the Public Service Act to 
misconceive the nature of their appointment. In part this is attributable to a 
failure to point out that often no contractual arrangement has been made and 
that appointments may be terminated for causes described. The recommendation 
is designed to ensure that initial advice on recruitment establishes clearly any 
legal entitlements, whether as tenured or non-tenured staff. 
8.5.5 I Conditions of employment as rights enforceable or recovera bit at iaw. To remove 
R 19 any doubts which may at present exist, we iccoininciid that each employee should 
have a legally enforceable right to all entitlements, including salaries and 
allowances, prescribed by legislation, determinations and awards. 
R 195 8.5.52 Appeal and icr/ca processes founded in statut: We rccouin?end that employees 
should have a statutory right to appeal ci seek review by the appropriate 
machinery established or specified under the Act in accordance with our 
proposals in paragraphs 8.5.24-39. 
8.5.53 Equal opportunity and avoidance of discrimination: At paragraph 8.3.25 we 
recommended that Parliament legislate to require all agencies of the Com-
monwealth government to exercise any powers or discretions they possess in a 
manner which does not discriminate in employment on grounds of race, creed, 
sex, age, marital status, political belief, security record or educational 
qualifications except where reasonably and justifiably required for the effective 
performance of the work to be undertaken. The law should however provide that 
this requirement should not prevent action taken with the approval or on the 
direction of the Executive Council, to confer rights or advantages on members of a 
group designated as disadvantaged. 
r. Haisbury Laws of England, 3rd Edition, VOL 25, 485. 
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8.5.54 Recovery oJ oveipqyment by employing authority The general rule that 
payments made under mistake at law are not recoverable by legal action does not 
apply where money is paid by the Crown. We believe that provision should be 
made to deal with cases where repayment of excess salary or allowances received 
in good faith would cause hardship. In this connection, we note that section 38A 
of the Victorian Audit Act provides an upper limit on the weekly rate of recovery 
of the amount of over-payment and requires due notice of the Treasurer's or 
public authority's intention to recover overpayment and the manner of doing so. 
Furthermore, upon request from the employee concerned, the Treasurer or 
public authority has discretion to reduce the rate of repayment or to remit the 
whole or part of the amount to be repaid. We recommend that a similar provision be R196 
made for Commonwealth government employees who should also have the right 
of appeal to the Personnel Appeals Tribunal on the amount and rate of 
repayment. 
8.5.55 Ciiiil and political iighls. The Commission has had drawn to its attention a 
number of instances of management attitudes and practices inhibiting the 
exercise of civil rights in the sense that the term rights' is used in the Racial 
Discrimination Act 19751.  We recommend that, except as expressly provided by an R197 
Act or regulation made under that Act, or as is necessary for the proper 
performance of his duties, a government employee should be free to exercise the 
civil and political rights, liberties and privileges generally enjoyed by citizens. 
Such a provision might serve to discourage, for example, impediments being 
placed in the way of staff who wish to occupy honorary office in community 
organisations, or who wish to make some public comment, or who do not wish to 
avail themselves of an option to be exempted from jury service. 
A Framework of Duties 
8-5-56 Duties as well as rights and remedies need to be established by statute if 
only to indicate the circumstances in which employment may be terminated or,  
other sanctions imposed. A substantial body of law as to the duties of an employee 
has been developed. Much of it is encapsulated in section 55  of the Public Service 
Act in a form which itemises conduct constituting an offence by an officer. We 
have already noted that the provisions of that section have been revised and 
amending legislation is awaited. 
8.5.57 One advantage in prescribing the duties by statute is to ensure that there 
is a clearly expressed standard against which performance may be assessed. Such 
prescription needs to be intelligible to stall and any reasonably informed and 
interested member of the public. Statutory duties operate positively (regardless of 
sanctions to enforce them), particularly for a workforce motivated by respect for 
public policy. If basic duties are given clear statutory expression, they will 
provide more readily a fair basis for disciplinary action for failure to perform them 
by the employing authority or by a citizen affected by that failure. It may also 
help reassure the community that the administration is guided by appropriate 
values. 
8.5.58 However we see merit in the use of the Board's regulation making power 
to set down the more detailed and specific duties. Only the more important 
should be set down by statute. 
I . 	 Section 10 and Article 5  of the Schedule. 
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8.5.59 A clear prescription is particularly necessary in relation to possible 
conflict of official and personal interests. The Commission has been asked by the 
Prime Minister to advise upon the question of declaration of pecuniary interests 
by public servants. A number of provisions designed to limit the possibility of such 
conflict are to be found in the Public Service Act and regulations such as the 
prohibition of outside employment, acceptance of fees, holding office in public 
corporations, or paid office in connection with commercial business (section 91, 
Public Service Act). The Commission sees value in the suggestion by the Public 
Service Board that the Joint Council should review these prohibitions against the 
background of current attitudes and practices. The Commission believes that for 
the purpose of the Act, it would be best to deal with such matters by statements of 
duty in general terms rather than by prohibition of particular conduct. Particular 
prohibitions might, after the review, be incorporated in Public Service 
regulations or Board determinations relating to particular occupations. 
8.5.60 The Commission's views as to the proper formulation of a public 
servant's duty to avoid conflict of interest have much in common with those 
expressed by the Public Service Board to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on 
Pecuniary Interests of Members of Parliament. The Board suggested that there 
would be merit in a widely understood convention that a public servant should 
regulate his interests to avoid conflict and should advise his minister or 
department head of any pecuniary interest that might at any time, or in relation 
to a matter with which he had to deal, conflict or appear to conflict with his public 
duty. However we hold that matters of such importance to the probity of the 
Service should not rest simply upon convention but upon explicit statutory duty, 
breach of which is subject to disciplinary penalty. At paragraph 8.5.64(d) our 
recommendation upon the terms of the duty is set out. 
8.5.6 i The Public Service Board, in a comment to the Commission on this 
subject, has enumerated an impressive list of reservations about any proposal that 
public servants be required to register their pecuniary interests. As Sir Frederick 
Wheeler observed in evidence to the Joint Parliamentary Committee, the 
approach of basing a registration system upon clear definition of those senior 
officers who should be included because of their official duties, 'might produce the 
conclusion that it was not a goer'. The Commission believes nevertheless that 
there is no insuperable obstacle to the development of a useful but perhaps 
incomplete system of registration. A system for registration of the pecuniary 
interests of ministers has now been developed and the Prime Minister has 
expressed to the Commission his personal view that: 
'First and Second Division officers of the Australian Public Service, office-
holders and statutory officials of equivalent status, and other officers in sensitive 
areas dealing with such matters as contracting and procurement, should be 
required to make a declaration of interests . . . (which) could be held on a 
confidential basis by the Public Service Board or. . . as may be appropriate . . 
8.5.62 Detailed attention to those activities which involve greatest risk of 
conflict of interest will need to be undertaken in the development of a useful 
system of registration of declarations of interests. However, a system of 
registration could initially cover the occupational categories listed by the Prime 
Minister and officers classified at levels equivalent to clerical-administrative class 
R i q8 8 and above, unless specifically exempted by the minister. We recommend that a 
system of registration of declarations of direct and indirect pecuniary interests be 
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developed by the Public Service Board along the lines suggested by Sir Frederick 
Wheeler in his evidence to the Joint Parliamentary Committee': 
'If it is decided that Members of Parliament should disclose thtir pecuniary 
interests, it would be no less appropriate that similar rules apply to those who 
provide advice to Ministers, including Permanent Heads, senior policy advisers 
and ministerial staff and, indeed, even less senior officers .....disclosure of 
conflicting interests is found desirable, it would probably be adequate for public 
servants to disclose their pecuniary interests in a 'register' held within each 
department. Access to the information could well be restricted to the responsible 
Minister and his Permanent Head. There would appear to be no real 
requirement to breach individual privacy further by making th€ information 
public, unless circumstances, in the opinion of the Minister, warranted such 
action.' 
In addition, however, we see merit in departmental heads and heads of statutory 
authorities registering their pecuniary interests with the Board, access to such 
disclosure being restricted to the relevant ministers. 
8.5.63 The establishment of such a register would not make less important the 
obligation to draw attention to an actual or an apparent conflict when it in fact 
emerged. Such a conflict might, of course, arise from a variety of sources other 
than registrable pecuniary interests and could in some instances have 
considerably more influence than a direct pecuniary interest. 
8.5.64 In outline, the duties which we recommend as warranting specific mention Ri99 
in the statute (see paragraph 8.5.58) include the following: 
(a) a person employed shall comply with reasonable directions given by a 
person authorised to issue such directions; 
(b) a person employed shall display skill, care and diligence in performance of 
work for which he or she is engaged; 
(c) a person employed shall avoid waste or extravagance in the use of public 
resources; 
(d) a person employed shall so regulate personal interests and dealings of a 
kind involving financial gain that they do not conflict or appear to conflict 
with his or her public duty; 
(e) unless specifically exempted by the minister, a person employed and 
classified at or above a specified level shall declare any direct or indirect 
financial interest in a register held by his head of department or statutory 
authority or, in the case of head of department or statutory authority, held 
by the Board. The minister shall have access to such a register; 
(f) a person employed shall reasonably assist members of the public in relation 
to matters within the area of work performed by the person employed to 
the extent authorised or required pursuant to the employee's duties or to 
any rule or procedure applicable to the employee; 
(g) a person employed shall not behave in his official capacity in a manner 
amounting to improper conduct; 
(h) a person employed shall comply with the provisions of the regulations, by-
laws, and determinations as applicable from time to time. 
Letter from Sir Frederick Wheeler to Chairman of Joint Committee, 13 March 1975. 
Transcript page 1272. 
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8.5.65 The Commission has given serious thought to whether the duties referred 
to in the Act should refer in any way to Improper conduct' outside the 
performance of professional duties, that is in the private life of the officer 
concerned. While the Commission can envisage circumstances in which such 
conduct could impair the officer's capacity to perform his work efficiently or 
could bring the Service into disrepute, it has decided not to recommend any 
specific reference to obligations in respect of private behaviour. We believe such 
behaviour is relevant only in so far as it bears generally or specifically upon the 
performance of official duties and are satisfied that there is, in clauses çb), (d), (e) 
and çg above, sufficient basis for senior officers to deal with such matters when in 
fact, and to the extent that, they affect performance. With regard to matters such 
as degrees of political activity, the Commission believes these are best left to the 
discipline of social pressure by the relevant peer groups, including consideration 
by any collective departmental management arrangements (see Chapter 
4.3.10-13). Stall organisations could, however, consider means whereby they 
might deal informally with criticisms directed at individual members. 
8.5.66 Various problems have arisen in recent years in which stall find that their 
religious views or other matters of conscience may potentially conflict with their 
obligations as government officers. One such problem, involving a number of 
officers in the then Postmaster-General's Department, was brought to the notice 
of the Commission in a submission.' While it is not easy to lay down general rules 
for resolving such conflicts, the Commission believes that each case warrants 
sympathetic consideration, and that avenues should be open to staff to discuss 
with management any doubts which may arise. It is to be hoped that, in many 
such cases, exemption in specific instances from the requirements of particular 
rules may be possible. Where this is not appropriate, the only course may be for 
the staff concerned to transfer to other duties. It is important that management 
ensure that such general rules as are laid down and applied go no further than is 
required for the maintenance of efficiency and the proper conduct of public 
business. Subject to this, it should be possible to resolve constructively those 
matters of conscience which may arise from time to time, and we believe that this 
would be the appropriate response of managers. 
Commissioner Munro expresses the following reservations to paragraphs 
8.4.84-104 and section 8.5 of this chapter. 
The Commission's recommendations on penalties for discipline and on 
grievances, rights and duties of persons employed by the Commonwealth will, if 
adopted, contribute to satisfactory reform of an important feature of the 
employment relationship of public servants. However, as the Commissioner 
most closely associated with this field of the Commission's inquiry, I am 
concerned lest serious deficiencies in the existing system of grievances resolution 
be maintained or carried over into any new system. The survival of deficient 
Submission No. 609, in which the officers told the Commission they had found a conflict 
existing between the Department's requirement that they should not divulge information 
obtained in the course of their duties, and their own religious precept that any information 
relating to the practice of their faith by another member should be related to that member or 
other members. The officers quoted a staffing provision made by an English banking company 
advising members of the religious group to discuss such problems with the company's personnel 
manager, 'who (would) be able to excuse (them) from the strict interpretation of the 
Declaration of Secrecy in the particular instance'. 
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practices is made more probable by the non-publication of the case studies 
undertaken and the deletion from the Commission's Report of detailed 
conclusions on such matters. The deletion of this detail is, to some extent, a 
matter of style but also stems from a reluctance of the Commission as a whole to 
offer conclusions based on evidence to which only one member of the 
Commission has had opportunity to give detailed attention. For my part, I have 
been uniquely placed to form such conclusions and I believe it important that 
this chance be taken to promote greater understanding of what I believe to be a 
neglected area of public personnel administration in Australia. 
Staff rights and remedies are of importance in personnel management and 
industrial relations. However, too little attention has been paid to their function 
as instruments of accountability of public service management. 
The essence of much of what I believe could responsibly be said by the 
Commission has been set down by me in Appendix 3.M originally prepared as a 
draft for the Commission's Report This document parallels the treatment of the 
subject in the Commission's Report, and has been revised to take account of some 
of the comments on the text as originally drafted. The points of most significant 
variance from the Commission's treatment are predominantly contained in Parts 
2, 3 and  4  of that Appendix. 
I also express a reservation from the Commission's comments and recom-
mendations at paragraphs 8.5.6-7 on the case of Mr W. F. Toomer. I have made 
detailed and extensive examination of the available documentation relating to 
Mr Toomer's submissions and case history and am responsible for a case study 
based thereon. Rather than comment upon the relevant section of the 
Commission's Report, I set down my own conclusions and recommendations on 
the case to the extent that is necessary for this purpose: 
(i) The evidential material upon which the case study was based provides a 
prima Jacie basis for concluding that a Disciplinary Appeal Board established 
under the Public Service Act was misdirected as to the basis upon which it 
should determine Mr Toomer's appeal, on the ground that he was innocent 
of the disciplinary offence of improper conduct arising out of the effect and 
content of public comments by him on Perth television stations on separate 
occasions injune andjuly 1974. As this was the first charge of this kind since 
the repeal of Public Service Regulation 34(b), and for other reasons, the 
decision on Mr Toomer's ' appeal makes it a leading case' and one likely to 
have had, and to continue to have, significant bearing upon the 
interpretation of a number of personnel practices and conditions. 
(2) The case study provides a salutary example by which to teach improvement 
within the Public Service not only in the achievement of better performance 
and discipline but in the use of grievance review procedures to promote 
effective administration and sound personnel management. 
() The method of the case study, which to some extent was a product of 
uncertainty as to the Commission's timetable, has not provided optimum 
opportunity for the selection of facts and opinions, which make up the study, 
to be fully tested by all or any of the individuals dealt with in the case study. 
However, for the most part the documentation on which the study was based 
affords a good access to the views of the main protagonists about the matters 
dealt with in the study. A draft of the study was made available to the 
Department of Health, the Public Service Board, and the Department of the 
Attorney-General and the remarks of these bodies, and those to whom it was 
referred by them, were taken into account. The completed case study was 
made available to the three officers most directly affected but it is probable 
that wider dissemination to those and other individuals would cause 
additional relevant information warranting notice to be disclosed. 
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() I doubt whether any valuable purpose would now be served by further 
inquiry into aspects of quarantine enforcement beyond any which may be 
carried out incidental to the functions of the Department of Health. 
However, considerations related to the impact of the particular case upon 
personnel practice generally and the real possibility of injustice to 
individuals directly concerned led me to recommend that the whole case 
from the original alleged offences onward be reviewed by an appropriately 
constituted Tribunal external to the Public Service. This Tribunal should 
have access to and be able to take into account the case study and the 
matters covered therein. 
() It would seem less than equitable that persons appearing before such a 
Tribunal (if constituted) should have to meet legal expenses. Special 
arrangements for necessary expenses, or the retention of Counsel assisting, 
ought therefore be favourably considered. 
(6) In order to place the case study formally before the government in this 
context 1 adopt and include it as part of the reservation and of my report on 
the terms of reference directed to me and my fellow Commissioners. While it 
is not to be printed with the main body of the Report the case study is to be 
transmitted in association with the Report and this reservation on the basis 
that publication of the case study should be a matter for the government. 
Comments made on the study by four officers of the Department of Health 
are appended to the study, which has been modified in minor respects to 
take into account the specifically directed comments made by one of the 
officers. I recommend that the case study be published in some generally 
available form. Should this recommendation not be accepted but the further 
review proposed come to pass, I suggest that favourable consideration be 
then given to publication of the case study upon the basis that any persons 
who wished to take issue with any matter of substance considered to be 
adverse to them be given opportunity to be heard by the Tribunal. 
The Chairman expresses the following reservation to paragraph 8.5.7: 
While not supporting all the points made by Mr Munro in relation to Mr 
Toomer's case, the Commission's examination of that case has been sufficient to 
convince me that an independent inquiry is necessary to ensure that justice is 
done to Mr Toomer. I do not therefore support the recommendation that the 
establishment of such an inquiry should be at the discretion of the Public Service 
Board. 
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Chapter 9 
	
Staffing the 
Administration—Il 
Structure and 
Management 
9.0.1 In the previous chapter we considered how the recruitment and 
employment of public servants could be achieved in a more equitable and 
efficient way and how the individual public servant could be rewarded or 
disciplined when appropriate in a fairer manner. In this chapter we cover a group 
of topics also related to the staffing of the administration—but focussing now on 
the structure and organisation of the Service and the particular problems it 
presents to management and staff organisations. 
9.0.2 We examine first some questions about the size and use of the service or the 
government workforce, the organisation of work according to the skills and status 
of staff and the various categories of employment (9.1-3). We discuss the possible 
development of a unified service and propose a new managerial relationship 
between the Public Service Board and various statutory authorities, legislative 
and* udicial agencies (9.4). The selection, training and development of managers 
in the administration is then discussed in 9.5.  The chapter concludes by 
examining how managerial authority is shared through industrial relations 
processes and arrangements for participation by or consultation with staff. 
9.1 CONTROL OF STAFF NUMBERS 
9.1. I The size of the government workforce has traditionally been a matter of 
concern. This concern reflects not merely the desire to conduct the government's 
affairs as efficiently as possible but also antagonism to the growth of the public 
sector and a conviction that the bureaucracy if left to itself will increase beyond 
the requirements of the functions it has to perform. As we emphasised in Chapter 
2.3 it is not for the Commission to judge what public sector functions might 
properly be. We mentioned in Chapter 3.'  that we do not subscribe to the view 
that the increasing cost of government administration necessarily denotes 
inefficiency. However, we are concerned that the administration's use of 
manpower should be economical and that current practices which may 
encourage waste should be revised. Within the Public Service itself responsibility 
for controlling numbers lies essentially with the Public Service Board, although 
the Executive Council is required to approve the creation or abolition of an 
'office'. 
9.1.2 The Board carries out these responsibilities through: 
(a) the control of departmental and agency establishments by virtue of its 
powers over the creation of 'offices' and 'positions'; 
(b) the planning of manpower use; 
(c) the administration of staff ceilings. 
Control of Establishments 
9.1.3 A department (or a statutory body staffed under the Public Service Act) 
requires the approval of the Board for the organisational structure it proposes, 
239 
that is, for the numbers of officers at various salary classifications. The Board is 
also responsible for setting the standards of responsibility and performance 
required for positions at any given level of classification. 
9.1.4 In recent years the Board has introduced some changes designed to 
delegate increased authority in these matters to the head of the department or 
agency concerned. The most important of these changes has been the gradual 
introduction of the Bulk Establishment (oiitrol System. 
9.1.5 The main features of this system are: 
(a) a department sets out annually the positions it requires at each grade and 
classification with supporting data; 
(b) the Board assesses this request as a whole and establishes a pool of positions 
on which the department can operate; 
(c) the Board carries out sample checks of positions established from the pool 
to satisfy itself that all classification standards are being met. 
All departments are now operating under this scheme, although the Board 
submitted that departments varied in the adequacy of the establishment control 
they exercised within it. On the other hand, many departments urged that the 
Bulk Establishment Control System, although an improvement on the earlier 
detailed control, still requires such external control in situations where greater 
freedom is most important: 
(a) when major organisational changes are necessary; 
(b) where significant changes occur in the duties of the department; 
(c) where an unforeseen emergency arises. 
Apart from these general criticisms the scheme is seen as inadequate because: 
(a) second division and some senior third division positions are excluded; 
(b) adjustments of organisation structures without reference to the Board are 
too restricted; 
(c) alterations to the duties of positions are also too restricted (although there 
is greater flexibility than earlier); 
(d) provision for new functions or significant changes in functions is not made; 
(e) documentation required is still excessive; 
(f) proposals require departments to forecast so far ahead and to list the 
number of positions of each class and grade so that the pool provides only 
limited flexibility; 
(g) complete application of the scheme is unduly delayed; 
(h) departments operate only under Board delegation and not by right. 
9. 1.6 A paper prepared for the Commission by Mr B. F. Jones reviews the 
working of the scheme and considers these criticisms.' The paper concludes that 
despite them the scheme represents an important evolutionary development and 
is evidence of the willingness of the Board to modify its procedures and to extend 
its delegations significantly. It argues however that progressively the role of the 
Board should be limited to the formulation of general policies, the issue of 
guidelines and the establishment of standards within which the departmental 
i. 	 B. F. Jones, Soieiy C/ass ficazon in the Austin/ion Public Service. Published by the Commission as a 
discussion paper. The paper's conclusions and recommendations can be found at Appendix 
3-C- 
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head would have full operating responsibility for personnel management. The 
Board would then serve as a source of professional guidance and would monitor 
the degree to which departmental performance conformed to its guidelines and 
standards. 
9.1.7 The Commission generally endorses thesejudgments and looks to a steady 
increase of departmental authority. To the extent that this occurs the power of the 
Board to enforce its standards set for classification would become the more 
important. This matter is dealt with in paragraphs 9.2.1-5 below. 
Manpower Planning and Control 
9. 1.8 In Chapter 3 we recommended a process for developing Forward 
Estimates of departmental use of financial and human resources. The proposal we 
outline there and discuss in detail in Chapter 11.2 and 1 1.6 (on the role of the 
Public Service Board) will involve individual departments making decisions 
about their future staffing needs and negotiating with a committee of Cabinet 
advised by the Board for triennial 'manpower estimates' and a yearly 'manpower 
budget'. 
9. 1.9 If the framework of these proposals is accepted the provision in section 
29(I) of the Public Service Act relating to the creation and abolition of offices 
should no longer be necessary. The essential elements are first the control of 
numbers, which should be by decision of the government in the context of the 
Forward Estimates and the Budget process. Second, the maintenance of 
classification standards (section 29(2)), which should continue to be a 
responsibility of the Board (see section g. i). Removal of the formal requirements 
for position creation by the Executive Council will avoid the cumbersome 
processes associated with section 29(I). We believe that as the system we propose 
(see particularly paragraphs 11.6.7-18) becomes effective it should be possible to 
amend the legislation to eliminate those processes. If this were done the following 
elements in the system would ensure adequate control both of numbers and of R200 
classifications: 
(a) government control over staffing levels will be achieved through the 
manpower budgeting process and the responsibility of individual 
permanent heads to their ministers; 
(b) within the limits set by manpower budgets, heads of departments should be 
made accountable for the effective and economical use of staff and 
determine, introduce and vary organisation structures within their 
respective departments; 
(c) heads of departments should submit regular returns on establishments and 
staffing to the Board, in accordance with its requirements; 
(d) on behalf of the government, the Board should monitor departmental and 
Public Service employment against budgets and report as required to the 
government; 
(e) the Board will retain the power (to be exercised as a reserve power) to 
classify and should audit grades allotted by heads of departments, 
recommend the alteration of grades not conforming with approved 
standards, and in the last resort reclassify (see paragraph 9.2.3). 
9.1.10 In general the Public Service Board should have the power to review the 
way in which departments are using their staff, by procedures based partially on 
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those now in operation for the staff utilisation reviews. It should investigate the 
way in which departments have followed up, through their appointment and 
promotion procedures, the indications given to the Board during the estimates 
discussions. Although it might be objected that in this way the Board would have 
no direct ex ante power of control over how departments operate, as it has had in 
the past, this is one of the consequences of accountable management and should 
not, we believe, lead to excessive additions to departmental staff complements. In 
the first place, the Board would be able to keep a close check on instances where 
departments vary from their estimates by comparing the previous year's estimates 
with the statement of position at the time new estimates were under discussion. It 
would also have available to it assessments from its staff utilisation review teams 
and also, periodically from the Auditor-General's efficiency audits. Where there 
appeared to be ground for believing that a department had not been sufficiently 
responsible in its use of staff, steps could be taken in the course of preparing 
estimates for the coming year. There would be no impediment to the Board's 
proposing to the government that a department should not be allowed to add 
more than a certain number above a particular salary level, if it considered that 
there had been an inappropriate drift upwards of departmental classifications. 
The Board should report annually to Parliament on such matters, as would the 
Auditor-General. 
9.1 1 I It is not our purpose to break down the concept of a service which is 
largely staffed by those who have made it their career. Accordingly we have 
recommended that while removing the procedures and the now largely 
ineffective controls associated with section 29(I) of the Public Service Act, 
relating to the creation and abolition of offices, tenure should be provided 
through the terms on which people employed are appointed to a department (see 
Section 9.3,  Categories of Employment). This tenure would remain with them 
whether they were working within the department itself, or were serving a period 
of rotation, or were on secondment for some special purpose. The legal 
consequences of the current unattachment provisions will in this way not fall so 
arbitrarily on the individual. Instead, only when persons employed are in excess 
of the numbers allocated will there need to be any consideration of redundancy: 
wherever staff are deployed they will remain attached to the department and it 
will be the responsibility of departmental management to ensure that there is 
work for them to do when they return from secondment, rotation or other special 
duties. Officers not actually serving with the department can be shown as such in 
annual staff returns. It will be more informative to show in what capacity they are 
serving elsewhere, than simply as at present to list them as 'unattached'. 
Staff Ceilings 
9.1.12 In the past control of staff levels in departments and other agencies 
controlled by the Public Service Board has rested predominantly upon the 
requirement that the Board approve establishments by obtaining the formal 
creation of positions. In recent years this has from time to time been reinforced by 
staff ceilings or limits imposed by government direction on the total size or rate of 
growth of the Service over a specified period. Considerable criticism has been 
directed at stafi ceilings as a control device. The Commission initiated a research 
project on the use of staff ceilings and the results of this work are published with 
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our Report. Much of the criticism is endorsed by the consultant's report which 
urges that more effective staff reductions can be achieved by longer term planning 
and that such planning is compatible with targets for reductions at least on 
established working units. Experience overseas, particularly in Japan in recent 
years, suggests that if targets are set on a longer term basis they can be more 
successfully planned and achieved. Departments, agencies and the Board are 
given the opportunity to vary the rate of recruitment and to arrange transfers of 
staff so as to take maximum advantage of normal wastages and to avoid age 
structures in particular units which could reduce efficiency and create serious 
problems for the future. Such targets could be incorporated in the guidelines 
issued to departments for the preparation of Forward Estimates. They should 
differentiate between existing and newly introduced programs so that reductions 
relating to existing functions could be assessed. This procedure has the additional 
advantage that when the departmental and agency preliminary bids on the 
Forward Estimates are brought together the relevant committee of Cabinet will 
have before it reasoned judgments of the capacity of departments to meet the 
targets, with their assessment of the impact on existing and planned programs. It 
will be consistent with the responsibility of ministers to determine the political 
priority to be attached to these programs. 
9-1-13 The Commission recommends that staff ceilings in their present form be R201 
abandoned and that Cabinet incorporate in their guidelines for the formulation 
of the Forward Estimates targets for manpower use in the years being covered. 
Control of Expenditure on Staffing 
9.1.14 In the foregoing comments on the control of numbers in Commonwealth 
employment, the Commission has accepted the general pattern of the present 
system, the essential elements of which are: 
(a) external control, actual or potential, over the establishment of depart-
ments and agencies; 
(b) the monitoring of standards set for classified positions. 
The changes we have proposed are designed to make that system better able to 
meet the changing requirements of departments and agencies while maintaining 
its essential discipline. Such an acceptance is inevitable while administrative skills 
remain in relatively short supply and numbers in Commonwealth employment 
remain so sensitive a political issue. 
9.1.15 However, the Commission is far from satisfied that the system provides 
the best approach, either to the control of numbers or to the achievement of 
administrative efficiency. In the long run, the Commission believes that the 
control of total financial expenditures on staffing (combined with continuing 
control of classification standards) and, even more importantly, control of total 
spending on all administrative costs associated with particular programs, would 
provide both more rational and more effective disciplines, while giving the 
maximum scope for entrepreneurial management within individual departments 
and agencies. Such forms of control would, at present, be impracticable because 
of the lack of analysis and historical record of salary and other administrative costs 
in relation to the total costs of various programs and activities. The Commission 
sees the assembling of such data as essential to the improvement of managerial 
I 
. See: Manpower Planning, Appendix iD. This appendix is an extraction of two consultancy 
reports by Mr K. Wiltshire, Staff Ceilings and Manpower Planning. 
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skills, and it is recommended (see Chapter i 1 -3.21   (j)) that the Treasury, the 
Public Service Board and the Auditor-General confer on the assembling of such 
data. 
9.1.16 When this data is available it should be possible for the Public Service 
Board and the Treasury to undertake a joint analysis of the possibilities of 
substituting a financial allocation on program or activity basis, inpiace of the 
present system of prescribing amounts for salary and other administrative 
charges, supplementing this only by the measures recommended in this and the 
next section for regular checks on observance of Public Service standards and 
guidelines in relation to classified positions. Such a financial allocation would give 
managers the maximum freedom to organise both human and administrative 
resources in the way which would seem best to them and would give them the 
maximum incentive to achieve economies. The Commission believes that this 
approach to the control of staff and administrative costs could bring many 
advantages which could readily be tested after certain preliminary studies by 
Treasury and the Board by instituting, on an experimental basis in particular 
departments or agencies, a system of control by this means. Our recommendation 
on this matter can be found at Chapter i I.3.21(k). 
9.2 THE ORGANISATION OF WORK 
Classification Techniques 
9.2.1 Section 7 of the Public Service Act defines 'classification' as: 
'the arrangement of officers and positions in classes, and includes the allotment to 
officers and positions of salaries or limits of salary according to the value of the 
work.' 
Classification, whether of jobs or of people, is a technique of description. The 
appropriate technique will be determined by the type of Service sought. In the 
Commonwealth Public Service classification of positions generally predominates, 
positions being graded within series of classes or grades, each having a prescribed 
salary or range of salary. 
9.2.2 Guidelines to the allocation of positions in classes or grades are provided 
by Position Classification Standards. These comprise Group Standards and Work 
Level Standards: the former describe the field of work covered by the particular 
standard and the qualifications required for the performance of that work; the 
latter identify positions which are comparable in responsibility and in making 
similar demands on skill and experience. Finally, work is classified into specific 
positions, the tasks and duties of which are prescribed by a duty statement 
prepared within the department. 
9.2.3 The classification power is vital to the co-ordination of work valuation 
and salary standards. The breakdown of comparability in such valuation and 
standards could clearly lead to competitive 'bidding up' of rewards and the loss of 
all salary discipline. At the same time it is difficult, and probably impossible, for 
an external control authority to comprehend fully the requirements for, and the 
full character of, every job. Given an adequate sense of responsibility the 
assessment of these factors could be better carried out within the department 
directly concerned. The problem is to reconcile the flexibility necessary to 
departmental managements with the existence of a reserve power to review their 
decisions and to ensure that essential standards are met. The Commission believes 
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that in practice a shift of decision towards the individual department is 
practicable and desirable and accordingly recommends that: 	 R202 
(a) the Public Service Board delegate its classification power under section 29 
of the Act (or its replacement provision) to the heads of the various 
departments; 
(b) the Board provide departments with statements of classification standards 
and train departmental officers in classification processes; 
(c) the Board conduct regular spot checks on departmental classification after 
discussion with the head of the department, and reclassify positions if it 
believes its standards have not been preserved; 
(d) the Board retain the right to withdraw its delegations if its standards are 
persistently breached. 
9.2.4 It is important that staff and their representative organisations should 
understand and participate in the classification process as well as departmental 
managers. During the late forties and the fifties use was madeof tri-partite 
classification committees in reviewing classification structures but the practice 
has fallen into disuse after the completion of reviews for the whole service, and also 
because of a tendency on the part of staff associations to concentrate on 
arbitration reviews of revised structures, and other factors. 
9.2.5 Despite the changed circumstances the Commission sees merit in the work 
of such committees at the departmental level in particular as a means of widening 
both the understanding of classification principles and participation in their 
application in particular situations. Accordingly the Commission recommends that R203 
the Public Service Board take up with Joint Council the question of re-
establishing departmental and sub-departmental classification committees with 
functions as agreed from time to time by Joint Council. 
9.2.6 Uniformity in the classification of positions depends upon the capacity to 
assess and compare the work value which can be assigned to those positions. To 
provide a basis for such assessment it has been the practice for duty statements to 
be prepared for all positions. It has been represented to the Commission that the 
present methods by which such statements are prepared tend: 
(a) to discourage initiative and imagination by prescribing duties and 
responsibilities in advance and too specifically; 
(b) to become coercive and difficult to change. 
These tendencies become more serious as the Public Service of the 1970S develops 
more heterogeneous tasks and more dynamic environments. An increasing 
number of innovative organisational forms are appearing in the Service, ranging 
from semi-autonomous work groups through 'matrix' organisations to project 
teams operating within an otherwise hierarchical structure. In addition there are 
specialist groups (such as some research units) which operate in a quite flexible 
fashion retaining only vestiges of more traditional bureaucratic form. 
9.2.7 Departments which are currently experimenting with new organisational 
forms, or which have adopted them from the outset, include parts of 
Environment, Housing and Community Development, Employment and 
Industrial Relations and the Bureau of Customs.' Some are new departments, 
I . See Changing Organisations, Appendix g.L for a discussion of these developments. 
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others have experienced fundamental changes in the type of work being carried 
out. The former Department of Housing and Construction provides an example 
of an organisation that has changed its methods of work in relation to existing 
functions with the development of project teams in the professional work areas. 
There has been a redistribution of authority in the area of organisation design. 
This redistribution stems from the fact that much of the initiative for innovations 
in organisational forms and methods of working has come from individual 
organisations, rather than from the Public Service Board. 
9.2.8 The means by which work is described and delimited needs to be 
compatible with this growing diversity of organisational forms, the choice of 
which we believe should be entrusted increasingly to departmental managers. 
Nevertheless it is probable that the more unusual organisational forms, while 
becoming more widespread, will develop slowly and for limited categories of work 
and that the classification system will for some time remain appropriate for the 
greater part of Commonwealth employment. 
9.2.9 Proposals to change organisational relationships must take into account 
the need for pay structures to reflect these relationships. The traditional 
correlation between pay and classification level and the need to adapt both to 
changes in relative responsibilities and in the skills actually being employed has 
been recognised, for instance, by officers in the former Bureau of Customs where 
experiments with new methods of working are well advanced: 
'Teamwork offers its own challenge to the pay fixation process. The comparative 
value attached to management functions and responsibility has made these the 
most highly remunerated functions in a group, irrespective of the nature of the 
group or its work. This derives from the need, in a bureaucracy, to support the 
formal authority of the "boss" when he directs and controls staff, by providing 
superior status. The authority of position, however, is inappropriate under 
conditions of team work.' 1  
9.2.10 Where changed methods of work reduce the importance of supervision 
and direction, there may be resistance to changes in the relative status and salary 
of those involved. A danger exists that changes of structure which reduce the 
number or importance of traditional supervisory positions will create an 
expectation that the associated pattern of monetary rewards would (or should) be 
changed in ways which would reduce what those involved earn. The fact that 
methods of work are becoming less hierarchical does not mean that the work 
being done is worth less but rather that new skills or new combinations of skills 
will now need to be rewarded. New terminology will be necessary to make explicit 
the rationalisation for salary differentials. If this were done it should reduce the 
suspicion which, inevitably accompanies organisational change. 
9.2.11 Position classification will also need to take into account the increasing 
percentage of specialists employed in government administration. The Public 
Service Board, in Memorandum 15 to the Commission, has said that there is an 
increasing number of positions with less precisely defined duties and re-
sponsibilities and that the classification of such positions requires a more flexible 
approach which is more judgmental and less prescriptive; the inclusion in 
position classification standards of an increasing amount of descriptive guideline 
material is an indication of changes in approach. 
I. Conlon and Van Oosterom, Adminis/rative implications of Teamwork, April 1975. 
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9.2.12 In the many areas of the Service which are becoming increasingly 
professional, it is no longer possible to determine duties and responsibilities 
accurately without knowledge about the particular person who is to fill a position. 
Allowance must be made for the individual qualities of the worker since these will 
determine his or her ultimate duties. Yet the existing position classification system 
is least successful where the personal capacities of the individual worker are most 
significant. Furthermore duty statements as currently used and conceived are 
inappropriate for thosejobs in which there is a great deal of discretionary activity 
rather than a precisely defined, predictable set of duties. Current duty statements 
are not framed to take account of changes in the value of a position with changes 
either of occupant or in the capacity of particular occupants. In such cases, work 
statements must be framed more in terms of the skills possessed by the employee 
and expected to be deployed in the work. 
9.2.13 The Commission supports the innovations foreshadowed by the Public 
Service Board and in the discussion paper on Salary Classification.' These 
involve the development of the concept of a position as primarily an authority to 
employ a person of a particular type and level; classification decisions based on 
work performed rather than estimates of work required; increasingly, a system of 
promotion to a level within a type of work rather than to a position with precisely 
defined duties. 
9.2.14 We also agree with the paper on Salary Classification that despite these 
changes the basic principle of classification will remain one of remuneration 
according to the value of the work. One difference will be that in some areas the 
value of work will be determined increasingly by the performance of individuals. 
As a result of these changes classification systems will need to provide for: 
classifications based on performance; inclusion of specialist functions and other 
non-managerial work in the classification standards for the higher classification 
levels (as, for example, provision for specialist Engineers to class 5);  and 
incremental advancement within the limits of prescribed salary ranges based on 
performance. One of the personnel policy goals which the Public Service Board 
sees as being assisted by the classification system is the provision of adequate 
rewards for increasing competence and skifis.2 
9.2. 15 The primary objective must be to introduce greater flexibility into the 
administration of the classification system. This could be achieved by changes in 
the procedures by which duty statements are prepared and the significance 
attached to them. 
9.2. 16 Duty Statements and Individual Work Plans: A duty statement at 
present is of limited use as a basis for classification or as a guide and incentive to 
staff. It is too often merely an incomplete, or out of date record. It would be 
preferable to provide from time to time an Individual Work Plan containing, 
wherever practicable, information on objectives to be pursued and their priorities 
in time, and outlining activities to be undertaken in pursuit of them. The 
preparation (or amendment) of such an Individual Work Plan could be an 
occasion for consultation between the officer and his immediate superior. The 
sources of knowledge, skills and training relevant to the work and its significance 
I . See Appendix 3.C. 
2. For our recommendations concerning the reward system see Chapter 8.4. The emphasis there 
is in favour of flexibility. 
247 
in possible career patterns for the officer would form part of the discussion. This 
procedure would also provide opportunities for informing staff in some detail of 
the shifts in departmental priorities to reflect changing ministerial and 
government priorities or the adoption of new programs. In these ways the 
Individual Work Plan could be used to strengthen staff' motivation, to enable 
greater participation and to add to the interest of work being done. 
R204 9.2. 17 The Commission recommends that: 
(a) the Public Service Act state that the duties of any officer employed under 
the Act (other than by contract for services) shall be those from time to 
time determined and notified to the officer by the head of the department 
or his delegate: this would provide the officer with a formal statement on 
which he could rely; 
(b) the Board encourage departments to provide and keep up to date' 
Individual Work Plans which emphasise objectives and goals to be 
achieved in place of present duty statements; 
(c) the Board assist departments by designing model Individual Work Plans 
for different categories of position and work; 
(d) departments use this system of Individual Work Plans to stimulate staff 
development and improved management techniques. 
9.2.18 We have refrained from making further specific recommendations on 
this matter for two reasons; first, we believe the need for modification and 
adaptation is appreciated by the Public Service Board, departments and the 
major staff associations. Secondly, it is our view that productive innovation will 
best proceed if people become committed to the need for change and the merits of 
diversity . 
Divisional Structure 
9.2.19 The present divisional structure is hierarchical; it consists of: 
(a) the first division, including the heads of the ministerial departments; the 
heads of the departments of the Parliament; and, on occasions, other very 
senior positions, as determined by the Governor-General; 
(b) the second division, including top administrative and management staff 
below the department heads, for example, deputy secretary, first assistant 
secretary, assistant secretary, and heads of certain 'outrider' units of 
departments; 
(c) the third division, including specialist, administrative and clerical staff, 
entry to which is controlled by examination at the end of secondary 
, schooling or by special qualifications in some instances; 
(d) the Jour/h division, including the rest of the staff, entry to which depends on 
the requirements of the job ranging from no specific qualifications for 
laboratory work, to requirements relating to education, training or 
experience for other work. 
9.2.20 Most of the government's workforce is in the fourth division. At June 
1975, 70.5 per cent of permanent, temporary and exempt staff (including those in 
the PMG's Department) were in the fourth division, compared with 29 per cent 
in the third division and 0.5 per cent in the second division.1 The ratio of staff 
I . Source: Public Service Board Annual Report 1975. 
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between the third and fourth divisions has changed only marginally in the last 25 
years. 
9.2.2 I In 1920 Commissioner McLachlan expected that this division of the 
service would 'secure a more desirable uniformity in classification and scales of 
pay, and remove claims for preferential treatment and an irritating distinction of 
'caste' based only upon nomenclature'. McLachlan's concern at the time was 
with distinctions in status which were developing between 'professional' work and 
clerical or administrative work. At the same time it was thought necessary to 
difierentiate the broad categories of work being performed and to ensure that an 
adequate supply of administrative potential was maintained. While some of the 
problems which concerned Commissioner McLachlan have been eliminated 
there can be little doubt that the divisional structure itself is a source of caste and 
status, for instance, in the relationship between the third and fourth divisions. 
Widespread doubts have been expressed as to the usefulness of the structure and 
as to whether the restraints on mobility within the Service it imposes serve any 
valuable purpose. 
9.2.22 Criticisms of the divisional structure include the following: 
(a) it has inhibited an objective assessment of the working requirements of 
lower third division positions; 
(b) it precludes the promotion to third division positions of officers of the 
fourth division of proven capacity'; it attaches disproportionate value to 
formal qualifications which may be irrelevant to the work to be performed. 
9.2.2 3 The validity of these criticisms is accepted by most departments and staff 
associations and by the Public Service Board which proposes the abolition of the 
divisions and their replacement by a series of occupational groups. The Board 
suggests: 
The occupational group would serve as a primary \ chicle for determination of 
entry standards, recruitment processes, design and application of training and 
developmental programs, staff deployment, manpower planning and establish-
ment and classification processes. Each occupational group would generally 
have its own pay and grading structure and its own entry qualifications. 
However, in some cases an occupational group would be one of a number of 
groups attached to a large pay and grading structure, or one of a number of 
groups with the same basic entry qualifications. Conversely, an occupational 
group could consist of a number of occupations with differing pay scales, or 
diflering entry qualifications. 12 
The Commission supports these proposals and we recommend that: 	 R205 
(a) provision for divisions be removed from the Public Service Act; 
(b) the Public Service Board develop a system of categories and occupational 
groups along the lines proposed in its Memorandum No. 5  and in Part 6 of 
its Second Submission which provses a Senior Executive Category.3  
I . During the period 1964 to 1974 promotion or transfer from the fourth division fluctuated 
between 7 per cent and ii per cent of the annual in-take into clerical/ administrative class i 
designations. At June 1974, officers (excluding PMG) who had transferred from the fourth 
division represented 5.4 per cent of third division permanent staff'. 
2. PSB Memorandum to the Commission No. 5. 
3. Sec section 9.5  for our recommendations on the 'Senior Executive Category'. 
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(c) the Act should not concern itself with the structure of the Service, which 
the Board and departments should be free to develop and modify as 
necessary. 
9.2.24 We realise that abolition of divisions is no guarantee against restrictive 
work practices and other undesirable barriers to mobility, but believe it will make 
them less likely. As an additional protection, we have in Chapter 8.2 
recommended that entry qualifications and selection methods for positions in the 
various occupational groups should be re-assessed so as to eliminate prerequisites 
which are unnecessary for the work in question. 
Allocation of Work Between Divisions and Occupational Groups 
9.2.25 Disagreement concerning the allocation of work between occupational 
groups will not be eliminated with the abolition of divisions. The allocation of 
work between the divisions has been a contentious issue in recent years and has 
sometimes been the subject of direct industrial action by staff associations. The 
Commission received a number of submissions on this subject. The analysis which 
follows draws heavily upon these and upon work undertaken for us by Mr Brian 
Jones.' Officers in the technical grades for example are critical of work allocation 
between themselves and professionals. The employment of officers in tasks which 
fail to use their skills, and the restrictions on the upward mobility of other 
occupational groups, is wasteful of resources and leads to worker dissatisfaction. 
9.2.26 Technical vs Professional: The principal representation made in this area is 
that professionally qualified people are still being employed on work appropriate 
to technical grades. Professional officers require a tertiary diploma or degree, 
and professional duties are defined as those actually requiring the application of 
the prescribed qualifications. Technical officers attain a technical certificate or 
equivalent standard, which enables them to perform duties to a higher technical 
level that those formally undertaken by technicians and comparable skilled 
groups. 
9.2.27 A series of work reviews has been undertaken in this area and is 
continuing. The purpose of the reviews has been to restructure the areas of 
overlap between technical and professional so that high grade technical work not 
requiring professional qualifications can be transferred from professional to sub-
professional groups. One recent report  described the consequent restructing as 
having involved: 
(a) a restatement of the engineer's role to emphasise work requiring 
professional qualifications; 
(b) employment of 'para-professionals' in operational management; 
(c) the transfer of man-management responsibilities from professionals to 
para-professionals; 
(d) the adoption by professionals of functional relationships with, rather than 
supervisory control over, para-professionals. 
R2o6 The Commission endorses the continuation of these reviews and believes the 
changes proposed are in the interests of both groups. They contribute to work 
satisfaction and make the best use of valuable knowledge and skills. 
Sec Appendix 3.0 for MrJoncs' conclusions. 
2. On the Australian Telecommunication Commission; see Royal Commission discussion paper, 
Salary Classification, P. 17. 
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9.2.28 Clerical-Administrative vs Clerical Assistant: There are no comparable 
reviews being undertaken in this field of work. The 'Fourth Division Clerk' 
scheme initiated by the Board in the mid- i 96os with a view to making better use 
of officers in the clerical assistant grades failed to achieve its objectives. 
9.2.29 A recent Public Service Board survey of the attitudes of new recruits 
showed that lower grade clerks and clerical assistants more than any other group 
claimed to be engaged on unchallenging, menial, repetitive work which made 
inadequate use of experience and ability and provided poor job satisfaction. 
Several of the efficiency reviews conducted recently have pointed to what was 
considered to be the 'over-qualification' of certain staff for the work performed. In 
one instance, a turnover rate of ioo per cent in six months was cited. This would 
suggest that some re-examination of skills and incentives appropriate to the work 
would be worthwhile. 
9.2.30 We recommend that: 	 R207 
(a) a review be made of the duties allotted to lower grade clerks with the aim of 
transferring suitable work to appropriate grades of clerical assistant; 
(b) the review should have regard to 
(i) the existing salary overlap between clerical assistant and lower 
clerical grades, 
(ii) the possibility of increasing the proportion of higher grade clerical 
assistants, 
(iii) the minimum recruitment levels to sustain the clerical/ 
administrative structure. 
9.2-31 We support the practice of consultation with staff associations in the R208 
selection of employee representatives on such review teams; it is vital that there be 
nominees from all occupational groups (or work areas) affected. Further, if staff 
associations are to participate in discussion about re-allocation of work they must 
have access to the findings of review teams, and staff representatives must be free 
to discuss the work reviews with the relevant associations. In the absence of such 
participation by representatives of both sides, staff confidence in reviews is 
eroded. Our recommendations at paragraph 9.2.5 (relating to the revival of 
Classification Committees) may offer an alternative framework for these 
processes. 
9.3 CATEGORIES OF EMPLOYMENT 
Existing Categories of Employment 
9.3.1 In Chapter 8. i reference was made to a distinction which exists under the 
Public Service Act between permanent staff (officers) and other staff. The 
distinction is an important one in the staffing arrangements of a number of 
Commonwealth departments and authorities. The Public Service Act provides 
for three sources of authority for the engagement of staff other than members of 
the first division. First, the Public Service Board, under section 33  of the Public 
Service Act, can appoint to the second, third and fourth divisions, 'officers' whose 
conditions are as prescribed in the Act. Secondly, section 82 of the Act provides 
that temporary employees may be engaged by the Chief Officer of a department 
on the selection or authorisation of the Public Service Board or its delegates and 
on such conditions of employment as the latter determines. Finally, section 8A of 
the Act confers a power on the Governor-General to declare specified provisions 
251 
of the Act inapplicable to certain employees. This power has been construed to 
allow engagement of a category of 'exempt employees'. The exemption provision 
has been most often used to permit departments to recruit specified categories of 
employees direct, without any reference to the Board, and without being bound 
by the normal temporary employment procedures under section 82 of the Act. 
9.3.2 While the differences have been narrowed considerably in recent years, a 
key difference remaining between the above categories is that only (permanent) 
officers have continuing tenure to the prescribed retiring age once their 
appointments have been confirmed'. 
9.3.3 Two further categories of employment are relevant. The first is the 
engagement of contractors for services, under general powers to contract. The 
authority to engage such contractors at present resides ultimately with the 
minister administering the particular department. The second relates to the 
appointment of officers of the Executive government by the Governor-General 
under section 67 of the Constitution. This power is the basis of appointment of 
heads of overseas missions, royal commissions and other such offices. 
The Need for Change 
9.3.4 The Public Service Board has acknowledged the need for some changes in 
the existing concepts of 'permanent' and 'temporary' employment and in its 
Second Submission to the Commission, it outlined some possible new 
arrangements. The Board wishes to avoid the perpetuation of classes of worker, 
and seeks to develop an emphasis rather on broad classes of work. People could 
thus be assisted to progress according to their ability, and would not be unduly 
restricted by categorisation. The Commission welcomes this change of attitude. 
Our concern to see this principle apply generally has been at the root of many of 
our recommendations on staffing policy and practice. 
Anew criterion—'anticipated duration of the work': While the widespread use of 
temporary staffing arrangements has permitted departments to move with speed 
and flexibility in the recruitment of staff to meet their immediate requirements for 
certain staff (generally, base-level), the use of these procedures, where the work is, 
or may become, of a long-term nature, creates problems for staff and 
management. For this reason, and in pursuit of the objective mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph, the Board has proposed that the test of whether staff have 
tenure should be whether the work in question is of a continuing nature or is for a 
definite period. The Commission endorses the Board's proposal for the gradual 
elimination of the distinction between officers and temporary employees and its 
replacement by categories distinguishable by tests of the duration of the work to 
R209 which the engagement relates, and we recommend accordingly. 
9.3.6 Part-time work: Part-time staff, a category not specifically provided for in 
the Act, are currently classified as temporary employees. As such they are subject 
to the distinctive general terms and conditions attaching to that status and are not 
part of the career structure. There are however some terms of employment which 
are unique to this category, for example, staff working less than 24 hours per week 
I . For a discussion of proposed amendments to the terms of compulsory removal see Chapter 
8.4.91-104. The Public Service Board (Background Volume for the Royal Commission, No. 8, 
Chapter 5) lists a number of other arrangements for the engagement of particular types of staff. 
See also Chapter 8. 1.6. 
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receive a 15  per cent pay loading in lieu of entitlements to recreation leave, sick 
leave etc. 
9.3.7 It is our view that the distinction based on anticipated duration of work R210 
should also apply to part-time staff, so as to express the situation from the point of 
view of matching staff to the nature of the work. There will be somejobs which are 
best done in less than the standard working week or standard working day. 
Submissions have been put to us arguing that there is scope for the establishment 
of part-time positions in a number of work categories, specifically: 
(a) for work which is routine, 'administrative-support' in character, including 
typing, accounting, machining, telex- and data-processing; 
(b) to meet peak workloads which are sufficiently regular and predictable to 
be met by using part-time employees; 
(c) for project work on which people with specialist skills may be employed to 
work in their homes. 
9.3.8 The Commission is aware that there are many sensitive and unresolved 
issues concerning the status of part-time staff. The Board has recently released a 
discussion paper on Part-Time Employment, and it is to be hoped that this will 
stimulate the extension of part-time employment opportunities in those areas 
where it is practicable. 
9.3.9 Some problems of implementation: We recommend that, with the clarification in R21 I 
the Act of the status of staff engaged, there should also be a concerted effort by the 
Public Service Board, in consultation with relevant staff organisations, to 
eliminate unnecessary differentiation between terms and conditions of employ-
ment for staff recruited for different durations. We leave it to the Board, which has 
acknowledged the need for reform, to develop detailed recommendations, taking 
into account the difficulties to which they have alluded in their Second 
Submission to the Commission. 
9.3.10 Any change in basic employment arrangements will have repercussions 
for management. The extension of certain rights and financial benefits to staff 
previously denied them creates costs for the employer. Staff may also resent the 
increased competition for promotion which comes with changed status for some 
employees. A specific source of resentment, which is reflected in union policies, is 
the integration of part-time staff into the career structure. Such problems nearly 
always arise in attempting to alleviate the effects of past discrimination against. 
certain groups of employees. 
ii The Commission is conscious of the problems of implementation, but we 
strongly recommend that machinery to permit the processes of negotiation leading R212 
to the development of a workable scheme be established at an early date. 
9.4 TOWARDS A UNIFIED SERVICE 
Introduction 
9.4.1 In the early years of Federation, the vast majority of the Commonwealth 
workforce was employed under the Public Service Act, and the career public 
servant had the right of mobility throughout that workforce on the basis of his 
merits. Today, only about one-third of this workforce is employed under the 
Public Service Act, and the number of independent employing authorities has 
increased greatly. 
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9.4.2 The greatly increased size and diversity of government employment is one 
of several factors which, in practice, have mitigated the notional force of the 
unified service concept. Other factors include: 
(a) a tendency for even the departmental service to contain discrete 
employment 'fields' or careers; for example, Tax, Customs, Prime Minister 
and Cabinet, Foreign Affairs'; 
(b) the fact that approximately one-quarter of staff employed under the Public 
Service Act are in the temporary and exempt categories2 and, while 
technically within the unified service, are excluded from the application of 
ostensible benefits of inclusion, for example, access to appeal procedures 
and career mobility; 
(c) the fact that within departments, the opportunities for mobility inherent in 
the unified service concept are restricted by the divisional structure of the 
administrative hierarchy3; 
(d) a decreasing rate of interchange of staff between departments (after 
allowance is made for the movements resulting from changes in the 
Administrative Arrangements). 
The first Public Service Act of 1902 was not designed to create a 'unified 
service' in the true sense of that term. Rather, the Act encouraged the 
establishment of a service which was divided by clear departmental boundaries. 
For instance, the then Minister for Home Affairs, in his Second Reading Speech, 
expressed the following intention of the Act: 
'1 have tried to keep each department by itself; that is unless under very 
exceptional circumstances, we provide that Government shall not go all over the 
service, and take a man out of one particular department to put him over the 
heads of officers in another department, who are looking forward to being able to 
climb up to the higher positions for which they have qualified. 1 have seen the ill 
effect of the alternative practice in other States. Of course, there is power for the 
Governor-General in Council to make transfers from other departments in 
exceptional cases, but these transfers must be on the recommendations of the 
commissioner and the permanent head.' 4 
9.4.4 Although this separation (a result perhaps of concern for the sensitivities 
of staff transferred from State departments to a new federal system) is no longer 
evident in interpretations of the Public Service Act, the concept of a unified 
service has never been widely reflected in practice. Nor has the Officers' Rights 
Declaration Act been effective in securing any significant measure of mobility 
between the Public Service and statutory authorities. It is doubtful whether 
changes to that legislation currently under consideration will promote any 
significantly greater mobility, although the changes may be valuable for the 
purposes for which they were intended. 
9.4.5 The Commission does not underestimate the complexity or difficulty of 
the issues involved in greater unification of agencies of government for any 
purpose. However, some measure of unification has already been achieved 
through such 'measures as the Commonwealth Employees' Furlough Act, the 
Maternity Leave (Australian Government Employees) Act, the Compensation 
i. See Appendix 3.A, Paper 8. 
2. See Chapter 8.i, Table 2 and Section 9.3  above. 
3. See Section 9.2 above. 
4. House of Representatives Debates, Vol. I 1901 p. io86 
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(Australian Government Employees) Act as well as arbitral determinations 
which have general application throughout the Public Service and relevant 
statutory bodies'. We see clear value in the extension of uniformity of this kind. 
We also see benefit in the avoidance of duplication in the determination of certain 
conditions of employment. 
9.4.6 Because of the benefits which clearly can be derived from the removal of 
unnecessary differences and duplication between Commonwealth government 
employment agencies, the Commission endorses in principle (although with some 
reservation on the need for separate legislation as in () below) the Public Service 
Board proposal outlined in Part 8 of its Second Submission and more particularly 
paragraph 8.11: 
'(i) The Australian Government employment area could be regarded as a 'loose 
entity' for employment purposes. 
(2) All major legislated conditions of employment (superannuation, furlough, 
compensation (if a separate scheme is to remain), maternity leave, 
recreation leave, leave loading, etc.) could be brought together into one Act 
and apply throughout the Administration, unless otherwise prescribed (for 
example, special superannuation arrangements for T.A.A. pilots might 
continue to be necessary). Provision would need to be made for 
determinations on the details of these major conditions—only the broad 
provisions and essentials should be incorporated in the legisiation—and 
determinations on other conditions of employment; these could include both 
general determinations, and specific determinations for particular areas of 
the Administration, groups, etc. 
() One Act—possibly the same Act as embodies the conditions of employment 
or a separate 'Administration' Act—could specify the broad principles that 
should apply to staffing of the whole Administration, for example, open 
competition and merit principle for promotion, termination only for cause 
and by due process after a form of probation, requirements as to conduct 
(including disciplinary appeals), etc., leaving to subordinate legislation or 
determinations the detail to be applied in particular situations. These 
provisions could be framed to apply unless otherwise prescribed (for 
example, special provisions would be required for Ministerial staff). 
() That Act could also provide for mobility within the Administration, subject 
to meeting qualification requirements for the particular position concerned 
and selection on merit in accordance with approved procedures. A person 
moving from one part of the administration to another would remain part of 
the general 'entity', but would be subject to the conditions of his current 
employer, who, if he became surplus, would make efforts in co-operation 
with other agencies to place him elsewhere in the administration—but if this 
could not be done then the normal redundancy arrangements would apply. 
Special provisions would need to be devised so that 'compulsory' transfers of 
staff groups could be made within the system, and so that transfers from 
other systems (for example State services) could be dealt with satisfactorily. 
(5) Separate Acts would establish particular institutions or employing agencies 
and these Acts would invoke the general provisions of the basic 
'Administration' Act, except to the extent that departures from the normal 
principles were deemed appropriate. Departures from the general principles 
would thus be readily apparent and would be subject to Parliamentary 
consideration in the course of debate on the relevant enabling legislation.' 
I . As, for example, Determination No. 32 of 1956, Commonwealth Public Sconce Arbitration Reports, 
Vol. 36 (1956), P. 27 1ff. 
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9.4.7 There are many aspects of this proposal which will need detailed 
development and consultation with interested parties, before they are ready for 
implementation. For instance there is no intention that the new provisions should 
take away the legislatively conferred independence of statutory bodies. Rather, 
they would provide one way by which statutory bodies could give their staff access 
to the Public Service itself, and rice versa, without all the complications attendant 
upon the Officers' Rights Declaration Act. Insofar as statutory bodies are 
concerned, we would expect the larger and more independent of these, and 
particularly universities and the commercial undertakings, to continue much as 
at present, but with the opportunity to confer on their staffs the benefits of the new 
Commonwealth employment provisions. It is clear that stall organisations, 
although generally in favour of greater mobility, and drawing attention to the 
inadequacy of staffing provisions in some statutory bodies, would also need to be 
brought into consultation to ensure adequate protection of the rights and 
opportunities of their members when the new arrangements are being settled. 
Our recommendations on these matters can be found in Chapter i 1.6, on the role 
of the Public Service Board. 
9.4.8 The Commission stresses the need to preserve the relative flexibility which 
a number of agencies enjoy in management matters. However we believe that 
such flexibility is compatible with the legislative framework we have outlined in 
this Report which, if adopted, will facilitate greater mobility between different 
agencies of government. The Commission would envisage the development of the 
Public Service Board mainly as a resource agency for Commonwealth 
government employment generally rather than a control agency. It would 
undertake the development of such aids as management information systems, 
recruitment services, training courses and so on. We discuss this further in Chap-
ter 11.6. There are many areas of Commonwealth administration which either 
are, or which it has been put to us should be, staffed outside the Public Service 
Act. The largest such area embraces certain statutory bodies, but we also consider 
below the staffing of ministerial offices and the parliamentary departments, staff 
for members of parliament and for the federal courts and the foreign service.' 
Staffing Statutory Bodies 
9.4.9 In Chapter 8.i we outlined three main types of arrangement for staffing 
statutory authorities: 
(a) staffing under the Public Service Act; 
(b) staffing outside the Public Service Act, but subject to a requirement that 
the Public Service Board approve terms and conditions of employment; 
(c) staffing outside the Public Service Act. 
Where it has been expressly provided that the stall of the body is to be employed 
under the Public Service Act, the chairman or chief officer of the body has in a 
number of cases been given head of department powers under the Act, allowing 
him direct access to the Public Service Board. Other forms of control apply to 
some of the bodies employing outside the Public Service Act. Some have to obtain 
the relevant minister's approval to terms and conditions, for example, the Law 
Reform Commission; others need ministerial approval for the determination of 
salaries above a specified amount, for example, the Australian Broadcasting 
Commission, the Australian National Airlines Commission and the Corn- 
i. 	 In Chapter ii . we discuss staffing provisions for the Auditor-General's Office. 
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monwealth Banking Corporation; and in other cases ministers have power to 
control the numbers employed, for example, the Australian Institute of 
Aboriginal Studies and the Commonwealth Police Force. In yet others the Public 
Service Board has power to impose ceilings on the numbers appointed to 
administrative/clerical positions, as in the Australian Atomic Energy Commis-
sion and CSIRO. 
9.4.10 The statutory provisions concerning the staffing of statutory authorities 
appear to be untidy and reveal no consistent principle as to when it is appropriate 
for staff to be employed under the Public Service Act and when not. In 1973, the 
then Prime Minister authorised the Public Service Board to undertake a full 
examination of the matter, and informed the Commission that as a • general 
principle the staffing of statutory authorities should be under the Public Service 
Act, and that even where an authority is given the power to determine its own 
staffing establishment, terms and conditions of employment should generally be 
subject to Public Service Board approval. 
i i The main consideration which appears to have influenced decisions to 
allow for separate staffing, outside the Public Service Act, has been a judgment 
that employment under that Act would not be suitable to engage staff needed for 
the fulfilment of the organisation's objectives. Specific features of employment 
under the Act which have been mentioned as rendering it unsuitable as a 
framework for staffing are: 
(a) the organisation of public servants into divisions, membership of which is 
determined largely by possession of prescribed educational qualifications; 
(b) classification by position not by person; 
(c) security of tenure accorded to those engaged for indefinite terms; 
(d) centralisation of the power to determine qualifications of recruitment, of 
control over establishments and organisational structure; 
(e) uniformity of regulation of the rights, duties and entitlements of 
employees; 
(f the possibility of disruption of an agency through promotion or transfer 
away from the agency of key staff. 
9.4-12 It has been suggested that an employment regime with characteristics 
such as these is not well adapted to the needs of some statutory corporations. Such 
bodies are often engaged in trade and commerce in competition with private 
enterprise, and need to be able to make decisions on employment matters quickly, 
without awaiting approval from an external authority. They need, it is said, to act 
with the same freedom as private entrepreneurs. Facility to compete for labour 
with other employers of the same occupational groups and to offer comparable 
terms and conditions of employment has also been a factor, though by no means 
the sole factor, in decisions to establish separate services or separate staffing for 
teachers, police and academics. 
9.4.13 With the greater measure of autonomy available for departmental and 
agency managers consequent upon adoption of our recommendations in sections 
9.1-3 and 9.4.5-8, a number of the objections to Public Service Act staffing 
should be removed. We note here that our recommendations represent in effect a 
continuation of a trend which has been evident over the years. In the past, there 
have been statutory transfers of staff to Public Service Act employment, for 
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example, the Federal Capital Commission (1930), the Repatriation Commission 
(1947), staff engaged by the CSIRO in aeronautical research (1948) and the 
London High Commissioner's staff (i). In 1975 the Public Service Act was 
amended to allow absorption into the service of declared categories of staff 
employed outside the Act, without the necessity of special legislation for each 
proposed transfer. We support this move. 
R214 9.4-14  Taking all these matters into account, we recommend that there should be 
a presumption in favour of staffing statutory bodies under a Public Service Act 
which conforms to the model we have outlined and is compatible with a selective 
application of particular sections to particular bodies according to circumstances. 
When the decision is taken to introduce legislation to bring a new body into being, 
the onus should be on its promoters to show why staffing should be outside the 
Act, or to nominate the matters under the Act in relation to which the new body 
should have autonomy. Before legislative proposals for separate staffing are 
approved, the Public Service Board should be consulted and its advice should be 
communicated to the responsible minister. 
9.4.15 The principal advantages which the Commission sees as flowing from 
employment under a renovated Public Service Act are as follows: 
(a) increased career opportunities for staff; 
(b) a larger pool of manpower from which departments and statutory 
authorities may draw; 
(c) a greater facility on the part of government to reallocate manpower in the 
public sector in order to give effect to changes in priorities and in the 
direction of policies; 
(d) greater ease in implementation and scope for application of manpower 
budgeting (see Chapter 3 The Efficient Use of Resources); 
(e) less need to deploy resources in the development of codes of employment 
for individual agencies although separate arrangements for a number of 
authorities would of course be maintained; 
(f) less time and effort spent in seeking and making determinations varying 
terms and conditions of employment; 
(g) wider application of a basic code of fair employment practices; 
(h) less need for reliance on the Officers' Rights Declaration Act to preserve 
rights of public servants who transfer to statutory authorities; 
(i) wider application of the concept of open competition on merit. 
9.4. 16 In the course of implementing the changes we have proposed to the 
Public Service Act, the Public Service Board should develop a program of 
negotiations with statutory bodies whose staffing arrangements are at present 
outside the Act, to secure a joint understanding with each authority as to the 
appropriate relationship to be adopted under the revised statute. It is not 
contemplated that the initiative for opening negotiations of this kind should rest 
only with the Public Service Board. Statutory bodies should be encouraged to 
approach the Board on such matters. If, in any negotiation, it does not prove 
possible for the two parties to reach mutual agreement, then, on the initiative of 
either, the issue should be referred for decision to the government. It would be 
expected that over time arrangements for a number of basic conditions of service 
would become uniform throughout Australian government employment. This 
would apply to provisions for furlough and various forms of leave, super- 
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annuation and compensation as well as the matters which in this Report we have 
seen as appropriately coming under common personnel policy: equality in 
employment (Chapter 8.3); merit recruitment (Chapter 8.2); rights and obliga-
tions of staff (Chapter 8.5); processes of personnel policy and staff grievance 
review (Chapter 8.5). Whether the Board would also be involved in matters of 
more particular detail would be one of the aspects to be negotiated. 
9.4.17 We do not have available to us sufficient detailed information to allow 
firm recommendations to be made about the arrangements to apply to particular 
bodies, or even to groups of bodies. However it is possible to make some 
observations about staffing arrangements for the main functional categories—
commercial undertakings, marketing boards, and academic and research 
institutions. Detailed arrangements would need to be left to the negotiation 
process we have recommended in paragraph 9.4.16. 
9-4,18 In relation to commercial undertakings, we recognise the importance of 
enabling the corporations to deal with employment matters speedily and free 
from constraints which do not apply to their competitors. However, we are not 
pdrsuaded that managerial autonomy would be seriously compromised if the 
corporation were to be subject to some of the broad provisions we recommend in 
this and the preceding chapter for application to the whole range of 
Commonwealth employment. We see a good case also for co-ordinating 
machinery of the kind we discuss at paragraph 9.6.53 to ensure some general 
consistency in the approach by the Commonwealth as an employer to important 
industrial issues. In relation to marketing authorities, it has been suggested that the 
fact that they derive their funds from levies on producers means that they should 
employ their own staff. We do not find this a convincing reason for separate 
staffing arrangements and recommend that these bodies be given the advantages of R215 
joining the Commonwealth employment group by bringing them under the new 
Public Service legislation. It would, be appropriate to confer chief officer status on 
the head of the agency. In relation to academic and research institutions we consider 
Australian tradition and practice warrant a high degree of autonomy in staffing 
and related matters.' 
9.4.19 In a number of instances the power given to the statutory body to engage 
staff on terms and conditions determined by it has been qualified by the 
requirement that the terms and conditions should be approved by a minister. 
This has the practical effect of putting the minister's department in the role of the 
Public Service Board and giving the department greater authority than it possesses 
in relation to departmental officers. Departments in this situation are, of course, 
at liberty to seek advice from the Board before advising the minister, but they are 
not under a duty to do so. In general we see little merit, and positive 
disadvantages, in the substitution of ministers and thereby departments for the 
Board as the body whose approval of terms and conditions is required. We 
recommend that the practice of conferring power on a minister to determine terms R216 
and conditions for staff of statutory bodies be avoided, and that existing provisions 
to this effect be repealed and the jurisdiction of the Public Service Board 
substituted. 
9.4.20 Two further objections were made by statutory bodies to the 
employment of staff under the Public Service Act. The first was that a body set up 
I . See also Chapter 10.2, Science and Government. 
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to give advice to a minister could not operate effectively if its staff were appointed 
in this way. This was a point put by the Commonwealth Bureau of Roads. The 
second was that in the case of bodies such as the office of the proposed 
Ombudsman, public confidence might be more difficult to maintain if staff were 
drawn exclusively from the Public Service. On the first point, we note that many 
commissions, for example, the Grants Commission, the Industries Assistance 
Commission and the Schools Commission, are staffed under the Public Service 
Act and have shown no notable lack of capacity to give independent advice to the 
minister. In relation to the second point, we envisage that bodies such as the 
proposed Ombudsman would have authority to recruit staff outside the Public 
Service—a power which will be available under the proposed new legislation. 
We doubt whether employment on terms and conditions available through-
out Commonwealth employment generally would reduce the effectiveness 
of the body. Free mobility into and out of other areas of Commonwealth 
employment may well enhance the capacity of quasi-judicial and investigative 
bodies. However, should there be any suggestion of impairment to the effective 
autonomy of such offices we would expect that action should be taken promptly 
by the Parliament to secure protection against its continuance. 
9.4.2 I Finally, we note that the system of salary determination introduced by 
the Remuneration Tribunals Act sits ill with the inconsistently applied system 
operating under previous legislation by which the determination of' higher 
salaries rests with individual ministers. The Remuneration Tribunal at present is 
an effective instrument of co-ordination, and in the Commission's view its 
jurisdiction should be enlarged to encompass and succeed the jurisdiction at 
present reposed in ministers to approve or disapprove payment of salaries to 
officers and employees of statutory authorities above a prescribed level. However, 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal should be limited to the higher level salaries and, 
consistent with our earlier recommendation about ministerial determination 
R217 (paragraph 9.4.19), we recommend that salaries not of a level appropriate for 
determination by the Tribunal be determined by the appropriate body, that is 
the Public Service Board or the statutory body itself) where it has staffing powers. 
R2 i 8 We further recommend that the legislation provide that determinations of the 
Remuneration Tribunal come into immediate effect: there should be no need for 
supplementary legislative action. 
Ministerial Staff 
94. 22 It follows from our discussion of the role of ministerial staff in Chapter 4.6 
that appointments to ministerial staff should be made by ministers. Many 
ministers adopt the practice of asking their departments to provide a list of 
suggested people for positions they wish to fill, and many ministerial staff are 
drawn from departments. Each minister must be able to make his own 
responsible choices in the matter of staff. For some positions, a minister would be 
well advised to consult with his department and to take into consideration the 
advantages of drawing upon staff with knowledge of and insight into 
departmental operations and the fact that a term in a ministerial office is valuable 
experience and training for staff. Appointment of public servants and of 
outsiders' should of course be subject to any arrangements or procedures decided 
R2 19 by the government. In this connection we suggest that the procedures might well 
require that a selection committee appointed by the Prime Minister should offer 
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advice to each minister concerning the candidates (including any suggested by 
the minister himself) for more senior positions. 
9.4.2 3 Under section 48A of the Public Service Act, officers seconded for duty as 
private secretaries to Ministers have a right to be restored to the service on 
termination of their employment in the minister's office. There is no such 
provision covering other staff employed in ministers' offices. In the new 
arrangements we are proposing for a unified service, it will continue to be possible 
to serve in a ministerial office and be reinstated on termination. Staff who have 
joined a ministerial office from outside the Service are presently employed on 
conditions laid down under the exempt employee provisions of the Public Service 
Act (section 8A). Ministerial staff perform a special role and should in our view be 
subject to clearly stated terms and conditions of employment, which in some 
respects should be different from those of the general Public Service. As indicated 
in paragraph 9.4.35, there is some similarity between ministerial staff and the staff 
of members of Parliament. 
9.4.24 The new legislation we have recommended to cover Commonwealth 
employment generally (see paragraph 9.4.6) will make provision for the 
application to special areas of employment of particular terms and conditions. 
We recommend that ministerial offices be considered such areas of employment, R220 
and that accordingly special arrangements be developed for the employment of 
ministerial staff. Essential features should be along the following lines: 
(a) the size and structure of ministerial staff establishments and terms and 
conditions of employment, including contractual entitlements on termi-
nation should be determined by the Prime Minister after consultation with 
the Public Service Board; 
(b) the classification structure should be common to all ministerial offices and 
should be determined by the Prime Minister after consultation with the 
Public Service Board; 
(c) the power to engage and dismiss ministerial staff should be vested in 
individual ministers—subject to any procedure advised to ministers by the 
Prime Minister; 
(d) public servants seconded to serve as ministerial staff should have the same 
entitlements as any other officer to whom the Officers' Rights Declaration 
Act applies, but those joining ministerial offices from outside should 
comply with normal requirements for entering the Public Service should 
they wish to do so. 
Staffing the Parliamentary Departments 
9.4.25 The Public Service Act of 1902 provided that appointments, promotions 
and other matters relating to the departments of the Parliament were to be 
determined on the nomination or recommendation of the Presiding Officer(s). 
The Senate made amendments to the Bill to put beyond doubt that all staff 
servicing the Parliament should be under the control of the Parliament and not of 
the Public Service Board. 
9.4.26 In the Report of the Royal Commission on Public Service Adminis-
tration, published in 1920, Commissioner McLachlan recommended that: 
'Officers of the Parliament should be brought into the general system of 
administration of the Public Service as regards classification, fixing of salaries, 
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determination of appeals other than in relation to punishments, the internal 
administration being left to the Heads of Departments of Parliament.'1  
9.4.27 This recommendation was not fully accepted, and in debate in the 
Senate on the Public Service Bill of 1921 the point was made that control of 
parliamentary staff by the Public Service Commissioner rather than by the 
Parliament would be abrogating the rights of the Parliament. However, it was 
also argued that the rights of officers serving the Parliament should be protected 
and that the careers of parliamentary staff should not be affected by political 
patronage. Therefore it was argued that classifications and salaries of officers of 
the Parliament should be examined by the Public Service Commissioner. 
9.4.2 8 Section 9  of the Public Service Act specifies the conditions and special 
provisions relating to staff of the parliamentary departments. In brief: 
(a) all appointments and promotions of officers of the parliamentary 
departments are made by the Governor-General on the recommendation 
of the Presiding Officer(s); 
(b) where reference is made in the Act to the Board, the Presiding Officer(s) 
are substituted for the Board, if this is not inconsistent with the context, and 
references to 'the Minister' are read as reference to the Presiding Officer(s); 
(c) classification of officers and offices is made by the Presiding Officer(s), but 
if the Presiding Officer(s) so request the Board does the classifying. (As a 
long standing practice the Presiding Officers have in most cases sought the 
advice of the Board before classifying an office. The Board is also often 
consulted on a range of other matters affecting the parliamentary staff, for 
example, organisation, pay, employment conditions and industrial 
matters.) 
In addition, the Governor-General may, on the recommendation of the Presiding 
Officer(s), make regulations on all matters on which the Board may do so, but a 
regulation made by the Board applies unless and until: 
(a) it is inconsistent with, or dealt with in a regulation relating to 
parliamentary officers; or 
(b) the Governor-General, on the recommendation of the Presiding Officer(s), 
declares that it shall not apply. 
9.4.29 The present arrangements create the situation where, although 
parliamentary staff are employed under the Public Service Act, certain 
fundamental provisions of the Act do not relate to them, and certain features of 
the 'career service' proper do not therefore apply to them. For example: 
(a) appointments are not made by the independent central personnel 
authority (the Board) after competitive processes controlled by that 
authority; 
(b) the appeal provisions of section 50 of the Public Service Act do not apply 
to promotions in the parliamentary departments; 
(c) certain special disciplinary provisions exist; 
(d) the application of provisions such as section 17 of the Public Service Act 
and the annual report provision (section 22) is unclear. 
9.4.30 The effect of the present arrangements is to recognise that there is a 
distinction between those serving the institution of Parliament and those serving 
i. McLachlan Report, P. 45. 
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the executive government. The Public Service Board has suggested to the 
Commission (in Memorandum No. 12) that the separateness of the parliamen-
tary staff might be recognised more clearly by the establishment under legislation 
of a separate Parliamentary Service. On the other hand, it has been put to the 
Commission that the small size of the parliamentary departments and their 
insulation from some of the provisions of the departmental Public Service, for 
example, the promotions appeal system, have the effect of reducing career 
opportunities for the staff, and of depriving them of rights which they might 
reasonably expect to enjoy as servants of the Commonwealth. 
9.4.31 The Commission believes that there are clear advantages to departments 
and to staff in both services in ensuring ease of movement between these two areas 
of Commonwealth employment. The Commission is of the opinion that the 
distinction between parliamentary departments and executive departments does 
not need to be emphasised by separate Acts related to terms and conditions of 
employment in the way suggested by the Board. Nor does it follow that the 
independence of Parliament in the staffing matters of its departments would be 
impaired by common legislation. The managers of the parliamentary depart-
ments could avail themselves of provisions applying elsewhere in Commonwealth 
employment while at the same time retaining a proper degree of independence to 
meet their particular needs. 
9.4.32 It was partly with the problems of staffing the parliamentary 
departments in mind that the Commission has developed proposals (see 
paragraphs 9.4.5-8) for the enactment of common legislation to cover 
Commonwealth employment generally. The concept of this legislation is that it 
will enable the relevant management groups to draw on the main streams of 
legislated conditions of service, for example, for leave, superannuation and 
compensation, while leaving each group to develop its own distinctive patterns of 
service. One advantage of these provisions is that they would simplify and 
encourage the movement of staff within the total field of Commonwealth 
employment and might therefore benefit the parliamentary departments, by 
offering them the capacity to engage staff for relatively short periods if this is 
thought to be desirable in some areas of their activities. 
9.4.33 The Commission has in mind that Parliament might consider the R221 
appropriateness of taking advantage of the provisions we have proposed so that 
the two Houses could apply the main features of Commonwealth employment to 
the parliamentary service, while reserving, for special determination by the 
designated authority within the Parliament power to develop particular features 
for the Parliamentary Service. One feature of the new legislation would be to 
provide that Parliament (and its officers) would have access to the Public Service 
Board for advice wherever that was considered desirable or necessary by the 
Presiding Officer. 
Staff for Members of Parliament 
9.4.34 All members of Parliament are entitled to have the services of an 
electorate secretary, except that the members of the House of Representatives for 
the Northern Territory and for Kalgoorlie are entitled to two. Additional 
personal staff are allowed to Opposition leaders' and since 1975  each Senator and 
I . At present, 34  staff members have been provided for office holders in the Opposition. 
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member has been permitted to engage additional staff for his electoral office 
within a given financial limit. In addition members may draw in emergencies 
upon a relief pool of secretary/typists provided within the Department of 
Administrative Services. 
9.4-35 Persons engaged specially for members of Parliament are exempt staff 
within the meaning of section 8A of the Public Service Act. There is no separate 
legislative provision for their appointment or terms of service—section 48A of the 
Act refers only to ministerial private secretaries. Personal staff of members of 
Parliament are engaged directly by members and have no security of tenure. The 
Commission inclines to the view that staff for members of Parliament might be 
associated either with arrangements for the Parliamentary Service (see paragraph 
9.4-33 above) or for ministerial staff (see paragraph 9.4.24 above). In either case, 
the Public Service Board would have an advisory role. Appointment to the staff of 
members would either be by contract (for those outside the Public Service) or on 
transfer from the departmental service (in the case of Public Service officers). 
Staffing the Courts 
9.4.36 The terms of reference of the Royal Commission do not expressly direct it 
to inquire into and report on the relationship between the federal courts and the 
administration. Nevertheless, there is one aspect of this relationship which we 
consider merits attention and comment. That is the functions and responsibilities 
of departments of state and other instrumentalities of the executive government in 
providing administrative services and staff for the courts. At the present time 
neither the High Court of Australia nor any other court established by law of the 
Commonwealth possesses any real or formal autonomy in relation to the 
administrative services required for the discharge of its judicial functions. The 
question is whether this state of affairs is compatible with the independence and 
autonomy which the Constitution guarantees to the courts. 
9..37 In some respects the administrative services and resources required for 
the operation of the courts are no different in kind from those required for other 
agencies of government, but there are features of court administration which 
make it a distinctive area of public administration. The main differentiating 
characteristic of court administration is that it is controlled by procedures that are 
very largely ofjudicial making, and the members of the courts are, in a sense, the 
principal administrators. Procedures for the conduct of litigation are laid down, 
in the broad, by Acts of Parliament and by Ordinances, but much of the detail is 
regulated by Rules of Court made by the courts themselves. While the-making of 
Rules of Courts is, strictly speaking, a legislative function it has been accepted as a 
legitimate use ofjudicial power and a function which does not offend against the 
separation of powers. It is moreover, a function which many judges regard as 
more properly theirs than that of any part of the executive branch and as being 
essential to the discharge of their constitutional responsibilities. 
9.4.38 Although the judges are responsible for the conduct of the business of 
their courts, their authority to command the resources required for the carrying 
out of their responsibilities is somewhat limited. To a very large extent they 
depend for their ancillary administrative services on the Attorney-General's 
Department. The non-judicial staff of the courts are technically part of the 
establishment of that Department. The annual estimates for the courts appear in 
the Department's estimates and their appropriations as part of the Department's 
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votes. Communications between the courts and the Attorney-General are 
through the Secretary to the Department, who is also the head of their 
administrative staff. Management services are shared with the Department. 
9.4.39 Overall the courts enjoy considerably less autonomy in staffing matters 
than many statutory authorities associated with the executive branch of 
government. For the purposes of the Public Service Act none has departmental 
status, and no officer of court nor any judge has permanent head powers, as, for 
example, has the Auditor-General. Their powers are very much more limited 
than the Presiding Officers of the Parliament (see paragraph 9.4.28 above) who 
generally speaking exercise the powers and responsibilities which ordinarily are 
exercised by the Public Service Board. 
9.4.40 It is, we believe, anomalous that the independence and autonomy of the 
judicial branch of government should not be recognised equally with those of the 
legislature. For reasons which have been stated earlier we do not regard the 
present arrangements for the staffing of the parliamentary departments as 
altogether satisfactory. The arrangements we mentioned as an alternative for 
service in the parliamentary departments might be used as a model for the staffing 
of the courts. What is important is a degree of managerial autonomy for the Court 
Service. 
9.4.41 The Commission is conscious that the way in which a court is 
administered may be of crucial importance to the individual citizen who has 
dealings with it. For this reason it is seen by some as important to ensure that any 
review of administrative arrangements for the courts provides an opportunity for 
and has regard to the expression of community interests related to the subject. 
9.4.42 The Commission does not feel in a position to make any firm 
recommendations on this question. Appendix 3.G sets out a proposal for a 
reorganisation of arrangements for the provision of administrative services for the 
High Court of Australia, the federal courts and the courts of the Commonwealth 
territories. We recommend that this proposal be referred to the judiciary and the R222 
Attorney-General's Department for their consideration. 
The Foreign Service 
9.4.3 Included in the terms of reference for the Commission is a requirement 
that it report upon the determination of conditions of service for persons serving 
overseas.1 A question which needs to be resolved before proposals can be made 
about these matters is whether there is to be a separate foreign service, or whether 
it is to be organised as part of the Commonwealth Public Service. 
9.4-44 A separate Joleign service: The Department of Foreign Affairs proposed in 
its submission that although those serving in Canberra should not be separated 
from the rest of the Public Service, greater autonomy in the administration of its 
overseas positions should be given by the passage of a special Act.' After careful 
deliberation and widespread consultation, having in mind the recommendations 
I . To assist it in reaching conclusions on the issues involved, the Commission asked Mr Justice 
Sharp, of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, to prepare for us a report on'Overseas 
Service'. The main parts of his report are reproduced in Appendix 3.K along with our 
comments on some of the proposals not discussed above. Our discussion of the formation and 
execution of Foreign Policy can be found at Chapter 10-4- 
a. Submission No. 2 14, paragraphs I 54ff. 
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contained in the report of Dr Sharp and taking into account also proposals for a 
greater sharing of responsibilities between the major central co-ordinating 
agencies and departments (Chapter 3  and ii), the Commission has concluded 
that government administration overseas should continue to be an extension of 
the Commonwealth Public Service. 
9.4-45 Consistent with the role and functions we outline in Chapter 10.4 for the 
R223 Department, the Commission considers that development in staffing matters 
should be in the other direction—towards greater integration of the work and 
staffing of Foreign Affairs with those of other departments. For similar reasons, 
R224 the Commission recommends that the Trade Commissioner Act be repealed. In this 
context, it notes the view of Dr Sharp, and of the Public Service Board, that the 
existence of the Act is not necessary to ensure continuance of the Trade 
Commissioner Service. With the added flexibility for the engagement and use of 
staff proposed elsewhere in the report, the legislative provisions may in future 
represent an impediment to, rather than an enhancement of, flexible adminis-
tration of the service. 
94.46 We indicate in Chapter 10.4 that in addition to its diplomatic functions 
the Department of Foreign Affairs discharges important administrative tasks. 
There has been a tendency within the Department to separate the 'diplomatic' 
from the 'consular and administrative' staff, we believe to the detriment of both. 
Policy and administration are in many areas closely linked and, while we do not 
necessarily suggest that there should be the one intake for both streams, we agree 
with the Foreign Affairs Association that it may be questioned whether the 
emphasis on the development of generalists adequately meets the contemporary 
needs of Australia's foreign relations and the consequent management demands 
on the department.1 The Association also expressed the view that: 
'officers should be confident that their placement in a particular stream will not 
prejudice their overall career prospects; neither the officer nor the Department 
should be unbreakably tied to a streaming decision once taken.' 
R225 The Commission recommends that continuing attention be given to ensuring 
adequate mobility within the Department. Among other things, this may achieve 
an improved mix of managerial and diplomatic capacities. 
9.4.47 Staff exchanges: Else'-where in this Report (Chapter 1 1.6) the Commission 
has made recommendations to promote greater and more deliberate movement 
of officers than those which result from promotion across departments. Service in 
Foreign Affairs, particularly in its diplomatic (or policy) stream, has shown a 
stronger tendency to confinement of career to the one department than is the case 
with any other except the former Postmaster-General's Department. This is in 
part a result of the development by Foreign Affairs of its own system of recruiting 
and training; and in part, of the very real difference between those who see their 
career as primarily based in Australia and those who see it as primarily based 
abroad. There has also been a reluctance to allow recruits into Foreign Affairs at 
any but the lowest levels, although there has been rather more movement out of 
the Department into home-based positions. 2 
I . Submission No. 703. 
2. See Appendix 3A 'The Career Service Survey', Paper 8. 
9.4.48 The Commission in general endorses the proposals by Dr Sharp for the 
rotation of Foreign Affairs officers into and out of the Department at a suitable 
stage following induction and early postings, on a basis which would fit them into 
the broad scheme of rotation proposed by the Commission itself. Thus the 
rotation need not be made immediately after the first posting abroad—for many 
officers the advantages would be greater at a later stage of their career. We 
recommend that, as a general principle, all diplomatic staff, and as high a R226 
proportion as Ipossible of other Foreign Affairs staff whose service is largely 
overseas, should serve for periods with other departments in Australia. 
9.4-49 While a system of rotation will be of value, we think it may not in itself be 
sufficient. Accordingly, we recommend that Foreign Affairs should recruit at all R227 
levels from other parts of the Service by advertising positions or groups of 
positions, both those subject to posting overseas and within the Department itself. 
As these recommendations are implemented we believe that the formulation of 
foreign policy will become both more expert—more a blend of overseas and home 
policy experience—and more knowledgeably based in Australia's interests; and 
that many of the difficulties of co-ordination currently experienced will be 
alleviated. 
9.4.50 Conditions of service: More than three quarters of those serving the 
Australian government overseas (excluding establishments at Butterworth 
(Malaysia) and Antarctica) are attached to Foreign Affairs-731 of the 1200 
permanent officers and 2700 of the 4100 exempt employees at the end of June 
1975. The largest other departmental employers of staff overseas at the same date 
were Labour and Immigration and Defence 1. There were 12 8  persons employed 
under the Trade Commissioner Act, and a further 480 locally engaged staff2. 
Most of those having the expectation that service overseas will be a primary 
feature of their working lives are within Foreign Affairs, and as such they require 
special consideration. 
9-4.51 Against this background Dr Sharp prepared his report and recom-
mended the establishment of an Overseas Service Advisory Council (OSAC) 
consisting of a full time Chairman appointed for two years, and having 
representatives of departments and staff. He envisaged that OSAC would develop 
and keep under review principles and standards to be followed in determining 
conditions of service generally. 
9-4-52 The Commission has had discussions with Dr Sharp, the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, the Public Service Board, Treasury and representatives of other 
interested departments concerning the proposal to establish OSAC to replace the 
Committee for Conditions of Overseas Service (CCOS). It has concluded that at 
this stage rather less elaborate machinery would be appropriate, and accordingly 
suggests regular, possibly bi-annual discussions modelled on those of the Joint 
Council among representatives of departments and unions and associations with 
significant membership serving overseas. If, as we believe, OSAC in this modified 
form proves able to make an important contribution in matters of terms and 
conditions for overseas employment, then it may well develop along the lines 
i. Labour and Immigration employed 186 permanent officers, Defence 1285 exempt employees. 
i. For further details, see table in Appendix 3.K. 
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suggested by Dr Sharp, including the appointment of a permanent or part-time 
Chairman of high rank and the acquisition of some executive functions. 
R228 9.4.53 Accordingly, the Commission recommends that: 
(a) an Overseas Service Advisory Council, chaired by a member of the Public 
Service Board, be established to provide 
(i) a forum for discussion of matters affecting service outside Australia, 
(ii) advice to the regulatory authorities and departments on any matters 
within their respective jurisdictions which affect the conditions of 
overseas service; 
(b) the Council should include representation from the Public Service Board 
and Treasury, from each department or agency with a substantial number 
of officers in overseas missions, and from registered unions or associations 
having significant membership in overseas establishments (these would 
have a right to contribute agenda items). On appropriate issues it should 
also draw into consultation representatives from other bodies representing 
sectional groups, for example the Foreign Affairs Association and the 
Foreign Affairs Wives Association. 
While OSAC could be expected over time to exercise a significant influence, 
particularly on matters of broad policy, the Public Service Board would naturally 
need to continue with the existing arrangements for prompt determination of 
operational questions as they arise. 
9.4.54 To guide the determination of conditions, the Commission gives general 
endorsement to the proposals made by Dr Sharp relating to such matters as 
equalisation of basic salaries and adequate provision for representational 
responsibilities and the problems of special locations. However, some of the 
principles he suggests are based on Canadian practice which may not in all 
aspects be entirely appropriate to Australia. There are also particular problems in 
determining common conditions for all Australia-based staff, as some of these 
serve under conditions within Australia which are not fully comparable. The 
R229 Commission accordingly recommends that, within the limits of applicability to 
Australian conditions, the principles proposed by Dr Sharp for the determination 
of overseas allowances (his recommendations 21 and 24-2 7) should be adopted 
and that a common code should as far as possible apply to conditions of service 
even where Australian conditions of service are different, unless the result is 
substantially unfair. 
9.4.55 The foregoing paragraphs deal primarily with terms and conditions for 
Australia-based officers. There is an important additional group, numerically 
larger than those based in Australia, who provide much of the basic services for 
Australian posts overseas. These are the 'locally engaged staff, numbering 2656 
out of a total Foreign Affairs staff of 4684 in December 1974. Many of these have 
given long and valuable service to the Australian government and while we 
R23o recognise the special features associated with their employment we suggest that 
consideration be given to providing better career prospects for them than at 
R231 present. We further recommend that a delegation of authority to determine 
appropriate markers (within guidelines stated by the Public Service Board, which 
should allow a substantial degree of local authority and reserve only important 
issues of principle) be extended to the Department of Foreign Affairs with the 
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Public Service Board retaining primary authority and determining those matters 
which fall outside the delegation guidelines.' 
9.4.56 We consider there should be an annual review of salaries and other R232 
conditions of locally engaged staff and that heads of mission should be authorised 
to make appropriate adjustments between annual reviews of salaries and other 
conditions wherever the average movement of marker salary rates equals or 
exceeds 5 per cent. However, we do not think that specific Australian conditions 
should be introduced for locally engaged staff. Rather, the aim of the 
Commonwealth government should at all times be to act as a good employer in 
the local environment, always taking into account certain minimal acceptable 
conditions that Australia should provide. 
9.4.57 inspection and review.- The number of overseas posts has grown rapidly in 
recent years, bringing the total in late 1975 to 94-66 full diplomatic missions 
(including4 missions to international organisations) and a further 32 functional, 
that is, non-diplomatic posts of which 7  are in countries where there is no mission. 
The head of 23 of the 32 functional posts is an officer from a department other 
than Foreign Affairs (either Overseas Trade or Immigration and Ethnic Affairs) 
which indicates a commendable flexibility in organisation overseas. 
9.4.58 The balance of functions between political or diplomatic and adminis-
trative or consular naturally varies from post to post and from time to time. 
However, with the rapidly increasing number, the immediacy of interests—either 
political or functional—must be diminishing. The Commission recommends that R233 
new missions or posts be opened only when there is a clear need; that the structure 
of a post be determined by direct reference to its main functions; and that regular 
reviews be made of the need to maintain missions or posts. (It should be possible in 
most cases to arrange dual accreditation if a mission ceases, in the broad sense, to 
be cost-effective.) Admittedly, it is not possible to assess in purely monetary terms 
whether a post is giving or would give 'value for money', but the Australian 
interest should be weighed against the scarce resources of both people and finance 
involved. Where the functions are primarily related to those of a department R234 
other than Foreign Affairs—normally these would relate to trade or 
immigration—there should be no automatic assumption that the post should be 
headed by a Foreign Affairs officer, though a specialist Foreign Affairs officer 
might often be attached to the post for 'political' functions such as reporting. In 
short, the criteria for establishing missions or posts overseas should be the same as 
those for establishing offices of departments within Australia: that there is a clear 
functional interest to be served. Foreign Affairs would nevertheless need, because 
of its general interests in conditions of service overseas, to keep a watch over terms 
and conditions for Australia-based and locally engaged staff, even in countries in 
which it does not maintain a mission: Foreign Affairs should have the capacity to 
be particularly flexible in the management of its overseas establishments, because 
of its practice of posting officers for limited periods. 
9.4-59 In its submission to the Royal Commission, the Department of Foreign 
Affairs recommended that an Inspectorate-General be established within the 
Department to monitor and regulate work and conditions of service at overseas 
I . 	 'Markers' are selected salary rates paid by local reputable employers, including expatriate 
firms and missions of comparable countries, which are used to assist in determining rates for 
locally engaged staff employed by Australian agencies. 
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posts.' Having in mind our decision not to recommend a separate Foreign Service 
Act we have concluded that there is no need to established a separate 
Inspectorate-General. However, we commend the steps the Department has 
taken, in association with the Public Service Board, to make regular inspections of 
posts overseas. The system of post liaison visits, which are undertaken by the 
Secretary or one of the Deputy Secretaries, is designed to review and promote the 
effectiveness at policy and general organisational level of individual posts, and 
might well serve as a model for departments operating primarily in Australia. In 
addition, the Public Service Board conducts inspections related primarily to 
conditions of service. With the modifications outlined below, these arrangements 
for review should continue. 
9.4.60 The Commission is aware of the cost and demands on senior staff of 
inspections. It raises the question whether, at the post liaison level, it will be 
possible for the Department's visits to be comprehensive. It may be that the 
program of visits will need to concentrate much more on regions or countries of 
particular interest or where the performance of the post is felt to require review. 
R235 With this reservation in mind, the Commission recommends that the system of post 
liaison visits be maintained and be clearly structured with the primary purpose of 
establishing: 
(a) whether there is justification for continuing the operation of the post or of 
any sections of the post; 
(b) the functional objectives for which the post is responsible; 
(c) the broad resource levels necessary to meet the functional objectives. 
9.4.61 At the level of detailed operations, the Commission endorses the findings 
of Dr Sharp, that inspections of posts should continue and be improved 
(Recommendations 3-39).  It sees these inspection arrangements as corn- 
R236 plementary to the post liaison visits and recommends that: 
(a) wherever practicable, joint inspections should be conducted by the Public 
Service Board and Foreign Affairs officers, with other departments 
represented when appropriate; 
(b) inspections should extend to embrace an assessment of management 
practice at individual posts and should monitor decisions taken under 
delegated authority; 
(c) individual inspectors should be authorised to determine any matters 
arising unless good reason exists for deferring a decision; 
(d) ajoint report should be prepared by the inspection team for Foreign Affairs 
(including the post concerned, the Public Service Board and appropriate 
departments); 
(e) consideration be given to inviting union representation on some of the 
visits made by inspection teams. 
9.4.62 The authorit5 oJheads of mission: The Department of Foreign Affairs drew 
attention to the difficulty which can arise when a difference of view develops 
between the head of mission and an officer attached to the mission from another 
department, for example, Overseas Trade, Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 
Defence or Treasury. It proposed that staff from other departments attached to 
posts overseas should be seconded to the foreign service and be placed under the 
I . Submission No. 214, paragraphs 166— 169. 
270 
authority of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. We believe this course would be 
neither desirable nor appropriate. At the same time, we recognise that close 
liaison is necessary between all officers serving the Corrimonwealth government 
overseas, and consider their activities should normally be co-ordinated by the 
head of mission, as the senior accredited representative of the government. 
9.4.63 We endorse the view' that the head of mission should be understood to 
have authority to exercise local discipline and guidance in relation to 
departmental officers posted overseas. He or she should have the right, which may 
be overridden by ministers, to decide the way in which a matter will be formally 
communicated to a foreign government; and a right, naturally subject to 
clearance with departmental head offices, to use all resources in the mission's 
territory to meet special needs over limited periods, for example, until 
replacement or additional staff can be brought in.' The head of mission should 
also have the primary delegation to make adjustments to terms and conditions for 
the employment of all Australia-based and locally engaged staff, regardless of the 
department to which they are attached, where such delegations are made. 
9.4.64 We do not, however, support the recommendation in the Sharp Report 
that in cases where the head of mission and an attached officer are unable to reach 
agreement, the attached officer should be transferred. Care must necessarily be 
taken in the appointment of officers to missions, and the Commission would 
expect that as a matter of normal prudence the Department of Foreign Affairs 
would not only watch over its own postings but also be consulted by other 
departments about officers they intend to attach to posts overseas. Where a 
disagreement does develop, it will normally be possible to resolve it at the mission 
itself. Where this is not possible, the matter will have to be taken up in Canberra 
and appropriate action taken, which may require moving one of the officers 
involved, after consultation between the departments and, if necessary, at 
ministerial level. 
9.4.65 Other matters: We have set out above our views and recommendations on 
the most important of the proposals put forward by Mr Justice Sharp. Appendix 
3.K contains our comments on aspects of some more of the proposals contained in 
the Sharp Report. Subject to these, the Commission recommends that the Public R237 
Service Board, the Department of Foreign Aflairs, and others concerned, follow 
up with a view to implementing them, the remaining proposals. contained in the 
Sharp Report. 
9-5 MANAGERS IN THE ADMINISTRATION 
9.5.1 In other sections of our Report we have made recommendations affecting 
the role of management in relation to particular activities of the administration. 
These include the new degree of accountability for departmental managers 
recommended in Chapter 3,  the new responsibilities outlined for them in Chapter 
4, the changes involved in making the administration more responsive to the 
community (Chapter 6) and in delegating more authority away from the centre 
(Chapter 7), as well as the range of recommendations made in this and the 
I . Expressed by Sir Arthur Tange in a letter to the Commission, 17  January 1975-  
2. Other matters in this area seem to be covered adequately by the Prime Minister's 1974 
Directive, which took the form of a letter to ministers about relations between departments at 
overseas establishments. 
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previous chapter affecting staffing practices. In the following sections we discuss 
methods of selecting and training managers and the role of 'management 
services', those areas of departments whose job it is to provide support for the 
operational or policy areas of departments—through information systems, 
training, audit, or 'personnel' work. 
The Selection and Training of Managers 
9.5.2 Given the increased responsibilities we are recommending for de-
partmental managers, it is obviously important that special consideration be 
given to ensuring that senior management is able to handle those responsibilities 
effectively. In Chapter 8.4 we noted the probability that there will be a shortage 
of senior experienced people during the next decade or two, which increases the 
need to ensure that staff with potential are identified and prepared for 
management positions. 
9.5.3 Apart from the problem of shortage of staff in the 'feeder levels' there is the 
problem of limited job movement of second division officers. Change of jobs has 
usually come through promotion, and promotional opportunities within the 
second division are very limited. Indeed, nearly half of second division positions 
in the service are at level i. It is likely, therefore, that the combined effect of the 
age structure and the limited movement within the range of second division jobs 
will result in an inadequate supply of sufficiently experienced managers. 
9.5.4 The 'Senior Executive tegory'. We have recommended in section 9.2 that 
the existing divisional structure be abolished and that in its place a range of 
categories of staff be developed to assist in the management and the development 
R238 of the service. We recommend that the higher management levels of the 
service—broadly those now comprehended within the second division—be 
marked out as Senior Executive Officers within a Senior Executive Category. 
9.5.5 Selection for appointment: It is important that when higher level appoint-
ments are being made, either in departments or in statutory bodies or agencies, 
the appointing authorities should have available to them comprehensive lists of 
people for consideration. Such lists would result from the rotation concept we 
propose in Chapter 1 1.6 supplemented by information about the length of time 
which individuals have served in particular positions. 
9.5.6 In Chapter ii .6 we outline the role we envisage the Public Service Board 
undertaking in relation to higher appointments. In order to ensure that the best 
possible appointments are made to positions in the Senior Executive Category, 
and that there is consistency in the lçvel of achievement required throughout the 
R239 Service, the Commission recommends that: 
(a) all senior vacancies be advertised within the Service, unless the Public 
Service Board has agreed that in the particular circumstances there is no 
need for advertising; 
(b) an officer of the Board be included on the selection panel; 
(c) the selection panel make its recommendations to both the Board and the 
departmental head; 
(d) where there is disagreement as to the person to be appointed, the 
departmental head make the appointment. 
9.5.7 The development and maintenance of management skills: The active involvement 
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we are recommending for the Public Service Board in higher level appointments, 
suggests that it should also be closely involved in the training of likely 
'candidates'.1 We note the current development within the Board's Office of an 
'Australian Government Managers' Program' which, although at present 
somewhat limited in scope, could be a useful adjunct to the procedures we outline 
in Chapter i 1.6 for staff rotation. For staff already holding senior executive 
positions, we believe that the management seminars arranged by the Board 
should be complemented by 'policy' seminars (that is, discussions relating to 
business of departments), organised by single departments or groups of 
departments when areas of need are identified. 
9.5.8 However we believe that officers are properly and best prepared for 
positions in the Senior Executive Category through having a wide experience of 
different aspects of the administration. To give them this experience is a more 
effective way of obtaining and maintaining management skills than are formal 
training courses. We have at several places in the Report  emphasised the need 
for staff mobility and the role of the Public Service Board in promoting it. We 
believe the need for mobility is particularly great for officers who are likely to 
move into the Senior Executive Category, and those already in it. 
9.5.9 One way of ensuring that such officers can develop and maintain 
management skills is simply to expose them to alfferent work through rotation to a 
department where their skills could for a time be used away from the department 
of their choice. Another would be to ensure, through rotation, that those who 
occupy management jobs in departments and agencies are not left there, but are 
given a chance before it is too late, to apply themselves in program or policy 
activities. Another possibility is to ensure that managers are given a period of 
rotation in one of the central agencies or, if they belong to the central agencies, in 
functional departments. As part of the policy to promote a wider range of 
experience among senior executive officers we recommend that officers in this 
category should normally not remain in any one position for more than 5-7 years, 
and the Public Service Board should watch over the arrangements made for 
moving such officers. We prefer the flexibility of this arrangement to proposals 
put to us for term or contract appointments of second division officers. 
9.5. io Thus officers in the Senior Executive Category should expect movement 
at any time after five years. In this way, the creative contribution of officers, 
which cannot be relied upon to last much beyond seven years in any one job will 
be maintained and the versatility of officers developed. Mobility of his kind must 
be regarded as a Service-wide issue and not one which can readily be handled 
within the framework of a single department. It will be an important task of the 
Public Service Board to promote the mobility desired. We take up the general 
question of career mobility again in Chapter i 1.6. 
Management Services 
9.5.11 The proposals we have made in this Report relating to, forward 
estimates, financial and manpower controls, and staffing practices, are only likely 
to be managed effectively by departmental staff if they have access to a variety of 
I . See Appendix 3.E, which includes the conclusions of our consultant on Management 
Training, Dr T. Williams. 
2. See also Appendix 3.F, 'Mobility'. 
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specialist expertise. This range of expertise encompasses what may be referred to 
as the 'management services' function in government administration. 
9.5.12 At present, the management services area is characterised by a wide 
diversity of activities, nomenclature (including position designations), staff 
experience and training, departmental influence and status. For example, a 
range of functions are common to over 50 per cent of the departments surveyed: 
directors and personnel officers in 16 departments revealed that the following 
range of functions are common to over 50 per cent of the departments surveyed: 
(a) advice on the formulation of policies and practices in personnel 
management, including recruitment, training, staff development and 
manpower planning; 
(b) the exercise of delegations under the Public Service Act and Regulations; 
(c) personnel operations including applications of conditions of service, 
control of registry and office services; 
(d) establishments; 
(e) representation of departments at inter-departmental meetings. 
Other functions less commonly performed (that is, in less than 50  per cent of 
departments surveyed) were organisation and methods, security, finance, 
industrial relations and certain operational functions. These included: 
(a) control of departmental relief staff; 
(b) co-ordination and operations of departmental procedures for vacancy 
interviewing and promotion appeals; 
(c) staff welfare and amenities; 
(d) control and implementation of flextime. 
9.5.13 Analyses have been carried out by Commission staff of data contained in 
the Public Service Board's Continuous Record of Personnel for public servants in 
positions with unambiguous 'personnel', 'establishments', 'training' or similar 
designations (collectively referred to here as 'management services' positions). 
These analyses revealed that management services is a relatively fast growing 
area of the Service, having a disproportionate number of staff recently promoted 
to their current positions. However, the people moving into management services 
positions (on the above definition) have tended to be older, longer-serving staff. 
Thus the growth of the management services area may lack the stimulus of fresh 
ideas which the younger and more recently recruited person might be expected to 
bring to this area of the Service. 
9.5.14 In accordance with the recommendations made in earlier chapters for an 
increased role by departments in the management of their resources, the 
R241 Commission has identified the fbllowing categories of service function that should 
be provided to departments by modern management services units: 
(a) information management: in order to make timely and relevant decisions, stall 
at all levels in government organisations must have access to a 
comprehensive information system which is updated by a continuing 
appraisal of the organisation's external and internal environments. This 
appraisal should encompass not only the efficiency, effectiveness and 
morale of the diverse individuals and groups which comprise the 
organisation and the use of financial resources but also the efficiency, 
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effectiveness and morale of the organisation as a total system. Rather than 
remaining locked into the managerial hierarchy, information will need to 
be collected from and be accessible to all levels of the organisation and, 
quite importantly in our view, in respect of information on which 
personnel policy is based, to staff associations (for example, training needs, 
manpower and career planning, job satisfaction, etc.). Automatic Data 
Processing skills will be essential for the effective interpretation of the 
information contained in those systems. 
(b) consultancy and organisational management: this management services function 
comprehends a wide variety of consultancy services including organi-
sational data collection and problem diagnosis, administrative system 
design, collection and dissemination of information and skills relating to 
new management techniques, and the provision of a range of specialist 
expertise in the design and implementation of strategies of organisational 
development or improvement. These specialist skills are likely to 
encompass the fields of social psychology, sociology, industrial relations, 
education and organisational development. 
(c) industrial relations and personnel administration: this category of management 
service functions, which in many ways overlaps (a) and (b) above, 
encompasses the various traditional aspects of personnel management 
(wages and salaries administration, establishments control, recruitment, 
training) as well as the new or developing areas (such as management-
staff consultation, manpower planning, classification reviews, staff 
appraisal and counselling). 
9.5.15 Each of these broad functions will need to have central as well as local 
counterparts. In particular, the Public Service Board should: 	 R242 
(a) act as a central clearing house and reservoir of knowledge, specialist skills 
and independent consultancy expertise which can be used by the broader 
Commonwealth Service we have proposed in section 9.4; 
(b) encourage and assist departments to formulate and regularly review plans 
for their long-range development as integrated, adaptive social and 
technical systems; 
(c) identify the need for and facilitate the introduction of changes in Public 
Service legislation, rules, regulations and traditions to ensure that 
initiatives for organisational improvement are legitimised and rewarded 
and not discouraged; 
(d) develop policy guidelines for maintaining the efficiency, effectiveness and 
morale of the Service as a whole, and for its developing role in relation to 
the broader changes in Australian society. 
9.5.16 Finally, we emphasise that the management services elements in 
departments need to be given a much more substantial role than their present 
relatively routine administrative and staffing functions. We recommend that as one R243 
measure towards improving the performance of management services groups, 
those working within them be moved into and out of operational areas and that 
consideration be given to appointing the senior officers for stated periods, for 
example, two or three years, after which they would return to functions of 
program execution and policy advising. 
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9.6 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
Machinery for Wage and Salary Fixation 
9.6.1 The primary responsibility for determining the terms and conditions of 
Commonwealth employees rests on the Public Service Board (see Chapter i 1.6) 
and various statutory authorities (see section 9.4).  However, this function is 
subject to recourse to the following arbitration tribunals: the Public Service 
Arbitrator; the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; the Flight 
Crew Officers Industrial Tribunal; the Remuneration Tribunal; the Australian 
Capital Territory Police Arbitration Tribunal; the Northern Territory Police 
Arbitration Tribunal; the Northern Territory Prison Officers Arbitration 
Tribunal; the Northern Territory Senior Prison Officers Arbitration Tribunal; 
the Northern Territory Fire Brigade Arbitration Tribunal; the Academic 
Salaries Tribunal. 
9.6.2 The pay and conditions of defence personnel are normally determined by 
the Minister on the recommendation of the Department of Defence. But in 
addition, from time to time, the Committee of Reference for Defence Forces Pay, 
on reference from the Minister, makes recommendations on variations in pay and 
conditions as the Minister requests. 
9.6.3 Main tribunals: The bulk of Australian government employees come 
under the determinations of the Public Service Arbitrator and the awards of the 
Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission (to be referred to hereafter 
as the 'Arbitration Commission'). The distribution of coverage as between these 
two tribunals has been drastically affected by the creation in July 1975 of the 
Australian Postal Commission and the Australian Telecommunications Com-
mission to replace the Postmaster General's Department. The legislation 
establishing these two Commissions provided for the Arbitration Commission 
to be the arbitral tribunal. 
9.6.4 The Public Service Board, the Department of Employment and 
Industrial Relations' and the Australian Council of Employees Federations2 
have suggested that the jurisdiction of the Public Service Arbitrator should be 
taken over by the Arbitration Commission. Although there has been a lack of 
unanimity in union policies on this matter, a number of unions which made 
submissions to us have urged that the present separate system of Public Service 
arbitration should be retained. 
9.6.5 However, the unions have asked that certain provisions in the Australian 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act should be incorporated in the Public Service 
Arbitration Act. In particular they mentioned: 
(a) the provision relating to the right of access of union officials to work places 
(s. 42); 
(b) the provision relating to the power to grant preference to members of 
registered organisations (s. 47); 
(c) the elevation of the Public Service Arbitrator to the level of Deputy 
President and with the same provision for tenure to the age of 6; 
i. 	 Submission No. 732. 
2. Submission No. 500. 
276 
(d) the extension to Deputy Public Service Arbitrators of the provision 
relating to the right of Commissioners to sit on reference and appeal 
benches and to be free to make awards without prior approval of the Public 
Service Arbitrator. 
Furthermore, to place Australian public servants on the same basis as other 
employees, the unions have asked for the removal of the current provision in the 
Public Service Arbitration Act (section 22) which gives Parliament the right to 
disallow determinations of the Arbitrator' and any decisions of the Arbitration 
Commission on reference or appeal. 
9.6.6 In our assessment, these proposals, which we endorse, if anything 
strengthen the case for the absorption of Public Service Arbitration into the 
Arbitration Commission. Certainly, the unions have not made a strong or 
sufficient case for retaining the present separate jurisdictions although they have 
said that they consider there are no 'compelling reasons' for absorption. 
9.6.7 The establishment in 1920 of a separate industrial tribunal for 
Commonwealth government employees was at least partly inspired by the Public 
Service Commissioner's reaction against the uses which staff organisations had 
made of the arbitral jurisdiction. More immediately, it was based on the need to 
relieve the congestion in the Arbitration Court and to provide a means for 
ensuring consistency in pay and working conditions within government 
employment. Since 1956, separation of Public Service Arbitration from the 
Arbitration Commission has been qualified by the introduction of provisions for 
reference and appeal (sections i 5A and 15C),  on matters of sufficient importance 
in the public interest, to a full Bench of the Commission constituted under the 
Public Service Arbitration Act. Since 1972, the Arbitration Commission has been 
organised on a panel system which could meet the requirements of speed and 
consistency in the determination of the pay and working conditions of Common-
wealth government officers and employees. Finally, the recent move of the postal 
and telecommunications employees out of the jurisdiction of the Public Service 
Arbitrator and into that of the Arbitration Commission has reduced the 
Arbitrator's coverage of Commonwealth government civilian stafi from about 
90 per cent to 6o per cent (this being still a wider coverage than that of the Public 
Service Board). Thus a number of the arguments which led to the establishment 
of a separate tribunal for Public Service arbitration no longer have the same force. 
While we agree that there are no 'compelling reasons' for absorbing the Public 
Service Arbitrator's jurisdiction into the Arbitration Commission, we see distinct 
advantages for such a move. 
9.6.8 Industrial discontent is often generated by differences in standards of pay 
and conditions of work which are not warranted by the nature and circumstances 
of work. The existence of unions whose membership straddles a wide area of 
Commonwealth government employment and the resulting pressures for fairly 
uniform standards of pay and conditions of work throughout this area, constitute 
prima facie strong industrial relations grounds for avoiding undue fragmentation 
of authorities, both managerial and arbitral, concerned with determination of 
I . The section applies to those determinations which in the opinion of the Arbitrator are not, or 
may not be, in accord with a law of the Commonwealth relating to conditions of employees in 
the Public Service. 
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pay and conditions of work of government employees. The managerial aspect of 
this matter will be discussed later (paragraphs 9.6.41-54). 
9.6.9 On the arbitral aspect, we believe that, with certain exceptions, it would 
be wise to place all Commonwealth government employees under a single 
R244 industrial tribunal. We recommend that apart from the exceptions noted in 
paragraph 9.6.40 the whole of Commonwealth government employment be 
placed within the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Commission. The Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act would be amended to provide a separate part dealing with 
the powers and procedures relating to Commonwealth government employment 
in the way that currently applies to the Flight Crew Officers Industrial Tribunal. 
However, in line with the provisions relating to other panels of the Arbitration 
Commission, the Deputy President of the proposed Commonwealth employment 
panel should be assigned to this panel by the President of the Arbitration 
Commission. 
9.6.10 The present panel system operating in the Arbitration Commission 
would enable all Commonwealth government employees, those employed under 
the Public Service Act as well as those employed by various statutory authorities 
outside this Act, to be dealt with by a specialist panel under a Deputy President 
and several Commissioners following in general the procedures and rules of the 
Public Service Arbitration Act. In effect, such an arrangement would be no 
different from one in which the Arbitrator handled the whole area of 
Commonwealth government employment under the existing Public Service 
Arbitration Act as amended in accordance with the submissions of the unions. 
There is the further advantage of enabling changes in the panel personnel to take 
place from time to time without impairment of the tenure of such persons within 
the Commission. 
9.6.11 Thus, the establishment of a panel for Commonwealth government 
employees within the Arbitration Commission should facilitate consistency of 
awards within the area of Commonwealth government employment as well as 
between this area and the rest of industry covered by the Arbitration 
Commission. At the same time, the resolution of conflict within Commonwealth 
employment should remain free from the various awkward jurisdictional 
restrictions relating to the meaning of industrial disputes, interstateness, ambit 
and common rule which apply to the power of the Arbitration Commission in 
relation to other employees. 
9.6.12 In recommending that the Arbitration Commission should handle the 
industrial matters of the whole area of Commonwealth government employment, 
we draw attention to the conditions which we believe to be necessary for effective 
operation of the arbitral machinery in this area of employment: 
(a) statutory independence of the wage fixing tribunal which operates within 
defined procedures including appeals and references to full benches but 
whose awards are final and not subject to disallowance by Parliament; 
(b) the Public Service Board and/or government through its employing 
authorities having the same rights as the unions in tribunal proceedings; 
(c) application of equitable principles of wage determination which maintain 
close parity of pay rates in Commonwealth government employment with 
comparable rates in the private and State sectors; 
(d) due regard for the state of the economy particularly on matters which 
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could be said to go beyond the standards enjoyed outside Commonwealth 
government employment; 
(e) consistency in the principles and decisions of the tribunals throughout their 
area of operation; 
(1) the conduct of proceedings with speed and in accordance with accepted 
practices of open hearings, adequate opportunity for parties and 
interveners to make full submissions, and the issue of reasoned decisions. 
We believe that to give full effect to these requirements, a number of departures 
from the provisions, procedures and practices of the present system of Public 
Service arbitration will be necessary. 
9.6. 13 Powers of disallowance: We recommend that the Government's power of R245 
disallowance of the tribunal's determinations at present contained in section 22 of 
the Public Service Arbitration Act be removed. Disallowance has occurred on 
four occasions only and the procedures in meeting the provisions under this 
section involve an unwarranted use of resources. But, more importantly, it seems 
to us to be wrong in principle for an arbitration procedure, whether in the public 
or private sector, to be qualified in this way and it is at variance with the way 
arbitration awards are viewed in the private sector where the employer has no 
right of veto on arbitration awards. 
9.6.14 We make no recommendation on the desirability or otherwise of 
excluding the tribunal from dealing with certain matters, for example, those 
covered by the Commonwealth Employees' Furlough Act, the Superannuation 
Act, the Commonwealth Employees' Compensation Act and any other 
prescribed Act or prescribed provisions of any other Act. However, as a matter of 
practice, on those matters not covered by these Acts, an arbitration tribunal 
should expect its determinations to apply subject only to the appeal provisions 
within the arbitration system and to challenge on questions of law in the High 
Court. 
9.6.15 Rig/its of appearance. We recommend that the Public Service Board, R246 
ministers and any Commonwealth government authority should have the same 
rights as all registered unions in proceedings before the Arbitration Commission. 
9.6. 16 Determining powerjor Public Service Board: The Public Service Board has 
submitted' that: 
'it should be enabled to give prompt effect to agreements reached with staff 
organisations or other decisions it reaches on pay and other conditions of 
employment for staff under the Public Service Act and proposes that it be 
empowered under the Act to make determinations to implement such 
arrangements generally.' 
Greater speed in implementation was also sought by the Council of Australian 
Government Employee Organisations. 
9.6. 17 We believe there is much merit in this proposal. We recommend that, for R247 
the purposes of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act, the Board be recognised as 
the 'employer' not only of those employed under the Public Service Act but also of 
those employed under other Acts all or some of whose terms and conditions of 
I . Memorandum 26, 'Powers and Machinery for Determining Pay and Other Conditions of 
Employment', paragraph 28. 
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employment have to be determined or approved by the Board. The Board should 
also have the power to determine all those matters of pay and conditions on which 
it has at present the responsibility to negotiate and to settle. It may be that on 
certain specific conditions (superannuation, compensation, etc.) the government 
rather than the Board, should have the right of determination and the powers of 
R248 the Board should be appropriately qualified. Accordingly, we recommend that 
subject to the overriding power of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, 
and except on matters from which it is specifically excluded, the Public Service 
Board be given the necessary power to make determinations on terms and 
conditions of employment. Disputes and grievances relating to personnel 
administration such as selection, promotion and dismissals, should be resolved 
through the procedures established under the Act without recourse to the 
Arbitration Commission. 
9.6.18 Accusations of pace-setting: Submissions have been put to us by the Central 
Industrial Secretariat' and the Associated Chamber of Manufacturers of 
Australia  that the Australian government sector has acted as an inflationary 
pace-setter on pay and conditions in recent years. We believe a distinction should 
be made between improvements in terms and conditions of employment which 
are the consequence of government decisions and decisions made by the Public 
Service Board and the Public Service Arbitrator. In particular, the Whitlam 
government legislated for an additional week's annual recreation leave and for 
parental leave. So far as the Board and the Public Service Arbitrator are 
concerned no persuasive evidence has been put to us to suggest that they have 
acted as pace-setters. We believe that these two bodies, and other primary wage 
fixing authorities in government employment should continue to determine pay 
rates and conditions of employment on the basis of fair comparison with the 
R249 private and State sectors, and we recommend accordingly. However, in view of 
criticisms which have been made concerning the pay surveys conducted by the 
Board we would urge that the Board carefully re-examine the basis of these 
surveys in order to ensure that they constitute fair comparisons with the private 
sector and State public sectors. In matters which are taken before the arbitration 
criticisms which have been made concerning the pay surveys conducted by the 
Board we would urge that the Board carefully re-examine the basis of these 
surveys in order to ensure that they constitute fair comparisons with the private 
sector and State public sectors. In matters which are taken before the arbitration 
tribunal for determination, it will of course be for the tribunal to decide on 
appropriate pay rates and conditions in the light of the submissions made by the 
parties and the principles applied generally by the tribunal. 
g.6. 19 More comprehensive awards: The procedures of the Public Service 
Arbitrator arising partly from the many unions involved, have resulted in an 
unnecessarily large number of determinations with the consequent cost of 
R250 processing them. We recommend a reduction in the number of awards for 
Commonwealth government employees by making such awards more compre-
hensivein relation to both the pay and conditions of employment and the parties 
involved. Thus, all unions whose members are covered by a common set of pay 
and conditions would be parties to the one award. However, this is not to suggest 
that an application for a consent award should be delayed simply because all the 
I . Submission No. 500. 
2. 	 Submission No. 412. 
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unions concerned have not agreed to the terms of such an award. So long as the 
unions covering the bulk of the employees affected have agreed with either the 
Public Service Board or statutory authority to the terms of an award, we recommend R251  
that the Board or authority should proceed with the application to the 
Arbitration Commission. 
9.6.20 Legality of industrial action: In the current industrial climate, section 66 of 
the Public Service Act, which makes it illegal for public servants to take industrial 
action and renders them liable to summary dismissal, is not viable. This section 
has not been invoked despite the fact that various forms of direct industrial action, 
including strikes, have been taken by public servants in recent years. The 
following table provides an indication of the relative significance of time lost due 
to direct industrial action in the Commonwealth Public Service. 
Man-hours lost per i000 employees per year' 
(mmonwealth 	 Australia 
Public Service 	 (excluding CPS) 
1969 	 July-December only) 70 1 310 
1970 1607 4531 
1971 795 5746 
1972 469 3 735 
1973 457 na. 
1974 2385 II 213 
It is evident from the above table that time lost due to industrial action is 
considerably less in the Public Service than in the remainder of the civilian 
workforce. It should be noted however, that these figures do not include action 
taken by government employees employed outside the Public Service Act and, in 
some areas, for example Naval Dockyards, time lost due to stoppages would be 
considerable. Both the Public Service Board and the Department of Employment 
and Industrial Relations advocated repeal of this section and the Commission 
recommends that the provision be deleted. Of course, it would be open to the 	 R252 
government should circumstances warrant it, to legislate for the maintenance of 
essential services. 
9.6.2 i Compulsory or preferential unionism: The unions have asked that any 
improvements in pay and conditions awarded to public servants should accrue 
only to union members and those shown to be conscientious objectors. The object 
of this proposal as we understand it is to induce public servants into union 
membership. 
9.6-22 The Arbitration Commission has as one of its objectives the encourage-
ment of trade unionism and it has the power to order preference to union 
members. It has exercised this power ma number of cases either where such a 
condition was agreed to between employers and unions or where the tribunal is 
persuaded that unjustifiable discrimination exists against union members. But it 
has no power to order compulsory unionism although, presumably, such power 
could be conferred upon it for Commonwealthgovernment employees. 
9.6.23 The Board has argued that preference for unionists in employment and 
Public Service Board, Background Volume 5, Pay, Conditions and Industrial Relations, P. 
''3. 
promotion and other such benefits would conflict with the merit principle which 
it says is 'fundamental to the continuing viability and health' of the Public Service. 
We accept this view and believe that union preference provisions would be a 
cumbersome arrangement and would be conducive to strife between union 
members and non-unionists. 
9.6.24 The question is whether the Board and statutory bodies should be given 
authority to come to an agreement outside the award of the Arbitration 
Commission requiring Commonwealth government employees (conscientious 
objectors excepted) to join the appropriate union within a short time after 
recruitment and making continued employment depend on union membership. 
This is an arrangement commonly adopted in private industry and would meet 
the submissions of the Public Service unions. 
9.6.25 The Commission is undecided about the wisdom of compelling union 
membership in government employment despite the occurrence of such an 
arrangement in many areas of private industry and makes no recommendation on 
this matter. 
9.6.26 However the Commission has given consideration to the suggestion that 
non-unionists should be required to pay a service or agency fee in lieu of dues to 
the appropriate union. On balance, it believes that there is merit in this approach. 
Such a fee would meet the valid point of view, that unions serve an important 
organisational function in representing employees in negotiations with employers 
and in appearances before industrial tribunals and that the cost of such a service 
should be borne by all employees, including those who may decide not to become 
members of the union. We note that such a system has operated in the Canadian 
Public Service for many years as a result of the decision of Mr Justice Rand in 
1946. The collection of union dues and service fees would be a matter of 
negotiation between the Public Service Board and the unions and be embodied in 
a Board determination. We understand that since 1970 arrangements have 
existed for the deduction of union dues from salaries and wages and that 
authorisation for the deductions to be made is required from the officer or 
employee. We see no objection to this arrangement and note that the collection of 
dues and fees through regular deductions from salaries is a practice commonly 
followed in private industry. 
9.6.2 7 Audit provisions: The internal audit provisions within government 
employment provide the basis for ensuring that determinations are adhered to. 
The Department of Employment and Industrial Relations suggested that this 
procedure is not appropriate for purposes of ensuring that industrial awards are 
observed; and that the relevant provision of the Arbitration Commission relating 
to the duties of Inspectors (s. I 25) should also apply to the Australian government 
sector. A similar view was also put by the Association of Architects, Engineers, 
Surveyors and Draughtsmen of Australia.1  
9.6.2 8 We are not persuaded that such a change is necessary. The present audit 
provisions should be amended to ensure that awards are adhered to rather than 
simply not exceeded. Such a change along with the vigilance of the Public Service 
unions and the sensitivity of public servants generally to determination and 
i. 	 Submission No. 368. 
award requirements should ensure that the terms and conditions of employment 
are met. 
9.6.29 Interpretation of awards: Under section 15F of the Public Service 
Arbitration Act, the Public Service Arbitrator may give an interpretation of a 
determination under this Act. The Department of Employment and Industrial 
Relations has submitted that should the jurisdiction of the Arbitration 
Commission be extended to take in all Commonwealth government employment, 
the interpretation of awards in respect of such employment should be undertaken 
by the Industrial Court. 
9.6.30 Interpretation of awards rarely constitutes a matter which is taken to the 
Industrial Court. In practice, such issues are resolved by the making of another 
award which puts the meaning of the first award beyond doubt. The power 
conferred under section 15F has not been tested but it may be no more than what 
is commonly done by the Arbitration Commission. We see merit in including this 
power explicitly in respect of arbitration in the government sector. 
9.6-31 Authority of individual Commissioners. The Public Service Board has 
proposed that, to ensure consistency in awards, the present provision in the Public 
Service Arbitration Act requiring Deputy Public Service Arbitrators' decisions 
to be approved by the Public Se'rvice Arbitrator, should be reflected in, that part 
of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act dealing with Commonwealth employ-
ment. This proposal would create an important difference in the authority and 
independence of Arbitration Commissioners, depending on whether they were 
dealing with Commonwealth employees or not. We do not believe that such a 
differentiation is either necessary or advisable for the purpose of ensuring 
consistency of awards within the panel dealing with Australian government 
employees. 
9.6.32 Other aspects: There are many other aspects of the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act to which those currently under the Public Service Arbitration 
Act would be subject which we have not detailed for comment because they. are 
less contentious. We recommend that these matters be determined by the R253 
government after full discussion between the Public Service Board, Department 
of Employment and Industrial Relations and the various peak councils of the 
unions. Such discussions will be most effective if an opportunity to study draft 
legislation is provided to the parties. 
9.6.33 Other Tribunals concerned with Commonwealth government 
employees: The argument underlying the absorption of the Public Service 
Arbitrator's Jurisdiction by the Arbitration Commission applies with even greater 
force to many of the much smaller specialist tribunals listed above (paragraph 
9.6. i) concerned with fixing rates of pay and conditions of work of groups of 
Commonwealth government employees. 
9.6.34 In its submission,' the Department of Employment and Industrial 
Relations has said: 
'These tribunals are not linked in any way with the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission or with the Public Service Arbitrator. Moreover, the procedures of 
these tribunals do not guarantee to the parties involved the application of the 
I . 	 No. 732. 
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same wage-fixing principles, for example, there are no provisions for appeal. The 
Department believes that there is a need to reduce the number of tribunals 
operating in the Australian government area and that compelling reasons would 
need to be shown to exist which necessitate the separation of particular 
government functionaries and employees from the main stream of the 
community's industrial relations processes and procedures for determining 
wages and conditions in the present social and economic climate.' 
9.6.35 The Department suggested that with the exception of judges and 
members of industrial tribunals, all those in Commonwealth government 
employment covered by the tribunals listed in paragraph 9.6.1 including 
members of the Defence Forces should come within the jurisdiction of the 
Arbitration Commission. 
9.6.36 While we see general merit in this proposal we believe that, partly 
because of the difficulty and possibly the undesirability of adopting the adversary 
style Of arbitration proceedings, it would be wise to keep the determination of pay 
and other benefits of certain groups outside the normal arbitration jurisdictions. 
These include members of Parliament, judges and members of industrial 
tribunals, first division officers, heads of statutory bodies and other statutory office 
holders, all of whose pay tends to be interrelated and who are at present 
encompassed by the Remuneration Tribunal; and members of the Defence 
Forces whose pay rates are determined by the Minister of Defence on the 
recommendation of the Department of Defence or of a reference committee 
appointed for the purpose. 
9.6.37 We do not share the Department of Employment and Industrial 
Relations' concern regarding the separation ofjurisdictions between, on the one 
hand, the Remuneration Tribunal and, on the other, the Public Service 
Arbitrator and Arbitration Commission, in respect of first division officers and 
senior statutory officers 'whose occupations have a close relationship to officers of 
the Commonwealth public service'. We do not believe that such a separation of 
function and differentiation of procedures is either industrially unsound or that 
'this approach is not consistent with the objectives of proper co-ordination of rates 
and conditions for holders of public offices and for Australian government 
employees generally'. 
9.6.38 The Remuneration Tribunal should not be a pace-setter and could be 
directed in its terms of reference to take account of the pay movements of relevant 
groups as well as general community movements. 
9.6.39 In connection with the pay of Defence Forces, we note the point made by 
Sir Arthur Tange that the Chairman of the Committee of Defence which 
recommends pay rates and other benefits to the Minister of Defence, is required to 
be a judge of the Commonwealth Industrial Court or a Deputy President of the 
Arbitration Commission and that one of the two other members of the Committee 
should be a Commissioner of the Arbitration Commission. 
R254 9.6.40 We therefore recommend that the Remuneration Tribunal and the 
Committee of Reference for Defence Forces Pay retain their present jurisdictions 
but that all Commonwealth government employees not covered by these two 
tribunals be dealt with by the Arbitration Commission in respect of their pay and 
conditions of work. In relation to the Remuneration Tribunal, we believe that 
there may be considerable benefit in the creation of provisions which provide 
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scope for giving special consideration to the claims of the holders of public offices, 
especially those whose salaries traditionally have been broadly equivalent io the 
salaries paid at levels of the third division of the Public Service. In particular, we 
note that the Tribunal is required at present under section 8(1) of the 
Remuneration Tribunals Act to report at the one time on all the groups within its 
jurisdiction and we recommend that consideration be given to repeal of this R255 
provision. 
Co-ordinated Management of Industrial Matters 
9.6-41 We referred earlier (paragraph 9.6.8) to the wisdom of avoiding undue 
fragmentation of authorities, both managerial and arbitral concerned with fixing 
pay and conditions of work. We turn now to consider the requirements of co-
ordinated management in industrial matters. 
9.6.42 The primary responsibility on the management side for determining pay 
and other conditions of work of those employed in the Commonwealth public 
service rests on the Public Service Board without government or ministerial 
direction. For statutory authorities, there are a multiplicity of arrangements 
ranging from Board primary responsibility to responsibility by the authority 
without approval by the Board or the minister. These arrangements are discussed 
in section 9.4  (Staffing Statutory Bodies) and a comprehensive list of authorities 
categorised by type of staffing arrangement is provided in Appendix i.K. 
9.6.43 Until July 1975, some 8o per cent of Commonwealth government 
employees were employed under the Public Service Act or with terms and 
conditions subject to Board approval. However, the establishment of the Postal 
and Telecommunications Commissions which employ about one-third of all 
Commonwealth government employees, has not only drastically reduced the 
Public Service Arbitrator's coverage of Commonwealth government employees, 
it has also taken postal and telecommunications employees, on the recom-
mendation of the Vernon Commission, out of the orbit of industrial co-ordination 
of the Public Service Board. The Departnient of Employment and Industrial 
Relations has submitted that under administrative direction since 1956, it has 
performed the task of co-ordinating the industrial matters relating to wage 
earners of certain authorities not in statutory relationship with the Public Service 
Board, and that although the 'full potential benefits' of this arrangement have not 
been realised, it has proved to be 'reasonably effective in ensuring a common 
approach' of the management units involved. 
9.6.44 We have received no evidence that the multiplicity of staffing 
arrangements has in practice resulted in notable anomalies in industrial, 
standards and industrial difficulties, although admittedly the evidence relates to 
the period before the removal of the Postal and Telecommunications Commis-
sions from the control of the Board. There have however been a number of 
complaints of considerable delays involved in the procedures for determining 
terms and conditions of employment by authorities in statutory relationship with 
the Board and from unions involved. (See paragraphs 9.6.46-49) No submissions 
were received from the group of statutory authorities which have been subject to 
co-ordination by the Department of Employment and Industrial Relations since 
the 1950s- 
9.6-45 In the section concerned with staffing of statutory bodies we have 
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discussed the co-ordination arrangement introduced in 1975 to provide a means 
of ensuring adherence to the wage indexation guidelines in all areas of Australian 
government employment. This new arrangement provides for decisions to be 
taken at ministerial level and in some cases this has resulted in the dispute being 
referred to the appropriate tribunal, the Arbitration Commission or the Public 
Service Arbitrator. Thus, at present there is a Prime Ministerial directive 
covering all staff superimposed on the various staffing arrangements. This recent 
directive provides in effect, for any irreconcilable difference of opinion to be 
resolved at ministerial level. 
9.6.46 The Public Service Board has expressed some concern to the 
Commission regarding difficulties which it alleges have arisen since the 
establishment of the Postal and Telecommunications Commissions. The 
difficulties arise from changes in terms and conditions of employment in these 
organisations, specifically concerning classification and standard working hours. 
It has claimed these changes have generated pressures for a flow-on to other areas 
of Commonwealth government employment. These criticisms from the Board 
imply that the new co-ordination arrangements discussed in the preceding 
paragraph represent an inadequate form of control. A different viewpoint has 
been expressed by the Postal Commission and the Australian Postal and 
Telecommunications Union (APTU). The Postal Commission' refers to the Co-
ordinating Committee comprising officers of the Public Service Board and the 
Department of Employment: 
• • the Committee's role tends to be exercised far too slowly and in too detailed 
and conservative fashion. In this way, its delaying and inhibiting effect is similar 
to the role of the Public Service Board in relation to Departments.' 
The Chairman of the Commission has claimed that delays in establishing new 
organisational arrangements designed to improve operational efficiency are 
having a serious effect on staff morale. The APTU expressed strong opposition to 
any control on industrial matters in the postal and telecommunications area 
being exercise by the Board .2 
9.6.47 The managements of statutory authorities which have always been 
required (by their respective enabling Acts) to obtain Public Service Board 
approval for changes in terms and conditions of employment had similar 
complaints; for example, the CSIRO Executive  stated that the statutory 
relationship between CSIRO and the Public Service Board places undesirable 
constraints on the Executive as a primary employer of a large work force. 
9.6.48 The unions which made submissions to us had varying views; it is 
evident, however, that their response to the question of co-ordination of terms and 
conditions of employment was related to the scope of their constitutional 
coverage. Thus, the unions with membership in both departments and statutory 
authorities (for example, APSA (Fourth Division Officers), POA, ACOA) 4 
argued for the Public Service Board to have a statutory power to control terms 
and conditions in all authorities. 
9.6.49 On the other hand, the 'in-house' unions (for example, Snowy 
I . 	 Letter, Commission File 75/237. 
2. Submission No. 764. 
3. Submission No. 362. 
4. Submission Nos. 219, 249, 92. 
Mountains Staff Association, ABC Staff Association, CSIRO Technical 
Association) '  expressed a preference for dealing with local management rather 
than with both the employing authority and the Public Service Board. 
9.6.50 The claims for greater departmental and agency autonomy in the 
determination of industrial conditions and their presentation to arbitration 
tribunals is understandable. The need to seek approval from a co-ordinating 
authority which must necessarily look beyond the individual case to the general 
consequences of an award, is not only irksome, because it may be restrictive of 
local initiatives and solutions, but it is also time consuming. However, we believe 
that some frustration of this kind must be accepted in order to achieve the 
substantial benefits of some managerial co-ordination of industrial relations 
throughout the Commonwealth government sector. While we concede the merit 
in the Vernon Commission's point that it is important for the corporations to be 
seen as employers negotiating in their own right and on their own responsibility, 
we think that on balance it is important for the whole area of Commonwealth 
government employment to have as far as possible a common and co-ordinated 
approach to industrial matters. It is illusory to believe that the different 
management units of the Commonwealth government sector can really exercise 
completely independent policies and practices, because the unions involved and 
the nature of the occupations necessarily link the different units together. While 
we would not go as far as the Department of Employment and Industrial 
Relations' assessment that 'to leave the conduct of industrial negotiations in the 
hands of the individual managements of the corporations would produce serious 
leap-frogging in terms of conditions of employment without proper regard to the 
overall effect, not only on pay and conditions in the Commonwealth government 
sector but also in the private sector', we believe that there are risks of leap-
frogging which should be avoided if possible. This applies to the Postal 
Commission and Telecommunications Commission no less than to other 
agencies. The question is how best to achieve managerial co-ordination of 
industrial relations policy. 
9.6.51 The Department of Employment and Industrial Relations has suggested 
that the Public Service Board should have its charter widened so that it might act 
in effect as a single employer in negotiations and arbitration representation for the 
whole of the Commonwealth government sector. A consultative committee 
chaired by the Department and consisting of the departments and authorities 
'which have major problems in industrial relations' should meet and advise the 
Board regularly. Further, the Department submits, should a conflict between 
them arise, the policy of the Board as the government employer should be 
overridden by the government's overall economic policy insofar as this has a 
bearing on industrial relations. 
9.6-52 While there is some merit in this proposal, there is a danger that given the 
differences in the nature of work in this large area of employment, such an 
arrangement may encourage the development of procrustean attitudes on the 
part of centralised management in pursuit of contrived uniformities. There are, of 
course, staffing matters which need to be dealt with in a highly co-ordinated 
fashion. For example, in its submission the Commonwealth Bank Officers' 
Association dealt in some detail with the subject of standards of amenities and 
I . 	 Submission Nos. 284, 414, 136. 
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physical working conditions conceding that too little has been done in this area. 
The submission pointed out that the Commonwealth government is not bound to 
comply, as are other employers, with the provisions of State legislation on the 
standards of shops and factories. The Association advocated that a code setting 
out minimum standards of office accommodation be established. The Commis- 
R256 sion agrees with this proposal and recommends that the Department of Employment 
and Industrial Relations and the Board establish a joint committee with a view to 
developing a code of standards on amenities and physical working conditions for 
Commonwealth government employment which should then be given expression 
in a.form binding on the administration. 
9.6.53 However, in general our recommendations on staffing of statutory 
authorities (paragraphs 9.4.9-21) should go a long way towards ensuring 
consistency in pay and conditions of Commonwealth employees and con-
sequently we do not endorse the proposal of the Department of Employment and 
Industrial Relations. Pending the implementation of our recommendations 
R257 concerning staffing of statutory authorities, we recommend that in general the 
present arrangements be continued subject to a number of modifications: 
(a) the Department of Employment and Industrial Relations and the Board 
should, from time to time, jointly issue guidelines on industrial matters to 
all statutory authorities. It is important that a unified policy be adopted by 
these two bodies; 
(b) the authorities, subject to the Department of Employment and Industrial 
Relations' co-ordinating role,1 should include the Postal and Telecom-
munications Commissions and any other authority not required to obtain 
the Public Service Board's approval on the determination of pay and other 
conditions of work. However, the Department of Employment and 
Industrial Relations should only have advisory powers in this connection 
and its deliberations should be greatly speeded up; 
(c) any authority, at present subject to the Board's approval, seeking to be 
freed from this requirement, should have its case considered, and a 
recommendation made thereon, by an independent person or committee 
specially appointed for this purpose as the occasion arises. (In this 
connection we draw attention to our views in paragraph 9.4.14); 
(d) the Public Service Board should have the right to intervene before the 
Arbitration Commission in all cases involving authorities not subject to 
Board approval to argue the case for or against the claims being pursued; 
(e) in respect of departments and of authorities in statutory relationship with 
the Board, the Public Service Board should be regarded as the 'employer' 
spokesman in arbitration proceedings, but where there are differences 
I . The term 'co-ordination' is open to a number of interpretations. In particular, it is used 
sometimes as a synonym for 'control' and on other occasions as something quite different from 
'control'. We therefore consider it desirable, in the interests of minimising misunderstanding, 
to indicate the type of co-ordination envisaged. When referring to co-ordination arrangements 
we mean a process of mutual adjustment rather than a process whereby a single agency (in this 
case the Board or the Department of Employment and Industrial Relations) makes an 
authoritative decision, that is, exercises a veto authority. The Commission would hope that 
'co-ordination' processes typically involve negotiation among equals with the interest of all 
parties being taken into account and the solution which accommodates them all best emerging 
without central directives. 
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between a department or authority and the Board the minister should have 
the right to appear on behalf of the department or authority. 
9.6.54 Various unions have complained of the failure on the part of the Public 
Service Board to negotiate fully and to enter into collective bargaining on 
differences between the Board and the unions. The Board has denied the validity 
of these claims and because of time pressures we have not had the opportunity to 
pursue this matter in any detail. However, while we see difficulties in the Board 
adopting the collective bargaining styles of the private sector, we believe that it 
should, as a rule, enter into detailed and exhaustive negotiation with the unions 
with a view to reaching agreement. We do not believe that our recommendations 
on means for co-ordination of industrial relations policies in the Commonwealth 
government sector should hinder the achievement of this objective. 
The Structure and Role of Registered Unions 
9.6.55 Commonwealth government employment is highly unionised: estimates 
of the level of unionisation range from 75 per cent to 90 per cent, a fact which can 
be explained in part by an employer policy of encouraging employees to join 
registered unions or staff associations. There is an excess of registered employee 
organisations with membership in the area of Australian government employ-
ment. Seventy-three associations represent the 377  000 officers and employees of 
the Australian government: this means one staff organisation for approximately 
every 5000 people. However, approximately half of these organisations (36), have 
a 'mixed' membership and the vast majority of their memberships are employed 
in the private sector. 
9.6.56 There are 37  staff organisations with membership confined to Com-
monwealth government employment. Membership distribution in this group is 
extremely uneven. The largest union, the Australian Postal and Telecom-
munications Union has a membership of approximately 45 000, while the 
Industrial Registrars' Association has less than io members. Two-thirds of the 37 
organisations have membership less than 2000, while only 5  have a membership 
greater than 15 000. In addition, two unregistered staff associations, the Second 
Division Officers' Association, and the Foreign Affairs Association, have come to 
our notice. 
9.6.57 Superimposed on this is a peak council structure consisting of the Council 
of Australian Government Employee Organisations (with a total of 22 affiliates); 
the Council of Professional Associations (7 affiliates); the Australian Council of 
Trade Unions and the Australian Council of Salaried and Professional 
Associations. The latter two have 34  affiliates and 6 affiliates respectively which 
have some of their membership in the Commonwealth government sector. 
9.6.58 In addition to great differences in membership size, the organisations 
also embody a wide range of organising bases; there are organisations based on 
the divisional structure, and others based on a particular occupation, while a 
number have membership confined to a particular statutory authority. In some 
cases there is more than one organisation covering a single occupation and there 
are a few associations with membership confined to one department. 
9.6.59 The large number of staff organisations and the diversity of their 
memberhip coverage is the result of registration and membership eligibility 
decisions of the Australian Industrial Court and the Industrial Registrar. Both 
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are guided by section 142 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act which reads: 
'The Registrar shall, unless in all the circumstances he thinks it undesirable so to 
do, refuse to register any association as an organisation if an organisation, to 
which the members of the association might conveniently belong, has already 
been registered.' 
9.6.60 Section 5  of the Public Service Arbitration Act, which permits the 
registration of unions of less than 100 employees provided they represent at least 
three-fifths of all employees in that industry, has been a very significaht provision 
because of the number of organisations which owe their existence to it. Thirteen of 
the 37  unions successfully invoked this section as a pre-condition for registration. 
In other words, these provisions are responsible for at least 35 per cent of the 37 
existing exclusively public sector organisations; the percentage may be much 
higher when the permissive effect of the narrow definition of 'industry' is taken 
into account. The decisions granting registration to these organisations have been 
made over a period ranging from 1912 to 1974. 
9.6.6 i Within the area of Commonwealth government administration, there 
are a number of largely inactive unions. They have neither the resources nor the 
expertise to represent adequately employee interests in an era of increasing staff 
participation in determination of conditions of employment and policy decisions. 
Leadership of individual Public Service unions is, in many cases, a part-time 
occupation: 22 of the 37  organisations with membership confined to the public 
sector rely entirely on part-time officials and only i o employ research staff and/or 
industrial officers. 
9.6.62 It is reasonable to ask what functions are being performed by some of the 
smaller staff organisations in an industrial relations system where wage and salary 
increases are automatically given universal application, and where negotiations 
relating to most conditions of employment are conducted by a limited number of 
associations or peak councils operating through Joint Council. From discussion 
with the Board and officials of a number of unions, we believe that some of the 
unions are not equipped to enter into any dialogue with the employer concerning, 
for example, proposed innovations in personnel policy or practice. In recent years 
the Board has increasingly confined itself to discussions with peak councils; when 
opinions are sought from individual unions the response is usually poor. This 
suggests that individual unions are not able to deal with such requests and that 
they rely on their respective peak councils to provide the considered reply. Some 
of the smaller staff organisations rely on outside organisations for research 
support. 
9.6.63 As our research has shown, there are problems associated with large 
unions as well as with small unions. One source of information was the response to 
the Career Service Survey. We do not see it as our charter to consider in further 
detail matters such as representation for minority groups or membership 
perceptions of their organisations' effectiveness. We hope, however, that the 
preliminary research we have undertaken may provide a basis for further 
research and discussion; the raw material is at hand for public sector unions to 
give these matters the attention they deserve. 
9.6.64 The large number of unions has produced a number of problems; it has 
I . See Appendix 3.A, Paper i. 
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generated a significant number of jurisdiction and demarcation disputes and 
increased the work load for the Public Service Arbitrator in the processing and 
hearing of claims. This point was raised by the Arbitrator in his submission to the 
Commission. 
9.6.65 The number of unions similarly aflects the work load of the Public 
Service Board. When the Board negotiates with the clerical /administrative pay 
group for example, there are about 8 unions present; in the trades and associated 
staff pay grouping there are 27 unions involved, 6 in the technical/drafting 
officers pay group, and 5  in the second division. The Board has commented on the 
multiplicity of unions and the extent of overlapping membership but has not 
expressed concern over the consequences which flow from these circumstances. 
9.6.66 Within the Commonwealth Public Service there are some long-standing 
examples of statutorily-based preference being extended to staff organisations 
with majority membership in a particular class, or with relatively large overall 
membership; this has applied to representation on Promotions Appeal Com-
mittees and on Joint Council. 
9.6.67 As well as these statutorily-based preferences there are a number of 
activities of the Board which suggest that the effect of its policy towards unions is 
to discriminate', if unintentionally, in favour of small or inactive staff 
organisations. An example is the granting of leave with pay to part-time officials 
participating in joint management staff association bodies (typically, the small 
unions have only part-time officials). Also, the assistance given by the Board when 
it advises organisations about the lodgment of applications for a pay increase and 
invokes regulation 742  to implement the change in pay rates is of benefit to the 
smaller unions, since they have little or no research and advocacy capacity. 
9.6.68 In the interest of more efficient administration of industrial relations, the 
Commission believes that it would be desirable for fewer associations to operate 
within the Public Service and Commonwealth government employment 
generally. To this end we recommend the following: 	 R258 
(a) the required membership for registration as an organisation under the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act should be raised to 1000 and section 5  of 
the Public Service Arbitration Act enabling associations with smaller 
membership to be registered, should be deleted; 
(b) the Industrial Registrar should actively exercise the discretion under 
section 143 (3G) of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act to dc-register 
those organisations in the public sector which are defunct or have less than 
the required membership; 
(c) the Board should avoid acting in ways which discriminate in favour of 
smaller unions; 
(d) the Public Service Board, the Department of Employment and Industrial 
See section 69 of the Public Service Act, superseded by Determination 32 of 1956 and General 
Order 5/F/i. When employees invoke Determination 32 to attend hearings before the 
Arbitrator or the Industrial Registrar, they are exercising a right, whereas its predecessor, 
section 69, involved the exercise of management discretion. 
This regulation empowers the Board to extend rates of pay or conditions of cmplo\mcnt which 
have been prescribed in a Determination of the Arbitrator to officers or classes of officers not 
covered by the Determination, for example, to officers who are not members of a registered 
union. The regulation has also become a device for minimising delays in the total system. 
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Relations and the peak organisations should enter into discussion about 
ways and means of promoting the amalgamation of associations and 
unions and rationalising their jurisdiction in the area of Commonwealth 
government employment. The abolition of the divisional structure (see 
section 9.2) which has been the organising base for a number of unions, 
presents an opportunity for the consideration of membership coverage. We 
are mindful of the fact that current legislation relating to the amalga-
mation of registered organisations contains procedural provisions which 
may have the effect of discouraging amalgamation; 
(e) in connection with (d), consideration should be given to appropriate 
organisational forms and representation on executive bodies of unions as a 
means of ensuring adequate responsiveness to the voice of minority 
occupational groups in unions. 
9.6.69 Finally, on the question of the internal distribution of decision making 
power in unions, the Commission notes that in keeping with the centralised 
nature of the public sector industrial relations system, union rules assign all 
significant powers to the federal office and severely limit independent action by 
State and, more particularly, local branches. (This is of course no different from 
the position in the private sector.) However, we believe that highly centralised 
organisations are not equipped to pursue and solve local problems adequately 
and to deal with day-to-day work problems. It is-interesting to note that in 
response to a Career Service Survey question a majority of members in both third 
and four divisions expressed the view that their organisation was effective in the 
pay area but considerably fewer recorded a similar level of satisfaction with their 
achievements in areas such as working conditions, reorganisation of working 
methods and matters affecting their specific work area.' 
9.6.70 If more decision making on personnel matters is to be devolved to 
departments and authorities, it would be desirable for the staff representatives 
who negotiate with management to have sufficient authority to represent a staff 
viewpoint without deferring to a higher authority in the union. 
9.6.71 Similarly, the encouragement for departments to develop organisational 
forms suitable to their particular operations, will require diverse systems and 
processes for personnel and industrial relations functions, including classification, 
promotion, grievance resolution, staff appraisal, hours of work and job design. 
In other words, there will be a range of Issues which can and ought to be 
developed, discussed and resolved by local representatives of associations. An 
example of such an issue is the recent innovation of flexible working hours. 
'Flextime' schemes are currently operating in sections and branches of all 
departments and in a number of statutory authorities. 2 Although the absence of 
an exhaustive evaluation prevents us from commenting directly on trial schemes, 
R259 we recommend that favourable consideration be given to the encouragement, on an 
experimental and adequately monitored basis, of even greater flexibility in the 
types of schemes introduced. 
9.6.72 The question of the arrangement of working hours provides a good 
I . 	 See Appendix 3.A., Paper i. 
2. The first department to introduce a flexible hours scheme was the then Department of Labour 
and Immigration in July 1973, 
  the last being the then Department of Tourism arjd Recreation 
in July 1975- 
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illustration of a personnel issue which could be locally determined; nevertheless, 
where unions and management are accustomed to a high degree of uniformity in 
wages and conditions, moves in the direction of local autonomy can be expected 
to generate some tension between local staff groups and both union hierarchy and 
management (as represented by. the Public Service Board). Our proposal 
presumes of course that each employing authority would take account of the 
extent and type of its responsibility to the public. Departments or branches with a 
high proportion of counter stall for example have markedly differing needs from 
branches which have no contact with the public and in which there is a low level 
of staff interdependence. A workable balance needs to be struck between the 
needs of management, staff and other government agencies. We believe, 
therefore, that staff organisations will need to redistribute, power, subject to 
guidelines, in response to our proposals for greater delegation of the management 
and registration of staff to departments and authorities. A failure to allow greater 
autonomy in decision making and to improve the negotiating skills of local 
representatives of unions will create a vacuum which may well be filled by more 
spontaneous and informal local leadership. 
Joint Consultation and Experiments in Staff Participation 
9.6.73 Consultation at the national level: Since 1945 there has been 
statutorily based joint consultation between representatives of managements and 
staff associations at a national level. The machinery for such consultation is the 
Joint Council. The main matters which were raised in submissions concerning 
Joint Council are: 
(a) the possible extension of its jurisdiction to all Commonwealth government 
employing authorities; 
(b) the question of whether the Council should have determinative powers; 
(c) its composition. (Recent legislative amendments have eliminated the last 
item as a source of contention.) 
9.6.74 The Joint Council is presently limited to an advisory role on matters 
affecting employment under the Public Service Act. From i July 1975 
recommendations made by Joint Council, if accepted, directly affect only about 
39 per cent of total Commonwealth government employees. In practice however, 
many of the conditions agreed upon by joint Council and endorsed by the Public 
Service Board are automatically accepted by a number of statutory authorities: 
the Board is in some statutory relationship with 34 statutory authorities 
representing approximately 33 000 staff and many of the provisions implemented 
following consideration by Joint Council are adopted by them. Other statutory 
bodies take independent account of Public Service precedents and almost all 
statutory bodies have interest in Joint Council recommendations on such matters 
as furlough and maternity-leave entitlements, the subject of generally applicable 
statutes. 
9.6.75 It is the view of the Commission that, given the relevance of the Joint 
Council advisory functions to Commonwealth government employment gen-
erally, and to ensure economy of industrial relations effort, there should be a 
change in the coverage and basis of representation on Joint Council to include 
statutory authorities, especially those whose industrial relations decisions are to 
be subject to the approval or control of another level of management, that is, the 
Public Service Board or the Department' of Employment and Industrial 
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R26o 	 Relations. We recommend therefore that the jurisdiction of Joint Council be 
expanded clearly to encompass matters of general interest to Commonwealth 
government employment but specifically relevant to statutory authorities and 
that the constitution ofJoint Council be amended to include direct repre-
sentatives of the major categories of statutory authorities. The basis of such 
representation might have regard to any form of co-ordination of conditions of 
employment which is brought into operation. Regardless of the form of co-
ordination we would envisage that the Public Service Board should appoint no 
less than three management members representative of statutory authorities. 
Further authorities might be co-opted to particular committees or be given access 
in relation to questions of special interest to them. All statutory authorities ought 
be at liberty to raise agenda items on matters where general government 
employment practices affect them. Corresponding modifications to accom-
modate a small increase in staff side representation of the existing confederations 
might be necessary. It would seem advisable for the Council to consider some 
system of separating specifically Public Service matters from the more general 
matters of interest. It may be practicable for such matters to be dealt with by a 
Committee ofJoint Council members, still leaving detailed work to be done by 
sub-committees. 
9.6- 76 Several other aspects of Joint Council composition and management 
were raised. In our consideration of them, we have been assisted by the Public 
Service Board's Memorandum No. jo, and except where we have said so, we 
generally agree with the thrust of that document. We note that action has already 
been taken to vary the membership and representative basis ofJoint Council. We 
think it best to leave the question of further changes to be resolved in light of 
experience of the operation of the revised body with the functional changes we 
have proposed. 
9.6.7 7 However, we see merit in the concept that the Council itself ought to 
exercise greater policy control and direction over the staff resources put at its 
R261 disposal and we recommend accordingly. The extension of the Council's coverage to 
statutory authorities would enhance the case for the establishment of a secretariat 
with a degree of independence from the Public Service Board, and we agree with 
the Public Service Board suggestions that the Secretariat might undertake a 
service role in relation to certain research and preliminary development of 
agenda items. Secondment of staff from the Board's Office, should allow the close 
relationship between secretariat and Board Office to be maintained. We envisage 
that members ofJoint Council, assisted by the secretariat would play some role in 
determining appointments to appeal bodies which we have recommended in 
Chapter 8.5. 
9.6.78 The Council of Australian Government Employees Organisations has 
submitted that Joint Council should be provided with determinative powers 
based upon consensus decisions. The Public Service Board has expressed the 
'strong view' that the Council should continue as a joint consultative body: 
It would be inappropriate to vest thejoint Council with determinative powers, 
which should continue to be vested in the central personnel authority charged by 
he Parliament with statutory responsibilities in relation to conditions of 
employment which (as indicated in Part F of the Board's First Submission to the 
Royal Commission) have close relationships with certain other central personnel 
functions. Such powers are, of course, exercised within a system of checks and 
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balances, including access to arbitration. Many of the recommendations of the 
Joint Council also require legislative action.'1  
9.6.79 The case for granting a determination making power to Joint Council 
partly originates from dissatisfaction with delays in implementation of agreed 
recommendations occasioned by the regulation making process. If the 
Commission's proposals (paragraph 9.6. i 7) that the Public Service Board be 
given power to make determinations is adopted there should be an abatement of 
the problems of delay. On balance, we have decided against recommending the 
granting of determinative powers to the Joint Council. 
9.6.80 Consultation at departmental level: In contrast to the long-standing 
machinery at the national level, there was, until July 1975, no statutorily based 
consultation machinery at the level of the individual department or authority.' 
There is however scope for the establishment of consultative machinery in 
individual departments and authorities by administrative action. Presumably 
this is what the Board is referring to when it claims'. . . in some departments there 
already exists various types of machinery for consultation with staff organi-
sations.' 
9. 6.8 I Evidence before the Commission indicates that there is considerable 
dissatisfaction with management's approach to consultation with staff and staff 
associations, and a number of organisations have advocated the introduction of 
formal processes of consultation at departmental level. The Public Service Board 
has also suggested that there is scope for the development of a Joint Council 
system at departmental and authority level. 
9.6.82 The Commission recommends that there be statutory provision for the R262 
creation of consultative councils within departments and authorities. The 
introduction of consultation machinery by legislative enactment is obviously a 
second-best solution--the ideal situation is characterised by an open, partici-
pative management style which, at the very least, regards as mandatory 
consultation with staff before decisions on matters which have an impact on their 
work environment. Our recommendation is not intended to detract from 
recognition of the importance of developing better means of informal 
consultation, but sole reliance on this means has evidently proved entirely 
unsatisfactory for many officers and employees of the Australian government in 
the past. 
9.6.83 Sole reliance on informal means of consultation probably discriminates 
in favour of the articulate, the politically skilled and the knowledgeable. For the 
vast majority of current fourth division officers and employees and those in the 
lower levels of the clerical/administrative structure, the management-staff 
dichotomy is a very real one; it is these officers and employees who are least likely 
to thrive on random, unstructured discussions between staff and management 
which have no legal authority. 
9.6.84 Although the evidence suggests it is vital that there be statutory provision 
I. Memorandum lo, paragraph io. 
2. The legislation establishing the Postal and Telecommunications Commissions provides for the 
creation of Consultative Councils comprising representatives of the Commission(s) and of 
organisations of officers and employees. 
3. Memorandum No. io, paragraph 37. 
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for such consultative councils, it is debatable whether the law should stipulate the 
precise form of the council in each establishment. If departmental heads are given 
the discretion to decide the means by which the structure and functions of such a 
council are to be decided upon, it is reasonable to expect those managements 
whose collective style fails to meet even the most restrained demands of their staff) 
to opt for centralised decision making on this question. What might be made 
mandatory is a vote of the staff on the range of options available in relation to such 
matters as the constitution, subject matter for discussion etc. This course of action 
has been recommended in the Corbett Report (paragraph 4.33).  Such a move 
acknowledges that a variety of organisational forms call for different types of 
consultation machinery. 
9.6.85 Some of the issues that might be decided in this way are: 
(a) how 'management' and 'stafF should be involved, for instance, through 
parity representation of these two groups; 
(b) the basis of staff representation, that is, whether representing staff, staff 
associations or a mixture of both; 
(c) whether the councils should be forums for discussions or a basis for 
recommendations for decisions; 
(d) the range of subject matters. If there is no legal definition of subject matter 
this may present problems rzs a- ris National Joint Council. 
9.6.86 In addition to accepting that there is a need for various forms of staff-
management consultation centred on the workplace we regard it as important to 
define and protect a staff right for representation at management level- in 
R263 government administration. Consequently, we recommend as a general proposition 
that a staff representative be included in any collegiate management arrange-
ment established in relation to departments or statutory authorities. We have 
particularly in mind statutory authorities where a collegiate style of management 
is used, and our recommendation on this can be found in Chapter 4.4.  However, 
there are instances of use of collegiate management styles in departments, 1  and 
inasmuch as these become more common, attention should be given to direct staff 
representation. We would exclude from this recommendation the Public Service 
Board although we see merit in at least one member of the Board being appointed 
from persons with a staff representative background. 
9.6.87 We recognise that there are many unresolved issues surrounding our 
recommendation for staff representation: 
(a) how are staff representatives to be elected? 
(b) what will be the tenure in office? 
(c) will the representative's role be merely to consult with management on 
staff issues or will it be to share managerial decision making responsibility? 
We are not in a position to give definitive answers to these questions and suggest 
that they be the subject of further thought both within unions and management as 
well as at political levels. The Commission doubts whether in all cases there is as 
yet a widely shared understanding of the role of such representatives. Recent 
innovations provide a basis for the development of such understanding by staff, 
unions and representatives. We would see the clarification of the role, form and 
ethics of representatives as a matter of priority for those unions which advocate or 
- 	 See Chapter 4.3. 
have achieved such representation.' Clearly also there is a case for allowing staff 
and management in different government organisations jointly to develop their 
own plans for staff representation. There are already different examples of staff 
representation existing within government employment, for example, Environ-
ment, Housing and Community Development, the Australian Broadcasting 
Commission, and the Postal and Telecommunications Commission. 2 A number 
of, but not all the experiments, maintain a division between staff participation in 
management and staff participation in overall policy formulation. While such a 
division may be a useful concept, as indicated in Chapter 4,  it is difficult in 
practice to observe the distinction. Certainly there can be no derogation from the 
minister's responsibilities over policy. 
We note particularly the submission of the Commonwealth, Bank Officers' Association (No. 
475), which raises this matter. 
See Appendix 3.L, Changing Organisations. 
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Chapter i o 
	
Special Problems of 
Administration 
10.0. I Our discussion and recommendations so far have necessarily been 
pitched at a fairly high level of generality. However, some areas of the 
administration encounter special problems which general solutions can only meet 
in part, or can meet only after emphasis is given to particular elements of the 
general solutions. In this chapter we examine some special activities to which our 
attention has been directed. We have approached them by seeking in the first 
place to apply the broad principles which underlie the general recommendations 
in previous chapters. The subjects now chosen for discussion—the administration 
of economic policy, science, health and welfare, foreign policy, and policies for 
aboriginals and women—have been raised in a number of submissions in ways 
which have suggested the need for special reappraisal. Finally, in section 7 of this 
chapter, we bring together a number of ideas relating to the function of 
information within the administration and its relationships with other instru-
ments of government and with the community. These supplement the numerous 
specific references to the role of information made in earlier chapters. 
io.i ECONOMIC POLICY 
jo. i. i Submissions and other material before the Commission made it clear 
that there was widespread dissatisfaction with existing means for the formulation 
and co-ordination of government economic policy. Ministers and ex-ministers, 
business men and trade union leaders, academic economists, and officials of 
departments and agencies within the bureaucracy all voiced criticisms. While, 
not surprisingly, the content of the criticisms varied, one set of themes tended to 
recur. It was argued that the Treasury held a substantial monopoly as the source 
of economic and financial advice and that, partly as a consequence, it had 
developed an almost doctrinal attitude about the theoretical basis on which 
policy should be developed. This, it was suggested, had led to its being insensitive 
to government priorities; to a failure to present ministers with a full range of 
options; to an isolation of policy from the influences of other departments, of 
professional economists outside government, and of the community—especially 
those sections of it actively engaged in production and commerce. While the 
Commission accepted that this criticism, certainly in such a bald and 
oversimplified form, was at least exaggerated, it could not ignore the strength and 
persistence with which it emerged. 
10.1.2 The Commission is conscious that the outcome of economic policy 
decisions is unlikely to be universally acclaimed. Most people see the economic 
system primarily as the context within which their own activities are conducted, 
and will tend to judge the success of its management by the way in which they feel 
it affects those activities. It is unlikely that any policy, however enlightened, will 
satisfy the more optimistic expectations. Consequently economic policy, and 
those who advise about it, are likely to become the scapegoats for failures wholly 
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unrelated to it. Furthermore, economic policy decisions can rarely, if ever, be 
based on wholly technical considerations. Any decision will have a different 
impact on different individuals, groups, and sectors within the economy. It will 
require the government to take account of essentially political considerations—of 
who gains and who pays—and to consider its own willingness and capacity to 
accept the electoral consequences. 
10.1.3 Therefore, whatever the changes in the means of developing policy, and 
however significant the resulting improvement in performance, economic policy 
is likely to continue to be a focus of discontent, and those who advise the 
government about it the butt of criticism. The Commission consequently feels it 
must be cautious in assessing the scope for improvement as the result of 
organisational changes. The need for caution is further emphasised by the fact 
that the effectiveness of any government's economic policy is limited by a number 
of factors which are outside its control—the gaps in our understanding of the 
interplay of economic forces, the unpredictable lags in the manifestation and 
identification of economic problems and in the operation of remedial measures to 
deal with them, the dispersal of powers of economic decision-making inherent in 
our federal system, and the effects of international economic forces. The 
significance of these constraints will be given little weight by those who are 
dissatisfied with the outcome. 
10.1.4 However, the Commission was aware that other countries have 
established more complex patterns of organisation from which to develop 
economic policies. It felt that there would 1e value in commissioning a study of 
the experiences of some of those countries, and widely based discussion of the 
relevance of the study to the Australian scene. 
10.1.5 Accordingly, it commissioned Dr W. E. Kasper, an economist with wide 
experience in Europe and America, to examine models offered by\other countries 
which could be relevant to Australian conditions. His report was widely circulated 
and became the starting point for vigorous debate. To ensure that it benefited 
fully from that debate, the Commission established a task force to review existing 
procedures and machinery and to make recommendations to remedy any 
deficiencies. The report of the task force was published, and the Commission 
received comment on it from interested organisations, groups and individuals.' 
This section of our report seeks to take account both of the work of the task force 
and of the response to it by those actively engaged in and directly affected by the 
outcome of economic policy formulation. 
10.1.6 The task force identified a number of issues and made recommendations 
in relation to them. While noting that, for the most part, Australian economic 
policy over a period of decades appears to have been reasonably effective, the task 
force nevertheless judged that the inadequacies 'are important and at times 
critical' .2 
 We turn now to consider what we believe to be the more important 
issues raised by the task force in this connection. 
Ministerial Involvement 
10.1.7 The task force rightly stresses that: 
I . The conclusions and recommendations of the Task Force and of Dr Kasper's paper are 
reproduced in Appendix 4.A. 
2. Report of the Task Force on Economic Policy—paragraph 14.15. 
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• consideration of the machinery of Government needs to start from the way in 
which broad objectives, priorities and policy directions of government are 
determined and Ministerial decisions taken. These will reflect the platform 
values of the party in power and, in the light of new and developing community 
attitudes of emerging issues and problems, relate them to the available resources 
and program possibilities'. (14.2  1.) 
And it is of the view that: 
'...There is lacking an explicit, systematic approach to developing a framework 
of goals and objectives, and priorities among programs, within which economic 
policy decisions are to be taken. . . Also lacking is a machinery whereby such a 
framework can be established or reviewed, though steps have been taken 
recently towards this end. 
These gaps make it difficult to identify problems ahead of time, to gather the 
necessary information, and to aialyse the various options open and their 
implications. It makes the assessment of costs and the alternatives foregone a 
hazardous and inexact procedure. It leaves unclear the trade-ofis between short 
and long term objectives. It makes it likely that co-ordination procedures will be 
deficient., It also tends to lead to a public discussion which is confused and 
misdirected'. (14.17-18) 
io.i.8 The Commission has emphasised throughout this Report that the 
determination of objectives and the setting of priorities are essentially political 
functions and must be performed in ways which effectively involve ministers. In 
Chapter 3  we argue that these tasks can be carried out realistically and effectively 
only within a budgetary process in which the competitive nature of diverse 
government objectives is acknowledged and their priorities assessed by 
ministerial bargaining in which there is continuous interplay between the 
political authority of ministers and the experience and knowledge of constraints 
which officials can bring to bear on that process. The Commission envisages this 
budgetary process being conducted in the first instance, and indeed primarily, in 
the context of the formulation and adoption by Cabinet of Forward Estimates of 
the expenditure and manpower to be employed. 
10.1.9 In the next chapter, we discuss in greater detail the preparation of 
Forward Estimates and the budgetary process involved. In that chapter, we 
emphasise the role of two ministerial committees, the Economic Committee and a 
smaller sub-committee, in establishing the government's objectives and priorities 
in the formulation of the size and content of the Forward Estimates. Governments 
will differ in theirjudgment about the precise structure of ministerial committees 
which will best serve their purposes. The references in this Report will be 
predominantly to the structure adopted by the Fraser Government. No 
significant changes in principle would have been involved for the Commission's 
recommendations in this part of its Report if we had based them on the structure 
existing in the latter stages of the Whitlam Government. The sources of economic 
advice to these committees will obviously play an important part in the outcome 
of the processes. 
Sources of Advice 
10.1.10 The task force drew attention to the commanding position at present 
occupied by the Treasury as against other departments as a source of economic 
advice. The Treasury, in their comments on the task force report, point out that a 
mere duplication of agencies assembling essentially the same data, analysing 
3°' 
them from the same theoretical standpoint, is unlikely to produce a significantly 
wider choice of strategies. Indeed, given the scarcity of good quality economic 
staff, the effect of dispersing them between several agencies may well be toreduce 
their effectiveness. There is merit in this argument. Our proposals are therefore 
designed not to duplicate economic advice unnecessarily but to spread the sources 
of advice in a way which will ensure that, as far as possible, the viewpoints of those 
involved in different aspects of the economy and those who see the economy as a 
whole from a different viewpoint and with a different time horizon are presented 
to the ministerial committees. Such an arrangement would provide the basis for a 
more balanced range of advice and at the same time reduce the probability of one 
source of advice or one analytical or conceptual set of principles becoming unduly 
dominant. 
i o. i . i i Our proposals in Chapter i 1.2 about the preparation of the forward 
estimates and the budgetary process emphasise the important role of the Treasury 
in these matters. Consequently the Treasury will continue to be a primary source 
of advice, especially in relation to relatively short term macro-economic 
management. However advice on this aspect of economic policy must be based on 
the behaviour of aggregates involved in the social accounts for the economic 
system as a whole. It will tend to be less concerned with the changes in the 
industrial pattern of the economy as it evolves in response to domestic and 
international stimuli, particularly the slower, longer term changes We have 
thought it important therefore to consider ways of ensuring that structural 
changes are constantly under review, and brought to bear on economic policy 
considerations. For this to be done effectively we consider it necessary that there 
should be within the administration a focus of knowledge and understanding of 
the structure of the economy as a whole which will balance and complement that 
of the Treasury. 
10.1.12 At present no such focus exists. While there is in each of the various 
departments concerned with the problems and interests of sectors of the economy 
(for example, primary industry, manufacturing industry, national resources) a 
wealth of detailed knowledge about its particular sector of activity, there is 
limited awareness of the inter-relationships between those sectors. The Industries 
Assistance Commission (IAC) has over its years of experience begun to lend 
some coherence to these partial views and the ways in which they are inter-
related. In particular, the IAC has recently taken the initiative, in association 
with the Department of Employment and Industrial Relations and other 
departments and agencies, to commission a study of the industrial structure of the 
economy (the IMPACT study), designed to bring together available data in 
systematic form so as to throw light on the problems of allocating resources 
between component parts of the economy (including the allocation between the 
public and private sectors), as well as on other aspects of economic policy. We are 
satisfied that an understanding of these structural issues will provide insights 
capable of contributing to the coherence of economic policy, and that the 
formulation of a structural model of the kind contemplated by the IMPACT 
study could contribute to such understanding.' 
R264 10. I. 13 We recommend therefore that there be a department, which might be 
i. See Appendix 4.A, Paper 3,  Improving Information Inputs to Policy Advice and Co-
ordination. 
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named the Department of Industries and the Economy (DINDEC), having the 
capacity to concern itself mainly with the medium and long term aspects of the 
industrial structure of the economy, and to act as the prime source of advice 
bearing on these aspects of economic policy. We emphasise that the rationale of 
this recommendation is not to provide a second source of advice on all economic 
policy issues. It is rather to ensure that particular advice and information at 
present lacking would be available from a department best suited to supply such 
advice and information. DINDEC would be the source of forward looking 
economic intelligence, particularly as it relates to structural developments within 
industry. Its concern would be with persisting and developing changes rather 
than with short term macro-economic fluctuations; its time horizon would be 
medium and long term; the policies with which it would be concerned would be 
those designed to exercise their influence progressively and often indirectly. Its 
contribution would therefore be qualitatively different from that of the Treasury 
but would frequently bear on the same issues. Together the two departments 
would assist ministers to take a more balanced view of the economic issues before 
them. On occasions, because of the different time horizon and different emphases 
in their respective views of the economy, they would advocate different courses of 
action—thus genuinely widening the range of choice available to ministers. 
10.1.14 Such a department, to be effective, would need to develop both 
political and administrative authority. It could perhaps be developed from the 
present Department of Business and Consumer Affairs, but changes would be 
necessary to emphasise its more comprehensive role. In particular its re-
sponsibilities for Customs should be transferred to another portfolio, perhaps in 
association with Taxation. We recommend: 	 R265 
(a) that the Department of Industries and the Economy (DINDEC) be the 
responsibility of a senior member of Cabinet who would also be a member 
of the Economic Committee of Cabinet and of the Committee which co-
ordinates departmental submissions on Forward Estimates and Budget 
bargaining; 
(b) that the Minister for DINDEC preside over a group of ministers 
responsible for industry sectors and have responsibility for co-ordinating 
their policies and expenditure plans; 
(c) that those statutory bodies with regulatory and investigatory functions 
affecting industry such as the IAC, the Trade Practices Tribunal and the 
Prices Justification Tribunal be attached to DINDEC;' 
(d) that the Foreign Investment Board of Review also be primarily responsible 
to the Minister for DINDEC, although it should continue to be served by 
Treasury also in so far as financial and balance of payments considerations 
are involved; 
(e) that the Permanent Head of DINDEC be chosen from officials with an 
appropriate background of economic training. 
10.1.15 The restructuring envisaged in the preceding paragraphs would reduce 
the need expressed by the task force for alternative sources of advice to be built up, 
especially in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Of course that 
i. See paragraphs io. 1.34-37 for a discussion of the relations between these and other statutory 
bodies concerned with economic policy. 
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Department, as the Prime Minister's immediate adviser and in the light of its co-
ordinating function, especially in relation to Forward Estimates and in providing 
the secretariat to the Cabinet Economic Committee (see Chapter 11.2 and 11.5), 
will have an important role in linking the financial and economic considerations 
with the government's political objectives. Some development of its economic 
capacity would be necessary for these purposes, but it could still be seen as 
essentially supplementary to that of the Treasury and the Department of 
Industries and the Economy. 
10.1.16 The development suggested would, it seems to the Commission, reduce 
the need for and probably make unnecessary any major division of the Treasury 
as contemplated by the task force and suggested by a number of persons critical of 
the Treasury. Although for reasons more fully explained in Chapter ii . we have 
been gravely concerned at the widespread criticism of the Treasury and indeed of 
the hostility towards it, and have therefore considered ways of distributing power 
and influence more widely within the bureaucracy, we are satisfied that an 
attempt to divide responsibility for economic policy from that for the formulation 
of the Budget (and therefore from a major influence on the Forward Estimates 
processes) would either fail (as it did in the United Kingdom) or greatly weaken 
the effectiveness of economic policy. We have therefore sought other ways to 
reduce the 'monopolistic' character of Treasury. 
10.1.17 The importance of adequate understanding of the state of the economy 
and its analytical basis applies to most departments because of the economic 
R266 implications of their activities. We therefore recommend that there should be 
regular briefings by the Treasury of the economists of these departments on the 
economy as was suggested by the task force. 1  We agree also that the discussions on 
such occasions would not be fully worthwhile without disclosure of the analytical 
bases and other relevant information, including quarterly national income 
forecasts, on which Treasury's evaluation of the state of the economy usually rests, 
R267 and recommend that these should be made available to departments participating 
in these discussions. The Commission notes the danger of leakage of confidential 
information in such an arrangement but we believe that in view of the advantage 
to be gained from such discussions, this is a risk that should be taken. At longer 
intervals, similar briefings directed to influences affecting the changing structure 
of the economy might be undertaken by DINDEC. 
io.i.i8 The Reserve Bank is entrusted with the implementation of monetary 
policy, which is formulated in conjunction with the Treasurer. The Reserve Bank 
Act provides that, in the event of disagreement between the Treasurer and the 
Bank, the view of the Cabinet shall prevail. There is generally close contact 
between Bank and Treasury officials. The Secretary to the Treasury is a member 
of the Bank Board and, by convention, the Treasurer is briefed regularly by the 
Governor of the Bank on the economic and monetary situation as he and his 
Board see it. 
10.1 .19 However we believe that it would be desirable for the Governor of the 
Bank to have an opportunity to provide directly to ministers his views on the state 
of the economy, together with his advice on the direction and thrust of economic 
R268 policy. Consequently, we recommend that the Governor of the Bank should have 
I . Task Force Report, paragraph 9.49. 
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direct access to the Economic Committee of Cabinet, on a regular basis. We also 
recommend that he should have direct access to the Treasurer and the Prime R269 
Minister as he considers necessary. Such an arrangement would ensure that finer 
points in the economic analysis and prescription emanating from the Bank may 
be communicated and discussed orally and directly with the members of the 
Economic Committee rather than by letter or indirectly through the Treasurer. 
The availability of this regular alternative source of advice, particularly on 
monetary policy, should also help weaken concern about undue Treasury 
dominance in economic policy making. This arrangement would, of course, in no 
way detract from the principle embodied in the Reserve Bank Act that the 
government rather than the Bank should have the final right of direction in 
aspects of monetary policy which that Act entrusts to the Bank. 
Informed Public Discussion 
10.1.20 Informed analysis and discussion on economic policy should take place 
outside as well as inside government departments. We believe that the 
government and certain agencies within the administration, such as the Treasury 
and the Australian Bureau of Statistics, have a special responsibility to provide 
the means for a high level of public understanding and debate on economic 
policy. The task force has put the matter in the following way: 
'Our assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of the policy-making process 
will, therefore, have underlying it a number of presumptions in favour of: 
(i) as high a degree as possible of openness in the decision-making process. 
(2) an effective and informed debate within and outside the decision-making 
machinery on economic policy issues. 
() a meaningful two-way consultation process on economic policies between 
government and community interests. 
() a capacity for taking a longer-term and wider view of economic 
developments and the social perspectives within which they will occur. 
() a systematic process of appraisal of past policies and their effects.' 
10.1.21 The formation recently of the Economic Consultative Group, 
consisting of persons from both sides of industry, as a regular channel of 
communication with the Prime Minister, Treasurer and other ministers is a step 
in the right direction. It should go a long way towards meeting criticisms of the 
shortcomings of the pre-budget consultations procedure. 
10.1.22 We have considered the merit of proposing publication of official short 
and longer term forecasts of national income, levels of production and the like. At 
present, only the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, 
and in a more restricted fashion, the Flinders University Institution of Labor 
Studies, publish such forecasts. The Treasury, in conjunction with the Reserve 
Bank and the Australian Bureau of Statistics, prepares quarterly forecasts, but 
these are regarded as confidential and have very limited circulation. The 
Treasury has argued against the publication of its forecasts on the grounds that 
they may well mislead those who lack the experience to be aware of limitations 
on their significance, and that if they are pessimistic they may be self-fulfilling. 
The forecasts embody much judgment in the values fitted into the forecasting 
model and we accept that for this reason along it would be unwise for the 
I . 	 Paragraph 6.57. 
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Treasury's own forecast, from which its economic advice to the Treasurer may be 
inferred, to be made public. 
10.1.23 However, we believe that there is merit in the proposal in the task force's 
report (paragraph 9.73) for a separate semi-independent group within the 
government machinery to prepare and publish estimates. Because of nature of its 
staff and other resources, and because it is not involved in advising on economic 
policy, the Australian Bureau of Statistics would seem to us to be the most 
appropriate location for such a unit. But to distinguish the work of this unit from 
R270 the Bureau's generally more factual publications, we recommend that a research 
unit under the charge of a Research Director be re-established within the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics and entrusted with the task of publishing regularly 
national income and other (employment, investment, etc) projections derived from 
a formal econometric model whose specifications should be described in 
appropriate publications. This would leave the Treasury and indeed other 
agencies, public and private, with the task of preparing their own forecasts which 
would take account of actual and anticipated policy changes and other factors not 
incorporated in the model. It would be possible for private enterprises themselves 
to make (on the basis of the Bureau's projections) their own forecasts, influenced 
by their own judgments and the special knowledge to which they may have 
access. 
10.1.24 The projections of the Bureau of Statistics' Research Directorate would 
be supplemented by the publication of estimates from other models, such as those 
referred to in the previous paragraph. These might in due course be 
supplemented by publishing the projections of the models designed by the 
Reserve Bank. Such a development would gradually reduce popular miscon-
ceptions about the prophetic quality of such projections. They would then be seen 
as one of a number of useful tools of economic policy and of informed discussion. 
Their existence would also remove an unnecessary source of hostility and 
suspicion provoked by non-disclosure of official forecasts. 
10.1.25 There are limits to the extent that economic analysis and advice 
emanating from the administration can be made public without government 
commitment or embarrassment. It is necessary, therefore, for additional sources 
of continuing economic analysis by independent bodies outside government to be 
undertaken and publicised. 
10.1.26 The Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research 
and the Flinders University Institute of Labor Studies fill this role to some extent, 
and they deserve more financial support to enable them to upgrade their work. A 
number of private banks publish useful though more limited analyses of the 
economy. But there is need for an additional body whose work and voice would 
command general attention from the public and from those in government 
departments advising on economic policy. In the words of the task force: 
'An alternative and continuing consideration of the issues by means of expert 
investigation and analysis of the issues, from outside the government system is 
highly desirable: it enhances the quality of advice being generated externally by 
bringing a wide range of minds to bear on problems; it improves the quality of 
advice by making the internal advisers respond to other views; it raises the 
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general level of public discussion and debate; and it achieves a more receptive 
public attitude.' 1  
10.1.27 The task force considered a number of possible arrangements and 
concluded that: 
'While a variety of possible models would serve to meet most of the needs in the 
Australian context, we see as coming closest to the ideal an Economic Advisory 
Council established as a statutory authority under either the Treasurer or Prime 
Minister, with freedom to publish and to determine the matters on which it can 
investigate and report. This would comprise: 
(i) three distinguished economic experts, a full time Chairman and two part 
time members—constituting an Economic Advisory Council; 
(2) a Consultative Board on Economic Policy, made up of about 12-15 persons 
of standing drawn from trade unions, business, the Public Service and 
Universities. The Board would have the opportunity to discuss the Council's 
work program and the results of its research before publication; it would not 
be committed to the published views, nor would it prevent publication after 
its comments had been given; 
() a small but good quality secretariat many of whom would be seconded from 
the Public Service and Universities for periods of up to 2-3 years. 12 
10.1.28 The Commission is greatly attracted to this proposal. For the 
government to set up and finance such a Council, which would be intensely 
'political' and which could at times be at variance with its own pronouncements 
on the state of the economy and could make critical ex post evaluations of 
economic measures taken by the government, calls for considerable political 
courage. We believe, however, that in time such an arrangement will be seen not 
only as a proper institution in a democracy but also a means for improving the 
understanding and thereby the performance of the economy. 
10.1.29 Although we strongly support this proposal of the task force, it is clear R27' 
that its implementation depends critically on the availability of a sufficient 
number of economists who would command the confidence of both the 
government and the public. This problem may not be resolved speedily. A 
possible economy, given scarce resources, would be to appoint a single senior 
Economic Counsellor, and enable him to draw on information and analysis 
available to him from various sources. Such a Counsellor would desirably be 
appointed for a short term—perhaps not exceeding three years. However, the 
question of raising the level of public debate on economic matters is too important 
to be left in abeyance indefinitely. 
10.1.30 If the problem of assembling the Economic Advisory Council is judged 
too difficult, its functions could in part be performed by the Research Directorate 
of the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Whether or not the Council is established, 
we recommend that the Australian Bureau of Statistics be given increased research R272 
responsibilities. In addition to publishing the national income projections, the 
Directorate should publish normally once a year and preferably before the 
Budget, a report on the state of the economy, which would throw light on the 
effects of economic measures taken by the government. We see this report as 
I . 	 Paragraph 6.34. 
2. 	 Paragraph 13.42. 
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superseding the Economic Survey which until 1973 the Treasury published 
annually. Because the Directorate is not involved in economic policy advising, it 
is free from the difficulty which faces Treasury or any other department in 
publishing reports and evaluations which do not simply reflect government policy 
and pronouncements. 
10-1-31 The Bureau of Statistics' Research Directorate should be in a position 
to draw on the considerable and under-used talents of the Bureau, and to 
supplement them by short-term secondments of economists and statisticians from 
other departments, including the Treasury and DINDEC and the universities. 
The Directorate should have an unfettered right to publish. It should be possible 
also for signed papers to be published by those attached to or commissioned by the 
Directorate on a variety of economic questions on which adequate analysis is not 
available to the public. To ensure that the Australian Bureau of Statistics has, and 
R273 is seen to have, this independence, we recommend that it be removed from the 
general oversight of Treasury and linked with a more appropriately 'neutral' 
department, such as the present Department of Administrative Services. 
10.1.32 The Consultative Board on Economic Policy proposed by the task force 
see paragraph 10.1.27 above) could operate in conjunction with the Bureau's 
Research Directorate. Members of the Board would be appointed by the 
government for a period of two to three years; there is no reason why the Board 
should not include members of the recently formed Economic Consultative 
Group. 
10.1.33 The papers and publications of the Directorate would provide the 
means for an informed discussion by the Board in which a variety of public 
viewpoints would be brought to bear on critical economic issues. In particular, we 
see special value in holding such discussions before the publication of the 
Directorate's report Ofl/ the state of the economy to enable early drafts of such 
reports to be discussed. The responsibility for the reports would, of course, rest 
entirely on the Directorate. The Board could also perform a useful function in 
suggesting areas of research to be undertaken by the Directorate. 
Co-ordination of Statutory Authorities 
10.1.34 It was put to us by Mr G. A. Rattigan1 that, in view of the large number 
of statutory bodies operating in the area of economic policy making, it would be 
desirable for them to have 'a common and explicit framework of policy objectives 
to provide overall guidance for the work of these bodies; and, second, each 
authority should be required to report on its work annually in terms of both its 
specific objectives and this broader framework'. 
10.1.35 While it is important for the different statutory authorities to work in 
ways consistent with the government's economic objectives, we see difficulties in 
establishing a 'coherent framework of policy objectives' applicable to all such 
bodies which is neither so broad as to be meaningless nor so narrow as to be too 
iestrictive for their effective operation. However, we believe that there is much 
advantage to be gained from periodic examinations of the stated objectives of the 
various authorities which are not subject to direct ministerial control, appraising 
them in the light of their performance and the current objectives of the 
government. 
I . Then Chairman of the Industries Assistance Commission, in Submission No. 217. 
10.1.36 The absence of any stated objectives, as for example in the case of the 
Prices Justification Tribunal and the Australian Wool Corporation, need not 
necessarily mean that these authorities are working inconsistently with the 
government's economic policy. Thus, in the case of the Prices Justification 
Tribunal, the government's policy can be put to the Tribunal from time to time in 
proceedings before it. Nevertheless, we recommend that as a rule it would be wise for R2 74 
each statutory authority to be given explicit objectives to guide its activities, thus 
enabling the public, especially those dealing with the authority, to know what its 
charter is. The general problems associated with including objectives in the Act 
setting up a statutory authority are discussed in Chapter 4.4. 
10.1.37 We endorse the recommendation of the task force's report (12.63-65) R275 
that, to ensure consistency in the activities of statutory authorities concerned with 
broad economic issues, it might be beneficial for such authorities to be under the 
charge of one minister, or if this is not possible, for the terms of reference of the 
Standing Interdepartmental Committee on Industries Assistance to be widened 
to include the examination of and advice on statutory authority objectives. The 
attachment of the Industries Assistance Commission, the Trade Practices 
Commission and the Prices Justification Tribunal to the Department of 
Industries and the Economy (see paragraph 10.1.14(c) above) seems to us to be 
entirely proper. 
International Economic Relations 
10.1.38 In its report, the task force pointed to the increasing importance of 
international economic relationships, particularly in relation to finance and 
resource policy. It noted that the Department of Foreign Affairs had sought to 
overcome the problem with proposals designed to extend its influence and control 
over the field of international economic policy. The Commission's view is that 
primary responsibility for the discharge of particular functions in the in-
ternational field must rest with the relevant minister and department, just as in 
the domestic field. Thus in the field of international economics, primary 
responsibility must be with Treasury and DINDEC, except where the 
responsibilities of functional departments such as Overseas Trade, National 
Resources and Primary Industry are dominant. The Department of Foreign 
Affairs should, by having sufficient capacity to understand the issues, ensure that 
responsible departments are fully informed and advised on relevant international 
political considerations, and that where Australia's interests require recon-
ciliation between international economic and other considerations, it is able to 
assist in the process.' The Commission is inclined to accept the view expressed by 
the Department of Foreign Affairs in comment on the task force report that the 
real problem is not so much that the Department fails to give sufficient weight to 
economic considerations in formulating foreign policy, as that specialist 
departments have a natural tendency to overlook other Australian national 
interests for which they have no responsibility. The establishment of committees 
and task forces when major problems arise is probably the appropriate response. 2 
10.1.39 However the Commission believes that some of the difficulties of giving 
coherence to the work of responsible departments in the international field derive 
from the absence of any statement of the government's broad approach to 
I. See also section 10.4, Forming and Executing Foreign Policy. 
2. 	 See paragraph 10.4.18. 
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international economic issues. The Commission considers that there would be 
value in the establishment of a task force to prepare for wide discussion a Green 
Paper on Australia and international economic issues, and that after a period of 
debate the government should issue a White Paper as a guide to departments and 
R276 to interests in the private sector likely to be affected. We recommend accordingly. 
Economic Research 
10.1.40 As we noted earlier, the effectiveness of economic policy depends 
among other things on adequate information and understanding about the 
economy as a whole and its various parts. The role of economic research in this 
connection needs no justification. However, apart from financial considerations, 
there is a shortage of competent economists and statisticians to undertake such 
research and the proliferation of research units could lead to a diffusion of 
economic talent and reduced research output. It is necessary, therefore, for 
research potential to be properly harnessed. 
10.1.41 The task force has set out certain principles and guidelines on the form 
and operation of government research bodies (paragraphs 13.14-29).  These are 
broadly in line with the recommendations made concerning research bureaux in 
Chapter 4.3,  and are therefore endorsed by the Commission. 
10.2 SCIENCE AND GOVERNMENT 
10.2. I The Commission received over fifty written submissions from organi-
sations, groups and individuals employed in scientific activity of one sort or 
another for the Commonwealth. These submissions were supplemented by oral 
evidence and by discussions during a series of visits to selected scientific 
establishments. Generally this information left with the Commission an 
impression of a widespread deterioration of morale and a sense of frustration 
among scientific personnel, at all levels, other than those in the Commonwealth 
Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO). Common themes of 
criticisms were: 
(a) that Public Service managerial, financial and personnel practices were 
unsuitable for the conduct of scientific and technological work; 
(b) that the Public Service does not offer an adequate career structure for 
scientific and technological personnel; 
(c) that there are inadequate opportunities for mobility, retraining and other 
means for scientists to adapt themselves to changing demands of scientific 
work; 
(d) that opportunities for travel and other forms of intra- and inter-
disciplinary stimulus were unduly restricted. 
10.2.2 More generally, there were doubts as to whether the decision-making 
processes in government science were likely to ensure a reasonable balance 
between the needs of the administration and professional interests of scientific 
personnel; questions about relevance of some work undertaken to meet general 
and long-term social needs and objectives; and other questions about the weight 
to be given to the more immediate benefits obtainable by concentration on the 
current problems of users of science in, for example, industry and defence. 
10.2.3 In other words, the evidence suggested that the problems of identifying 
and stating objectives and their priorities, of allocating responsibilities, of 
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developing and delegating authority to make decisions, of assessing results, and of 
providing for appropriate forms of accountability, presented distinctive 
difficulties in scientific activity and that procedures within government 
employment were unsatisfactory to many of those involved. 
10.2.4 The Commission decided, therefore, that it should establish a special 
task force of members with diverse experience of different aspects of science and its 
administration to study these matters in more detail. I The task force report was 
published in January 1976 and comment was invited from a wide range of 
interested parties, including the administrative heads of Commonwealth agencies 
responsible for the activities reviewed. This section of the Commission's report 
reflects its response to the evidence submitted, to the judgments of the task force 
and to comments on it. 
Background 
10.2.5 The Commonwealth government has financed and administered 
scientific activities since shortly after Federation. Beginning with meteorological 
and analytical services, it moved to the establishment between the wars of the 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. This major initiative derived in 
part from a recognition of the existing and potential contribution of science to 
agricultural and other rural production. Under the guidance of Sir George Julius 
and Sir David Rivett (first and second Chairmen of the Council), individual and 
working groups of scientists were given considerable freedom to choose the lines of 
their inquiries and to design their conduct. Fundamental research was 
undertaken, as well as applied studies. It was in this period that the 'culture' or 
'ethos' of CSIRO to which the task force refers was established and confirmed. 
Subsequently the expansion of Australian secondary and extractive industries, 
the war effort and associated defence interests, advances in the scientific bases of 
medicine, the advent of nuclear energy, the rapid development of telecom-
munications and the surge of mineral discoveries provided stimuli to which 
successive governments responded with greater allocation of resources and some 
institutional changes. Scientific activity in Australian government thus continued 
to expand markedly during the igos and 196os. Since then, as in most western 
industrial countries, there appears to have been a period of consolidation, with an 
attendant contraction of job opportunities for scientists both inside and outside 
Commonwealth employment. 
10.2.6 Apart from its own activities, the Australian government has, through its 
support for universities and other tertiary educational institutions, its provision of 
finance for grants to a range of research workers and its support for research in 
industry, been responsible for maintaining scientific work of considerable 
diversity, ranging from 'pure' research through applied research and develop-
ment to the provision of 'scientific services' to industry, commerce, consumers and 
the community generally. The growth of these forms of support for science largely 
outside government has, until recently, sustained an increasing aggregate 
Commonwealth expenditure on science. 
The Rationale for Government Support for Science 
10.2.7 The justification for scientific activity is twofold. First, the study to 
comprehend the universe in which we live and of which we are a part, in all its 
I. The membership, terms of reference, and main conclusions of the task force can be found at 
Appendix 4.B, together with responses to the task force's report. 
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grandeur and complexity, is seen by many as one of the noblest and intrinsically 
worthwhile of human activities. Like the arts, scientific activity is one of the graces 
of life, and its presence as an aspect of a particular society is seen as a mark of 
civilisation commanding respect from other societies. Since this activity can no 
longer be effectively performed by the wealthy amateur, a civilised community 
will, it is argued, properly support it. 
10.2.8 Secondly, science is seen as materially useful: indeed, as the source from 
which has flowed the vast growth in man's capacity to produce, transforming the 
natural resources of his environment into an ever-increasing flow of goods and 
services for the improvement of his material welfare. Linked with this justification 
is the profound impact of science on defence. 
10.2.9 It was in the pursuit of science as a self-justifying activity that the 
scientific community referred to by the task force first came into existence and 
developed its ethos based on universalism, community, disinterestedness and 
organised scepticism. it was here, too, that there developed the concept of 
scientific autonomy'----individually at the laboratory level and as a community 
setting its on objectives, applying its own tests of performance and establishing 
its own forms of accountability and characteristic rewards. 
10.2.10 However, it was the same community of scientists, accepting the same 
ethos and working with the same autonomy, which produced the knowledge from 
which came the material benefits often cited to justify scientific activity. The 
overall success of scientific endeavour has, not surprisingly, been used to justify 
the continued autonomy of scientists at work individually and corporately, and to 
support claims for a greater allocation of resources. The argument is persuasive, 
at least in relation to research originating within science itself. Even in such work, 
of course, motivations are complex. An individual scientist will probably be 
driven by a combination of scientific curiosity, desire for esteem of his scientific 
colleagues, an urge to improve man's material welfare, and worldly ambition. 
10.2.11 It is impossible to be sure which of these motives is (or are) the prime 
source (or sources) of the creative energy from which come the innovative idea 
which is the mark of success. It can however, be said that organisational forms 
which limit autonomy do not necessarily impair the effectiveness of any of these 
motives except that of scientific curiosity. Activities derived from this motive are 
of their nature unpredictable, and material benefits from them cannot be 
anticipated with any precision. In effect, it seems to the Commission, the 
scientist's claim for autonomy is in essence a claim that he should be given scope 
for his scientific curiosity to guide his work, at least to the extent that his general 
field of work appears (to him and his colleagues) to call for it. There would be a 
substantial consensus that this scope is necessary in 'pure' research. 
10.2.12 The avowed purpose of most government science is rarely pure 
research. It is usually directed to specified material purposes. CSIRO was 
established to provide a basis for the growth and increased productivity of 
industry; the Weapons Research Establishment to make possible the design of 
more effective military equipment; the Atomic Energy Commission to solve the 
problems of the use and safety of nuclear energy; and so on. Do the arguments for 
the characteristic environment, for the 'culture' and 'ethos' of science, and for the 
autonomy claimed by scientists for research into science-stimulated problems 
apply also to research undertaken specifically to meet the needs of actual and 
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potential users? The same question must be asked with greater force as science-
based work proceeds from pure research through applied research and 
technology to the 'development' end of the 'research and development' scale. It is 
most difficult to answer when the work is intended essentially to provide scientific 
services which, while not wholly without a research component, are pre-
dominantly concerned to apply clearly accepted knowledge and techniques to 
the solution of particular manifestations of familiar problems. If the argument 
outlined in paragraph 10.2.1 i is valid, an important consideration affecting the 
answer will be the degree to which scientific curiosity is felt to be an important 
motivating force for those involved. 
10.2. 13  The task force answered the question generally in the affirmative. As a 
prerequisite for effectiveness and efficiency throughout the range of science-based 
work it postulated 'as much autonomy as possible at as low a level as possible'. It 
recognised that the 'tasks of service science are inherently more closely defined 
than those of research' but urged that bureaucratic and political direction should 
in all forms of science-based work be kept to the minimum feasible. The task force 
appears to have been influenced by the example of CSIRO, which is widely held 
to be an unusually successful government science institution. The task force's 
prescription for the ills to which the Commission's attention has been directed has 
been in essence to generalise for all government science the underlying principles, 
structures, and conditions of employment which apply in CSIRO. These would 
involve: 
(a) the statutory corporation in preference to the department; 
(b) greater freedom from the controls over staffing and expenditure exercised 
by the Public Service Board and Treasury; 
(c) promotion and rewards for personal performance; 
(d) greater mobility of persons between science institutions inside and outside 
government; 
(e) greater opportunity for communication, especially with other scientists 
but also with potential users in the community. 
10.2.14 Generally speaking, the report of the task force has been well received 
by scientists and science administrators, as well as by the associations of 
professional officers concerned.' Thus one distinguished scientist with long 
experience in managerial and organisational aspects of science (who was 
nonetheless one of the more critical commentators on features of the report) 
concluded: 
'There is so much that is sensible, well thought out and, seemingly, practical in 
this Report that if seriously taken up and at least partly elaborated and adopted 
ought to be regarded as a landmark in the restructuring of government science. 12 
10.2.15 Criticism or doubts as to the adequacy of the task force conclusions 
emerged from some whose views were sought, primarily in relation to action 
needed to ensure the 'relevance' of government scientific work and to ideas about 
the institutional pattern on which it is organised. We shall return to these matters 
later. 
10.2.16 The response of those authorities within the public service whose 
functions affect the 'autonomy' of scientists in government by prescribing and 
I. Sec Appendix 4.B. 
2. Letter from Sir Otto Frankel, a retired member of CSIRO Executive. 
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ordering their objectives and by determining the allocation of resources, has been 
generally negative. The Department of Science appears to reject both the 
diagnosis and the prescription advanced by the task force, and it is not clear 
whether it accepts the judgment that there is a 'malaise' requiring treatment. The 
Department of Defence recognises the condition, but believes it necessary and 
possible to meet the essential needs of scientific work within the departmental 
structure; and, while accepting the need for special conditions for science-based 
work, it has criticised the task force for failing to offer advice on the ways such 
conditions might be provided within the departmental context. It indicated also 
that some changes directed to this end had already been made, and that attention 
was being given to the problem. The Public Service Board and Treasury, while 
not rejecting the general approach of the task force, have reservations about 
'autonomy'. All these organisations question to some degree the special status, 
claimed for science workers, and emphasise the importance of uniformity and 
even-handedness in the treatment of similarly qualified staff. Some would 
subordinate 'autonomy' in the choice of work to be undertaken to direction by 
users. 
10.2.17 Thus, the Department of Science comments: 
'We see no reason why the service scientist or the scientist or engineer employed 
on development should be treated differently from a telecommunication 
engineer employed by A.T.C., a civil engineer or architect employed by the 
Department of Construction, an industrial psychologist employed by the 
Department of Employment and Industrial Relations or for that matter an 
economist employed by the Treasury, a social worker employed by the 
Department of Social Security or a lawyer employed by the Attorney-General's 
Department.' 1  
10.2. i8 The Secretary, Department of Defence, writes: 
'If defence science activities are to prosper and be effective they must be 
intimately connected with the inter-related military/civilian activities of the 
Department of Defence . . . The degree of inter-relationship . . . requires the 
exchange of officers at working level and all levels between. It requires 
participation by the defence scientists in government negotiations with foreign 
governments. It requires detailed day to day responsiveness to departmental business' 
(our emphasis) 
10.2.19 It has been suggested to the Commission that the involvement, 
participation and responsiveness postulated by the Department of Defence are 
not incompatible with the special conditions necessary for effective science-based 
work, but represent merely an appropriate way of ensuring the degree of contact 
between officials, science workers and potential users, which the task force, and 
the Commission, regard as essential (see paragraph 10.2.57). The Commission 
respects this suggestion as evidence of a willingness and desire to make science-
based work in the department effective. That it was offered in opposition to a plea 
for a degree of autonomy which working scientists almost unanimously regard as 
vital to their work, and that it stresses 'detailed day to day responsiveness' 
indicates the emphasis on the subordination of initiative by the scientist, to 
military and administrative influences. The Commission is convinced that such a 
subordination, if carried too far, could prejudice the effective operation of defence 
science establishments (see paragraph 10.2.61). Nevertheless, we welcome the 
1. Supplementary Submission by Department of Science. 
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comments by the Secretary of the Department as one of the few signs of 
departmental willingness to come to grips with this problem. 
10.2.20 The Public Service Board, while not unsympathetic towards some of 
the views expressed by the task force, commented: 
'...the Board is firmly of the opinion that there should be uniformity in general 
conditions of service and that expertise should be rewarded through salary 
payments and not through extraordinary conditions of employment.' 
10.2.21 The Board also draws attention to some respects in which employment 
in a statutory authority may not serve the interests of scientists or those with whose 
problems they are concerned. The Board emphasises the importance, when the 
nature of special conditions of work or terms of employment are being worked 
out, of keeping them as far as possible within the framework of existing 
institutions. The Commission accepts the validity of these comments. 
10.2.22 Among the criticisms of the report of the task force were several to the 
effect that it had not adequately dealt with the problem of relevance—of ensuring 
that scientists, in the exercise of their 'autonomy', will give due weight not merely 
to the relevance of their work to the structure of scientific knowledge and the 
problems of potential users, but also to the social significance of the problem, and 
the lines along which its solution may be sought. Thus, Sir Otto Frankel writes: 
'I believe the task force has passed over this problem of relevance rather lightly, 
as it has the related problem of communications.' 
The task force was certainly conscious of this problem. Thus it comments: 
'Society provides the resources for science . . . and unsurprisingly expects science 
to be accountable and to be relevant to the problems perceived by society.' 
Generally, as Sir Otto notes, it appears to judge that this problem 'has been 
successfully solved in the CSIRO-State Agricultural Department-user complex 
thanks to the pluralist, largely informal communications at many levels between 
the Research agency (CSIRO) and mission-oriented Departments.' He goes on, 
however, to comment: 
'Yet one may well feel that the research worker in CSIRO tends to be relatively 
isolated from the realism—ecological, economic, cultural, social and simply 
human—of the farming scene and may miss out on impacts which could trigger research 
ideas of relevance to the user.' (our emphasis) 
10.2.23 This increasing isolation from realism Sir Otto Frankel attributes to the 
heavier demands of administration on the divisional chiefs and the Executive 
(both being composed of scientists), and the consequent decline in their personal 
involvement in the communication between practising scientist and the outside 
world. He sees these changes as being the source of signs that CSIRO itself is not 
free from the 'malaise' which exists in government science establishments. 
10.2.24 Although the task force refers to the expectation of society that science 
would be accountable, it does not suggest explicit procedures by which that 
accountability (in the sense in which the Commission has used the term') can be 
made effective, other than to the institutions of the science community itself. 
Throughout its work the Commission has emphasised that, if resources are to be 
efficiently employed, those who are given responsibility and control of them 
should be called on to account for their performance and for the use of the related 
I. See Chapters 2 and 3. 
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resources. That such accountability is required ex post need not impair the 
autonomy of the performer but can provide information relevant to any 
subsequent revjew of the allocation of society's resources between alternative 
claims on them. Some tasks, including those performed by science, may require 
special procedures of accountability, and these may not be easy to design. This 
does not, in our view, relieve scientists (at any rate those within government) of 
the obligation to render an account. 
10.2.25 Nor is it any part of our intention to exempt science as an activity from 
the disciplines in expenditure and the use of manpower which we propose for 
other parts of the administration. Scientific activity, as a call upon resources, must 
take its place in the competitive processes of the Forward Estimates and the 
Budget along with other demands. Our purpose is not to free it from such 
constraints, but to suggest the pre-conditions for the more effective use of the 
resources attached to it. The Commission believes the forward estimating 
procedures proposed in Chapters 3  and ii should significantly reduce some of the 
problems of management brought to our notice by scientific officers. 
10.2.26 Even so the Commission judges that there is need for change in the 
organisation and management of Commonwealth scientific activity. This need 
derives from elements in the present arrangements which lead to ineffective and 
inefficient use of resources. Important among these elements is a sense of 
dissatisfaction, revealed in submissions and in the Commission's Career Service 
Survey, among staff trained and qualified for scientific disciplines. It has been 
argued that this dissatisfaction reflects merely the recent stabilisation of 
government expenditure in the relevant fields and the contraction of work and 
promotion opportunities which that implies. This contraction has certainly 
occurred: our analysis of personnel records shows that the median length of 
service for a number of scientific designations has been increasing over the last 
decade, particularly at the top levels, in contrast to the third division as a whole, 
and for non-scientific graduates in particular, where it has been decreasing. I It 
may also be said that the institutional arrangements developed during the period 
of rapid growth may not be adequate to maintain and stimulate effective scientific 
work in today's less euphoric climate. 
10.2.27 The Commission endorses the importance given by the task force to 
having scientific work done in an environment favourable to the appropriate 
'culture', where workers are stimulated to act in accordance with the traditional 
'ethos' of science. There is little doubt that scientists at all levels perform better to 
the extent that they feel themselves to be acting in accord with the tradition of 
scientists. In practice, the wide spectrum of scientific activity means that at the 
research end of the field the autonomy can be and needs to be greater than at the 
service or consumer end. Scientists with managerial responsibilities (at various 
levels) should have significant inditidual and corporate autonomy in matters 
with genuine scientific content, and in pursuing an 'entrepreneurial' allocation of 
the resources available to them. But they should not work in isolation or without 
exposure to the challenge and stimulus of the problems confronting the actual and 
potential users of the outcome of their work. They should not be exempted from 
the need to justify their claims on community resources, though this requirement 
will vary in its nature and detail across the spectrum. The autonomy which their 
1. See Tables in Appendix 3.A, Paper 9. 
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tradition asks for should not be inconsistent with regular reviews of performance 
and with periodic accountability for its relevance to the needs and values of users 
and of society generally. it is not possible to prescribe in advance the precise 
character of the environment required fin particular scientific tasks nor the 
precise degree and form of autonomy justified. These will need to be determined 
instance by instance, desirably after discussion between managers of establish-
ments engaged on science-based work and the relevant co-ordinating authorities. 
Issues 
10.2.28 The Commission considers that it should comment on the following 
major questions affecting the administration of science in government: 
(a) How should the government be advised on broad policy issues affecting 
scientific activities inside and outside government? 
(b) Should specifically purpose-oriented research and service science activities 
within government be grouped together or linked with departments or 
agencies with related functional responsibilities? 
(c) Is effective scientific work possible within a department? 
(d) What considerations should determine whether organisations conducting 
scientific work should be made statutory, and in that event what powers 
should the statute entrust to them? 
(e) What conditions of employment, different from those for government 
employees generally, should scientific employees enjoy? 
(1) What measures are necessary to ensure that government science 
organisations can communicate effectively with other scientific in-
stitutions, potential users (especially in other government agencies and in 
the private sector) and the community generally? 
(g) By what procedures can government science organisations be held 
accountable for the efficient use of resources entrusted to them and fdr the 
relevance of their work to the problems of users and society generally? 
10.2.29 Policy advice: When the Commission examined this matter the 
responsibility for advising the government on major issues of science policy was 
shared between the Australian Science and Technology Council (ASTEC), the 
Department of Science, the Executive of CS1RO and major 'user' departments. 
10.2.30 It was at that time envisaged that ASTEC would advise on matters 
such as the broad priorities to be observed in the allocation of government support 
for science activities inside and outside government; the identification of major 
social problems, actual or potential, to which scientific inquiry is likely to be 
relevant; and the action necessary to ensure that optimum use is made of the 
output of science here and internationally. ASTEC at that time reported to the 
Prime Minister acting as Chairman of a Committee of Ministers with 
responsibilities in science. These arrangements are under review, and the 
government may now have different views about the membership, scope and lines 
of responsibility of ASTEC. But the Commission recommends that ASTEC or a R277 
similar broadly based body drawing on the intellectual leadership of distin-
guished scientists, technologists, users of Iscience and others equipped to assess the 
more general impact of science and technology in society, continue to advise the 
Prime Minister and a ministerial committee on science policy. 
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10.2.31 The organisation of government science: The task force, in a 
number of recommendations, envisages ASTEC offering advice also on matters 
essentially internal to government science administration. The wisdom of this has 
been questioned (by Treasury, the Public Service Board and some members of 
ASTEC itself), and the Commission is inclined to accept this criticism. ASTEC 
can exercise its most beneficial influence if it restricts its concern to those 
judgments in which is required the capacity to recognise the developing -pattern of 
scientific knowledge and its relevance and potential for human affairs. 
Involvement in organisational and administrative matters is likely both to 
distract its attention and bring its authority into question. 
10.2.32 Nevertheless there are questions about which the government will from 
time to time need advice from a body identified with science-based work in 
government, but more broadly based than any single department or agency. In 
particular, it will need advice about the appropriate structure of the organisations 
conducting government science and the allocation of responsibilities between 
them. The Commission is impressed with the need to restructure these 
organisations from time to time referred to by Mr Leon Peres in a letter 
supplementing the report of the task force. Historically the scientific organisations 
have come into existence in response to particular needs or opportunities, and it is 
unlikely that the resulting pattern will remain the most effective. Restructuring 
can become necessary for instance to provide for the shifting emphasis in scientific 
or practical interest, to avoid an organisation growing to excessive size, or to 
regroup science resources in the light of newly-emerging knowledge, of 
opportunities recently recognised, and of changing social priorities. Unless all 
agencies are linked, however loosely, within a common framework and unless 
responsibility lies somewhere to review that framework periodically, the task is 
unlikely to be performed except under the pressure of some immediate political 
issue, when sober judgment may be difficult. (Recent unheralded decisions 
affecting the conduct of research relating to minerals and energy perhaps provide 
an illustration.) 
10.2.33 Thus, for instance, it is widely urged among scientists, and more 
generally, that increasing concern about the pressure of rising population on the 
ecology of man may warrant a major shift in emphasis in the work of government 
science agencies, as well as in policies operating in the socio-political field. Such a 
shift could conceivably call for structural changes in the framework of 
government science establishments. 
10.2.34 Similarly, there may well be a case for reconsidering the form, structure 
and functions of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission. It was conceived 
under the influence of scientific, technological and economic expectations which 
have changed dramatically since its establishment. It seems that, if consideration 
were being given now for the first time to creating such a Commission, the scope of 
its research and other functions, the division of responsibility between it, CSIRO, 
the Bureau of Mineral Resources, defence science establishments, other 
government science agencies, universities and the private sector, and the 
structure of the Commission itself) would almost certainly be different. 
10.2.35 Similarly, concern has been expressed about the size and possible 
rigidity of CSIRO. Although the divisional structure of CSIRO offers scope for 
periodic internal reorganisation and regrouping, and the Executive is clearly 
conscious of its responsibilities in these matters, it seems likely that occasions will 
arise when parts of CSIRO might, with advantage, be combined with other 
elements within the government science sector in a unit perhaps separate from 
CSIRO. Change of this kind would be for decision as the need emerged. There 
should, however, be means for the need to be recognised and assessed, and the 
options for meeting it reviewed, so that the government could be adequately 
advised. 
10.2.36 The Commission recommends therefore, that the government establish a R278 
Council of Government Science Establishments broadly representative of the 
scientific management of the various establishments, such as CSIRO, Defence 
Science, the Meteorological Bureau, but with a membership overlap with 
ASTEC. We envisage that this Council would: 
(a) advise the government on organisational and related problems in 
government science from the point of view of managers of science-based 
work; 
(b) initiate for consideration, or advise on, proposals for organisational review; 
(c) initiate for consideration, or advise on proposals relating to terms and 
conditions of employment for scientists; 
(d) be invited immediately to advise: 
(i) what government science agencies could, with advantage, be given a 
statutory basis, 
(ii) whether, and if so how, the structure and functions of the Australian 
Atomic Energy Commission and the Bureau of Mineral Resources 
should be recast. 
10.2.37 his not contemplated that the Council would have exclusive rights of 
advice on these matters, or executive authority. We have assumed that 
departments and agencies, and those with wider responsibilities relating to the 
machinery of government, would continue to have opportunities to express their 
views. The proposal is designed to give those responsible for the management of 
government science-based work a recognised channel for the expression of their 
views other than through the department or agency to which they individually 
are attached. 
10.2.38 Such a Council could, the Commission believes, provide from its 
membership the nucleus of study groups for special purposes in the science field. 
The power of the user influence, the need for secrecy and other factors clearly 
cause especially difficult problems in the management of defence science. The 
Commission recommends that the Minister for Defence set up a study group to 
advise him on these matters, and that the nucleus of this group might be drawn 
from the Council and its advice be sought as to which other science administrators 
should be included. While our judgment on this issue cannot be fully informed, 
we doubt whether its requirements of secrecy and related problems need inhibit a 
rational inquiry in which selected persons outside the defence science community 
participate. 
10.2.39 The Council of Government Science Establishments could prove 
valuable to the Public Service Board as a source of advice and as a secondary 
source of provisional views on claims that special conditions are necessary in 
particular fields and categories of scientific work. 
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10.2.40 Is effective science possible within a department? The task force 
considers the departmental form of organisation 'a closely administered, 
centralised, strongly hierarchical structure', and therefore unable to provide a 
desirable research environment. It argues that a government department will, 
like other large-scale organisations, have a 'natural bias and tendency (to) favour 
order at the expense of creative freedom'. It quotes approvingly the judgment of 
Schumacher' that 'centralism is mainly an idea of order; decentralisation one of 
freedom. The man of order is typically the accountant and generally the 
administrator; while the man of creative freedom is the entrepreneur'. 
10.2.41 The task force believes that research, whether 'pure' or applied', 
should be conducted 'within many semi-autonomous units. . . Each of them will 
have a large amount of freedom, to give them the greatest possible chance to 
creativity and entrepreneurship'. Furthermore, it believes that service science 
also needs an environment similar to that necessary for research, since high 
standards of service demand behaviour in accordance with the 'ethos' of 
science—that is, the practice of disinterestedness and organised scepticism. To 
this end, service science will require a significant minimum degree of autonomy in 
the performance of' its tasks and will need 'a sense of collegiality' with other 
scientists, as well as 'frequent contact with and advice and criticism from research 
workers in relevant fields'. The task force saw these needs as applying equally to 
research directed to the practical ends of users, such as in Defence establishments. 
10.2.42 This distrust of the bureaucracy by scientists is traditional and 
pervading. Basically it seems to derive from a fear that 'non-science' values will 
over-ride the scientist's ethos, thereby emasculating the creativity of science work 
and rendering the scientist schizoid, alienated and uncreative. 
10.2.43 To the Commission, an interesting aspect of this line of argument is its 
familiarity. It emphasises autonomy as a source of entrepreneurship and 
creativity, the stifling effect of centralism and hierarchy, the virtues of 
decentralisation and devolution, the damaging effect of conflict between what is 
demanded of a worker and what accords with his professional 'ethos'. 
Throughout the evidence before us and the studies we have sponsored these 
themes recur with fugue-like repetition and diversity. We are satisfied that, just as 
'service science groups are exposed to the risks of becoming depressed and 
stagnating pockets of the scientific community', so too are other groups within the 
bureaucracy. Science-based work may be the extreme instance which illumines 
the nature of the risk, but it is not wholly different in kind. Disinterestedness and 
organised scepticism form part of the ethos of other and wider groups within the 
administration, and entrepreneurship will yield its benefits more generally if 
appropriate autonomy and stimulus can be provided. 
10.2.44 The Commission in all phases of its work has therefore sought ways of 
creating scope for entrepreneurship. It proposes shifts in responsibility from co-
ordinating authorities to departments; from top and central levels of departments 
and agencies to functional units and centralised offices. It approves experiments 
in non-hierarchical organisational forms. To the extent that the principles it 
asserts are applied in the spirit as well as the letter, it will be less necessary to 
design special organisations for groups whose need for autonomy is great. Within 
a department or statutory agency the wise administrator will seek to ensure the 
I . 	 E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful, London, 1973, pp. 227-9. 
320 
most productive environment for different categories of work and workers, and 
many of the conditions of employment now felt necessary as special exceptions 
will be more generally available. 
10.2.45 For these reasons we believe the choice between the departmental and 
statutory form of organisation should not be made simply on the basis of a need to 
provide an appropriate environment and conditions of employment. This should 
be capable of being met in either. Those responsible for science establishments, 
statutory or departmental, should at least ensure to staff with the relevant 
responsibilities and functions a sufficient degree of autonomy to enable them: 
(a) to participate in defining objectives and in identifying areas requiring 
scientific investigation or technical development; 
(b) to identify the scientific question or questions relevant to the problem or 
issue to be studied; 
(c) tojudge whether such a question is likely to be answered or illuminated by 
scientific work within their capacity; 
(d) to design (and if necessary redesign) research or experimental work to be 
undertaken; 
(e) to allocate financial and staffing resources available to them, within 
budgetary limits set for broad project categories, and in accordance with 
guidelines set in negotiation with Treasury and the Public Service Board, 
as a basis for substantial delegations. 
10.2.46 While we see no reason in principle why these requirements should not 
be met in departments, the material before us leads us to conclude that they are 
not in fact met in most instances, and we find departmental responses to the task 
force report frankly discouraging. The Commission acknowledges that this 
comment unqualified is unfair in some instances. In particular it has been 
impressed by the responses of the Department of Defence. While the Commission 
disagrees with much in these responses, it believes they show an awareness of the 
issues and a willingness to contemplate significant change to deal with them. It is 
partly because of them that we are inclined to agree that an appropriate 
environment for science-based work can in fact be provided within a 
departmental structure Provided that the department is responsible for matters to which 
that work is directly relevant. 
10.2.47 In the Commission's examination of statutory agencies (Chapter 4.4), 
it has sought to identify the considerations which justify Parliament entrusting 
particular functions to non-ministerial agencies. Of these, the dominant one is 
the desirability of the relevant functions being performed and being seen to be 
pe?Jormed in a day to day sense independently of a minister and of party-political 
influence. This is not inconsistent with a provision which gives the minister a 
reserve power of direction—as the Science and Industry Research Act does in 
relation to CSIRO. This consideration, in our view, clearly justifies the present 
statutory basis for CSIRO with its widely-ranging research responsibilities and, 
we believe, for service science organisations such as the Bureau of Meteorology 
and the Analytical Laboratories. The Bureau was established by Parliament by 
statute, but the powers necessary for it to perform its functions have not been 
conferred upon it, so that it remains dependent upon departmental support and 
subject to departmental constraint. Both serve a diversity of users—other 
departments and agencies, particular groups of industries and the public at large, 
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directly and through the media. Their functions are capable of clear definition 
and do not appear to be of a kind requiring adjustment with changes in 
government or the generality of changes in government policy. In some respects 
their work requires the same authority and freedom from suspicion of party- 
R279 political influence as that of the Government Statistician. It seems appropriate to 
the Commission therefore that they be set up by statutes which would specify their 
powers in relation to the conduct of matters referred to in paragraph 10.2.45 
above. In administrative matters (see paragraph 10.2.45(e) ) the statutes could, 
as we suggest elsewhere, make the exercise of their powers subject to the 
concurrence of co-ordinating authorities such as the Public Service Board and 
Treasury. They would not be associated with a 'responsible' department, but 
would be linked to a general service department, such as the Department of 
Administrative Services. 
10.2.48 For other science establishments to which the task force refers, we find 
the issues less clear. The Commission suggests, therefore, that for them the choice 
between statutory and departmental form should be studied by the Council of 
Government Science Establishments recommended in paragraph 10.2.36 above, 
in consultation with the Public Service Board and Treasury, and that its report 
should be submitted for decision to the Science Committee of Ministers. While, as 
we state above, we see no reason why an appropriate environment should not be 
possible within a departmental context, we expect that the Council, in 
considering these and similar instances, would look for evidence that departments 
were prepared to resist the tendency to prefer centralism and hierarchy even 
when cogent arguments for devolution and autonomy exist. 
10.2.49 Should science functions be grouped? The task force rejected the 
present concept of a Minister and Department of Science with a general 
responsibility in the science field and administering a wide range of specific 
science functions. It has urged that responsibility for these latter functions should 
be dispersed so that each forms part of the portfolio linked with the department of 
the minister with responsibilities most closely related. It saw this spread of science 
activities as a means of increasing the capacity of departments and agencies to use 
science and of widening the ministerial and official awareness of the relevance of 
science to government and public affairs. 
R28o 10.2.50 The Commission agrees that there is a strong case for the dispersal of 
some existing science-based organisations to departments with related re-
sponsibilities. The task force, however, urged that responsibility for CSIRO 
should be given to a minister without other science functions so as to assert its 
responsibility to serve all ministers and departments. There will remain, 
therefore, the need for a ministerial focus for CSIRO and also for general science 
policy, including policy of the kind about which ASTEC has been set up to advise 
the government. 
R281 10.2.51 The minister providing this focus could be a Minister for Science, a 
minister with a wider portfolio incorporating Science, or the Prime Minister 
(preferably assisted by another minister). The present line of responsibility of 
ASTEC to the Prime Minister as Chairman of a Ministerial Committee on 
Science accords with the Commission's conviction that science should be seen as a 
resource for all government activities. If the Prime Minister continues to accept 
this responsibility, the Commission suggests that CSIRO should also work to him 
and that ASTEC, the Council of Government Science Establishments (if it is 
established) and the ministerial committee should all be serviced from within the 
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Cabinet Office. It would seem wise, in this event, that the Prime Minister be 
assisted by another minister in relation to his science responsibilities, although it 
should be clear that this minister is exercising his functions on behalf of the Prime 
Minister as Chairman of the Ministerial Committee on Science. 
10.2.52 If, however, a Prime Minister judges it necessary to transfer the 
responsibilities for ASTEC, CSIRO and the Council of Government Science 
Establishments to another minister, then a Minister for Science with a more 
traditional style department could be appointed. It would be important, in the 
Commission's view, that the establishment of such a department should not lead 
to a concentration within it of responsibility for more specialist science activities, 
and that the Minister concerned and his Department should see themselves as 
acting in a trustee capacity for a Ministerial Committee on Science and should be 
closely linked with the work of ASTEC and the Council of Government Science 
Establishments. Such a trusteeship role would, we consider, be more difficult if 
these responsibilities were merged with a wider range of issues, as it was for 
instance some years ago in the Department of Education and Science. Such a 
merging of responsibilities would in our view be the least desirable of the choices 
outlined above. 
10.2-53 The precise distribution of responsibilities for the other science agencies 
and functions reviewed in Section V of the Task Force Report should, the 
Commission considers, be determined by the Prime Minister after receiving 
advice from the Council of Government Science Establishments, the Department 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Public Service Board. 
10.2.54 Terms and conditions of employment: The Commission is 
sympathetic towards the proposals submitted by the task force to provide 
incentives, improve career possibilities and increase staff mobility. The principles 
underlying these proposals are, as the Commission urges elsewhere (Chapters 8.4, 
9.4 and i 1.6), applicable more generally in government employment. We 
contemplate certain basic uniform terms and conditions for government 
employment generally, but with provision for conditions appropriate to special 
categories of work and special classes of staff to be negotiated with the Public 
Service Board. 
10.2.55 We recommend that the Council of Government Science Establishments R282 
be authorised to advise the Public Service Board in relation to special provisions 
affecting those engaged in science work. We believe the task force proposals 
provide a reasonable basis for negotiations between the Public Service Board and 
individual scientific establishments, but that the Council could assist the Board to 
assess the validity of claims for special provisions. In addition, we see no reason 
why government science should not develop its own 'non-material' rewards and 
recognition for distinguished performance. Consideration might be given to 
special awards for distinguished performance, to be granted on the advice of the 
Council or of experts chosen by them. 
10.2.56 Effective communication: The task force urges the importance of 
free, informal and personal communication between those engaged in govern-
ment science and other scientists, and between them and actual and potential 
users of the results of their work, especially in industry, the armed forces and 
government administration. 
10.2.57 The Commission accepts the task force's assessment and the need to 
improve the scope of this communication and broadly endorses the ideas it has 
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presented. These ideas, however, should be seen as illustrative rather than 
definitive. Ingenuity and the capacity to recognise and seize opportunities are the 
R283 vital requirements. For this reason, we believe that the departmental Science 
Advisers recommended by the task force should be seen rather as Science Liaison 
Officers and that their essential tasks should be: 
(a) to main contact with continuing work in science relevant to the interests of 
the department or agency concerned; 
(b) to bring before the executives of the department or agency information 
about scientific work or ideas of potential interest or value to them; 
(c) to establish contact between officials, science workers, potential users, etc. 
when opportunity and possible benefit come together; 
(d) to bring to the attention of senior officers possible sources of scientific 
advice on matters with which they are concerned. 
A scientist with such a role would be more active and have a more continuously 
constructive potential than one who saw his task as merely to offer advice, 
especially as, objectively, there will be subjects on which his advice may be sought 
about which he personally could have little to offer. He should normally be an 
officer on rotation from a more specifically scientific environment, and should 
know where to go to obtain information or advice. We note that advisers with 
such functions have existed in the Armed Services for many years. 
10.2.58 Relevance and accountability: The task force contemplates that 
scientists in government will, while exposed to the informal influence of actual 
and potential users, departmental officials, other scientists, etc., be responsible 
themselves for determining what scientific issues are relevant to any line of 
inquiry and the choice of the means by which such issues are to be explored. 
10.2.59 The task force justifies this freedom by reference to its conviction that 
scientists possessing such freedom have, if a long term view is taken of the outcome 
of their work, 'delivered the goods'. Generally, the Commission shares this 
conviction. However, it believes that the relevant freedom will not be impaired if 
those who possess it are called upon to report on how they have used it and with 
what results. 
R284 10.2.60 We recommend, therefore, that government science establishments 
should compile reports on lines similar to those we have proposed be prepared by 
departments and agencies, taking into account the relevant prescriptions for such 
reports proposed by the Auditor-General (see Chapters 4.3.25-27 and ii..7). 
We suggest also that ASTEC, in consultation with the Council of Government 
Science Establishments, should at regular intervals set up groups of scientists, 
administrators, and others with widely ranging awareness of social change, to 
review the work of particular establishments or working units within them. Such 
reviews would be designed to bring under notice the progress on particular lines of 
inquiry, draw attention to benefits which that progress has conferred or could 
confer, and generally assess its relevance to contemporary and future scientific 
and social problems. Apart from the benefit which such reviews would provide for 
the managers of the establishments concerned, for departmental officers, and for 
those to whom they are responsible and for the ministers concerned, they would 
provide ASTEC with significant material on which it could base, at least in part, 
its advice to the government on broad scientific priorities and on the allocation of 
resources to them. 
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10.2.6 I The Secretary to the Department of Defence has, in comment on this 
idea, urged that in some areas of defence science the constraints of necessary 
secrecy would render it impracticable. We acknowledge the problems of secrecy 
in the defence area, but hesitate to exclude defence science from our 
recommendations. In general, we, consider it should be subject to the same 
principles, practices and precepts. Even where exceptions may be necessary, we 
consider these should he strictly limited and subject to review, and that an 
awareness of the scientific community's need for free flows of information and 
ideas should constrain any tendency to excessive secrecy. This is a matter which 
governments may need to consider, but the very importance of defence science 
and the damaging effects of isolation and secrecy argue for an active and 
continuing search for constructive solutions. It would seem to the Commission 
that if people of adequate qualifications, competence and acknowledged loyalty 
can be found to undertake this work, so too can persons loyal and competent to 
receive and assess accounts of their efforts. 
10.3 HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE 
Problems and Suggested Remedies 
10.3.1 Submissions and other material before the Commission made it clear 
that government programs concerned with the health and welfare of members of 
the community were a frequent and growing source of difficulties both in policy 
and administration. Since 'welfare' is often defined to include all those policies 
that affect the health, education, housing and financial self-sufficiency of the 
individual and family, we should expect difficulties in both the design of 
appropriate policies and in administration of programs. Studies in Australia, in 
the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States reveal the complexity of the 
problems, the conflicting principles which underlie different approaches to their 
solution and the obstacles to be overcome if rational solutions are to be found. 
10.3.2 The reasons are not far to seek. First, in one form or another, government 
policies in welfare bear upon the li.ves of almost every family. With free education 
at all levels, Medibank, housing subsidies, pension and other financial benefits, 
some of which are free of means test, there are few who are not beneficiaries or 
clients of government programs. Similarly, all contribute to the cost, in varying 
degrees. Of all government activities, welfare programs make the most direct and 
universal impact on the individual and the family. 
10.3.3 Secondly, there is a staggering multiplicity of separate programs 
composing the whole. Some of the programs are concerned with ensuring socially 
acceptable minimum income security; some are concerned with compensation for 
loss, injury or deprivation; and many are concerned to provide free, or at low cost, 
servicesjudged to be important to health and welfare. Some of these programs are 
directed at specific groups—the aged, young children, the incapacitated, 
Aboriginals, migrants—but many are almost universal in their potential 
clientele. Many of these programs overlap in their content and clientele, and 
frequently their relationship, individually and collectively, to the objective of 
overall individual or family welfare has not, in Australia, been the subject of 
systematic study.' Indeed, one basic question yet to be resolved is to what extent 
i. See Appendix 4j,  Paper 4, a Case Study of the IDC on Overlap in Australian Government 
Grants to Local Bodies. 
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government programs in health and welfare are more efficient and effective when 
directed at the family or other social group rather than at individuals. 
10.3.4 Thirdly, responsibility for the planning and management of these 
programs is dispersed between federal, State and local levels of government and 
innumerable voluntary groups and, within the various levels of government, 
between departments, commissions and other agencies. This leads not merely to a 
tendency to duplicate facilities and staff, and to competition for scarce resources, 
especially in newer community based programs. It also creates, both among 
clients and administrators, vested interests in the characteristics of individual 
programs, and in the authority, security and opportunity provided by the 
organisations which administer them. This dispersal of responsibility makes it 
difficult to determine policies in closely interlocking fields and practically 
impossible to assess the outcome of the whole complex of programs, or indeed of its 
component parts. 
10.3.5 Governments have been aware of these problems for years, and a series of 
partial inquiries has been conducted here and overseas to illuminate them. The 
Whitlam Government, for instance, set up a series of statutory commissions which 
it hoped would progressively invoke order in this confusion. Thus, the Social 
Welfare Commission received a charter which apparently was intended to give it 
authority to review the whole field of welfare programs and to advise on their 
rationalisation both from the point of view .of policy content and administration. 
Others, such as the Children's Commission, were to be concerned with the impact 
of the programs on an important section of the community. The work of these 
agencies, as well as that of other more ad hoc bodies of inquiry, has thrown 
valuable light on parts of the problem. However, before the Whitlam 
Government came to an end it had become less optimistic about statutory 
commissions as effective instruments of change. 
10.3.6 Certainly, too much had been expected of them. They were intended not 
merely to evolve a general foundation for a multiplicity of programs, bringing 
greater understanding and expertise to the work of the bureaucracy, but also to be 
the instruments of greater participation by non-government experts, by other 
levels of government, by voluntary agencies and by the clientele itself. In some 
instances the statutory commission was itself to be involved in administration, 
sometimes replacing, sometimes paralleling bodies already in existence. 
10.3.7 Furthermore, it seems that on occasions at least, the statutory 
commissions failed to establish satisfactory working relations with the existing 
bureaucracies.' How far this was due to their failure to see this relationship as 
critical to their work and their future, and how far to passive, possibly active, 
resistance to their ideas and ambitions, is impossible to judge, and indeed 
judgment would be purposeless. 
10.3.8 It became clear also that the appointment of statutory commissions, with 
power to review programs and to assess their adequacy in meeting social needs as 
the commissions saw them, tended to produce expectations that their recom-
mendations and therefore their claims on budgetary resources, would be 
automatically validated. The possibility that some increasingly important (and 
expensive) fields of expenditure would move away from departmental control 
1. 	 See also Chapter 6.3. 
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and become less subject to Treasury scrutiny as a result of the apparent 
independence of some of the statutory authorities was a source of anxiety; this was 
especially true of those commissions with ineffective links to the relevant 
department and those with very vocal lobby groups pressing their claims. 
10.3.9 It was in the light of these considerations that the Commission received 
from the then Prime Minister and the then Minister for Social Security a request 
to report on an appropriate structure for the administration of the government's 
responsibilities in health and welfare. 
10.3.10 The Commission therefore setup a task force to make a special study of 
this field of government. It was encouraged to do this by the knowledge that there 
were other fields of government in addition to health and welfare, where pro-
grams, independently conceived, and designed and administered by separate but 
overlapping agencies, sometimes directed at multiple and partially competing 
objectives, had led to some administrative incoherence with its attendant waste 
and loss of purpose. It was hoped that the study of the health and welfare field 
might suggest principles of organisation capable of being applied over a wider 
area of government administration. The membership of the task force, its terms of 
reference and the major conclusions from its report are set out in Appendix 4.C. 
10.3.11 Four dominant themes emerge from the report of the task force: 
i. There is an immediate need to rationalise the mosaic of health and welfare 
services which is marked by duplication of roles and responsibilities and 
which stimulates rather than reduces the need for institutional care. 
2. The failure to rationalise these services derives in part from a lack of policy 
analysis and program evaluation, which itself reflects to some degree an 
absence of relevant policy-oriented research capacity within and outside 
government. 
3. A rationalisation of services, including possibly a greater devolution of 
their delivery and more effective division of responsibility between federal, 
State and local levels of government and voluntary agencies, would enable 
some restructuring, with economies in personnel, particularly in federal 
departments and agencies: it was acknowledged that this devolution should 
be achieved only by joint planning and hard bargaining in which the 
federal government would be prepared to trade withdrawal from the 
front-line administration of services for an enhanced capacity to set 
principles and standards backed by broad rather than narrowly specific 
financial supports. 
. A rationalisation of the kind described in 3  above, calling for joint 
planning, complex negotiations and the restructuring of departments and 
agencies at all levels of government, could not be achieved quickly: 
progress might be expedited by federal action which could be seen as an 
indicator of its willingness to withdraw from some service delivery and to 
reduce the degree of detail in its control programs financed by special 
purpose grants, and by joint planning with the States towards block grant 
and revenue sharing funding of certain health and welfare services. 
10-3. 12 With these themes in mind the task force concluded that in the federal 
sphere consideration should be given to changes which might ultimately lead to 
the complete integration in one 'giant' department of the existing departments 
and agencies involved in health and social welfare policy and programs. To this 
327 
end it envisaged the immediate establishment of a single Health and Welfare 
Commission to replace five existing statutory authorities, bringing together the 
heads of existing departments and major agencies with an addition of specialist 
advisers from outside government. The functions of the integrated Commission 
would be to act as a co-ordinated source of advice to the government, to 
rationalise administration, and to review the effectiveness of programs. Similarly, 
the task force contemplated, as a first step, the consolidation over the next two 
years of existing departments into two, and the integration of rehabilitation 
payments and services with welfare and pension benefits payments and with the 
community health and social services available to the general community. 
10.3.13 The report of the task force has been welcomed by many interested 
groups as a valuable exposition and analysis of the present situation and the need 
for reform. The principles it enunciates have also been generally welcomed, but 
the responses of particular agencies and individuals appear to us often to reflect 
their own identification with aspects of existing programs and organisations to 
which we refer above. Generally, they serve to reinforce the task force's judgment 
that the desired restructuring will come about only slowly. 
10.3. 14 Since the presentation of the task force's report, the present government 
has made some changes which bear upon matters discussed in it. Such changes do 
not, however, render the task force's assessment less valid or, in our view, reduce 
the need for longer-term action. There are, however, two aspects of those changes 
to which the Commission attaches importance: 
(a) the Prime Minister has established a number of Cabinet-level committees 
concerned with broad areas of policy comprehending the responsibilities of 
several ministers and their departments. (None of these committees has 
responsibility for the health-welfare complex, though there is a committee 
of backbenchers with responsibility for health and welfare.) 
(b) the Government has indicated its belief that the efficiency of government 
would be improved by a reduction in the number of Commissions and 
agencies and the greater integration of their work with that of the relevant 
departments, and has begun to take steps to that end. 
The Commission's Conclusions 
10.3.15 i. The Commission is satisfied that the four basic themes enunciated in 
the task force report (see paragraph 10.3.11 above) summarise the 
issues involved, and justify a major effort to rationalise welfare 
policies and their administration. 
2. Such a rationalisation is unlikely unless it is backed by powerful 
Cabinet and ministerial authority. 
3. The immediate task will be to establish, at ministerial and official 
levels, machinery to provide that authority, and so ensure the 
participation and co-operation of existing administrative units. 
4. This machinery must be designed not merely to mobilise the 
knowledge and skills of those in existing departments and agencies, 
but to draw also upon outside sources of expertise and stimulus. 
. A major task of those heading this machinery, if it is established, will 
he to plan and conduct detailed negotiations with States, local 
government, authorities and voluntary agencies, leading to firm 
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agreements for the division of responsibility and appropriate 
devolution. 
6. Rationalisation within the federal government should proceed step 
by step as these negotiations and related internal studies are 
completed. 
10.3.16 In considering specific ways of embodying these conclusions in 
recommendations for action, the Commission gave careful thought to the 
judgment of the task force that eventually it would be desirable to move, over a 
two or three year period, towards a single 'giant' department with comprehensive 
responsibility in the welfare field. The Commission agreed that this should not be 
a prime objective for the foreseeable future. Whether it would at any time be 
desirable is a question that may be easier to answer after some years' experience of 
the plan the Commission proposes. 
10.3.17 A better solution, for the short-term at least, can be devised. The 
Commission has taken note that the Swedish administrative system works 
through a single ministry of Health and Social Welfare, supported by a number of 
substantially autonomous agencies which are responsible for groups of programs. 
Such agencies are managed by senior officials of status comparable with that of a 
departmental head who, while accepting the authority of their parent 
department, in matters of broad policy, exercise considerable freedom to manage 
their own agencies. 
10.3.18 Similarly, the Commission was interested in the experience of the 
Defence Department while it operated with three separate Service departments 
(in the years 1939-1972). It is our impression that the Prime Minister's directive 
Of 1958, which gave the minister and his department clear authority not only to 
develop policy but also to oversee and influence its execution, was felt to be 
necessary because its ministers and senior officials for the preceding period had 
lacked the requisite political force and Cabinet authority to make their role 
effective once the war years and their immediate aftermath were over. 
10.3.19 Although the Defence experience is not necessarily applicable to 
Health and Welfare it does emphasise that greater rationalisation is likely to be 
achieved only if the responsibility for achieving it over a period of time is given to 
a senior minister without detailed responsibility for specific programs. Even then, 
that minister will need to be backed with organisational resources adequate to 
dominate the broad policy conceptions and program activities of his colleagues 
who are responsible for different aspects of the government's services. His 
resources must be sufficient also to bring about, with the backing of a Cabinet 
decision if necessary, any restructuring that is found to be desirable as a result of 
studies sponsored by him or agreements reached with the States. We recognise 
that there can be difficulties in singling out one minister for a pre-eminent 
position unless she or he is really given more authority than the other ministers. 
That would be done best by making only the senior minister a member of 
Cabinet, which would be consistent with recent developments in Australia, with 
Defence experience, with much evidence put to the task force and with the 
Commission's own judgment that the establishment of 'tiers' of ministers would 
increase the effectiveness of ministerial government. 
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10.3.20 The Commission has considered seriously whether the task of 
rationalising the administrative structure of health and welfare and of co-
ordinating policies and management could not be given to one (perhaps the most 
senior) of the ministers responsible for the various portfolios within the complex. 
The Commission is anxious not to add unnecessarily to the units already involved, 
and a co-ordinating minister could find value in having access to experience and a 
power base of existing functions. On the other hand, the minister would have 
conflicting responsibilities—to defend the functions and interests of his existing 
department and to subordinate them to a more rational structure. He would have 
two sources of advice dedicated to these separate objectives. Furthermore, 
collaboration from other ministers and their departments would be impaired by 
reservations about the objectivity of these two sources. He would also have to 
carry a substantial extra load, and the planning and policy element might well be 
forced into second place. 
10. 3.2 I The Commission concludes that if the rationalisation is to proceed 
expeditiously and effectively, the minister must see it as his primary purpose and 
be able to pursue it undistracted by conflicting loyalties. If it is felt that the senior 
minister chosen for this task can reasonably carry an additional portfolio, we 
suggest that it be outside the health and welfare field. 
10.3.22 It has been argued that a minister with such a role would lack an 
adequate power base in the health and welfare field to make it effective. This 
could be a source of difficulty. However, the Commission believes that the 
minister's access to more comprehensive information, his responsibility for 
research and the organisation of policy and administrative reviews, and the 
responsibility for preparation of a welfare budget, could prove adequate. Finally 
of course the minister's effectiveness will depend on his own capacity to command 
support from Cabinet and the Prime Minister. If this is clear we see little ground 
for concern. 
R285 	 10.3.23 	 In more detail we recommend that: 
(a)  there be a Minister and Department for Social Welfare with a 
responsibility to co-ordinate government policy and administration in the 
broad field of health and welfare; 
(b)  the Minister for Social Welfare be a senior minister and a member of 
Cabinet, and if he is given another portfolio, it not be one of those 
concerned with particular parts of health and welfare policies; 
(c)  the Minister for Social Welfare preside over a Ministerial Committee 
including the Ministers for Health, Social Security, Repatriation, and 
Aboriginal Affairs and for some purposes the Minister for Environment, 
Housing and Community Development; 
(d)  the Minister for Social Welfare be responsible for 
(i) achieving a simplified coherent administrative structure to give 
effect to government programs relating to health and welfare, 
(ii) co-ordinating the formulation and review of welfare policies, 
(iii) integrating the preparation of Forward Estimates and Budgets for 
the whole social welfare area, 
(iv) planning, arranging and co-ordinating the research necessary for 
policy formulation and review, 
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(v) co-ordinating consultation and negotiation with other levels of 
government and voluntary agencies, and between federal agencies, 
to ensure effectiveness and economy in 
—the delivery of services to the community 
—the recruitment, training, employment and organisation of 
professional workers; 
(e) the Minister for Social Welfare be supported by a Consultative Council 
consisting of 
(i) the heads of the departments in the social welfare field, 
(ii) experts from outside the Service retained on a short term basis for 
their expertise in relevant capacities such as policy analysis, financial 
organisation, access to and delivery of service, and the organisation 
and use of information, 
• (iii) representatives of selected National Advisory Councils, 
(iv) the Director of the Bureau of Social Policy (see below); 
(f) the Department of Social Welfare be small and designed to provide 
administrative support for the Minister as Chairman of the Ministerial 
Committee and for the Consultative Council and to service task forces and 
other study groups set up by the Minister for Social Welfare to assist him to 
rationalise and co-ordinate administration. It should also include a 
Bureau of Social Policy; 
(g) the Bureau of Social Policy should 
(i) provide some research capacity, but be concerned primarily to 
initiate and support studies in academic and other centres of 
research, 
(ii) collaborate with the Australian Bureau of Statistics in the 
development of adequate statistical information as a basis for policy 
formulation and review, 
(iii) have substantial autonomy in the design and conduct of research 
programs and in the publication of their results (the Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics provides a suitable model). 
10.4 FORMING AND EXECUTING FOREIGN POLICY 
104.1 The wide ranging and challenging submission from the Department of 
Foreign Affairs', the Commission's terms of reference, and the report which Mr 
Justice Sharp prepared for it on the determination of conditions for overseas 
service 2, led the Commission to seek to define the essential role of the Department 
of Foreign Affairs. We considered, with Dr Sharp, that it would not be possible to 
devise suitable overall arrangements for staffing the Department unless its task 
was first clarified, and its place in the administration as a whole determined. 
10.4.2 Primary responsibility for foreign policy rests with the Minister and 
Department of Foreign Affairs. Essentially their role is to express the 
government's basic attitudes and policies in matters of international concern, to 
offer guidance on international influences bearing upon the responsibilities of 
other ministers and departments, and to help reconcile differences and conflicts 
I. 	 Submission No. 214. 
2. Extracts from the report by MrJustice Sharp 'Overseas Service', appear in Appendix 3.K. The 
Commission discussed staffing issues in Chapter 9.4.43-62 and comments further on the Sharp 
Report in an Explanatory Note associated with Appendix 3.K. 
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which may emerge between domestic and international objectives, so making 
possible the presentation internationally of a consistent and coherent pattern of 
government views and decisions. The immediate discharge of these tasks is in the 
hands of a relatively small group of professional diplomatic officers (entitled 
Foreign Affairs Officers), of whom 283 were in posts abroad and 170 in Australia 
at the end of 1974.1  
10.4.3 The diplomatic staff abroad represent the Australian government in the 
countries to which they are attached, providing information about Australian 
government policies, and conducting negotiations necessary for the conduct of 
Australian affairs with them. They maintain a flow of information—political, 
economic and other—from each country to Australia as a support for policy-
related activities there, which are largely in the hands of the diplomatic staff 
located in the head office in Canberra. 
10.4.4 It is often not realised that Foreign Affairs is in fact a relatively large 
department, with administrative tasks overseas of some size. These include 
consular functions, administration of aid and migration programs, and the 
operation of communications facilities. Some 3600 of the total Foreign Affairs 
staff of 4700 are located overseas. 
10.4.5 The consular function is of considerable and growing importance. 
Hundreds of thousands of Australians travel overseas each year, and require 
assistance for a multitude of purposes, routine or emergency. The role of 
supporting with appropriate facilities the many official visitors from Australia 
who rely on the posts for assistance while they are discharging their official duties 
in a foreign country is also significant. These aspects of Foreign Affairs' work tend 
to be under-rated both by the public generally and even by elements in the 
Department itself. 
10.4.6 In submissions put to the Commission, the point has been made that the 
ease and speed of travel, a new outlook and new working methods among heads of 
government including summit meetings and personal visits, the growth of 
intergovernmental agencies, and the widening of the subject matter of 
international activity, have led to major changes in the methods of conducting 
international relations. While there is still a need for an accredited representative 
as a recognised 'go-between' in the business of one national government with 
another, much of the high level representation or negotiation is done by a visiting 
minister or a delegation chosen for competence in a special field. The Foreign 
Affairs officer may then, at least on some important occasions, become the 
assistant, rather than the principal agent in diplomacy. 
10.4.7 These changes are relevant to the structure and management of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, and we believe the Department is being adapted 
to them. Thus, we understand that a Foreign Affairs representative is always 
attached to a. delegation where a head of mission does not lead it, or where 
Foreign Affairs does not have the main carriage of a matter which is the subject of 
international negotiation. The business of international negotiation is complex, 
having its own mode, style and conventions, and while it is not necessary that a 
senior officer in Foreign Affairs will necessarily conduct it more skilfully than 
1. Figures are from the Annual Report of the Department of Foreign Affairs for 1974, and are as 
at 31 December 1974. 
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others, it is important that their expertise be drawn upon to the full. To this end 
we recommend that the Department arrange for the specialised briefing of officers, R286 
both those in the Department and in other departments, who will be involved in 
international negotiations of any size, complexity or importance. 
10.4.8 We note also that while a minister or senior official from Australia may 
assume primary responsibility for representing the government during the 
intensive period of time associated with the overseas visit of a delegation or an 
international conference, this does not diminish-----indeed it enhances—the 
importance of the continuing Foreign Affairs representation. Almost as important 
as the intensive phase will be the preparations made for the visit and the manner 
in which the outcome of the visit is carried forward. In these, the officer on the 
spot is of critical importance, and Foreign Affairs staff will need to be selected with 
perhaps greater regard for this aspect of the work. 
10.4.9 The difficulties in designing appropriate machinery fbr the formulation 
and conduct of foreign affairs arise from the problems of identifying where such 
affairs begin and end. There is almost no subject matter, however closely 
identified with the traditional diplomatic interests of 'a Department of Foreign 
Affairs—representation, reporting and negotiation—which does not contain a 
substantial component of domestic concern. Thus, even the negotiation of a 
traditional treaty of friendship with a foreign country would raise matters 
affecting navigation, trade policy, cultural exchanges and other matters of 
immediate concern to ministers, departments and agencies with relevant 
responsibilities, but concerned primarily with the domestic scene. Equally of 
course there is almost no aspect of domestic policy which does not, or could not, in 
some circumstances involve issues of important international concern or of 
significance in our relationships with particular foreign countries. 
10.4.10 The organisational problem is therefore one of ensuring: 
(a) that the specialist knowledge and skills of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs are effectively used not merely in relation to matters where 
international aspects are dominant but also in bringing to bear relevant 
international considerations on domestic matters within the primary 
competence of other departments; 
(b) that there is a sufficient exchange of information between the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and relevant domestic departments, to enable the 
specialised knowledge and skills of each to be fully deployed; 
(c) that the Department of Foreign Affairs has sufficient co-ordinating 
authority to enable it to bring before ministers or Cabinet matters where 
some reconciliation is necessary to resolve differing or conflicting attitudes 
which derive from the different weights being given to international and 
domestic concerns respectively; 
(d) that these policy activities are supported by effectively operating posts 
overseas, which have also a significant administrative role focusing on 
consular activities and administrative support. 
10.4.11 In policy matters, the role of the Department of Foreign Affairs is 
therefore essentially one of co-ordination. Clearly, opinions can differ as to how 
far it is necessary or wise fbr a co-ordinator to have a dominant role in formulating 
policies and their administration when they lie within his co-ordinating 
responsibility. Other countries show wide differences iii their approach to this 
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division. On the whole, the Commission favours an emphasis similar to that of the 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, which seeks to recognise the 
primary responsibility of other departments within their fields of specialised 
concern, to avoid building up expert staffs paralleling those of 'line' departments, 
and to exercise its influence primarily through various instruments of 
consultation. 
10.4.12 There will always be important issues, both international and domestic, 
where the Minister for Foreign Affairs and his Department will develop a 
'Foreign Affairs' point of view. However, the increasing direct involvement of 
other departments in international activities suggests that it should be possible to 
develop a foreign policy which reflects the political outlook of the government, 
and takes account of Australia's broad national interests as they are assessed by 
the various departments influenced by special groups and the community 
generally. We envisage a much closer integration in the future between the role 
and functions of Foreign Affairs and the rest of Australian government 
administration. In Chapter 9.4  we recommend more open recruitment into this 
Department, and extensive rotation of staff both between Foreign Affairs and 
other departments and between the diplomatic and other streams within the 
Department itself. Here we follow through some other issues which are significant 
for the development of foreign policy and for the Department of Foreign Affairs. 
Problems of Policy Co-ordination 
10.4.13 The Department of Foreign Affairs has difficulties in making effective 
its co-ordinating role. It has few direct powers and a limited 'home base'. Within 
Australia, it deals with departments with specialised knowledge and often a 
community power base, supported and moderated by the whole apparatus of 
elected representatives, ministers, and a general sense of community. When 
policies are in dispute, these primarily domestically oriented influences make it 
difficult for the Department of Foreign Affairs to lend adequate weight to the 
advice it proffers, however ably it has analysed and presented its arguments. 
10.4.14 The consequence is that Foreign Affairs, by its very nature, depends 
upon consultation and upon the influence it can exercise on other officials and 
ministers so as to achieve agreed solutions. Both at home and abroad, its functions 
must, insofar as they affect the responsibilities of other departments, be exercised 
in a truly diplomatic fashion—by negotiation and persuasion rather than by the 
exercise of its own authority. The Commission endorses therefore the claims so 
strongly emphasised in the Department's submission that it should be more fully 
informed and should be consulted or given the opportunity to contribute to policy 
formation whenever, in its opinion, there are significant international con-
siderations. The Commission believes its proposals for staff rotation, in which 
Foreign Affairs would play a part, will make an important contribution to 
improvement of co-ordination. 
10.4.15 The full sharing of information is, of course, a mutual obligation and 
the Department of Foreign Affairs will have access to material of immediate 
relevance to the work of departments—not only those with an 'international' 
component in their work such as Overseas Trade, Primary Industry, Immig-
ration and Ethnic Affairs, and National Resources, but others with pre-
dominantly domestic scope. It would not, the Commission believes, be 
appropriate to establish formal rules relating to the exchange of information. 
R287 However, the Commission recommends that departments and agencies review their 
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present procedures for the exchange of information in consultation with the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and that the Public Service Board monitor the 
effectiveness of the procedures established, drawing the attention of the Auditor-
General to serious deficiencies if they persist. 
10-4. 16 By providing a recognised means by which such deficiencies can be 
brought to notice, the Commission believes the needs and interests of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs can substantially be met. They will nevertheless 
depend upon open and mutually constructive relationships being developed and 
maintained between the Department of Foreign Affairs and departments 
generally. 
10.4.17 The Commission notes with interest the attempts the department has 
been making to develop its own capacity to deal with emerging issues by the 
development of a separate secretariat, which operates outside and independently 
of the line structure of the department, and has terms of reference ranging widely 
from policy planning to organisational matters. We see this as a proper response 
to the rapidly shifting forces of policy concern in the Department of Foreign 
Affairs. Properly used, such a secretariat could strengthen collaboration with 
other departments by drawing promptly to their attention newly emerging 
problems. The Department should, however, resist the temptation to elevate in 
an exaggerated way international political elements in such problems to justify its 
own interventiQn. Such a practice, of which several departments complained, 
tends to undermine the confidence of departments in the advice of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and to reduce their willingness to consult it. 
Equally, such departments have an obligation to consult the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, and to keep it fully informed, where international matters 
obviously are involved. 
10.4.18 To assist in harmonising departmental objectives in the foreign policy 
field, the Commission recommends the judicious establishment by the Department R288 
of Foreign Affairs, in consultation with the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, of task forces, study groups and interdepartmental committees to review 
particular aspects of policy in relation to particular countries, groups of countries, 
or to problems of more general significance. The Commission believes that where 
policy development is involved task forces are preferable to interdepartmental 
committees, although the results of their work in relation to a particular problem 
may need to be examined in due course by such an interdepartmental committee. 
In some cases, the work of an interdepartmental committee, such as the 
committee on Japan, would benefit by referring a particular problem to a task 
force for examination and report.1 The work of such task forces could frequently 
become the basis for governmental statements and sometimes for the issue of a 
Green or White Paper and should therefore draw upon the resources of a number 
of departments, but their membership need not be constituted on a representative 
basis. 
10.5 THE ADMINISTRATION OF ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS 
10.5.1 The administration of Aboriginal affairs presents those responsible for it 
with peculiarly difficult problems and, despite patently genuine good will, energy 
I . The roles of task forces and interdepartmental committees are more fully discussed in Chapter 
11.5.24-26. The IDCs on Japan were the subject of a study for the Commission by Dr Trevor 
Matthews—see Appendix 4.J, Papers r—. 
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and dedication, their efforts are frequently received by articulate Aboriginals 
with dissatisfaction and even hostility. These judgments are supported by the 
submissions to the Commission from the Department of Aboriginal Affairs, the 
oral and written evidence of Aboriginal spokesmen, the views of authorities and 
representatives consulted and, in particular, by the report prepared for the 
Commission by Professor Charles Rowley. 
10.5.2 To some extent this situation resembles that of other countries where 
effirts have been made to improve the lot of depressed ethnic minorities. It 
illustrates the difficult of prod [Icing rapid and evident improvement, and the 
tendency for hopes and aspirations inevitably to run ahead of achievement. The 
consequences of the past remain stronger than the outcome of contemporary 
policy. 
10.5.3 Past attitudes, policies and actions have left Aboriginal society largely 
destroyed, and its people physically, intellectually and emotionally damaged. 
Aboriginal attitudes towards white Australians frequently are still bitter, 
resentful and aggressive. The small scale and the clan structure of traditional 
Aboriginal society, the lack of cohesion between its units, and the dispersal of 
Aboriginals following its breakdown in many parts of Australia have combined to 
make Aboriginal Australians a fragmented population among whom common 
attitudes and aspirations have developed slowly and with difficulty and who have 
found organised action difficult. It is only recently that it has become apparent (at 
least to white Australians) that a substantial proportion both of those Aboriginals 
whose pattern of life is predominantly based on Aboriginal tradition and of the 
urban and fringe-dwelling part-Aboriginals, share a desire to preserve a separate 
identity---to salvage and restore a distinctive Aboriginal culture and to resist 
complete assimilation into the general Australian society. Furthermore, although 
they differ widely in the purposes for which they would use it, both groups seek 
significant authority in the determination of policies and the management of 
programs concerned with their affairs. 
10.5.4 Political and official actions, on the other hand, have been handicapped 
by the persistence of attitudes based on now rejected policies of assimilation and 
'protection', by a profound and widespread ignorance of Aboriginal attitudes and 
by a lack of experience in dealing with the problems of ethnic minorities. 
10.5.5 Some of these obstacles to improvement are now, although skwly, 
becoming less serious. It is now common ground in the policies of political parties 
that the aspirations of Aboriginals should be respected, and policies guided by 
them. Research by the Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies and by social 
scientists is now steadily increasing the awareness of contemporary Aboriginal 
Australians. Communication between Aboriginals of differing tribal affiliation, 
gegraphical location and social background is also increasing rapidly. Above all, 
ministers and officials are learning--frequently, it is true, from their mistakes. 
The task of designing administrative techniques and structures which will, at 
acceptable cost, achieve significant improvements in material and social welfare 
and satisfy the aspirations of Aboriginals, remains difficult and is likely to 
continue to encounter resistances. In view of the conflicting nature of the material 
before it, the Commission considered that it should devote special attention to this 
problem. 
I . Extracts from Professor Rowley's report can be found at Appendix 3.1. 
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10.5.6 An important source of difficulty is the claim by Aboriginals to authority 
and power in decisions about their affairs. No political party accepts the view that 
Aboriginal affairs should or can be the concern of Aboriginals alone. Indeed there 
would be agreement among them that, insofar as they call for special action or 
programs, these are the responsibility and concern of the community as a whole. 
The realities of power mean that ultimate decisions about them and the allocation 
of resources to them will finally be made, in present circumstances, by white 
decision makers. The Commission is satisfied, however, that unless these decision 
makers act in accordance with procedures which give Aboriginals a substantive 
and conscious participation in the processes of decision and, within broad limits, 
in the decisions themselves, programs will continue to fall short of their objectives, 
and resistance, hostility and a rejection of responsibility will continue to mark 
Aboriginal attitudes. 
10.5.7 The Commission believes that such substantive and conscious partici-
pation will be promoted if: 
(a) effective political means exist for the expression of Aboriginal attitudes 
and aspirations and the exploration and resolution of conflicts, both 
among Aboriginals and between Aboriginal and white Australian society; 
(b) Aboriginal communities (including those within white society) can, where 
they wish to do so, be helped to develop institutions for the substantially 
independent conduct of chosen aspects of their own affairs; 
(c) real power to make decisions in matters of importance to Aboriginals is 
entrusted to these institutions and to individuals vested with authority by 
the Aboriginal group affected; 
(d) increasingly varied and satisfying opportunities are provided for Abor-
iginal energies, ambitions and creativeness. 
The National Aboriginal Consultative Committee 
10.5.8 Following earlier attempts to establish a national forum, in 1973 the 
government encouraged the establishment of the National Aboriginal Con-
sultative Committee (NACC), a representative body of Aboriginals elected by 
adult Aboriginal franchise, to act in an advisory and consultative capacity to the 
Minister and the Department. So far the experiment appears to have satisfied 
none of those concerned. 
10.5.9 Its members complain of their lack of real power and of the failure of the 
Minister and the Department to seek or follow their advice. At the same time, 
the Department believes that the Committee's advice is seriously heeded and 
influences departmental advice to ministers. Aboriginals generally, and 
particularly those involved in local community affairs, complain of the NACC's 
failure to communicate with them or to represent them effectively. Despite the 
Department's claim, it seems that the administration is uncertain about the 
Committee's role, sceptical about its capacity for executive responsibility and 
suspicious of domination of tradition oriented Aboriginals by more politically 
sophisticated and aggressive urban Aboriginals. 
10.5.10 However, some kind of representative body appears essential to provide 
a forum for Aboriginals and to assist in resolving conflict, and, despite its 
weaknesses, the NACC exists and has begun to learn its job. It would seem good 
sense, therefore, for the government and the Department to give it increasing R289 
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recognition and to collaborate with it in improving its composition and 
performance and strengthening its authority. Its greatest weakness as an effective 
instrument of Aboriginal authority appears to be that, at the local community 
level, it is not accepted as representative and that its relationships with that level 
are ineffective. Three suggestions have been made which could help overcome 
these weaknesses: 
(a) that, in future elections for the NACC, candidates should be eligible only if 
they are office holders of an Aboriginal Council or incorporated society 
and their nomination is supported by it; 
(b) that one member be elected as at present but for each electorate there be a 
second member who would be required to be such an office holder; 
(c) that for each electorate a second member be chosen by the Chairmen of the 
various Councils and incorporated societies from their membership. 
R290 10.5.11 The Commission recommends that these possibilities and the suggestions 
contained in the following paragraph, be referred to the NACC, and to the 
recently appointed committee on the future of NACC, for their consideration. 
R291 10.5.12 The Commission suggests that the NACC or any representative body 
which succeeds it would be strengthened if: 
(a) the government provided accommodation, facilities and finance for a 
permanent NACC secretariat; 
(b) the Department released, without loss of salary or status, public servants 
whom the NACC wishes to employ and who wish to work with it; 
(c) the Department assisted NACC members to develop their role as 
'ombudsmen'; 
(d) the Department and the NACC arranged with the Australian Institute of 
Aboriginal Studies and Centre for Continuing Education (Australian 
National University) to conduct regular training courses for NACC 
members to cover topics such as Aboriginal culture and tradition, the more 
important components of policy involved in Aboriginal affairs, a general 
background to the work of the government and some procedural aspects of 
the NACC and similar bodies; 
(e) arrangements were made with the same educational institutions for 
regular seminars for NACC members on different policy aspects of 
Aboriginal affairs; 
(f) the NACC were closely involved in advising the Department of Aboriginal 
Affairs on priorities on expenditure and on Aboriginal responses to its work; 
(g) NACC executive members with responsibility to the Committee for 
specific aspects of Aboriginal affairs were given direct access to the 
appropriate ministers (Social Security, Housing, etc.) and to appropriate 
officers in their departments; 
(h) the NACC were given control of the funds for its own administration and 
were assisted in setting up appropriate controls for those funds. 
Commission or Department? 
10.5.13 The NACC and some Aboriginal leaders believe that action at the 
political level (through the NACC) would be insufficient. They urge greater 
Aboriginal authority through a Commission with statutory powers which would 
replace the Department. The concept of the Commission has not been clearly 
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defined. Mr Charles Perkins, in his oral evidence to the Commission, spoke 
sometimes as if the NACC would itself become the Commission, but more 
generally the concept appears to provide for an executive Commission, with the 
NACC performing more deliberative, advisory and review functions. 
10.5.14 The main reasons advanced by various Aboriginal spokesmen for a 
Commission are that: 
(a) a traditional department is likely to be dominated by white career-minded 
public servants with neither the necessary knowledge or understanding of 
Aboriginals nor dedication to their interests; 
(b) a traditional department is unlikely to be sufficiently free of central 
bureaucratic restraints to be able to deal expeditiously with the urgent 
problems facing Aboriginals; 
(c) a traditional department, even with an enthusiastic minister, is unlikely to 
have sufficient political 'clout' to obtain the resources necessary; 
(d) Aboriginals are unlikely to identify with a government department and are 
unlikely to work happily within it; 
(e) a Commission would be better placed than a department to stimulate the 
performance of functional departments insofar as they affect Aboriginals, 
and to co-ordinate or contract out their work; 
(f) a Commission, if it included members of the NACC executive and other 
Aboriginals, would provide a more effective channel for grass-roots 
Aboriginal influence on policy and administration than the alternative of 
appointing additional Aboriginals to the staff of the Department. 
10.5.15 The Commission does not accept the validity of many of the criticisms 
implied in these reasons and, furthermore, thinks it likely that the comments 
which are valid would be equally applicable to a Commission and its staff. The 
Aboriginals expressing preference for a Commission are, it seems to us, guided by 
the expectation that it would give greater authority and opportunity to 
Aboriginals. Whether this would be so would depend upon the constitution, 
powers and staffing of the Commission. 
10..16 There is, of course, nothing sacrosanct about the departmental style of 
organisation, but in Chapter 4.3  of this Report we have concluded that it is 
generally the most appropriate for giving effect to programs reflecting the policies 
of particular ministers and governments, while acknowledging that there are 
circumstances where a statutory agency may be preferable. It could be that, as a 
political consensus about policies in Aboriginal affairs develops and functional 
departments come to perform as adequately for Aboriginals as for other 
Australians, the establishment of a Commission to replace the Department would 
be justified. We do not consider these prerequisites are met at present. It is, 
however, an issue which might well be reconsidered from time to time. 
10.5.17 In the meantime, we believe that important improvements are possible 
in the administration of Aboriginal affairs through: 
(a) changes within the Department; 
(b) the growth of Aboriginal institutions; 
(c) the increasing participation, at the policy level, of representatively chosen 
Aboriginals; 
(d) the increasing participation of Aboriginals in administration and service 
delivery. 
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10-5.18 Within the Department, the Commission has the impression that some 
members of staff have become tired and disillusioned by the strain and 
disappointments of this exacting work; some lack any real commitment to its 
purposes or to contemporary policies based upon changed objectives. There is 
therefore a need both for the recruitment (for short terms if necessary) of those 
with a firm desire to work in this field, and for a positive program of counselling 
and placement in other work of those who are or have become unsuited to it. 
Secondment for a period of years could prove a useful device. The Commission 
endorses the departmental view that responsibility for functional programs for 
Aboriginals, even when they have distinctive qualities, should be with the 
department responsible generally for such programs. However in centres where 
Aboriginals form significant communities there may be value in developing for 
them offices in which various departments and agencies including those of other 
levels of government, are brought together along the lines of the NOW 
R292 experiment (see Appendix 2.F). The Commission recommends that the Depart-
ment explore this possible course of action. 
10.5.19 The contribution of the last three developments mentioned in 
paragraph 10.5.17 will increase as Aboriginals, by training and experience, 
acquire increasing knowledge and capacity. Increasing participation at the 
policy level could, the Commission believes, be stimulated by the adoption by the 
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs of an experimental technique for adding 
Aboriginal sources of advice to those from the Department. In Chapter 4.3.45-47, 
we have suggested that a minister wishing to have continuing access to non-
departmental advice could do this, while integrating it with that of his 
departmental advisers, by establishing some form of advisory machinery. An 
adaptation of this proposal appears to the Commission to be eminently suitable 
for Aboriginal affairs. 
R293 10.5.20 The Commission recommends, therefore: 
(a) that the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs appoint a Ministerial Council-----a 
possible membership might be: the Minister (Chairman),  the Secretary to 
the Department (Deputy Chairman), the Chairman of the NACC 
(Deputy Chairman), four departmental members from departments 
having substantial responsibilities for Aboriginals, four executive members 
of the NACC, two Aboriginals chosen by the Minister from a panel 
submitted by the NACC so as to ensure regional and cultural balance; 
(b) that the functions of the Ministerial Council be 
(i) to advise the Minister and the Secretary of the Department on policy 
and administration, 
(ii) to help co-ordinate the work of various departments insofar as they 
affect Aboriginals, 
(iii) to receive reports on progress in the achievement of policy objectives 
from functional departments and from regional and community 
committees, 
(iv) to improve liaison and communication with NACC and other 
Aboriginal Councils; 
(c) that the Ministerial Council meet each month and be serviced by the 
Department; 
(d) that, at regional and community levels, committees presided over by the 
Chairman of the relevant Aboriginal Council be established, with their 
340 
membership following the pattern of the Ministerial Council, to co-
ordinate the work of departments, Aboriginal Councils and other 
organisations; 
(e) that the co-ordinating and review committees at regional and community 
levels report to the Ministerial Council half-yearly. 
Community Institutions 
10-5.21 Many of the difficulties encountered in the administration of 
Aboriginal affairs arise from the lack of appropriate indigenous institutions within 
Aboriginal communities for the performance of tasks they wish to undertake. In 
northern and central Australia, Aboriginal Councils, deriving authority in part 
from traditional practice and in part from government, have developed in 
Aboriginal communities and have been entrusted with increasing responsibilities 
arising from government policies. 
10.5.22 The Commission had the opportunity to see some such Councils at 
work, and was impressed with their increasing competence. However, most of 
these Councils are still learning their job, are uncertain of their authority, and 
lack clarity about their relations with the government and its agencies and the 
degree to which they can rely upon government support. 
10.5.23 In more urban environments the problem is even more difficult. In 
New South Wales, the Aboriginal Foundation, the Aboriginal Legal Service and 
the Aboriginal Medical Service have emerged from collaboration between 
radical Aboriginal and sympathetic professional groups. Other similar organi-
sati()ns have developed in other States and regions. Their influence has been 
important, but their experience has been varied and there has been a high rate of 
failure, of administrative breakdown and internal dissention. 
10.5.24 The Department has sought increasingly to support the development of 
these organisations and to entrust administrative and executive tasks to them, and 
has carried out programs designed to strengthen them and to train their executive 
and staff. These efforts have encountered problems and often failure. The 
Commission believes that these problems and failures do not justify a withdrawal 
of support and authority from them. Error is the price of learning and of 
responsibility and cannot wholly be avoided. The availability, on request, of 
advice, expertise and training, and the application of guidelines for self-discipline 
and control can, however, minimize it. 
10.5.25 The Commission recommends that the policy of steadily shifting R294 
responsibility for appropriate local and community tasks to Aboriginal 
institutions should be confirmed. It believes also that a systematic study of the 
prerequisites of success for emerging institutions will help ensure that undue 
burdens are not placed on them prematurely, and that they are helped to follow 
and to build on successful examples. We recommend that the Department and the R295 
Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies collaborate in studies of this kind and in 
the dissemination of their outcome. 
Increased Aboriginal Participation in Administration 
10.5.26 The recommendations above will, the Commission believes, do much 
to increase Aboriginal influence on and participation in the processes of 
government which deal with their affairs, especially in matters relating primarily 
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or exclusively to Aboriginals. They are, however, unlikely to satisfy legitimate 
Aboriginal aspirations until those employed in these processes include a 
substantially higher proportion of Aboriginals than at present at all levels of work 
and responsibility and until opportunities for Aboriginals in this and other 
governmental work are seen to correspond more closely with those open to other 
Australians. Detailed recommendations for moving towards these goals are 
contained in Chapter 8.3. 
Review and Assessment 
10.5.27 This Report has emphasised frequently the need for the progressive 
assessment of government programs. Nowhere is it more acute than in Aboriginal 
affairs. The complexity of the problems and the unexpectedness of many of the 
difficulties which have been encountered in carrying out apparently well-
founded programs emphasise this need. 
10.5.28 Some programs which have significant measurable indicators of success 
will be easier to assess (for example, health or infant and maternal mortality). 
Others, such as those aimed at the encouragement of a conscious and independent 
Aboriginal identity and a developed capacity in Aboriginals to manage their own 
affairs, will remain more elusive for the assessor. Modern research techniques can, 
however, be used. The research should be fostered to develop in the field of 
Aboriginal administration measurable indicators of various components of 
R296 welfare. The Commission recommends that the Department of Aboriginal Affairs 
and the Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies collaborate to stimulate this 
work. 
10.5.29 At Chapter i 1.5.20 the Commission recommends that the Department 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet should be responsible for progressive reviews of 
R297 the effectiveness of government programs. It recommends, accordingly, that the 
Departments of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and of Aboriginal Affairs should 
set up an external group to assess the long term results flowing from governmental 
programs in Aboriginal affairs and to provide a continuing basis for future 
assessment.' These assessments should be based in part upon uniform statistical 
and factual data from Aboriginal communities and upon the reports of the 
regional co-ordinating and review committees reporting to the Ministerial 
Council which would be appointed by the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (see 
paragraph 10.5.20 above). They should take into account the outcome of the 
research sponsored by the Department and the Institute relating to the 
identification and measurement of indicators of Aboriginal welfare. 
io.6 WOMEN 
io.6.i The Commission's general responsibility to comment on machinery of 
government, and evidence of the community's heightened awareness of the need 
for a specific capacity in the administration to consider the impact of government 
policies and programs on women, necessitate some observations on adminis-
trative arrangements which have a bearing on the position of women. 
10.6.2 The Commission's call for submissions brought a considerable response 
from women's groups—for example the Women's Electoral Lobby, Women in 
I . The Commission is aware of the inquiry into services for Aboriginals announced by the 
government late in January 1976, but not of the procedures adopted or the outcome of its 
inquiries. 
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Australian Government Employment, the National Council of Women, 
YWCA— and from individual women. In addition, the Public Service Board, 
staff associations and community organisations commented both on the 
employment of women (discussed in Chapter 8.3) and on the problems of women 
as clients of the administration. Evidence was also given before the Commission 
and at public meetings. 
10.6.3 In response to the high level of interest in these matters, the Commission 
published in August 1975  a discussion paper prepared by staff members, Sexism in 
Public Service, as a means of taking the relevant issues to a wider audience. The 
paper examined patterns of employment of women in the administration, and 
gave some consideration to the adequacy of existing administrative machinery for 
the execution of the government's responsibility for the welfare of all women. 
Responses to the paper both from within the administration and from outside, 
together with the Commission's own research and the evidence put before it, have 
provided a foundation for the views and recommendations contained in this 
section of the Report.' 
10.6.4 The Commission recognises that social changes in the twentieth century 
have greatly changed the role of women. The largely domestic role traditionally 
assigned to them in our society has been modified partly because of declining 
birth rates, increased educational opportunities, increasing participation of 
women in the workforce and resulting changes in the aspirations and expectations 
of women themselves. 
10.6.5 The institutions of society have been slow to respond to the changing role 
and needs of women 2, 
 especially to the increasing numbers of working women 3, 
or to acknowledge the subtle but real impediments to opportunities for full 
development of their ability and potential in the workplace. These impediments 
include a generally lower level of formal educational attainment, career 
aspirations depressed by social conditioning', the concentration of women in a 
narrow range of occupations characterised by relatively poor conditions and rates 
of pay 1, and interruptions to careers for the purpose of bearing or caring for young 
children, responsibility for whom has traditionally been assigned in our society to 
women. These factors are reflected in the high incidence of poverty, dependence 
and unemployment amongst women. 
io.6.6 It has been put to the Commission in submissions and in response to the 
publication of the discussion paper that the administration reflects male 
orientations and life-styles and that some new arrangements are needed to ensure 
i. See Appendix 3.J for a selection of submissions, the major conclusions and recommendations of 
the discussion paper, and responses to the paper. 
2. 'If it were only a question of attitudes, however, the problems of women in Australia would not be so 
serious. But it is a characteristic of Australian society, as it is of all societies, that attitudes become 
enshrined in a nation's institutions. And when, as in Australia, discrimination against women is 
characteristic of the institutional arrangements in the country, the problem for women becomes well 
nigh intractable.' 
Margaret Power, The Wages of Sex, Australian Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. i, March 1974- 
3. See Ryan and Conlon, The Gentle Invaders, Nelson (Sydney) 1974. Ann Summers, Damned 
Whores and God's Police, Allen Lane (Melbourne) 1975.  Encel, McKenzie and Tebbutt, Women 
and Society, Cheshire (Melbourne) Ig. 
4. See Girls, Schools and Society. Report by a Study Group to the Schools Commission, November 
1975- 
5 	 See Margaret Power, The Wages of Sex. 
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adequate consideration of the needs and interests of women in the formulation of 
policy, the implementation of programs and the delivery of services.' The need 
for such arrangements is underlined by the absence of women from senior 
positions in the Service  and the consequent lack of opportunities—with 
exceptions discussed below—for female participation in policy decisions which 
vitally affect the welfare of women and men in the community. 
10.6.7 The longest established administrative unit concerned with women's 
affairs is the Women's Bureau, originally the Women's Section, established in 
1962 in the then Department of Labour, now Employment and Industrial 
Relations. The Bureau has made a significant contribution to the welfare of 
women in the Australian community by undertaking or sponsoring studies of 
trends in women's employment and so providing vitally necessary information on 
which informed policy decisions may be based. In addition the Bureau has some 
capacity to contribute to policy developments. More recent initiatives include the 
appointment by the Schools Commission in 1974 of a committee to study the 
effects of social change on the educational needs of women and girls (the report of 
the committee, Girls Schools and Society was published in 1975); the appointment of 
a National Advisory Committee for International Women's Year, which in 
addition to planning events to mark the year was responsible for research grants 
totalling $2 million; and the creation in 1974 of a Women's Affairs Section, 
upgraded in 1975  to a Branch, in the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet. 
io.6.8 The Commission attaches considerable significance to the potential of 
the Women's Affairs Branch, during the years when the discrimination inherent 
in Australian institutional arrangements is being modified, to contribute to the 
welfare of women and to assist in the eradication of discrimination. Its access to 
Cabinet submissions has made possible for the first time adequately informed 
comment on the likely impact on women of evolving policies, and provides an 
opportunity to influence the thrust and content of such policies. At the same time 
the Branch is involved in preparation of responses to representations made to the 
government by women's organisations and individual women. Through this 
work and the contacts it has developed itself, it is able to act as a channel of 
communication between government and women in the community. Accord- 
R298 ingly the Commission recommends that the Branch be maintained and streng-
thened. 
10.6.9 We have considered the suggestion that the work of the Women's Affairs 
Branch and the Women's Bureau be complemented and reinforced by the 
creation of women's policy units in other departments, especially those with 
substantial functional responsibilities and a high proportion of female clients, for 
example, the Departments of Social Security, Education, Health, Immigration 
and Ethnic Affairs, Aboriginal Affairs, and those policy departments whose work 
has significant implications for women as well as men, such as 
Environment, Housing and Community Development. Additionally, the 
need for a unit in the Attorney-General's Department has been suggested, so that 
1. See comments on the paper by the Royal Commission on Human Relationships, the 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Women's Electoral Lobby, Appendix 
3.J. 
2. See Chapter 8.3 and Appendix 3.A, Paper io, The Illusion of Equality. 
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the implications of legislation and legislative change for women can be 
considered. Those who have commended the establishment of such units have 
emphasised the value of making use of the specialist expertise available within 
functional departments to review existing programs, initiate programs for which 
a need is seen, and influence the development of new policies at the point of 
origin. 
io.6.io The Commission acknowledges the logic of these suggestions. We also 
recognise their potential to increase the participation of qualified women in 
decision-making. However, we see some risks in the widespread development of 
such units. They introduce a principle of organisation based on social groups 
rather than function or content which in the long run we regard as undesirable. 
It is possible that their existence may entrench sexist attitudes rather than 
promote a common pursuit of policies and attitudes which offer the maximum 
scope for new development of individual and group capacities. However, we are 
conscious that the rejection of special measures to modify discriminatory aspects 
of existing institutions may inhibit or prevent necessary change. We think that 
there is scope for experiment in this matter. 
io.6.i i We recommejid therefore that some of those departments referred to in R299 
the previous paragraph be encouragcd to develop women's policy units on an 
experimental basis, and that their effectiveness be assessed at the end of a three 
year period. One of these units should be established in the Department of Social 
Welfare (see section 10.3) since there is a predominance of women among the 
clients of the agencies to be co-ordinated by this Department. In the meantime, 
we suggest that the Women's Affairs Branch confer with the remaining 
departments on existing organisational arrangements which would ensure 
special attention to matters particularly concerning women. The results of these 
arrangements and the activities of the women's policy units could then be 
compared as a guide to future action. 
i o.6. 12 Policies and programs affecting women need to be soundly based on 
relevant information. The Women's Bureau has over the years been a source of 
reliable factual information and analyses of women's employment; it is time that 
other facets of women's problems were the subject of similar research. The 
creation of a Bureau of Social Policy has been recommended earlier in this 
chapter (paragraph 10.3.23); we recomm-nd that it be responsible for the initiation R30o 
and conduct of specific studies relating to women. It should of course be open to 
departments or to units especially concerned with women's affairs to request the 
Bureau of Social Policy to provide or to arrange the provision of information on 
specific matters. The Women's Affairs Branch could well accept responsibility for 
monitoring the scope of these studies, consulting as necessary with policy units 
and with the Office of Equality in Employment in the Public Service Board (see 
Chapter 8.3) and other similar units. 
10.7 INFORMATION 
10.7.1 Information is power. It gives distinctive strength to those who possess it: 
to public servants, to individuals or groups who may have access to it. The 
classical dictum of Lord Acton that all power tends to corrupt has application to 
this as well as other forms of power. Because information is power and is capable of 
abuse, questions of access to it, of authority to withhold it and of the privacy of 
those who supply the data on which it is based are of much importance. 
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10.7.2 One in ten of the submissions received by the Commission was critical of 
the way information is gathered, used and disseminated, or not disseminated, by 
the bureaucracy. There were criticisms of a lack of effective communication 
between managers and subordinates and there were complaints about the lack of 
co-ordination of the various services which provide information either to the 
public or to the administration, such as libraries, registries and information 
sections. 
10.7.3 Taken as a whole, the Commonwealth administration has more 
information available to it than any other entity in Australia. Probably the largest 
amount is collected as a byproduct of the discharge of the varied functions of 
Commonwealth agencies—in the welfare field, in defence and external relations, 
in customs, in taxation and so on. More information comes from a wide range of 
individual and institutional communications with the administration. Infor-
mation is also directly collected for the purpose of developing statistics and other 
organised data for use by the administration and the public—a function largely 
but not wholly carried out by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Finally, 
repositories of information have been established from which it can be made 
available to those who wish to use it—a function which both the National Library 
and the Australian Archives discharge. 
Information for the Administration 
10.7.4 Information is essential to the process of administration. Without it the 
policy process can be inadequate, administration may be insensitive or inefficient, 
and management ineffective. No matter how skilled the personnel of an 
organisation, how sophisticated their techniques or how perceptive their 
judgments, their work can be nullified or seriously prejudiced by the absence of 
adequate information. 
10.7.5 Our studies have convinced us that the management systems of 
government have failed to develop adequately the information resources at their 
disposal, to integrate them fully into the decision-making processes and to ensure 
them proper dissemination. 
10.7.6 Throughout our Report we have identified specific situations in which 
improved information flows can lead to better administration. In Chapter 3  we 
have emphasised the need for improved systems of communication as a basis for 
accountable management.' In Chapter 5  we refer to the need to improve the 
provision of information held by the administration to the Parliament and to the 
information needs of individual members of Parliament; in Chapter 6 we have 
urged that decision makers and managers take into account information about 
community views and aspirations; in Chapter 7  we have emphasised the need to 
provide information at outposts as a basis for prompt local decisions; in Chapter 9 
we have pointed to the role of information in promoting better management; and 
a recurring theme in our examination of special problems in this chapter has been 
the need for better flows of information within the system and between the 
administration and the community. In Chapters 4  and i i, we point to the 
dangers of departments, particularly the co-ordinating agencies, regarding as 
'their own' information they obtain in the course of their work. Having identified 
so many areas where information needs to be developed within the adminis- 
i. 	 See also Appendix i.E. 
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tration, we now consider some general aspects of the development task and of 
public access to government information. 
10.7.7 Information for policy: The OECD Ad Hoc Group on Scientific and 
Technical Information' pointed to the rapid growth in information available and 
to the importance of ensuring that it is harnessed effectively. It commented: 
'The organised processing and exchange of information has reached a peak of 
sophistication in certain fields of professional specialisation. The logical structure 
and basic language of science is designed to facilitate the organisation and 
creative use of technical information. Great progress in this direction has also 
been made in the social sciences. Contemporary technology for information 
handling now permits more efficient storage, retrieval, and exchange of 
information between specialists. But the challenge of modern societies is the 
effective use of such specialised information to guide the destiny of those 
societies.' 
10.7.8 Departments need to respond actively if they are to keep pace with these 
developments and take advantage of the possibilities of such sophisticated 
technology. The Commission commends for consideration the recommendation 
by the OECD group that: 
governments at the highest level accord priority attention not Qnly to the 
development of policies for the generation of scientific and technical information 
but also to the development of policy for the efficient and prudent use of such 
information in policy formulation, in the conduct of the affairs of government 
and in R and D management.'2 
While much of the responsibility for recognising the relevance and potential of 
information technology must remain with departmental management, we 
consider the Public Service Board should play a part in keeping them informed 
and in stimulating and monitoring developments, especially through its 
membership and work for the National Information Advisory Council which is 
discussed in paragraphs 10.7.30-32 below. 
10.7.9 Registries: Registries, with their responsibilities for handling cor-
respondence and other documents placed on files, are still the central information 
storage, retrieval and control point for most Commonwealth agencies, and even 
with greater use of ADP they will continue to be of critical importance to the 
operation of an agency. Indeed the integration of data embodied in registry files 
into the ADP system may well be one important development in this field. Yet, in 
spite of its central role, the registry is usually staffed by junior officers with 
minimum qualifications and no formal training, and technological development 
has often been minimal. Many individual registries are therefore seen to be below 
the standards of efficiency which their importance seems to demand. 
10.7.10 The Commission engaged consultants3 to carry out a series of case 
studies of individual registries in as wide a range as possible of government 
organisations. The key finding, which has been largely endorsed by the Public 
Service Board, the Australian Archives and the Treasury and others to whom 
copies of the report were sent, is that: 
I . lnjoi'mation for a Changing Society, OECD Paris içj'r. 
2. OECD Report, page 41. 
3. Cruikshank and Partners. Extracts from their report are contained in Appendix 4.D. 
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• . the registries which had least trouble in keeping to set procedures in an 
orderly way were those which received attention from a reasonably senior 
departmental officer. Typically, this man headed or was a particularly forceful 
member of the management services function so that he occupied a suitably 
dominant cross functional role. He was likely to have achieved a sufficient 
modification of registry practices and an adequate subjugation of action officers 
to produce a workable arrangement. If a registry is simply invested with the 
normal lormal authority and then gets no particular higher management 
attention, it will almost certainly fail to do much more than open and direct 
correspondence and provide a messenger service.' 
10.7.11 The Commission regards this as a realistic assessment of the need 
R30 i registries have for senior managerial support and encouragement. We recommend 
that: 
(a) registries be integrated more effectively into the managerial and 
administrative structure and process of departments and agencies, with 
better lines of communication to improve services and resolve problems; 
(b) group organisation of registry staff be investigated by departments not 
using these methods; 
(c) training be improved for registry users and stafi. 
10.7.12 Automatic Data Processing: ADP is used as a storer and processor of 
information and is therefore an important tool of management. The need for a 
central authority to develop and monitor, its use was canvassed by the Public 
Service Board in a Memorandum (No. i to the Commission. We appointed a 
consultant' to examine the present use and practice in relation to ADP. The 
report of the consultant and discussions based upon it point to the need for more 
expert technical advice; greater standardisation; and more effective sharing of 
communication networks. 
10.7.13 The Commission believes that this rationalisation of ADP use as well as 
its further development and up-dating will be made easier by a concentration of 
sources of technical expertise and advice on policy. On balance it seems 
appropriate and consistent with our recommendations in Chapter i 1.6 that this 
R302 function be concentrated with the Public Service Board. We recommend that a 
small but expert group be developed within the Board, staffed to a large degree by 
rotation and maintaining effective communication with centres of expertise 
outside the administration: 
(a) to service the interdepartmental committee on automatic data processing; 
(b) to provide advice on the development and use of ADP; 
(c) to monitor and review the ADP activities of the departments, particularly 
in relation to the observance of standards and the sharing of network 
potential; 
(d) to develop a code of ethics for computer operation and use. 
10.7.14 The development of this group in the Board will not eliminate the need 
for the standing interdepartmental committee on ADP. Indeed the work of that 
IDC may become more important as the Forward Estimates process is developed. 
It should however make it possible to give the IDC's decisions substantial 
1. Professor C. S. Wallace, whose report, with a staff paper based on its conclusions, is in 
Appendix 4.D. 
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authority and avoid the duplication of clearance procedures which appears to 
exist at present. 
10.7.15 A submission from MrJ. B. Thacker' drew attention to the very real 
risks of misuse of data recorded on ADP and of the difficulties of protecting its 
confidentiality. He urged the establishment of a body authorised to hear, examine 
and act on complaints both from within the Public Service and outside in respect 
of data held by the administration, as to its accuracy, methods of acquisition and 
use. The Commission is satisfied that problems exist and will develop in this area, 
and that research and study of the issues as a basis for action is desirable. We 
consider that the Board's specialist staff should look further into this matter and if 
necessary recommend suitable legislation. The terms of reference of the Law 
Reform Commission's inquiry into privacy include investigation of the integrity 
of computer data. 
10-7-16 Statistics: The importance of statistics has been recognised pro-
gressively by the establishment of a separate bureau, and now of a statutory body, 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics, to obtain and process information and to 
guarantee secrecy and professional standards of accuracy and interpretation. 
Earlier in this chapter (paragraph 10.1.31) we have suggested the need to attach 
the Bureau to a service department and for it to work for all or many departments, 
contributing equally to the needs of policy-making units in all fields of 
government. 
10.7.17 The Committee on Integration of Data Systems, which reported in 
1974, suggested that efforts be made to ensure that official data systems are 
mutually compatible. It drew attention to a serious lack of co-ordination in 
existing systems, with separate departments operating data systems inde-
pendently of one another, on inconsistent bases, and without adequate 
consultation. 
10.7.18 These recommendations have not yet been adequately put into effect 
and there remains substantial scope to reduce costs and to rationalise the 
demands on those who provide information. We note that the Australian 
Statistics Act provides for the appointment of an advisory council to the 
Statistician, and recommend that this provision be implemented promptly and that R303 
the council's members be selected so as to ensure representation of the wide 
variety of actual and potential users of statistics as well as of those who supply or 
process the material. 
Public Access to Information 
10.7.19 The Commission has generally emphasised the need for wider public 
access to information in the possession of government agencies. Governments and 
their officials insist that they must restrict public access to the information they 
hold on grounds of national security, to protect the privacy of individuals and 
respect confidences reposed in them, and to permit and facilitate, effective 
working of the administrative machine. The proponents of open access have 
emphasised that governments operate essentially for and on behalf of citizens, 
that they function better when minimum restrictions are imposed on access to the 
information they hold, and that openness promotes an aware and participatory 
democracy. 
I. 	 Submission No. 186. 
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10.7.20 While there is no simple solution to the problems of determining what 
can properly be withheld, the general sentiment and expectations of the 
community have been changing consistently in the direction of requiring more 
openness and access to information gathered and held in its administration. This 
fact is a starting point for the consideration of issues of detail in the following 
paragraphs. 
10.7.21 Freedom of Information legislation: The emphasis of much of 
what we have said in our Report is on openness, as ameans of stimulating 
efficiency, responsiveness and accountability in the administration, it remains, 
however, difficult to determine just where the right of access to information 
should stop. The interdepartmental committee established by the Whitlam 
government interpreted the requirement that it should develop proposals for 
freedom of information legislation consistent with the Westminster style system, 
as necessitating not only a large number of exemptions from disclosure, but also 
the reervation to ministers of the final responsibility for disclosure of certain 
categories of information. An alternative approach is represented by a draft Bill 
which was produced by a consultant to the Commission in association with 
Commissioner Munro, which provides that departments should be obliged to 
maintain and publish lists, indexes, etc. of material held, and to provide 
information on request, subject to specified exemptions and to review of decisions 
to refuse access by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. 
10.7.22 The majority of the Commission, while urging greater openness and 
freedom of access to information about governmental processes, and agreeing 
that legislation could well contribute to these objectives, has felt it to be 
inappropriate to endorse or recommend a specific draft Bill. A minority report by 
Commissioner Munro on Freedom of Information, which includes the draft Bill 
and an Explanatory Memorandum, appears at Appendix 2.A. We consider every 
reasonable attempt should be made to provide individuals and community 
groups with access to much information which until now has been the privileged 
possession of ministers and public servants. At the same time, difficult problems 
will remain to be resolved if improved rights of access are to serve the desired 
purposes. For example, a great deal of material currently made available 
represents a waste of resources (see paragraph 10-7.24).  Furthermore 'snowing' 
with information is a recognised technique of obfuscation. Nevertheless, a general 
disposition to openness where possible would certainly give a sounder basis for 
community judgment and participation. 
10.7.23 In this context, we note that Canada has relied on administrative rather 
than legislative measures and that a committee of the Canadian House of 
Commons has been reviewing the effect of the guidelines governing access to 
official information which were issued in 1973. These guidelines required 
departments and agencies to produce, on notice of motion by the House, 
government papers, documents and consultant reports, except where they fell 
within the scope of 16 specified categories of exemption. The guidelines came to 
be used in determining not only what papers would be produced to the 
Parliament, but also the form of answers to parliamentary questions and of 
responses to citizens' requests. We understand that in the Netherlands there has 
been no legislation but a continuing relaxation of restrictions on access by 
administrative means.' 
I . See Appendix 2.A, Introduction, paragraphs 22-3- 
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10.7.24 Departmental information services: Many departments and 
authorities have established units to provide information for community use. It 
emerges from a questionnaire sent by the Commission to 43  departments and 
statutory bodies early in 1975 that 28 of them have specially designated 
information sections and a further five were planning to establish one. These 
sections, which employ some 800 people and whose direct costs appear to be over 
$50 million a year, emphasise the publication of material for distribution. The 
content is determined by the department or agency, but much of it appears to lack 
a clear objective or program and only thirteen of the respondents have sponsored 
or undertaken systematic assessment of the effects of these programs. From 25-80 
per cent of requests for published material from different departments and 
agencies come from school children. The Commission doubts the value of much 
of this department sponsored work. Its relevance to the information needs of the 
public and its cost effectiveness can be seriously questioned. Furthermore much of 
it is propagandist in style and purpose. If it is to be continued there is a clear need 
for its control by information specialists rather than predominantly by journalists 
as at present. 
10.7.25 An associated question is the relationship between officials and 
representatives of the media. Mr Geoff Allen prepared a report on a consultancy 
basis entitled 'The Press and the Public Service" in which he concluded that 
departments should keep their relations with the media separate from 
publications and publicity. He expressed the view that journalist qualifications 
should not be prescribed for departmental positions established to provide 
information to and conduct departmental relations with the media. Media 
relations staff should be given, as a primary task, the responsibility of facilitating 
contact, rather than being a buffer, between the media and senior officers and 
functional specialists in departments. On this basis, one or at most two officers are 
likely to be enough staff for most departments, and we suggest the foregoing as a R304 
basis for departmental action. 
10.7.26 In relation to the preparation of publications and general material for 
dissemination, the Commission recommends: 	 R305 
(a) a review of departmental information programs and of the qualifications 
required for those staffing information sections; 
(b) a review of the levels at which approval can be given to the release of non-
political information (markedly different delegations exist in different 
departments); 
(c) systematic evaluations of the effects of information programs by setting 
measurable information objectives and priorities; 
(d) a central professional body to monitor the relevance and objectivity of 
departmental publications. 
The Advisory Council which we suggest at paragraph 10.7.31 might be a suitable 
body to carry out these recommendations. 
10.7.27 Information for Parliament: The Parliament already receives a 
substantial volume and range of information through reports and other formal 
documents such as the budget papers, as well as through less formal means, of 
I . Portions are reproduced in Appendix 2j. 
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which answers to parliamentary questions are the best known.' Members of 
Parliament have stated that the sheer volume of material they receive makes 
systematic use of it difficult. The Parliamentary Library Research Service meets 
specific requests from members, and often provides a liaison with departments 
holding additional material. However, the service for members could be more 
R3o6 systematic and comprehensive. The Commission recommends that the Parliamen-
tary Library Research Staff confer with departments to explore means by which 
departmental material can be made more timely and more relevant. 
10.7.28 Library and Archives: Libraries in Australia are currently ex-
periencing rapid development, both in integration and in the use of more 
sophisticated techniques. The National Library's initiative in linking libraries in 
an information service focusing on the National Library (ALBIS) is the foremost 
example of such development. The Australian Archives is charged with providing 
access for those within and outside the administration to papers no longer in 
current use in departments. Because of the content of the papers, access to them is 
less readily obtainable than it is to papers held by the National Library and other 
libraries. While for some papers the maintenance of a 'closed' period is justified, 
standards appear to be excessively severe and the Commission believes that 
restrictions on access should be kept to the minimum consistent with safeguarding 
strictly defined national interest and the rights of individuals to privacy. 
R307 10.7.29 In general, the Commission recommends that steps betaken progressively 
with a view to improving the flow of information to the community. In particular, 
we recommend: 
(a) that distribution of information on existing and proposed government 
programs be improved by making such information available at many 
more locations—schools, universities, hospitals, workplaces, libraries, 
community centres, learning exchanges and departments—and better 
publicised through talks, use of Community Newsletters, etc.; 
(b) that such information be in diverse forms—pamphlets, tapes (audio and 
visual) and both on loan and for sale; 
(c) that more information be made available to the public about the 
organisational structure of the administration (including names and 
telephone numbers of a contact person and of key officials), and that 
shorter, simpler versions of departmental handbooks should be prepared, 
and be available on request; 
(d) that names and contact points of action officers be added to outgoing 
correspondence and that officers in direct contact with the public always 
be identified by name tags or signs; 
(e) that wider use be made of 'Green Papers' to open up public debate before 
programs are finalised; 
(1) that in relation to legislation there be, where possible, wide consultation 
with interested groups before Bills are prepared, and a period during 
which the Bills are allowed to lie on the table of the Houses; 
(g) that a description of programs under which funds are available for group 
activities be produced and widely circulated—these should include 
information about the department and section responsible; 
I . 	 See Chapter 5.1.8-9 and 5.2.6-7 
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(h) that all such information be designed to meet the needs of the potential 
users—where necessary it should 
(i) be multi-lingual, 
(ii) refer specifically to the department or agency concerned and points 
of contact, 
(iii) state conditions which must be met by applicants for benefits 
reviewed, 
(iv) specify documents which applicants are required to produce. 
Co-ordination and Review of Policy and Administration 
10.7.30 Each of the main sources of information, including the Bureau of 
Statistics, the National Library and the Australian Archives, has major 
responsibilities and many problems of its own to be resolved. The administration 
has problems of its own, some of which are of direct relevance to these main 
sources. The need to tackle these separate problems has tended to inhibit the 
development of a coherent policy and strategy for the information function 
generally. This tendency may well be intensified if the structure of separate 
advisory bodies envisaged develops along lines now proposed. The Commission 
believes that joint means must be devised to grapple with the expanding quantity 
and potential use of information as identified in the OECD report to which we 
have referred (paragraph 10.7.7). This joint consultation should supplement 
measures being taken to expose each information agency and the administration 
generally to the effective influence of its own clientele. One result of the joint 
discussions may also be to stimulate each agency's capacity to meet demands 
made upon it. 
10.7.31 Accordingly, we suggest that consideration be given to establishing a R3o8 
Commonwealth Information Advisory Council under an independent chairman, 
and including representatives from community users of the information held by 
the Commonwealth government. Other members of the Council would be the 
Australian Government Statistician, the Director-General of the National 
Library, the Director-General of Archives, a member of the Public Service Board 
and some representatives from departments (including at least one with a major 
computer installation). The primary purpose of the Council would be to advise 
the Commonwealth government on the development of a comprehensive 
information policy, to review significant technological developments, and to 
provide a forum for consultation between specialist information agencies. It 
should report annually, and by special reports if the occasion demanded, to the 
Minister for Administrative Services. It would advise on: 
(a) the development of policies for the generation and the efficient use of 
information within government administration, and for making the 
information available outside the administration; 
(b) desirable changes in the form and content of information made available 
by each of the three main sources; 
(c) desirable improvements in users' access to particular classes of infor-
mation; 
(d) the priorities to be attached to proposed developments. 
10.7.32 The Public Service Board should be ready to assist the Council and, in 
association with it, review departmental activities in the information field. The 
Council itself should be serviced by a small secretariat within the Department of 
Administrative Services, with many of the secretariat's staff being on rotation. 
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Chapter i i 	 Co-ordination and 
Control 
ii.i CO-ORDINATION AND POWER 
ii.i.i The minister and his department together form the basic standard unit 
which wields the executive power of government. It is certain that occasions will 
arise on which individual ministers and their departments will seek to exercise 
their powers to a degree or in ways which ignore, or seek to ignore, constraints 
necessary for the success of the government as a whole and the welfare of the 
community. Essential, therefore, to any form of government in which authority is 
entrusted to a number of ministers will be the means by which the discipline of 
such constraints is made effective. 
II . 1.2 Broadly, these constraints are of two kinds. The first derives from the fact 
that a minister shares a collective responsibility with his colleagues (see Chapter 
4.'). He is a member of a government with a broadly-stated policy and political 
philosophy. He is a member of a Cabinet or Ministry which must approve major 
decisions he may wish to make. The scope of his portfolio cannot be precisely 
delimited: it will bear upon, and be borne upon by, those of his colleagues, and to 
a.significant extent it competes with some of them. 
I I . i .3 The second kind of constraint derives from the real, if imprecise, limits 
imposed by economic, social and political considerations external to the 
government itself. Most government policies involve the use of 
resources—obvious in the money and manpower they demand to make them 
effective—and consequently cOmpete with the uses which the non-governmental 
sector would wish to make of those resources. Many government policies involve 
social changes. There are limits within which any society can effectively or will 
voluntarily accept change at any given time. Furthermore, particular forms of 
change will run counter to the habits, interests and prejudices of individuals and 
groups whose resistance, active or passive, can render planned change difficult 
and sometimes ineffective. 
11.1.4 Above all, ministers must always be aware of the constraints imposed by 
the electoral processes. To be returned to power at the next election is a primary 
objective of all representative governments, and relevance to this objective will 
inevitably be a basic test to be applied to ministerial and departmental action. 
11.1.5 The machinery of government, in both its ministerial and administrative 
aspects, will therefore need to be designed to make effective the discipline of these 
constraints. This process can briefly be referred to as 'co-ordination'. It is clear 
that this need is already, at least to some degree, taken into account. Some 
ministers, by the nature of their portfolios, have co-ordinating functions, that is 
they are responsible for seeing that the discipline of one or more of the constraints 
to which we have referred is imposed. This responsibility affects the structure, role 
and method of operation of their departments and related agencies. The Prime 
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Minister (with his Department, including the Cabinet Office, as well as the 
Public Service Board) and the Treasurer (with Treasury) clearly exercise such co-
ordinating functions. Cabinet committees and interdepartmental committees 
serve similar purposes. And, in a somewhat different way, so do party meetings: 
their impact may be especially concerned with the constraint of electoral 
judgment. 
I 1. 1.6 The Commission's concern has been with the administrative aspects of 
these processes: with the means by which co-ordinating ministers and cabinet 
committees are serviced, informed and advised; with the means by which 
constraining factors external to government—such as the competitive claims on 
available resources and the state of the economy—are assessed and brought to 
ministerial attention; the relationships between functional departments and co-
ordinating authorities such as Treasury and the Public Service Board; and with 
the effectiveness of departmental co-operative arrangements, including the use of 
interdepartmental committees. Earlier parts of this Report will have made 
evident that some of the most difficult problems of Australian government 
administration emerge in these co-ordinating processes. In this chapter we will 
attempt to bring together some general conclusions about the co-ordinating 
function itself, the difkring approaches to its periormancc, and our recom-
mendations as to changes which could usefully be made in the way in which 
Australian government administration is organised to achieve co-ordination. 
II. 1.7 Central to this task is a view about the nature of discipline and the most 
effective way to achieve it. As we have indicated above (paragraph ii. I. 1-5) 
discipline requires the acceptance of a need to modify planned or desired 
behaviour to conform with constraints which should or must be acknowledged. 
Discipline can be either voluntarily accepted or externally imposed. In our view, 
externally imposed discipline often tends to be ineffective because it withdraws 
responsibility from all except the source of discipline itself. It depends therefore 
for its effectiveness finally on the knowledge that there is a coercive power which 
that source can exercise. It tends to place the interest of the part above that of the 
whole, and often produces tension and incipient revolt, and may in critical 
circumstances break down altogether. 
11.1.8 On the other hand voluntarily accepted discipline is for other reasons 
equally difficult to achieve. It requires a widespread acceptance of responsibility, 
an understanding of the nature, significance and force of the constraints which 
make discipline necessary, and a willingness to see and accept their relevance 
even to strongly favoured objectives and programs. it is, therefore, likely to 
weaken when such objectives and programs appear to be in question. But if 
voluntary acceptance can be achieved this form of discipline is by far the more 
effective. 
11.1.9 The Commission's examination of material before it has led it to 
conclude that discipline in the conduct of Commonwealth government affairs is 
essentially externally imposed. In practice the Treasurer and Treasury and the 
Public Service Board are the primary instruments of that discipline, although 
their authority is, especially in times of stress, dependent on Cabinet support. 
There are a few areas, such as Defence, where Treasury has developed a more co-
operative relationship, within which the degree of discipline and its impact on 
programs appears to be worked out in negotiation and on a basis of relative 
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equality. However, the general experience of ministers and their departments is 
that in giving effect to broad Cabinet and parliamentary decisions they need 
approval from one or both (and perhaps also from other lesser) co-ordinating 
agencies for many actions, especially those which depart from the expected 
course. More importantly, ministers and Cabinet are dependent on those 
agencies for information and judgment about the nature and severity of many of 
the constraints which make discipline necessary. Furthermore, the procedures by 
which this information is collated and the judgments formed often do not involve 
the majority of ministers of their senior advisers sufficiently to commit them to the 
relevant judgments. There are therefore continuous signs of tension: between 
functional departments and co-ordinating authorities, between these authorities 
and individual ministers and at times the Cabinet, and even in some 
circumstances between those authorities and their own ministers. From time to 
time it has been apparent that the ministerial and Cabinet support necessary for 
the effective operation of the co-ordinating authorities has in fact been 
withdrawn, with damaging effects on the coherence of government adminis-
tration. 
i i. i. io The Commission concludes therefore that a serious effort must be made 
to base co-ordination to a greater extent on voluntarily accepted discipline at all 
levels. To this end we argued in Chapter 3  that ministers and their departments 
should be more actively involved in the processes by which: 
(a) the nature and severity of constraints on ministerial action are assessed; 
(b) the priority to be attached to various government objectives and programs 
affected by those constraints is determined. 
i i. i. i i This chapter examines the changes in the procedures and machinery of 
government necessary to promote such involvement and to achieve a form of 
discipline which is better understood, more compatible with the essence of 
ministerial responsibility, and therefore more effective. In particular it will deal 
with the processes of the Forward Estimates and the Budget, with the functions, 
structure and methods of work of the Treasury, the Auditor-General's Office, the 
Department ofthe Prime Minister and Cabinet (including ministerial and inter-
departmental committees) and the Public Service Board. 
11.2 FORWARD ESTIMATES AND THE BUDGET 
i i .2. i The Commission believes that the Forward Estimates process, as we 
describe it in Chapter 3  and here, is central to the task of rational co-ordination of 
policies as well as the efficient use of resources. In Chapter 3  we have emphasised 
its importance in the achievement of efficiency—in establishing the government's 
objectives and their priorities in ways which make possible coherent work plans 
for individual ministers, departments and agencies and therefore for subordinate 
levels of managerial responsibility. Looked at from the viewpoint of this chapter, 
the process is seen as essential in making clear the scope which individual 
ministers, departments and agencies will have for the exercise of their respective 
authorities. The process will be an expression of the constraints imposed by the 
need to acknowledge the existence of other claims to the financial and manpower 
resources required for each ministerial program—constraints both for the 
government as a whole and as between ministers. If the process is to lead to the 
voluntary acceptance of the discipline that it expresses, it is important that it 
should be based upon: 
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(a) generally accepted assessments of the resources potentially available, and 
of the other external constraints; 
(b) a clear understanding of the general political considerations to be taken 
into account; 
(c) effective participation of ministers in the bargaining aspects of the process. 
R3 i o In the paragraphs which follow we describe a procedure which the Commission 
believes goes some way to meet these requirements. In designing it we have taken 
into account the many criticisms we have received of the current Budget process, 
and its apparent failure from time to time to achieve the acceptance of self-
discipline among ministers and departments. We have noted the useful 
preliminary experiments in Forward Estimates and the recent assembly of data 
about commitments that have been and are being conducted by the Treasury and 
the Public Service Board. We have been influenced also by the example of the 
budgetary processes as conducted by the Canadian government and the role 
played in them by the Canadian Treasury Board. 
11.2.2 The Forward Estimates Budget process, as the Commission envisages it, 
begins with the formulation of policy guidelines for ministers and departments. 
This formulation is seen initially as the responsibility of the Economic Committee 
of Cabinet.' The guidelines should establish 
(a) the proportion of the potential gross domestic product and the total 
numbers of the work force which the government is willing to pre-empt for 
its purposes; 
(b) the general social, economic and political objectives to which the 
government wishes to give priority in the period to be covered by the 
Forward Estimates; 
(c) the margin or reserve provision to be included to cover contingencies or 
new programs that the government may wish to develop within the period 
covered. 
11.2.3 It will be noted that we suggest the guidelines refer to claims on the 
potential rather than the actual or anticipated gross domestic product. Only if 
this is done will the Estimates reflect accurately the objectives and priorities of the 
government itself. Once these begin to be modified by what are judged to be the 
needs of economic policy, they will reflect rather the priorities of those who assess 
those needs and advise about the- means whereby they can best be met. The 
Commission is conscious of the resentment which has been built up by the 
dominance which the current budgetary process gives to these economic policy 
priorities, and sees that resentment as a significant obstacle to the achievement of 
substantially accepted discipline among ministers and departments. Con-
siderations of economic management will, of course, need to be taken into 
account at the appropriate time. The Commission is satisfied that this will be 
when the relevant parts of the Forward Estimates are being modified for 
incorporation into the annual Budget. 
I . In this and other chapters of the Report, when referring to the work of Cabinet committees, we 
have, except where we are deliberately proposing innovation, referred to the structure of 
committees set up by the present government. Different governments will not always have the 
same committee structure although we believe there will be elements in common. The 
procedure could as well have been described with reference to the committee structure used by 
the Whitlam government. 
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11.2.4 Nevertheless, the formulation of guidelines about the total claims by the 
government on the economy's resources will need to be based also upon informed 
judgment about such factors as the growth and changing composition of the work 
force, the changing levels of productivity, long term shifts in the pattern ul 
consumers' demands, the developing industrial and sectoral structure of the 
economy and in particular the future demands to be made by the public sector 
itself from the continuance of existing policies. On these matters the Economic 
Committee of Cabinet will require information and assessment from sources such 
as the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the Department of Employment and 
Industrial Relations, the Public Service Board, the Treasury and the proposed 
Department of Industries and the Economy (DINDEC—see Chapter io.i). 
While the knowledge that the Treasury and the Bureau of Statistics possess of the 
aggregates embodied in the Social Accounts will continue to be important, the 
Commission sees the knowledge and judgment about the changing structure of 
the economy which it hopes will be the special competence of the Department of 
Industries and the Economy as likely to exercise a significant influence on the 
Committee's work.1  
11.2.5 In the formulation of the priorities in policy objectives the Commission 
also sees a special role for the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. It 
will, under the guidance of the Prime Minister, be responsible at the department 
level for ensuring that the political and social philosophy of the government and 
the content of its policy statements are adequately expressed in the Estimates. 
(See section 11.5). 
11.2.6 The appropriate provision for contingencies and future plans will, of 
necessity, be somewhat arbitrary, although experience will no doubt provide 
increasing guidance. Canadian experience suggests that some of the most difficult 
issues facing its Treasury Board concern the size and preliminary distribution of 
these provisions. The Economic Committee may well need to take account of 
expectations of medium-term domestic and international economic change in 
formulating its conclusions on the reserve provision. 
11.2.7 The Commission believes, therefore, that the Economic Committee will 
find it useful to set up a committee of senior officials drawn from the Departments 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Treasury, Industries and the Economy and 
the Public Service Board to confer with it in the preparation of the guidelines. 
11.2.8 These guidelines, when approved by Cabinet, will, the Commission 
envisages, form the basis of three-year estimates of expenditure and manpower 
use by ministers and their departments. They will therefore be the means of 
ensuring that a discipline made necessary by real constraints is brought to bear on 
ministerial and departmental planning from the outset, and by the individual 
ministers and departments themselves. These estimates will be prepared 
annually, on a rolling basis, and will be the occasion of a re-assessment of existing 
programs and the allocation of resources to them, as well as a consideration of new 
programs to be provided for. Both the Whitlam government and the present 
government have judged it necessary to review the expenditure flowing from 
existing programs. There can be no doubt that such reviews are from time to time 
i. See Appendix 4.A, Paper 3 for a discussion of the relevance of the IMPACT Study in this 
matter. 
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desirable for practical reasons as well as for political reassessment. The 
Commission considers, however, that the procedure of their review by an external 
authority inevitably neglects significant department expertise, and gives too little 
weight to the departments' judgment, and to the preferences and political 
judgments of their ministers. The Forward Estimates procedures we describe 
would, on the other hand, assign this task of review and the weighting of existing 
against possible future programs in the first instance to those with the most 
intimate knowledge and with the deepest concern about the outcome.' It would, 
therefore, be likely to lead to more acceptable economies and to command 
greater commitment to their achievement. 
11.2.9 Similarly, the Commission sees this review in the light of guidelines 
prepared by the Economic Committee of Cabinet as being the occasion when the 
government's general policy about the size of the work force it is prepared to use 
will be worked out in reference to particular programs and the departments and 
agencies responsible. The tendency of governments over recent decades to rely on 
the occasional (and increasingly frequent) imposition of staff ceilings is, in the 
Commission's view, an abrogation of ministerial responsibility and furthermore is 
inept and unjust in its incidence. Although the imposition of department staff 
ceilings has, over recent years, carried the authority of Cabinet or the Prime 
Minister, the failure of successive governments to consider manpower require-
ments as a resource integrated with finance and programs as a whole, has placed 
on departments and the Public Service Board the responsibility of judging the 
relative importance of different programs and administrative and advisory 
functions. 2 This responsibility is essentially political and should be accepted by 
ministers, as it would be if the Forward Estimates procedure recommended were 
adopted. 
11.2.10 It should be noted that with this procedure: 
(a) both the responsible minister and his department will have the maximum 
incentive to seek, and if possible take advantage of, economies in 
manpower use from improved organisation, mechanisation, the measure-
ment of output etc.—since the alternative will be the sacrifice of some 
desired program or activity; 
(b) on the occasions when a potential or existing program or activity is 
curtailed or eliminated, it will be by ministerial or Cabinet decision, taken 
in the light of the priorities of the minister concerned after he has weighed 
the advice of his department. That is, responsibility will lie where it 
belongs, and where the social and political costs can best be assessed. 
11.2.1 1 These reviews by ministers and their departments will result in initial 
bids in terms of expenditure and planned employment. Though the guidelines 
have by now marked out the outer boundaries of expenditure, it is likely that the 
aggregate of these early bids will exceed the limits set or implied for them. 
Accordingly a process of discussion and negotiation will be called for to achieve 
the necessary conformity. The Commission proposes that this process would be 
I . 	 In this and other respects the system resembles the 'rolling program' approach developed 
between Treasury and the Department of Defence for the general field of military expenditure. 
2. As our consultant. Mr K. Wiltshire, comments in his report, Staff Ceilings, 'they have been the 
means whereby public servants have determined priorities properly the role of politicians' (see 
Appendix i.D). See also Chapter 9.1.12-13. 
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the responsibility of the Economic Committee of Cabinet—certainly that 
Committee should watch over it. At the same time, the Commission is conscious 
that, if this process is to be effectively performed and the relevant ministers are to 
be actively involved, it will be time-consuming and somewhat tedious. We see 
advantages, therefore, in adapting to this task Canadian experience as embodied 
in the Treasury Board. 'ii his Board, although statutory, is a ministerial committee 
presided over by a nominee of the Prime Minister, of which the Finance Minister 
himself has only nominal membership and which rarely includes senior ministers. 
Senior ministers may not be able to devote the time required for the detailed 
negotiations involved. The Commission suggests therefore, that the Economic 
Committee should appoint a sub-committee in which they might (at least at 
times) be represented by more junior ministers. This sub-committee should be 
presided over by a minister nominated by the Prime Minister, and should discuss 
Forward Estimates bids with ministers concerned and their departmental 
advisers, so that they can be revised and reconciled in the aggregate with the 
original guidelines. We see this sub-committee on the Forward Estimates being 
serviced by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, but receiving 
detailed comments and suggested modifications on the original bids from the 
Supply Divisions of the Treasury, from the Department of Industries and the 
Economy in respect of claims on resources generally, from the Public Service 
Board in respect of planned manpower use, and from the Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet in relation to policy priorities. Indeed, officers of 
these departments could usefully constitute a working group to assist the 
ministerial sub-committee. This group could be differently constituted from that 
assisting the Economic Committee in the formulation of the original guidelines. It 
would place more emphasis on the structure and content of individual programs 
and the resources required for them. Officers from the departments concerned 
should participate in the work of this group at relevant times. 
I 1.2.12 We have emphasised that it is important that manpower estimates be 
prepared which will be consistent with the financial estimates and in conformity 
with the public employment policies of the government. In this latter aspect, the 
Public Service Board will have an important role. Its task will be to gather 
together from departments and agencies their initial bids for manpower use and 
to examine them in the light of the guidelines issued to ministers and departments. 
It would also be for the Board to draw attention to any special pressure on the 
supply either of experience or skills which the initial bids might engender. The 
Board's analysis of the manpower bids would flow through the working group of 
officials to the ministerial sub-committee on the Forward Estimates where it 
would provide a basis for discussion between the sub-committee and individual 
ministers and their departmental advisers. 
11.2.13 In this bargaining process the sub-committee would be assisted if the 
expenditure and employment plans of individual departments could be 
correlated where they were directed to overlapping purposes. Thus, if the 
grouping of Welfare departments suggested by the Commission (see Chapter 
10.3) were adopted, some of the bargaining and re-assessment could usefully be 
undertaken by ministers and officials from those departments acting together 
under the chairmanship of the Minister for Social Welfare. Other groupings of 
I . 	 On the Board's role in the Forward Estimates procedure, see further section 11.6. 
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departments suggest themselves (see Chapter 4.3.34-37).  Where they do not exist 
formally but could be useful for this purpose, they might be set up on an ad hoc 
basis to facilitate the work of the sub-committee. 
11.2. 14 The report of this Forward Estimates sub-committee would, we 
envisage, go first to the Economic Committee of Cabinet for endorsement, and 
then to Cabinet itselffor formal confirmation. It would then provide a framework 
for the planning of departments and agencies. The firmness and clarity of that 
framework would provide a context within which ministers and the heads of 
departments and agencies could be allowed significant freedom to modify, within 
the approved totals, the precise pattern of planned employment and expenditure. 
In other words, it would provide the opportunity for, and at the same time set 
limits to, the entrepreneurial scope for managers which the Commission 
recommends in Chapter 3. 
I 1.2.15 Forward Estimates, while compiled on a three-year basis, will need 
revision and extension annually—so that they operate on a rolling three-year 
basis. In this revision, some of the reserve provision for possible future programs 
and for contingencies will be absorbed by more firmly planned expenditure and 
employment expectations. 
11.2. i6 This annual up-dating could usefully take place immediately after the 
preparation of the annual Budget, although it should be emphasised that the 
Forward Estimates should continue to be compiled on the basis of optimum, 
rather than actually anticipated resources available, as assessed in the gross 
domestic product. 
I 1.2. 17 The relevant year of the Forward Estimates will provide the basis for 
the expenditure content of the annual Budget, but will, of course, need to be 
modified in the light of contingencies, new programs decided upon and the needs 
of demand-control policies to the extent that the government wishes to resort to 
them. It should be noted, however, that, in view of the extreme uncertainty about 
the nature and the length of time-lags in the economic process, a good case could 
be made for planning total public expenditure always on the assumption of the 
optimum total use of resources—that is at the level of high employment most 
likely to be consonant with reasonable price stability. This approach would rely 
in part upon the 'fly-wheel' effects of a stable-public sector expenditure to provide 
a reliable context for and some offset to the fluctuations inherent in the workings 
the private sector. 
I 1.2.18 The Commission has not attempted to lay down any time frame for 
implementing fully its recommendations for integrated Forward Estimates. The 
development of a satisfactory process will require a dedicated effort over several 
years. It will need strong direction and leadership from the government as a 
whole. It will be unlikely to succeed if left to individual departments, unaided and 
lacking direction. The three levels involved—individul departments, central 
agencies and ministers—will need to develop jointly a capacity to contribute 
effectively to the process. Nor do we propose a time-schedule for the yearly series 
of adjustments leading up to each Budget. In a sense what we are proposing will 
make that schedule a more complex one, in that as well as departmental 
negotiations with the Public Service Board and the Treasury, we are proposing an 
integration of financial and manpower bids (see also Chapter 9.1.14-16 on 
budgeting staffing and administrative costs). However, we do not believe that 
either the initial bargaining to reconcile departmental estimates or the 
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subsequent adjustment in the light of current economic and other factors, need 
prove unmanageable. In this respect, the critical difference in the Commission's 
proposal and the present practice is that initial bids would be prepared in the light 
of guidelines determined by Cabinet. 
11.2.19 The diagrams on pages 364 and 365, based on the discussion in the 
previous paragraphs, and on the section of the Report on Economic Policy (I o. i), 
illustrate the flQw of information and decisions involved in the Forward Estimates 
and its relevance to the Budget cycle. 
11.3 THE TREASURY AND FINANCIAL CO-ORDINATION 
11.3. I In paragraphs ii. 1.1-5 we refer to constraints which limit the freedom of 
action of individual ministers, and consider the means by which the nature and 
severity of those constraints can be made apparent and the discipline they make 
necessary be clarified and accepted. Important among these constraints are those 
which arise from the fact that programs and activities of each minister and his 
department require resources which could be used for the programs and activities 
of other ministers, other levels of government or for non-governmental purposes. 
In the exercise of discipline arising from these constraints the role of the Treasurer 
and the Treasury has traditionally been predominant. Indeed the conclusion 
expressed in paragraph i 1. 1.9 that the discipline exercised in the Commonwealth 
administration is essentially externally imposed rather than voluntarily accepted, 
is based upon an examination of that role as seen by the Treasury itself, by 
ministers, and by other departments and agencies. Also, the judgment that 
greater emphasis needs to be given to self-imposed discipline is to an important 
degree drawn from aspects of the present Treasury controls and their outcome in 
the disciplinary processes themselves. 
11.3.2 The Commission sees the development of the Forward Estimates budget 
process as the prime basis for strengthening both the effectiveness of discipline in 
the use of resources and the involvement and identification of ministers and 
functional departments with that process and the restraints it imposes. We do not 
see the process as conflicting with the essential purposes of expenditure control for 
which Treasury has been responsible, and we envisage a vital role for Treasury 
within that process. Indeed we are conscious that it is a development the first 
phases of which the Treasury itself has initiated. Nevertheless, the primary 
purpose of the Forward Estimates is to provide an acceptable basis for an 
alternative form of discipline to that on which Treasury has relied, a discipline in 
which concern and authority for expenditure control will be spread more widely, 
and one which will rely more on the development of a consensus about the facts 
and on a hard-won agreement emerging from tough negotiation about the action 
which should flow from that consensus. The Commission has reached the 
conclusion that this alternative must be sought after a consideration of the 
accounts of Treasury operations by Treasury itself and of the many criticisms of 
the operations and the responses by Treasury to those criticisms, and after 
examining the results of more specific studies which the Commission itself 
initiated. 1  
i. Appendix 4.E, Financial Administration, contains a selection of material relevant to this 
section of the Report, including part of the Treasury Submission (Paper i), criticisms of 
Treasury's role (Paper 2) and extracts from a consultancy report on Treasury controls (Paper 
5). See also Appendix i .C, 'Program Budgeting'. 
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The Disciplinary Role of Treasury 
r 1.3-3  Treasury has said that one area of government administration with 
which it is particularly concerned is the 'management and control of public 
expenditure'.1 It believes that the control which it exercises in this area should 
seek to ensure that: 
(a) expenditure, generally and in its parts, fits in with overall economic 
strategy; 
(b) its elements form a coherent, internally consistent and well-balanced 
whole.' 
In its submission the Treasury properly emphasises the management demands 
which the setting of the administrative priorities makes upon it. 
11.3.4 At the same time, the Commission believes that expenditure is and 
should be the expression of the objectives and priorities of ministers, Cabinet or 
Parliament and that the first purpose of expenditure control should be to ensure 
that, within the limits of the resources which the government is willing and able to 
employ, expenditure, generally and in its parts, is an accurate reflection of the 
government's objectives and priorities as ministers individually and jointly 
determine them. 
11.3.5 Treasury has argued that because of the close day by day involvement of 
its minister in the workings of the Department it is not possible to see the Treasury 
as exercising any significant role except in association with him. It is true that 
unless Treasury is backed by the Treasurer's support, its authority will quickly 
break down. This however does not invalidate the widely held view that the 
Treasury has command of the information on which financial and economic 
policy is based, that it is equipped to interpret the relevance and significance of 
that information and that it approaches its task of informing and advising the 
Treasurer with a coherent and some would say almost doctrinal force and 
persuasiveness. It would be surprising if this were not so—given the undoubted 
competence and experience accumulated in Treasury—and it would be 
surprising if that force and persuasiveness were not generally effective. 
11.3.6 The Commission does not criticise the closeness of this relationship 
between Treasury and its minister or the fact that it frequently and desirably 
extends also to the Prime Minister. However it draws attention to the fact that the 
relationship is often developed and exercised in a way which does not involve 
other ministers and their departments sufficiently to command their willing 
acceptance of the judgments which emerge from it. Thus, for instance, the 
Commission is satisfied that those departments (and probably their ministers 
also) whose expenditure plans have been substantially curtailed as this Report 
approaches completion believe: 
(a) that the priorities expressed in the cuts imposed are not theirs or those of 
their ministers; 
(b) that they do not reflect the considered outcome of independent studies to 
which they, as the responsible department, had an opportunity to 
contribute; 
i. See Appendix 4.E, Paper i, paragraph 3. 
2. See Appendix 4.E, Paper i, paragraph 14. 
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(c) that they reflect rather the arbitrary and personal priorities of 
officials—particularly those of senior Treasury officers. 
This situation is not unique. In almost all budgetary situations there are choices to 
be made, and the means by which they are at present exercised ensures that there 
are persistent dissatisfactions, not simply from the necessity for choice but from 
the fact that the priorities of ministers and their departments exercise too little 
influence in them. The Commission believed therefore that it must examine the 
material before it so as tojudge whether this situation reflects prevailing attitudes 
and practices within Treasury itself—attitudes and practices developed and 
fostered over time, which adapt to but do not fundamentally change with 
changing Treasurers and governments. That the Treasury has such a clearly 
defined institutional character and personality is certainly one of the most firmly 
held convictions among departmental officials. 
11.3.7 In elaborating on the relevance of public expenditure to economic 
strategy the Treasury notes that: 
'with the increasing emphasis on the use of taxation and public expenditure as 
instruments to influence the course of the economy, unity of responsibility for 
fiscal policy, monetary policy and general economic policy would seem to be 
becoming increasingly indispensible.' 
This responsibility they see as being united in the portfolio of the Treasurer (with 
whose responsibilities those of the Treasury are 'co-extensive'). 1 Public 
expenditure and taxation are not the only government instruments to influence 
the course of the economy. Tariff and other industry-directed measures, 
international economic policies, wages and income policies, as well as the 
government's general approach to the desired balance between the public and 
private sectors and between goods and services respectively as components in the 
content of gross national expenditure, can be as pervasive and possibly as 
powerful. These considerations do not affect the judgment that there must be 
'unity of responsibility' for the major components of economic policy and 
management, but they suggest that the necessary unity can be achieved only at 
Cabinet level and that it should be a unity of a character which all ministers (and 
their departments) can influence, and which, therefore, they have a greater 
obligation to accept. 
11.3.8 It is because of the necessity for such unity that the Commission has 
emphasised the corporate and the essentially political character of the judgments 
involved in the Forward Estimates processes it has proposed in section 11.2 above. 
It follows that the Commission believes that, where these judgments are 
concerned with matters within the responsibility of one minister, he and his 
department should have a primary voice in them. It does not therefore agree that 
the Treasury statement that 
'one object in Treasury 'scrutiny' of expenditure estimates and analysis of 
expenditure proposals is to promote review of programs and activities that might 
no longer be justifiable 	 12 
can properly be seen as applying in any exclusive way to Treasury—even if the 
term 'Treasury' is taken, as it frequently is, to denote the combination of the 
I . Appendix 4.E, Paper i, paragraphs 36-7 
2. Appendix 4.E, Paper i, paragraph 48. 
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Treasurer and his Department. It will be apparent from paragraph ii .2.8 above 
that the Commission is conscious of the need for such reviews to be conducted, but 
believes that, within the Forward Estimates procedure, they can and should be 
made by the ministers and departments concerned. They possess the fullest 
knowledge of the criteria by which the individual programs concerned should be 
judged, and on them the responsibility for termination or modification of the 
programs properly lies. 
11-3.9 The Treasury emphasises the dependence of its contribution to the 
management and control of public expenditure upon: 
(a) day-by-day liaison with, and close collaborative efforts by, the whole range 
of Treasury Divisions; 
(b) continuous dialogue 
(i) with Commonwealth departments and agencies, 
(ii) with State Treasuries, 
(iii) with the Treasurer and through him with the Cabinet.' 
It concludes that effective management and control of public expenditure, in a 
context where new authorities, new programs and a high rate of increase in 
government expenditure add new dimensions, new problems and new challenges 
to the task, depends upon 'the willingness of all concerned to accept the disciplines 
necessary'. 2 
11.3.10 The Commission finds these statements unexceptionable. We note 
however that material befbre us suggests that liaison and dialogue within 
Treasury, and between it and its various 'clients', is not always mutually 
satisfying, and that, despite the dialogue, both ministers and departments have 
frequently remained unwilling to accept the disciplines judged by Treasury to be 
necessary. These conclusions are derived from an examination of submissions, 
research studies and other material relating to the role and practice of Treasury in 
financial control sce Appendix 4.E). 
Liaison within the Treasury 
11.3.11 The Treasury has argued strongly that its various divisions are in 
practice so closely integrated that action to place any of them under separate 
departmental and ministerial direction would involve serious damage to the 
effectiveness of its work. This view has been vigorously contested, and, as we have 
mentioned in Chapter io.i, there are many advocates within and outside the 
administration for a division of Treasury into two departments—one concerned 
with Financial and Economic Policy and the other with Budgetary and Financial 
Control. This is a matter to which we will return. We are concerned at this point 
simply to note that the integration of the various divisions is sometimes seen from 
both within and outside the Treasury as excessive domination by the division 
responsible for financial and economic policy. One former Treasury officer who is 
now a senior officer in another department, for example, spoke frankly and 
informally to the Commission about his working experiences and argued that: 
'Treasury cultivates a very different sort of person in FEP3 from those it 
cultivates in operating, areas. FEP doesn't have people who've been out and 
i. Appendix 4.E, Paper i, paragraph 55. 
2. Appendix 4.E, Paper i, paragraph 58. 
3. The general }inancial and Economic Policy Division of ireasury, often referred to as 'FEP'. 
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managed things, made things work. They haven't begun to understand the 
constraints that operational managers have to face and draw conclusions from 
that of what operational managers need to work with.' 
It has also been argued more formally by departments that the views of the 
relevant sections of the Supply Divisions about the expenditure proposals of 
departments within their area of responsibility are frequently over-ruled on the 
basis of a priori judgments from the policy division. Similarly one past Treasurer 
complained that information he received through senior officers about the 
implications that proposals put before him would have for particular programs 
was different from the advice which he subsequently found would have been 
offered by the relevant section of the Supply Divisions. On the other hand 
Treasury contends that all divisions of the Department have direct access to the 
Treasurer and that if the view of one is preferred it is by ministerial decision. 
Attitudes of Treasury Clients 
11.3.12 It would be surprising if Treasury were a popular department. The task 
of drawing attention to the reality of constraints on what ministers, departments, 
parliamentarians and groups and individuals in the community would like to do 
or have done is not one which easily wins friends for those who perform it. Too 
much therefore should not be made of the frequency with which criticism of 
Treasury and its procedures recurred in statements made to the Commission. Nor 
do criticisms cast any doubt upon the capacity of the Treasury to undertake its 
various tasks; in fact, our survey material shows clearly that Treasury attracts 
capable officers and rewards them well in terms of their career advancement.' It 
was nevertheless the view of consultants engaged by the Commission to study the 
nature of Treasury controls that there is also: 
'a remarkable lack of understanding in departments of the objectives and 
procedures of the Treasury. This may be in part the fault of departments, but it is 
our impression that Treasury Officers pay far too little attention to good 
customer relations based on frank information flows. The reasons for the 
Treasury's reaction to a certain proposal may be self-evident to Treasury officials 
but it is often only dimly understood by departments.' 2 
Equally the frequency of proposals for change in procedures are not of major 
concern. Treasury has shown some willingness recently to modify its procedures 
in particular instances, and the Commission has the impression that departments 
seeking greater flexibility have not exhausted the scope for direct representations 
for change. Furthermore in some important instances Treasury has been 
inhibited by legislative provisions, by the wishes of Parliament, and by the 
difficulties of achieving effective change in a department with heavy burdens 
arising from current problems. 
11.3.13 However, some criticisms go much deeper and are directed at the whole 
style and authority of Treasury. In brief they express the belief that Treasury is 
too privileged, too powerful, and too prone to substitute its own judgments, its 
own values and its own priorities for those of other departments, ministers and the 
government itself. Criticisms of such scope and intensity, if they are believed by 
those who make them, can make unworkable the relationships between the 
agency at which they are directed and its clients. The Commission believes that 
I . Appendix 3.A, Paper ii, The Co-ordinating Departments. 
2. See Appendix 4.E, Paper 5,  in section on Problems of Bureaucratic Structure. 
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there have been occasions within the last seven years when relationships between 
Treasury and its clients have been seriously strained. The last three Prime 
Ministers and three of the last four Treasurers, as well as a number of individual 
ex-ministers, have expressed to the Commission, or publicly, dissatisfaction with 
the role of the Treasury.' We have been informed that there have been occasions 
when the Treasurer found himself without significant support from his colleagues 
and more rarely when the Treasurer has dissociated himself from the Cabinet 
submissions made in his name but prepared in Treasury. It is easy to attach 
unwarranted weight to these occasions, but the Commission is satisfied that, in 
the aggregate, they are significant. 
i i .3. 14 They are consistent with the existence of a widespread 'unwillingness to 
accept the disciplines necessary'. Furthermore, it is sometimes true that such 
unwillingness exists because of ignorance, prejudice or plain unreasonableness on 
the part of some ministers and their departments. However, this is to be expected 
from time to time in a parliamentary system of government (and probably in any 
other system also). The official is the professional in this context and, as such, he 
should accept the greater responsibility for making the system work. A system 
which is based upon collective Cabinet responsibility can work only if the 
majority of the Cabinet at least acquiesces in the need for discipline and the 
pattern of action needed to make it effective. It is the task of the professional to 
achieve that acquiescence, despite the difficulties which from time to time face 
him. Treasury officers are of course not the only professionals involved. 
Departmental heads and other senior advisers can influence the attitude of their 
ministers on the issues. Adequate support for the Treasurer in recognising the 
need for discipline may well depend on their attitudes. The Treasury has much to 
gain if it can, by involving other ministers and their departmental advisers, 
achieve a wider sharing of responsibility and a weakening of the adversary 
relationship which frequently exists between them. 
Conclusions 
11.3.15 One of the obstacles to this sharing of responsibility for discipline in the 
use of resources is the suspicion and hostility arising from the Treasury 
'monopoly' of advice on economic policy, and the power it exercises from the 
combination of that monopoly with the control of expenditure. Accordingly the 
Commission has given thought to the possible benefits of dividing the economic 
policy function of Treasury from that of financial control (see Chapter Jo. I also). 
11.3.16 We have not however recommended it. We do not wholly accept the 
Treasury argument that the integration necessary between the two fields of work 
demands their performance within a single department. Our reasons are 
essentially more pragmatic. The core of the government's economic policy is 
contained in the Budget (and in the Forward Estimates to the extent that they will 
determine pre-Budget action and planning and therefore influence the content of 
the Budget); and we fear that an attempt to separate the responsibility for 
economic policy from responsibility for formulating the Budget could weaken the 
effectiveness of economic policy (see Chapter io.i.i6). However, we urge a 
i. The fourth former Treasurer spoke warmly of the Treasury's work and saw the difficulties as 
reflecting primarily an unwillingness among ministers and departments to accept the reality of 
constraints on governmental action. 
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greater non-Treasury contribution to that policy as a matter of high importance 
(10.1.10-15). Secondly we believe that the essence of the weaknesses in the 
present disciplines lies essentially in the attitudes of Treasury and its ministerial 
and departmental clients rather than in the structure of Treasury itself. Thirdly, 
we are conscious that the changes we have proposed will take time to become 
effective, that the system must continue to work while change occurs and that 
frequent structural changes in the machinery of government have deleterious 
effects on departmental morale and effectiveness. We have therefore proposed no 
major structural changes in Treasury, but have concentrated on suggesting 
means whereby it can to a much greater extent share its responsibilities and 
involve other departments and agencies in their performance. We see possibilities 
of such sharing as affecting particularly: 
(a) Cabinet and its committees; 
(b) ministers and their departmental advisers; 
(c) the Auditor-General; 
(d) the Public Service Board; 
(e) the Department of Industries and the Economy; 
(f) the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
11.3.17 In particular we have proposed that the Auditor-General and the 
Bureau of Statistics perform more comprehensive roles, and we believe that they 
should be more clearly seen to be independent and quite separate from the 
Treasury. To this end we have suggested in Chapter 10.1 that the Bureau should 
become responsible to a minister such as the Minister for Administrative Services, 
and should be encouraged and enabled to broaden its scope as a primary source of 
information for the formulation, conduct and assessment of government 
programs. We deal in more detail in section I 1.4 below with the role of the 
Auditor-General. At this point it is sufficient to say that we see any tendency in the 
administration to identify him with Treasury as detrimental to his independent 
legal position and status, and as diminishing his power to strengthen the capacity 
of the government and Parliament to raise the levels of administrative efficiency. 
1'-3,18 Apart from these shifts of authority, a general improvement in the level 
of responsibility in financial management requires a greater willingness on the 
part of Treasury to devolve detailed control on the departmental head. We are 
aware that greater devolution has been inhibited by legislative and parliamen-
tary obstacles as well as by sheer inertia. It would be consistent with our new 
concept of the Treasury role if it were to take initiatives, particularly with the 
relevant parliamentary committee or committees, to reflect the more broadly 
based search for efficiency that is required of the administration generally. A 
great volume of material is already prepared each year to support the detailed 
departmental estimates now incorporated in the schedule to the Appropriation 
Bills ('the Estimates'). There seems to be good reason to attempt to produce 
schedules to the Appropriation Bills which are more descriptive of programs and 
objectives than the present stylised form, provided there is a guarantee of 
adequate supporting material should Parliament ask for it. The necessary 
supporting information could either be produced in departmental annual reports 
or be made available directly to the Senate Estimates Committees, the House of 
Representatives Expenditure Committee and the Public Accounts Committee. 
11.3. 19 Several of the consultants' reports, and some of the material provided 
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by Treasury in response to criticisms and proposals contained in submissions, 
reveal a range of possible courses of action. The Commission notes that with 
somewhat parallel responsibilities the Public Service Board has shown a greater 
willingness to devolve and delegate than has the Treasury. 
11.3.20 We are aware however that in recent years Treasury has taken 
significant initiatives in this direction, of which the formal review of the Audit Act 
being carried out by Treasury and the Auditor-General is a recent example. We 
also recognise that a number of criticisms of Treasury recently made to the 
Commission, such as those of the Department of Transport, have led to revisions 
of current practice, largely to the mutual satisfaction of Treasury and of the 
departments concerned, and we believe that Treasury should be authorised and 
encouraged to proceed consciously and deliberately with more extensive 
devolution. 
R3ri i 1.3.21 The Commission recommends: 
(a) that Treasury review its approach to its responsibilities for financial 
control so as 
(i) to involve ministers and their departments more effectively in the 
assessment of constraints on government and ministerial action, and 
in the determination of priorities in any discipline required by those 
constraints, 
(ii) to rely more confidently on the influence which its access to 
information, its strategic position in the administration and its 
undoubted competence should enable it to exercise, and less on its 
capacity to concentrate within its own control decisions as to what is 
to be presented to Cabinet; 
(b) that Treasury use the development of the inter-related Forward Estimates 
and annual Budget processes as the prime instrument for involving other 
ministers and departments, and for the exercise of their professional 
influence; 
(c) that the Secretary to the Treasury allocate responsibility within his 
Department for work associated with the development of Forward 
Estimates, so that 
(i) the Division of Financial and Economic Policy is primarily 
concerned with the formulation of the general guidelines to be issued 
to departments, 
(ii) the Supply Divisions are primarily responsible for weighing the 
relevant departmental assessments of the costs and benefits of various 
programs and for achieving an acceptable balance between them; 
(d) that, in order to strengthen the Supply Divisions' influence in this work, 
the Secretary to the Treasury encourage his officers from those Divisions to 
communicate more freely with officers of departments and agencies within 
their field of concern by 
(i) visiting departments and becoming personally familiar with their 
priorities and problems, 
(ii) standing ready to be consulted in the formative stages of new policies 
or revisions of policy, 
Within the department concerned the relative Treasury Supply Officer 
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should in our view be seen as a helpful and friendly adviser and critic, and 
within Treasury as one having responsibility first to ensure that the 
departmental view is understood and appreciated even if not accepted; 
(e) that there be greater mobility of staff between Treasury and functional 
departments, especially in relatively senior posts; 
(1) that Treasury progressively devolve upon departmental heads greater 
reponsibility for detailed financial control within their own departments, 
developing the Treasury role as rather 
(i) a source of professional guidance on organisational aspects of that 
control, 
(ii) a stimulus to financial efficiency; 
(g) that to give effect to the previous recommendation a course of action be set 
in train based upon the following proposals 
(i) the Audit Act and regulations under it be amended, if necessary, to 
make clear the authority of the Secretary to the Treasury to delegate 
his powers under the Act. (A review will be required of Treasury 
regulation I27A which provides that chief officers (that is, heads of 
departments and some few other senior officers) are entitled to give 
directions to officers under their control relating to the same field as 
the Treasury directions, provided that their directions are not 
inconsistent with the Treasury directions, the Treasury regulations, 
or the Audit Act. A careful modification of this regulation or a 
selective relaxation of the control imposed by it should be 
considered—see also Chapter 4.3.15), 
(ii) the department head be nominated as the responsible Accounting 
Officer (see Chapter 4.5.6), and that ministers, the Auditor-General 
and the parliamentary committees hold him accountable for his 
department's financial management, 
(iii) Treasury invite, initially, a selected number of departmental heads 
to consult with it on the delegation of additional authority to their 
departments as a basis for this greater responsibility and accounta-
bility. The discussions with Treasury would embrace questions of 
organisational structure, control procedures, and any amendments 
they would propose to current practice, 
(iv) after a pattern of delegated authority had been devised in several 
such discussions, it should be open to either Treasury or the head of 
any department to seek such consultations for the same end, 
(v) the Secretary to the Treasury should satisfy himself in discussions 
with departmental heads that the control arrangements proposed 
are adequate, and should retain a reserve power to withdraw a 
delegated authority, but there should be a presumption that the 
head of the department concerned is responsible and competent to 
judge what is necessary and appropriate to the needs of his 
department, 
(vi) a departmental head should not be required to accept full delegated 
authority if his department is not large enough to warrant it, or if for 
other reasons it is agreed such a transfer is undesirable, 
(vii) the Secretary to the Treasury should have the right at any time to 
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propose to the head of any department that a joint review of 
financial control procedures within that department be conducted, 
and indeed Treasury should arrange a regular program of such 
reviews (see Chapter 3.6); 
(h) that Treasury, to facilitate these changes, should set up within its own 
organisation a unit concerned with departmental financial controls which 
should act as a consultant to departments, maintaining continuing study of 
innovation in this field in the public and private sectors in Australia and 
abroad, and communicating freely with professional and academic 
agencies; 
(i) that in order to combine effective parliamentary control over expenditure 
with administrative flexibility, Treasury should take up with the 
appropriate parliamentary committee or committees 
(i) the possibility of revising the schedule to the annual Appropriation 
Bills ('the Estimates') to allow presentation of proposed expenditures 
in a form that will more adequately reflect programs, while 
continuing to provide in this or other documents the legal basis for 
parliamentary authorisation of expenditure, 
(ii) ways in which the annual authorisation of expenditure could be used 
to encourage the economical use of funds, for example, by use of 
virement' in agreed circumstances and within the context of other 
revisions to existing systems recommended in this Report; and also 
by developing a more constructive attitude to instances of under-
expenditure of an appropriation, 
(iii) the form and content of supporting material to be available for the 
Estimates debate, for example, in departmental annual reports, 
sections of the Budget papers, documents available from the minister 
on request; 
(j) that to increase the effectiveness of parliamentary review of efficiency, 
Treasury, the Public Service Board and the Auditor-General confer on the 
preparation by Treasury of comparative studies over time, and between 
comparable activities, of the administrative and salary costs involved in 
particular government programs and activities; 
(k) that, when the studies referred to in U) are available, Treasury and the 
Public Service Board undertake a joint analysis of the possibilities of 
substituting a financial allocation on a program or activity basis, in place of 
the present system of prescribing amounts for salary and other adminis-
trative charges (see Chapter 9.1.14-16); 
(1) that the separateness and independence from Treasury of the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics and the Auditor-General be emphasised by 
(i) in relation to the former, changes in the line of ministerial 
responsibility (see Chapter io.i), 
(ii) in relation to the latter, structural changes in the Audit Act (see 
paragraph 11.4.11). 
i. That is, the transfer of money from one item of expenditure to another, by section 37  of the 
Audit Act. 
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11.4 THE AUDITOR-GENERAL AND EFFICIENCY AUDITS 
11.4.1 Having put so much emphasis throughout this Report on the new 
delegatory methods by which the Treasury and the Public Service Board in 
particular should in future help to co-ordinate the activities of departments, we 
should re-emphasise how necessary also is a renewed vitality for some ancient 
instruments of restraint, of which the most important is the office of the Auditor-
General. In his submission to the Commission, the Auditor-General criticised the 
limitations on his role embodied in provisions of the current Audit legislation, 
especially those that restrict him to verifying the regulation of financial 
transactions and the proper accounting for assets. Accordingly, he urged: 
'There is a pressing need to review the statutory powers and functions of the 
Auditor-General with the object of removing anachronistic limitations and 
authorising him, at the minimum, to evaluate whether expenditure although 
regular in every respect, is wasteful or non-productive. This would enable him to 
operate more effectively in the interest of Parliamentary scrutiny and control of 
financial administration'.' 
Support for this position came from a wide range of government agencies and 
outsiders. The Public Service Board also advocated, in the light of the practical 
limitations on its own activities, the extension of the Auditor-General's role to 
embrace efficiency auditing. Since the Commission believes that the achievement 
of efficiency requires that officials be called to account for their use of 
resources, and that such accountability will need to be based on regular and 
independent assessments of performance, it has concluded that the Auditor-
General, with appropriately extended functions and powers, could develop the 
capacity to conduct these assessments. Moreover, through his special relationship 
with Parliament, the Auditor-General could assist in Parliament's scrutiny of the 
efficiency of the administration. Accordingly, we have recommended in Chapter 
3 that the Auditor-General should be empowered to conduct efficiency audits 
throughout the Commonwealth government administration. In the following 
paragraphs of this section we examine: 
(a) the scope of efficiency audits; 
(b) the extent of the Auditor-General's jurisdiction; 
(c) the role of departments and agencies in efficiency audits; 
(d) the Auditor-General's special relationship with Parliament; 
(e) the resources and powers necessary for the Auditor-General to perform this 
extended role; 
(f) the relationship of the Auditor-General and co-ordinating authorities. 
The Scope of Efficiency Audits 
11.4.2 Views about the scope and purpose of audits vary widely, but there is an 
increasing tendency to see them as becoming more comprehensive in range and 
influence. One of the broadest descriptions of the audit function is that sponsored 
by the United States General Accounting Office2 which identifies three elements, 
types or stages of auditing as follows: 
(a) financial and compliance: this form of audit determines whether financial 
operations are conducted with propriety, whether financial reports are 
I . See Appendix 4.F, The Auditor-General, Paper i. 
2. See Appendix 4.F, Paper 4. 
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presented fairly and whether the agency subject to audit has complied with 
the applicable laws and regulations; 
(b) economy and efficienc5: this determines whether an agency is managing or 
utilising its resources (personnel, property, space, and so forth) in an 
economical and efficient manner, and seeks to reveal the causes of any 
inefficiencies or uneconomical practices, including inadequacies in 
management information systems, administrative procedures, or organi-
sational structure; 
(c) program results: this determines whether the desired results or benefits are 
being achieved, whether the objectives established by the legislature or 
other authorising body are being met, and whether the agency has 
considered alternatives which might yield desired results at a lower cost. 
11.4.3 The Auditor-General's present functions are confined primarily to the 
first of these three elements. It will be apparent from Chapter 3,  which deals with 
the achievement of efficiency, that the Commission contemplates that the 
Auditor-General should have power to audit the efficiency of departments and 
agencies in the use of financial, manpower and other resources and so to 
comprehend the second group of the elements listed above. This audit will be 
directed to any aspect of the organisation of a department or agency concerned 
which suggests a wasteful use of money, manpower or other resources. 
11.4.4 It will not be easy to draw the line between studies directed to the 
assessment of efficiency in these matters, and those determining how far the 
desired results or benefits contemplated in any program under review are in fact 
being achieved. Even in principle, there may be some overlap. The results or 
benefits contemplated will generally be a complex, and sometimes competitive, 
set of objectives derived in varying degree from differing personal and political 
motivations. The assessment of success in achieving the objectives will therefore 
involve judgment not merely about financial and administrative competence but 
also about political considerations with which, in theory at least, the Auditor-
General should not be involved. It is because of this component and the relevance 
of such assessments to the Forward Estimates and the formulation of new policies 
that the Commission suggests that primary responsibility for ensuring the 
assessment of program effectiveness should be with the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, and the promotion of these program reviews is discussed in 
the next section (see paragraph 11.5.20). We expect that the Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet would draw heavily on the work of the Auditor-
General as revealed in his reports, and that these would be a fruitful source of 
guidance as to the priority which should be given to the review of particular 
programs. 
The Extent of the Auditor-General's Jurisdiction 
R312 11.4.5 The Commission contemplates that the Auditor-General's concern with 
the monitoring of efficiency will extend to all agencies which he audits in respect 
of financial regularity (see Chapter 4.4.33). This would bring under examination 
some statutory corporations and government companies at present outside the 
scope of Public Service Board and Treasury review. 
The Role of Departments and Agencies in Efficiency Audits 
11.4.6 As developed in Chapter 3.6, the Commission believes that the process of 
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'Ificiency assessment and efficiency audit should be built, like that of financial 
audit, on a practice of internal audit in the individual departments and agencies. 
In this way the audit will exercise its most immediate influence on the way in 
which the work of the department or agency is conducted. Such internal audits 
will reduce the burden of detailed work on the Auditor-General and enable him 
to concentrate on an assessment of the internal work, with detailed spot-checking 
where he judges this necessary, and on broader aspects of efficiency calling for 
expertise in assessment. This approach will place additional strains on existing 
staff resources in departments and agencies and the task will need to be assessed 
and overcome by planned development. 
11.4.7 The Commission recommends, therefore, that departments and agencies R313 
be required to prepare regular reports or assessments along lines laid down by or 
agreed with the Auditor-General, and that these reports should be available to 
the Auditor-General, as well as being sent to the minister. The precise means by 
which these reports are prepared would be a matter for the departmental head, 
but it could well be entrusted to a committee presided over by a senior 
departmental officer. The results of its work could then be brought to bear on 
modifications of existing programs being considered in the context of the Forward 
Estimates. 
Relations of the Auditor-General to Parliament 
11.4.8 We recommended in Chapter 3.6 that there should be a parliamentary 
committee concerned to scrutinise administrative efficiency.' Such a scrutiny 
would accord with one of the traditional roles of Parliament. To be effective 
however, the committee would need to have a special relationship with the 
Auditor-General upon whose reports its work would in large part be based. To 
emphasise this special relationship we urge that, while the committee should have R314 
its own parliamentary secretariat, it should be advised on professional matters by 
the Auditor-General and his staff, and that the Chairman and Deputy-Chairman 
of the Committee (being drawn from the membership of the government and 
opposition parties respectively) should establish a close working relationship with 
the Auditor-General in a way which would give weight to the non-partisan role of 
the Committee. This special relationship would be acknowledged if the Auditor- R315 
General were appointed by the Governor-General in Council only after it had 
received a report from an expert selection committee the membership of which 
had been agreed between the government and the Chairman and Deputy-
Chairman of this parliamentary committee. 
Powers of the Auditor-General 
I 1.4.9 It would be necessary for the Auditor-General and his staff to have fully 
adequate powers for the performance of his expanded role. He will not be able 
fully to assume that role overnight. It will be a developing process, involving the 
gradual addition of resources and expertise. In legislative terms, it may perhaps 
be argued that the current Audit Act (especially section 13  which gives to the 
Auditor-General power to 'call for persons and papers') would suffice for the 
purpose of his expanded functions. The views of the Auditor-General should be 
obtained on this matter. 
I . 	 See also Chapter 5.1.23-26. 
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I 1.4.10 A related question is that of staffing. The Commission expects that to a 
large extent the Auditor-General will prefer to recruit his staff from the ranks of 
those employed under the Public Service Act. However, especially while the 
numbers of skilled staff are being built up or later, when special forms of expertise 
may be required, or new tasks are to be undertaken, these sources inside the 
Service may not be adequate. Furthermore, it would clearly be undesirable if 
difficulties in staffing impaired the Auditor-General's capacity to establish the 
basis for accountability of departments and agencies, both those with functional 
and co-ordinating responsibilities. The Commission hesitates to prescribe the 
R316 precise degree of autonomy which the Auditor-General should have in staffing, 
but believes it should be sufficient to allow him to recruit specialist consultants 
outside the Public Service Act, and should generally be adequate to place 
responsibility firmly on him for the effectiveness of his organisation. It can be 
expected also that the enhanced role will call for additional financial resources to 
meet increased travel and professional development needs. There may well be 
other organisational matters about which special legislative provisions should be 
made. 
R3 i 7 11-4-11 We recommend therefore that Cabinet authorise the Auditor-General to 
consult with the Departments of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Treasury, 
the Public Service Board and other relevant authorities, and report on the 
legislative provisions necessary to enable him effectively to undertake efficiency 
audits as recommended by the Commission. Whatever enabling legislation may 
be needed, it would appear desirable for the Auditor-General to be given 
statutory duties incorporating some of the provisions which are currently listed in 
section 17 of the Public Service Act as applying to the Public Service Board. For 
instance, sub-section i (b), (c) and (d), which reads as follows: 
'(b) 	 to examine the business of each department and ascertain whether any 
inefficiency or lack of economy exists; 
(c) to exercise a critical oversight of the activities, and the methods of 
conducting the business, of each Department; 
(d) to maintain a comprehensive and continuous system of measuring and 
checking the economical and efficient working of each Department . . 
appear suitable for inclusion in substance in revised legislation. Some extension of 
this sub-section would be necessary to ensure that the relevant provisions 
included the statutory bodies to be covered by the Auditor-General's authority. 
Specific legislative proposals should be developed by the Auditor-General for the 
government's consideration. The present Auditor-General has suggested to the 
Commission that there would be advantage in replacing the Audit Act by an Act 
dealing with financial management and a separate Act dealing with audit 
provisions. We suggest that this proposal be explored further. The Auditor-
General should also be invited to outline a program by which he would develop 
the resources and technical capacities necessary to the conduct of efficiency 
audits. 
Relations with Co-ordinating Agencies 
IT .4.12 The changes proposed in the role of the Auditor-General will have 
important effects for the central co-ordinating agencies. First, their own activities 
and the efficiency with which they are conducted will be subject to independent 
critical assessment. This will bring under examination not merely their use of 
financial and manpower resources, but the effects on the efficient operations of 
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other departments and agencies of the controls exercised by them, the guidelines 
issued and professional advice offered. Thus for instance, if a department 
considered that waste was being caused by its adherence in inappropriate 
circumstances to the requirements of the Audit Act or Treasury Regulations, this 
could be said in the report on the departmental efficiency audit, and it would 
therefore be drawn to the attention of the Auditor-General. Similarly, his 
examinations would cover not only the wasteful use of manpower in 
departmental activities but any inefficiencies due, in the department's judgment, 
to unjustified restraints imposed by the Public Service Board. Again, if in the 
Auditor-General's view a program was being made relatively inefficient because 
of faulty organisation, it would be open to him to advise the department to seek 
specialist help from the Public Service Board, and especially from its 
management consultancy group. The Auditor-General's work and reports would 
therefore in various ways provide a continuing stimulus to the professional 
functions of Treasury, the Public Service Board and other co-ordinating agencies, 
and a means for the progressive up-dating of legislative and other controls, as well 
as providing more informal guidelines and advice.' The Commission is convinced 
that this aspect of the Auditor-General's role would bring clear benefits to 
efficiency and provide a useful way of overcoming many departments' difficulties 
in establishing dialogue with the co-ordinating authorities. 
11.4-13 In his submission, the Auditor-General expressed the view that his work 
in the auditing of efficiency would be facilitated if his interaction with the co-
ordinating agencies could be formalised. We agree with this submission, and 
accordingly recommend that the government authorise the Auditor-General to R318 
establish under his own chairmanship a committee comprising representatives of 
the heads of Treasury, Public Service Board, Prime Minister and Cabinet and 
Administrative Services, to assist him in the development of his role in the audit of 
efficiency. 
11.5 THE DEPARTMENT OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND 
CABINET AND POLICY CO-ORDINATION 
11.5.1 In earlier sections of this Chapter we have drawn attention to the 
existence of constraints which set limits to the actions of individual ministers and 
their departments, and to the role of co-ordinating authorities as the interpreters 
of these constraints. Among the most complex of the constraints in terms of the 
demands made on ministers are those which derive from the political philosophy 
or policies of the government and the party to which its members belong, and 
those which arise from membership of a Cabinet and responsibility to it. These 
constraints are an important concern of the Prime Minister and his Department. 
As the political leader of the government, the Prime Minister is the principal 
guardian of its philosophy and policies. As chairman of the Cabinet he is 
responsible for preserving its corporate unity and making it an effective 
instrument of ministerial decision. There is a significant difference in the style and 
purpose of these two roles. The essence of the first is the quality of public 
leadership by which a Prime Minister imposes a personal and political stamp on 
the work of his government. The second role is one of private chairmanship, 
requiring the capacity to combine diverse ambitious and competitive and 
I . The 1975 Report of the Canadian Auditor-General on the Canadian Treasury Board financial 
control system illustrates this possibility. 
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sometimes conflicting talents into a coherent whole; to balance and to reconcile. 
11.5.2 Prime Ministers will differ in the emphasis they give and the talents they 
bring to the performance of these roles. Some in the past have predominantly 
been chairmen of Cabinet, leaving initiatives largely to colleagues but holding the 
reins firmly. Others have sought to be a primary source of initiative in a wide 
range of subjects over the gamut of portfolios. The latter approach is perhaps 
becoming increasingly evident; it has been frequently remarked that there is a 
trend towards a presidential style of government in Westminster-style systems. 
One of the advantages of ministerial and Cabinet government is its flexibility in 
accommodating such changes and shifts of emphasis. 
11-5-3 That these changes occur means, however, that the part of the 
administration which serves the Prime Minister and Cabinet particularly must be 
structured so that it can adapt to the needs of both the central components of 
government, in whatever pattern their relationships are, in the event, cast. In 
Australia both are served by a single department—the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet—although it has not always been so. A short history of the 
Department can be found at Appendix 4.H, and it illustrates the double line of 
responsibility of this Department and the complex loyalties required of it—to the 
Cabinet as a collective of ministers who are by tradition nominally equal, and to 
the Prime Minister both as an individual minister and as leader of the 
government. 
Is the Departmental Form Appropriate? 
11.5.4 These basic tasks of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
are significantly different from those of functional departments, and from those of 
other co-ordinating agencies such as the Treasury and the Public Service Board. 
It is noteworthy that they are tasks undertaken in the United Kingdom, and in 
Canada and New Zealand—two other systems broadly following the Westmin-
ster pattern—by non-departmental organisations. These considerations have led 
to a range of questions as to whether there should be a Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet at all, whether the Prime Minister should be served by a 
political office, whether the function of servicing Cabinet should be performed 
separately, and whether the Department should have any functional, as well as 
co-ordinating, responsibilities. 
I 1.5.5 The basic reason for the existence of a department in Australia. is 
probably the constitutional provision for departments of state in a context which 
has been interpreted as requiring that a minister must administer a department. 
However, the existence of a department has proved useful for other reasons. First 
there are certain functions which it has seemed appropriate for the Prime 
Minister to reserve to himself. These have included the conduct of formal 
relationships with State governments, the granting of honours, and related 
ceremonial functions. Individual Prime Ministers have additionally had special 
interests which they have wished to include in their own portfolio. Furthermore, 
new functions'accepted by the government for which no obvious departmental 
home existed, expecially where they are of a rather general character, have 
tended to be placed initially in the Prime Minister's Department until an 
appropriate administrative structure and pattern of basic policy have evolved. 
Thus, within the last seven years, responsibility for government support for the 
arts, for protection of the environment, for aboriginal affairs, for policies relating 
to women in the community, and for science, have all been placed, at least for 
periods, in the Prime Minister's Department. The tendency has been, however, 
for these functions and activities to be 'hived off when the initial phase is over and 
lines of development are established. The practice of placing new functions 
temporarily in the Prime Minister's Department has been valuable, in some 
instances at least, but the Commission considers that where it is adopted it should 
be temporary, and the aim should be to enable the Department to concentrate on 
its primary tasks of servicing Cabinet and the Prime Minister. 
11.5.6 The departmental form is sometimes said to be unsuitable for the 
function of servicing and advising the Prime Minister, since those responsible will 
inevitably be involved in issues of significant political content. It is presumably for 
this reason that in Canada the Prime Minister has his own political office rather 
than a department. The Commission does not find this objection compelling. The 
departmental form is adaptable enough to accommodate an attention to political 
issues. To do so adequately it may be necessary to provide room in the top levels of 
the Prime Minister's Department for senior advisers on short-term appointment, 
whose role is to inject into departmental work the appropriate political 
awareness. This consideration also lends weight to the right of the Prime Minister 
to have a departmental head who is personally and professionally acceptable to 
him. But, as we have indicated in other parts of the Report, these objectives can be 
achieved within the departmental framework. 
11.5.7 In other respects the departmental form has many advantages. In 
particular, we believe it can provide more effectively than a separate political 
office for communication with other departments and agencies. This com-
munication is essential to both the co-ordinating and leadership roles of the Prime 
Minister which it is, in any event, preferable not to keep apart. We have no doubt 
that the existence of a Prime Minister's Department comprehending both 
functions is a source of strength. The Commission concludes: 
(a) that a single Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet continue to be 
the principal administrative agency serving the Prime Minister in his roles 
as Leader of the Government and Chairman of Cabinet; 
(b) that continuing thought be given to separating from the Department any 
functions which are not essential for discharging the roles of policy co-
ordination, development, adaptation and review. 
What Kind of Departmental Structure? 
11 ..8 In the past, the Department has been organised in divisions roughly 
paralleling the functions of other departments. The primary purpose of these 
divisions has been to advise the Prime Minister on matters within the relevant 
functional areas, including on papers going to Cabinet. They have also provided 
representatives on interdepartmental committees, dealt with correspondence and 
prepared background material for speeches. Apart from these functionally-based 
divisions, there has been a relatively small and separate Cabinet Office whose 
functions are essentially those of managing Cabinet submissions and other 
material, recording Cabinet decisions and ensuring that they are made known to 
those involved.' 
I . See the consultancy report, Australian Cabinet Structure and Procedures, by R. F. 1. Smith, 
Appendix 4.G. 
I 1.5.9 There appear to be defects in these arrangements from the point of view 
of servicing the Cabinet. The divisions have tended to develop a life of their own, 
effectively related neither to the work of Cabinet and its committees nor to the 
main policy concerns of the Prime Minister and the Department. Their mode of 
work can also lead to significant duplication, often on a less well-informed basis, of 
work in the relevant functional department. The Commission sees no 
worthwhile benefit from the building up of additional groups of officials to 
'second think' the departments primarily responsible. It would be preferable if 
those involved in this work in the policy divisions saw their role as being rather to 
concentrate more on the Cabinet aspects of their work and, in this: 
(a) to draw to the attention of the Prime Minister and other Cabinet ministers 
considerations which arise from factors apparently not fully covered in the 
material coming forward, particularly those outside the area of re-, 
sponsibility of the functional department concerned; 
(b) to ensure that those best equipped to comment on these considerations in 
other parts of the administration are enabled to do so; 
(c) to distribute work, for example correspondence, wherever possible to other 
departments and their ministers, rather than bring it to the Prime 
Minister. 
11.5.10 We understand there have been moves recently to link the work of the 
Department's policy divisions more specifically with the various committees of 
Cabinet. Such changes would in our view, if carried through into the 
organisational structure of the divisions, greatly strengthen the effectiveness of the 
Cabinet Office and clarify its role. If the policy divisions and Cabinet Office of the 
department were in fact organised as a series of Cabinet committee secretariats it 
would be possible for them not merely to service the committees more adequately 
from the secretarial point of view, but to ensure that the necessary data and 
departmental and ministerial views on the issues before the committee were 
effectively mobilised and necessary research studies undertaken. The secretariats 
could also provide the nucleus for any special task forces or IDCs the committees 
wished to establish in order to clarify or seek solutions to particular problems 
facing them. They could if anything be smaller in size than the existing policy 
divisions. 
11.5.11 It would follow from this suggested structure and the method of work 
proposed, that the various secretariats would be staffed not solely by persons with 
professional qualifications or experience in functions falling within the general 
purview of the Cabinet committee concerned, but also by officers with a more 
general capacity to grasp the issues involved, to identify relevant sources of 
information and to recognise relationships with other areas of governmental 
work. Staffing of the Cabinet Office might best be arranged on the basis of a mix, 
perhaps about half and half, of officers on normal posting and officers on 
rotation.' This would provide a desirable element of continuity in advising and 
servicing the Cabinet and its committees, help keep the system open, bring in 
fresh insights and knowledge from the functional departments and, when 
seconded officers returned to these departments, take to them the advantages of 
experience in working direct to Cabinet. More generally, such rotation and 
secondment would: 
I . For an outline of the Commission's proposals in relation to rotation of staff, see section i 1.6 and 
Appendix 3.F. 
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(a) avoid the development of an entrenched and powerful central agency, 
thereby weakening the spread of responsibility among ministers; 
(b) develop the talents and broaden the perspective of promising officers; 
(c) give departments greater flexibility in allocating functions among their 
own senior staff) 
(d) promote better understanding within departments of the need for co-
ordination, and provide a basis for it. 
11.5.12 The Commission recommends that: 	 R319 
(a) the policy divisions of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet work 
as secretariats within the Cabinet Office to service Cabinet and its 
committees, their organisation mirroring whatever Cabinet committee 
structure the government adopts; 
(b) these secretariats be staffed by a mix of officers on normal posting and 
officers on rotation from other departments and agencies. 
11.5.13 An associated question is whether the presence of officials at Cabinet 
committees should be encouraged, and if so, on what basis.1 Practice in this 
matter has fluctuated, both in Australia and overseas. There will certainly be 
occasions when ministers will decide to meet without officials, but their presence 
can frequently provide ministers with additional resources and bring under 
notice administrative matters2 without over-burdening the minister or affecting 
the capacity of the departmental head to administer his department effectively. 
11.5.14 Apart from these Cabinet committee secretariats, the Prime Minister 
himself will have need for a centrally placed group of officers possessing diverse 
skills and experience and a significant innovative capacity. This central group 
should be able to concentrate its attention on the issues which from time to time 
are judged by the Prime Minister to be of the most immediate urgency. 
Consequently, while the group should be small, its method of operation should be 
flexible enough to enable it to recruit by secondment additional staff on a short 
term basis from other departments, universities or the private sector, for the 
concentrated study of particular issues. It should be able also to throw its weight 
into the support of particular Cabinet committee secretariats faced with tasks 
which overtax their normal strength or call for special innovative capacity. 
1 ' .5-15 An effective link between this centrally placed, policy-oriented group 
and the general structure of Cabinet committee secretariats would be created if 
this 'policy unit' acted also as the secretariat for the Cabinet Committee on 
Planning and Co-ordination or whatever ministerial group the Prime Minister 
from time to time chooses to consult most closely and most extensively on major 
policy issues confronting the government. 
i i..i6 The primary operating mode of the unit would be the task force.. As 
indicated in the Commission's study of interdepartmental committees , the 
purpose of task forces is to bring into the process of policy developing and review 
the expertise of officials and others on an individual rather than a 'representative' 
basis. A feature of task forces is that they are formed for particular purposes and 
I . This question is discussed in the consultancy paper by Dr Smith—see Appendix 4.G. 
2. This was advocated by another consultant, Professor Spann. Sec Appendix 1.1. 
3. See Appendix 4.J. 
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disbanded when they have been accomplished. Using the task force mode will 
give flexibility to the policy developing area of the Department, keep its numbers 
small and, in an era of rapid change, help it to form and re-form quickly as 
problems emerge. 
11.5.17 The unit would have a continuing nucleus of officers supplemented by 
others seconded on rotation or appointed for a short term. 1 It could be expected 
that as new needs emerged, or with a change in government, fresh people from 
outside the Service would be commissioned on a short term basis to assist with 
assignments having a political emphasis. Such a mix of career public servants, 
some on rotation or short term secondment, with politically oriented appointees 
from outside also on short terms, would assist the permanent officials to 
understand and be responsive to their requirements, while enabling the 
government to make the best use of their administrative and managerial capacity. 
11.5.18 These arrangements should make less necessary the appointment of 
additional special advisers in the Prime Minister's private office, and would 
ensure the more effective integration of the work of special advisers with that of 
the Department. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister will continue to need a 
personal office, much along the lines of recent establishments, attuned to his 
immediate needs in matters such as departmental liaison, political advice, speech 
writing and close-in administrative support. 2 
11.5.19 The suggested policy unit would have an essential role in the 
Department's preparation of guidelines for the Forward Estimates process. The 
Department's primary function here will be to help identify 'political' issues 
associated with resource allocation, ensuring that the government's priorities are 
embodied in departmental bids, and assisting the ministerial resolution of the 
issues. For this, the policy unit would need to work closely with Treasury and with 
the Public Service Board and ensure that a feasible range of policy options 
(including political questions) is presented to ministers. The unit would 
collaborate with the secretariat of the Economic Committee of Cabinet in 
performing the Department's role in the Forward Estimates process. Between 
them, the secretariat and the policy unit should identify political issues requiring 
ministerial resolution, before adequate guidelines can be prepared, and 
collaborate with Treasury, DINDEC and the Public Service Board in the 
assessment of the constraints imposed by demands on resources on the scale and 
content of government programs. It would probably be for the secretariat of the 
Economic Committee to arrange official support for the ministerial sub-
committee which would be responsible for negotiations with individual ministers 
and their departments in reconciling Forward Estimate bids with the original 
guidelines. 
11.5.2o The policy unit would also be the appropriate area to organise reviews 
of program effectiveness of the kind discussed briefly in Chapters 3.6 and 1 1 .4 of 
the Report. A system of program analysis and review developed in the British 
Civil Service has not been conspicuously successful. Its application here is 
unlikely to be easier. Nevertheless, it remains important to assess the results of 
I . The nucleus should also be posted only for a renewable term, for example 3 years, for reasons 
outlined in Chapter 4.3.40 in relation to policy groups in departments. 
2. 	 See Chapter 4.6. 
programs against their intended effects, and processes built upon the experience 
of the Program Analysis and Review (PAR) scheme arranged by the British 
Treasury with the co-operation of line departments seem to offer the best 
prospects, despite acknowledged difficulties. Ministers and parliamentarians 
obviously need to become aware of what happens when their decisions are 
implemented. An intensive analysis of selected programs, chosen because of their 
political or financial importance, and carried out by small expert groups, could 
contribute to this awareness. If a central nucleus of persons were associated with a 
series of such reviews the groups would be likely to develop and strengthen their 
techniques with experience. Such a nucleus would need to be supplemented by 
officers seconded from appropriate departments and agencies and from outside 
government employment. The groups should be composed so as clearly to give 
weight to the broad political attitudes of the government. There would frequently 
be merit in including an officer from the Auditor-General's staff since he would 
give the group access to a wide range of relevant information and judgment. The 
Commission envisages that responsibility for establishing such study groups and 
advising on the choice of programs to be reviewed should be with the policy unit 
established in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
11.5.21 Accordingly, we recommend that authority be given to the Department of R320 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet to develop a small policy unit whose purpose 
would be: 
(a) to arrange for the handling of assignments involving the development of 
new or modified policies where existing departmental machinery is 
inadequate, including major policy issues raised by Royal Commissions 
and committees of inquiry; 
(b) to assist in the formulation of overall programs for implementing the 
government's objectives; 
(c) to evaluate the effectiveness of ongoing programs against the general 
philosophy, policies and priorities of the government; 
(d) to assist the various Cabinet secretariats on special assignments. 
11.5.22 The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet structured in this 
way would we believe be equipped to bring both to Cabinet and its committees as 
the embodiment of the collective function of ministers, and also to the Prime 
Minister as the Leader Of the Government, an adaptable, integrated and flexible 
form of service and support. In so doing, it would recognise that, in the first group 
of functions, its responsibility would be to ministers generally and, in the latter, to 
the Prime Minister himself. 
11.5.23 Top structure: The importance of each of the two roles of the Department 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the distinctive qualities required of the 
officials to head the sections performing these roles suggest that there would be 
value in a top management structure of the department which provided for two 
senior positions both at or near head of department status. To achieve flexibility, 
the position and title of Secretary to the Department could be held by either the 
Secretary to Cabinet or the director of the policy unit. The Secretary to the 
Department would be appointed in the normal way for heads of departments (see 
Chapter 4.5). The person to head the policy unit could if desired, like the 'Chief 
Adviser' recommended by the Fulton Committee in the United Kingdom, be 
selected with political as well as administrative and professional considerations in 
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mind and have a short term appointment. In the event of two appointments being 
made on lines such as we have suggested, both officers should have direct access to 
the Prime Minister. 
Task Forces and Interdepartmental Committees 
11-5.24 The role and the working of interdepartmental committees (IDCs) 
were the subject of a good deal of criticism in submissions to the Commission. It 
was alleged that IDCs tend to break down lines of ministerial responsibility, 
become battle grounds for the protection of departmental privilege, are time-
consuming and often contribute little to the solution of the problems before them. 
To provide ourselves with clear information, departments were asked to complete 
a questionnaire about IDCs which they convene or to which they provide a 
chairman, and consultants and staff of the Commission undertook studies of 
fourteen IDCs and three associated sub-committees. A review of these studies 
appears at Appendix 4.J. The report prepared as a result indicates that IDCs can 
make a positive contribution primarily where there is an 'administrative' rather 
than a 'policy' task to discharge, and where there are no entrenched 
departmental policy attitudes to inhibit a committee's work. The evidence 
suggests that there will often be other methods of resolving problems affecting 
several ministers and departments which would be preferable to the establish-
ment of an IDC, and that when IDCs are formed ministers should be aware of 
their limitations. 
R321 11.5.25 Before an IDC is established, consideration should be given to the 
following alternatives: 
(a) requiring the department primarily concerned to discharge the function in 
consultation with other interested departments and authorities, parti-
cularly where the purpose would be, for example, gathering and assessing 
information; 
(b) appointing a task force, usually by drawing on individuals (not necessarily 
departmental officers) having relevant skills and background with 
instructions to take departmental views into account but not to be 
inhibited by them. This may be appropriate where an innovative solution 
is called for, or there are entrenched departmental views. 
R322 1 ' -5.26 In relation to task forces and IDCs when established, we recommend: 
(a) that IDCs be normally established only by Cabinet, the Prime Minister, or 
by two or more ministers with the Prime Minister's approval; 
(b) that a register of all IDCs and task forces be maintained by the Secretary to 
Cabinet; 
(c) that when appointment is made of a task force or an IDC the purpose, date 
for report and membership be clearly defined; 
(d) that a minister may, with the approval of the Prime Minister, nominate a 
consultant or adviser from outside his department to join a task force or an 
IDC; 
(e) that a chairman of an IDC report progress periodically to the Secretary to 
Cabinet, who if, in his view, the committee seems unlikely to reach 
constructive agreement, may recommend to the Prime Minister 
(i) the nomination of a small group from the committee to make 
recommendations to ministers independently of the IDC, 
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(ii) the appointment of a task force, with or without members from the 
IDC, to develop a solution or make recommendations. 
(f) that the Secretary to Cabinet and, if appointed, the head of the policy unit, 
report twice yearly to Cabinet listing operative IDCs and indicating the 
current state of each one's work and the expected date of its conclusion. 
Machinery of Government Review 
11.5.27 It has been suggested to the Commission that a separate 'Machinery of 
Government Unit' should be established, possibly attached to the Department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet. We agree with the view that more conscious 
thought and rigorous examination should be given to proposals for administrative 
change, because these are almost always costly in both manpower and money and 
often damaging to departmental and staff morale. It is also essential, in the 
interests of efficiency, that there be continuing and critical monitoring of the way 
the various units work within the total Commonwealth administration, in 
relation both to one another and to the government's broad political purposes. 
11.5.28 At the same time, the allocation of functions at the ministerial level is a 
highly political exercise, and the niceties of organisational structure will 
frequently have to be sacrificed to it. At the official level, responsibility for the 
administrative structure rests primarily with the three co-ordinating 
agencies—Treasury, Public Service Board and the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet. At ministerial level, the main responsibility must rest with 
the Prime Minister as the allocator of portfolios, Chairman of Cabinet and 
political leader of the government. In these capacities, it is his responsibility both 
to co-ordinate, and to allocate the work of government among ministers and their 
departments as rationally as possible. We have already suggested arrangements 
the Department might make to assist the Prime Minister as he watches over the 
progressive embodiment of party policy in government programs. 
11.5.29 These are complex and demanding tasks, and to discharge them the 
Prime Minister should be able to look to expert assistance. We think this 
assistance could be readily available, given a slight rearrangement of existing 
resources. We do not support the idea of a separate Machinery of Government 
Unit, for two reasons. First, most of the continuing work of such a unit would 
duplicate work already being done as a necessary adjunct to the day to day 
operation of the Public Service Board and also, to some extent, of the Treasury 
and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Secondly, substantial 
changes are likely to be called for only intermittently and will then often arise 
from unpredictable political events or considerations. 
11.5.30 In these circumstances, it would be a waste of skilled and widely 
experienced officers to use them to staff such a unit. It would seem preferable to 
call together, as the occasion arises, those best able to provide relevant and expert 
advice. The important needs are to ensure that relevant material is kept up to 
date and that the likely sources of advice can be promptly identified. 
11.5.31 Accordingly, the Commission recommends that: 	 R323 
(a) the Public Service Board maintain a continuing assessment of changes in 
administrative arrangements required on grounds of efficiency, and be 
responsible for formulating recommendations on such matters;' 
I . The Public Service Board's responsibilities relating to senior appointments are discussed at 
paragraphs 11.6.23-24. 
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(b) the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, using the policy unit if 
established, be responsible as the occasion arises for advising on general 
machinery of government matters, primarily by drawing upon the 
information and experience of the Public Service Board and relevant 
departments. 
Ministerial Arrangements 
11.5.32 It has been suggested to the Commission that the weight of 
administrative responsibility resting on the Prime Minister is such as to warrant 
the appointment of a second minister whose task would be to assist the Prime 
Minister in administering his Department. In our view, that is not the best 
approach. If the administrative burden is too heavy, the main object should be to 
lighten it by revising arrangements at the administrative level. 1 There is no-one 
who can reasonably share, as an assisting minister, the Prime Minister's primary 
responsibility for co-ordination of policy and for giving leadership and making 
decisions on important issues. Where assistance in the policy roles is needed, this 
properly comes from ministers, or from the Cabinet and, where necessary, from 
changes in their method of functioning. 
11.5-33 Nevertheless we recognise that flexibility is vital, and that the 
administrative burdens on ministers, and especially on the Prime Minister, 
R324 cannot always be kept nicely in balance. Accordingly, the Commission suggests 
that, should the Prime Minister wish at any time to have assistance with 
administrative matters associated with his portfolio, he might consider either the 
appointment of a 'Minister Assisting' along traditional lines, when he will usually 
have a nominated area of responsibility, or the appointment of one who might, for 
example, be designated Special Minister of State and would discharge this 
function along with the duties of another portfolio. (For this reason, the Special 
Minister might not hold one of the more senior or onerous portfolios.) If 
appointed, a Special or Assisting Minister might well assist the Prime Minister in 
the management of some of the policy projects being undertaken by the policy 
unit, or in a policy field such as science (Chapter 10.2) or an area of 
administrative development such as regional administration (Chapter 7.3). 
11.6 THE PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD 
11.6.1 The functions of the Public Service Board, and the way in which it 
discharges them, were the main issue or an important issue in some 132 
submissions to the Commission, covering virtually every aspect of the work of the 
Board. The issue of how responsibility should be divided between the Board and 
the heads of departments and agencies was a persistent theme in many of these 
submissions. Departmental heads argued that they should have greater 
responsibility for decisions about the organisation and staffing of their departments, 
subject to budgetary restraints. On the other hand, the Board emphasised the 
importance of common standards throughout Commonwealth government 
employment generally, and the consequent need for effective central controls. In 
this section we shall be concerned to examine the work of the Board as the prime 
instrument of co-ordination in the fields of employment, personnel practice and 
organisation. Other aspects of its responsibilities are discussed elsewhere, and 
particularly in Chapters 8 and 9. 
I . This is one of the reasons for the Public Service Board having independent statutory status. See 
paragraph 11.6.5. 
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11.6.2 Throughout this Report, and especially in the present chapter, the 
Commission has argued that an effective performance of the co-ordinating 
function entails developing among those whose activities are to be co-ordinated 
an awareness of the need for discipline, an acceptance of the constraints which 
make it necessary, and an active involvement in the processes by which it is 
applied. Accordingly we have urged that co-ordinating authorities—particularly 
the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Treasury and the Board 
should place greater emphasis on their educating and promotional functions, 
delegating greater responsibility for immediate decisions to the departments and 
agencies concerned, and limiting their active intervention to the conduct of spot 
checks and joint studies to discover the adequacy with which the delegated 
responsibility is accepted and performed. 
11.6.3 We will, therefore, consider the work of the Board as a co-ordinator in 
relation to: 
(a) control of staff numbers; 
(b) organisational efficiency; 
(c) control of salary and related costs; 
(d) the development of personnel capacity. 
We also examine briefly the role of the Board in other matters on which it has been 
an important source of advice to governments and to Parliament. Finally, we will 
suggest that the time is ripe for a recasting of the legislative basis for the Board's 
work, and will list briefly some provisions which our work suggests should be 
incorporated in new legislation. 
11.6.4 There have been many changes since the responsibilities of the Board 
were last reviewed, both in Australian society generally and within the 
Commonwealth government itself) which justify such a reconsideration. Among 
those of a general character which affect the Board's work are: 
(a) radical changes in the social and ethnic composition of the Australian 
work force; 
(b) important changes in the attitude towards the work experience as a 
component in the quality of life—as a source of personal satisfaction, 
development and fulfilment; 
(c) greater mobility of people between occupations and places; 
(d) the beginnings of a transformation in the role of women in society and in 
the work force. 
Similarly, in government itself there has been: 
(a) a substantial increase in the functions of government and therefore of the 
proportion of the total work force in public employment; 
(b) a diversification of the content of these functions and of the skills and 
capacities of staff required to perform them; 
(c) a transfei' to statutory agencies of responsibility for many Commonwealth 
government functions and therefore for a larger proportion of Com-
monwealth employment. 
i i .6.5 Notwithstanding these changes, the central functions of the Board have 
remained with it since enactment of the first Public Service Act in 1902, when a 
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single Commissioner was provided for.' We are not attracted to the course 
recommended by the Fulton committee in Britain, that the functions of a central 
personnel authority should be carried out by a department of state, for two 
reasons. First, there are several such functions which we believe should be carried 
out in a way which guarantees political neutrality. These functions include 
recruitment and selection (which in Britain have remained with the independent 
Civil Service Commission). Secondly, we do not believe it appropriate that any 
one minister, apart from the Prime Minister, should be given authority over 
matters affecting the staffing arrangements of other ministers' departments. 
However we consider it undesirable that the Prime Minister should accept 
additional burdens of a departmental character. In the Commission's opinion 
these considerations outweigh the general preference for the departmental form 
we have expressed in Chapter 4.  We consider that the statutory independence of 
the Board should be maintained and that the Prime Minister should continue to 
be the minister responsible for the general working of the Public Service. 
r 1.6.6 The Commission has been assisted by material prepared for it by the 
Board and its staff2 and by many hours of discussion, formal and informal. The 
earlier material supplied was largely descriptive, but later material from the 
Board was progressively concerned with problems presented to the Commission, 
outlining action the Board had already taken or considered should be taken. 
Altogether this material provided a comprehensive and impressive account of the 
work of the Board. The Commission has been grateful for it. 
Control of Staff Numbers 
11.6.7 In Chapter 9.'  we have indicated that at present the power of the Board 
to influence the numbers employed in government departments and agencies 
rests upon the following bases: 
(a) its approval is required for the establishment proposals of departments and 
some other agencies; 
(b) it has authority to recommend to the Executive Council that 'positions' be 
created; 
(c) it supervises the applications of government approved ceilings, parti-
cularly insofar as differences may be called for in their applications to 
various departments and agencies; 
(d) it has power to conduct surveys of departments and agencies in relation to 
manpower use and organisational efficiency. 
In that chapter we drew attention to the increasing use being made of bulk 
establishment approvals and other modifications of past practice designed to 
devolve greater authority on departments and agencies, and we have urged 
further changes directed to this end. We have also, in Chapter g, urged that in 
future the control of numbers be exercised primarily by incorporating 
departmental and agency plans for future use of manpower in the Forward 
Estimates budget process. It is unnecessary to repeat what has already been said 
in that chapter. However, it is necessary to make clear how the Commission 
I . The most important legislative changes since 1902 have been in the addition of a specific 
responsibility for promoting the efficiency of the service (section 17 added in 1922); in the 
revision of the promotion appeal arrangements (1945); and in the modification of the 
recruitment provisions (1960). 
2. See Appendix 4.1. 
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envisages the Board performing its functions in relation to these matters, 
especially where the approach recommended by the Commission involves 
significant changes in the Board's authority or practice. 
I 1.6.8 Guidelines for forward estimates of manpower use: The Board 
would be an important source of advice for the Economic Committee of Cabinet 
in the preparation of guidelines to be issued to departments to assist them in the 
preparation of their Forward Estimates. The Commission envisages that the 
Board, in consultation with the Department of Employment and Industrial 
Relations, would prepare for that Committee a survey of the factors likely to 
influence Commonwealth employment in the years to be covered by the 
estimates. This survey would examine elements relevant to both the demand and 
supply aspects of that employment. On the demand side it would draw attention 
to the predictable needs (in broad categories of personnel) of existing and 
committed programs as well' as those of new programs announced or 
foreshadowed, so far as these had been assessed. It would also review the trends in 
employment, both in other levels of government and in the private sector, for 
categories broadly competitive with the government's work force. On the supply 
side, it would present a review of demographic data relating to the actual and 
potential work force, drawing attention to relevant considerations in the age, sex, 
educational and skill profiles, together with comparable material for the 
government's own work force. It would review the expected impact over the 
relevant years of expected retirements and other wastages, of plans for training 
and in particular, of programs to bring about planned reductions in manpower 
use. 
11.6.9 The consideration of the content of this review, together with Cabinet 
policies and priorities, would enable, the Economic Committee to reach a 
reasoned judgment on the demands for personnel which it considers necessary to 
make during the period covered by the estimates. The Commission contemplates 
that the preparation of these guidelines would involve a realistic weighing of the 
benefits of existing and contemplated programs against the manpower required 
to administer them. In this task the Board will have an important responsibility to 
warn the government against unduly optimistic expectations either about the 
economies which can quickly be achieved in the administration of existing 
programs or about the availability of personnel required to give effect to new 
programs. An important purpose of the Board's independent status is to enable it 
to protect the standards of administrative performance and to guard against 
undue government pressure on departments and agencies and those who work in 
them. 
1 1.6. 1  Preparation of departmental estimates: While it will be the 
responsibility of individual ministers and their departments to prepare, for 
consideration by a Cabinet committee, forecasts of the various categories of 
personnel likely to be required over the period of the estimates, such departments 
may well need to confer with the Board, particularly when new establishment 
units will be required or where significant re-organisations are contemplated as 
part of longer-term 'ceiling' exercises. The consultation would provide a first 
opportunity to bring greater realism into 'ministerial and departmental 
expectations. 
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11.6.11 Co-ordination of departmental and agency estimates: As 
departmental and agency estimates are assembled, the Board will be primarily 
responsible for combining them and seeking to reconcile them in the aggregate 
with the Cabinet Committee's guidelines. As we have indicated in section 11.2, 
we envisage this reconciliation being conducted under the guidance of a sub-
committee of the Economic Committee of Cabinet assisted by officials 
from the Board, Treasury, Prime Minister and Cabinet and DINDEC. 
The Board will need, therefore, to confer with these departments as 
well as with those submitting estimates so that there is a reconciliation of the bases 
on which modifications of the original bids are proposed to the sub-committee. In 
this phase also the Board will be concerned not merely to reduce the departmental 
bids so as to conform with the aggregates proposed in the guidelines, but to 
emphasise to the sub-committee where policy initiatives contemplated by the 
government or by individual ministers would impose intolerable strains on the 
administration. Indeed, it is only by such a process that ministers can be 
effectively involved in the choices made, and political authority and re-
sponsibility for them adequately accepted. 
i i.6. 12 Within the various departmental estimates there will be a series of 
provisions for contingencies and for programs as yet undecided. It will be 
especially necessary for the Board to comment to ministerial committees on the 
degree to which these contingency provisions could be covered by a central 
reserve provision in broad categories of manpower resources, on which individual 
departments could draw by negotiation with the Board directly for minor 
contingencies or following decisions by Cabinet where new or expanded 
programs are involved. The Commission considers that such Forward Estimates, 
when they carry ministerial and Cabinet authority could properly form the basis 
of planning both by the Board itself and individual departments and agencies. 
The Commission does not anticipate, however, that this would render 
unnecessary any Board control over departmental establishments. 
11.6.13 Control of establishments: The Commission believes that the 
proposals outlined in earlier sections of this Report will provide a sound basis for a 
change in the character of the Board's control of establishments. The Forward 
Estimates of manpower use would provide a more clearly understood context for 
planning by both Board and departments, but with more scope for initiative by 
departments and agencies. 
I 1.6.14 The statements which departments will make annually to the Board of 
their manpower requirements for the next two or three years will represent a 
development of the forward manpower estimates on which the Board has recently 
been working. The object will be to provide, in a fair degree of aggregated detail 
consistent with the guidelines and for the Forward Estimates period, an indication 
of where the department or agency expects to encounter increased or reduced 
workloads, how it proposes to redeploy staff from one area to another to meet 
changing workloads, and its new requirements for staff in broad occupational 
categories. These estimates will be the subject of discussion between the Board 
and the departments and agencies concerned. This should result in a largely 
agreed outcome, but substantial matters of disagreement would be referred for 
decision to the Cabinet sub-committee, along with the Board's general advice to 
the government on manpower requirements and the correlated financial 
submissions. 
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11.6. i 5 Discussion of the forthcoming Budget-year estimates (including staffing 
estimates involved in forward expenditure commitments) will need to be in rather 
greater detail than those of the later years in the Forward Estimates program. 
Departments will have scope to exercise initiative by changing the arrangements 
set out in the Forward Estimates, but they would need to notify the Board of 
changes made and of variations in relation to the salary levels at which additional 
staff would be employed. In the whole process, the emphasis will be on obtaining 
government decisions on the maximum numbers in broad categories that a 
department or agency may employ consistent with the approved Forward 
Estimates and, ahead of each Budget year, consistent with overall Budget policy. 
Rather than being involved in detailed position and organisation control, the 
Board's role will be to satisfy itself that initial departmental estimates as to staff 
categories and levels are reasonable and that any revisions following adjustments 
in the estimates are also reasonable. The Board will have the power to review the 
way in which departments are using their staff, by procedures based on those now 
in operation for the Board's staff utilisation reviews. In conducting these reviews, 
the Board would receive advice from the Treasury and the Auditor-General 
about areas in which it appeared there might be some question about the effective 
utilisation of staff. 
i i.6.i6 The Commission does not contemplate a formal transfer of legal 
responsibility for classification of stafi positions from the Board to the 
departmental head, but rather an appropriate delegation by the Board which, 
since it could be withdrawn, would leave the Board holding a reserve authority. 
This reserve authority, backed by the conduct of staff utilisation studies, joint 
organisational studies and the efficiency audits carried out by the Auditor-
General would, in the Commission's view, represent more adequate protection of 
proper standards of manpower use than a system of ex ante examination and 
approval in detail of departmental establishments. 
11.6. 17  The maintenance of comparative standards in classification, and 
therefore in general levels of salary, is the critical element in preserving their 
integrity and comparability with external standards. Nevertheless we consider 
that, given an adequate statement of standards and guidelines from the Board, 
departments should be best able to judge the level of competence, qualifications 
and experience required for a particular task and therefore to determine the 
classification for the work. It will, however, remain necessary to guard against 
departmental heads seeing their own work as of special importance and against 
the desire to build a competitively impressive 'empire'. The Commission believes, 
therefore, that, within the approved Forward Estimates and a broad establishment 
profile accepted by the Board, the departmental head should have delegated 
authority to classify positions. Because of the critical nature of these decisions, we 
recommend that the Board should conduct regular checks to satisfy itself that its R325 
standards and guidelines are being observed, and should retain the right to 
reclassify any position if it judged this necessary. 
11.6.18 If Board control of departmental and agency employment is exercised 
in the way we have described above, there will no longer be the need for the Board 
to use the device of formal position creation. The procedure is over-elaborate, 
excessively focused on detail and adds a large and primarily routine body of work 
to the business of the Executive Council. The Commission recommends therefore R326 
that section 29 of the Act be repealed at an appropriate time. In the meantime, 
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and as the Forward Estimates process is developed, the Board should approve for 
each department each year a complement of positions (until section 29 is 
repealed, this could be accomplished by the creation process) that will meet the 
department's total range of needs within the maximum numbers determined.1  
The Board and Organisational Efficiency 
11.6.19 The responsibility of the Board to ensure reasonable discipline in the 
use of manpower gives it important functions in relation to the organisation of 
work in departments and agencies. In the past the Board has performed these 
functions predominantly by: 
(a) ex ante consideration of and decisions about departmental organisational 
plans and establishments; 
(b) control of classification; 
(c) section 17 studies; 
(d) manpower use reviews. 
The changes proposed will require a shift of emphasis in the Board's work, placing 
greater emphasis on its work as a source of expertise (that is as a consultant), on its 
sponsorship and monitoring of experiments and on increased participation of the 
departments and agencies in joint 'section 17' and manpower use studies. 
R327 11.6.20 For these purposes we see value in the Board having a small but 
competent group to provide specialised management consultancy services on a 
full time and expert basis for Commonwealth government employment 
generally. Outside management consultants, although useful as bringing a 'fresh 
eye' to the workings of the Service, can on many occasions be of only limited value 
to a government organisation. The consultancy group should be small in number, 
with an emphasis on expertise and freshness of approach-2o or 30 would be a 
maximum size—staffed largely on a rotating basis, with people brought to it for 
relatively short periods from the management service groups in departments, 
from policy or operational areas of departments and from the private sector. If the 
group is to be kept small, it will from time to time be preferable to use specialised 
consultants from outside, rather than to carry an establishment covering all fields 
of organisational skills. 
11.6.21 It has been put to us that it would be preferable to have a separate 
Bureau of Management which would to some extent operate in competition with 
the Board and provide the departmental or agency head with an alternative 
source of advice. There is some attraction in this idea, but, on balance, we have 
concluded that with the removal of its possibly conflicting role of detailed 
structural auditing, the Board could effectively discharge the efficiency 
promoting function, drawing occasionally on outside support. 
R328 11.6.22 The Board should, in the Commission's view, continue to provide 
advice to the Prime Minister on the broader questions involved in the 
organisation of the work of government generally. For this purpose it should 
maintain a continuing assessment of the adequacy of existing administrative 
arrangements and confer with the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet so 
I . A fuller discussion of the way in which the new manpower control and departmental 
establishment arrangements might be expected to operate is set out in the explanatory note in 
Appendix 4.1 Paper r. Paragraph 9. 1.9 contains a more detailed description of the procedures 
to be implemented in place of the processes associated with section 29. 
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that it would be ready, as opportunity offered, to provide information and advice 
to the Prime Minister. This matter is dealt with more fully in paragraphs 
11.5.27-31. 
11.6.23 The Board and higher appointments: Closely related to its 
responsibilities to advise the Prime Minister on the machinery of government is 
the help which the Board can give to departmental heads, ministers and Cabinet 
in relation to higher appointments, whether in departments or in statutory 
agencies. The Commission considers that the practice followed in the United 
Kingdom of maintaining, and keeping up to date, lists of possible candidates for 
higher appointments, supported by information about their qualifications, 
experience and performance, could prove valuable in Australia. The Board could 
well be responsible for the maintenance of such lists and stand ready to advise 
ministers or Cabinet in relation to relevant appointments. 
11.6.24 To provide a basis for this work, the Commission recommends that: 	 R329 
(a) each year the Chairman of the Board contact each departmental head and 
head of major statutory agencies seeking the following information 
(i) details of foreseeable vacancies likely to be occurring in the 
department or agency in the forthcoming eighteen months, 
a return on each officer occupying a senior post, each officer at the 
threshold of promotion to a senior post, and any other officer whom 
the departmental head considers may be ready for promotion to a 
senior post within the forthcoming eighteen months; 
(b) the return referred to in (a) (ii) above indicate whether the officer in 
question is ready for 
(i) promotion, and if so, whether he or she can be regarded as 
promotable to any position or only to particular types of positions, 
for example, within his or her own specialist area, 
(ii) transfer and, if so, whether within the department or elsewhere, 
(iii) transfer to a central policy or management organisation, for example 
to a post in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the 
Treasury or the Public Service Board, 
(iv) transfer to a less onerous position, 
(v) selection for a period outside the Public Service—in commerce or 
industry, the service of another government, a labour organisation, 
or an educational institution;' 
(c) the officer concerned witness the return and have the opportunity to add 
his or her own comments; 
(d) the Public Service Board have the option of interviewing officers 
concerned and, in any case, endeavour to interview all such officers once in 
every five years; 
(e) in addition, the Board be responsible for maintaining lists of the names of 
'outside' people who might be suitable for appointment, particularly to a 
statutory body's governing board. 
The Board and the Control of Salary and Related Costs 
11.6.25 The Board's co-ordinating function covers also the maintenance of 
r. See Chapter 6.3.29 for recommendations on exchanges of personnel with the private sector. 
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order and even-handedness in the adjustment of salaries and wages. The 
procedures involved in these processes are reviewed in more detail in Chapter 
9.6.41-54. However, we consider here the difficult question of the degree of 
autonomy which the Board should have in negotiation, and in arbitration 
proceedings in relation to wage and salary determinations. At present these are 
matters within the Board's competence, subject to the right of Parliament to 
disallow its regulations and (separately) to a decision by the appropriate 
industrial tribunal. 
1 1.6.26 It has been argued that, at times when wages and incomes policy is a 
critical component in economic policy, it should be within the power of the 
government to establish a pattern of wage and salary levels within its own 
employment which could act as guidelines in other fields of employment. 
Accordingly it has been proposed to us that, while the Board's authority in these 
matters should prevail in general, it should be required to accept a formal 
direction from the Governor-General-in-Council as to the limits within which it 
should exercise that authority. 
ii .6.2 7 There is a dilemma to be faced here. If the Board is successfully to 
negotiate and participate in arbitral processes in these matters, its credibility will 
depend on the consistency with which it behaves, and the standards of objectivity 
and integrity it maintains. Its capacity to maintain such standards will always be 
in question if it is called upon to argue a case which runs counter to principles it 
has previously espoused. If there were no other means by which the government's 
view could be asserted, this risk might have to be taken: but, if it were, the Board 
should have the protection of a formal public direction from the Governor-
General-in-Council. However, in such instances, arbitral proceedings will almost 
inevitably be required, and it is open to the government for it to intervene and 
have its views expressed and taken into account. 
I 1.6.28 On this difficult question, the Commission considers, on balance, that 
the long-term advantages of removing from government the burden of decision, 
accompanied as it would be by political pressures, outweigh the possibility of 
advantageous intervention in circumstances of special seriousness; and that this is 
especially the case when intervention remains possible by other means. 
The Board and Personnel Development 
11.6.29 Inherent in the Board's co-ordinating function will be the task of 
ensuring that it supplements action taken by individual departments to ensure 
that, for those aspects of Commonwealth employment as a whole for which it has 
responsibility, there is available a work force of adequate quality, training and 
experience. Broadly, this calls for appropriate procedures for recruitment, 
training, placement and promotion. These matters are dealt with in some detail 
in Chapter 8, which indicates the Commission's views on the principles  which 
should guide the Board and the departments and agencies concerned in relation 
to them. 
11.6.30 Planned mobility: Here we wish to touch upon a matter in which 
effective action may well depend upon action or support by the Board—the 
development of mobility of staff within departments, between departments, and 
between Commonwealth and other employment as a means of: 
i. Commissioner Bailey's reservation is set out at the end of the Chapter. 
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(a) increasing job interest and satisfaction; 
(b) increasing scope for personal promotion and development; 
(c) improving efficiency; 
(d) encouraging innovation and enterprise generally. 
11.6.31 A number of considerations have been brought to our notice justifying 
greater mobility.' First, demographic data indicates that over the next ten years 
shortages of experienced officers will develop, particularly in the more senior 
grades, as the post-war intake of staff retires. Increased mobility among younger 
officers could serve both to develop them as effectively as possible, and to allocate 
their capacities fairly among all agencies. Secondly, it seems likely that 
Commonwealth employment will grow less rapidly over the next 10-20 years, 
making job interest and enthusiasm more dependent on factors other than rapid 
promotion. 
11.6.32 Thirdly, there seems to be a need to counter an 'inbreeding' 
characteristic of the co-ordinating departments, if communication between them 
and 'line' departments and agencies is to be infused with insights derived from 
work 'in the field'. 2 A system of rotation of officers between departments and the 
central agencies, strengthening functional departments and contributing to the 
understanding of co-ordinating authorities, would contribute to a sense of unity 
and cohesion in the Service. The experience of the Department of Foreign Affairs, 
which is also characterised by a low rate of intake from other departments but has 
made efforts at staff exchanges, shows that a rotation scheme is most unlikely to 
develop effectively on a bilateral basis. 
11.6.33 Fourthly, greater movement both ways between the 'Canberra' and the 
'non-Canberra' Service would widen the range of opportunity for officers in 
both, and would lessen the dichotomy between them, with benefit to both 
communities. Finally, we have noted the very small movement from the 
departmental Service to statutory bodies, and the even smaller reverse movement 
(primarily because the provisions of the Officers' Rights Declaration Act do not 
apply to officers leaving statutory bodies to join departments). The result is often 
a curtailment of career opportunities, an uneven spread of talent and sometimes 
the development of isolated backwaters of employment exposed to little stimulus 
and offering little scope for capacity. 
11.6.34 The Commission recommends that the Board, in consultation with R330 
departments, staff organisations and statutory and other agencies, develop a 
scheme of staff rotation to supplement the personal initiatives of individual staff 
members. The scheme should not be limited to senior management and 
professional staff, but should involve also officers at senior levels of the present 
third and fourth divisions. Departments themselves should be responsible for 
encouraging internal movements of staff at lower levels, and for supplementing 
moves at more senior levels initiated by the Board. 
11.6.35 At present there is a tendency for officers to 'get stuck' in a particular 
job rather than to find themselves moving too often. An expectation that one 
would not ordinarily stay more than a reasonable time in one job would increase 
i. See Appendix 3.F, Mobility. 
2. See Appendix 3.A, Paper ii, The Co-ordinating Departments, and Paper 8, Birds of a Feather 
in Foreign Affairs. 
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job interest, encourage the development of a person's full capacities, and assist 
more flexible and effective administration. This is not to deny that some will 
prefer to remain longer in ajob they enjoy and perform efficiently, and in which 
they make a contribution to the organisation. Nor do we believe that moves 
should be so frequent as to prevent competence in the job being developed and 
assessed. Too frequent movement tends to disrupt departmental operations. 
However, people should be able to look forward to a change in work environment 
or in the departmental context within which they discharge duties. Planned 
moves of the kind contemplated could valuably supplement the normal 'ladders 
of promotion' of which staff would ordinarily be aware or to which their attention 
was drawn (see Chapter 8.4.28). 
11.6.36 Mobility at senior levels—the top levels in the present third division 
and in the second division—must be regarded as a Service-wide issue and not one 
which can readily be handled wholly within the framework of a single 
department. It will be an important task of the Board, in consultation with 
departments and authorities, to develop such mobility over time. In large part, 
we would expect the Board to act with the consent and co-operation of the officers 
concerned and their employing authorities. 
11.6.37 Where, for some reason, difficulties were experienced with a particular 
R331 department, we recommend that the Board should not hesitate to use the power of 
directing temporary transfers of staff which is currently contained in section 51 
of the Public Service Act. (We note that the Victorian Public Service Board has, 
in section 51 of their Public Service Act 1974, a power of transfer not limited to 
temporary transfers.) However, since the primary purpose of this planned 
mobility is increased diversity and opportunity for the individual officer, it would 
clearly be unwise for the transfer to be forced upon him. The Commission believes 
that the Board should respect the wishes of officers not to be moved if they do not 
respond to persuasion.' 
11.6.38 An important aspect of the Board's responsibility for personnel 
development will be in the special measures taken to ensure that the more 
disadvantaged members of the community generally are given opportunity to 
obtain Commonwealth employment and to advance within it according to their 
full potential.2 This responsibility means that the Board: 
(a) is required to exercise its powers under the Act in a non-discriminatory 
way; 
(b) has power to initiate action to assist disadvantaged persons to acquire 
additional qualifications and experience which will enable them to enter 
Commonwealth employment and to perform more effectively in it. 
The Board's Report to Parliament 
11.6.39 The Board's authority derives from Parliament, and it is therefore 
appropriate that it should report annually to it. While the Commission envisages 
that the formal audit of the organisational and financial performances of 
departments and agencies will be the responsibility of the Auditor-General, it 
R332 believes that the Board's report should be a comprehensive source of information 
While Section 52 (2) would, in its terms, be available to require an officer to accept a transfer, 
we do not envisage its use in the rotation scheme. 
2. This question is dealt with more fully in Chapter 8.3. 
about Commonwealth employment, providing a continuous and developing 
picture of changes affecting its efficiency. To this end, the Board should confer 
with Treasury, Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Auditor-General and the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics to devise a standard statistical basis for its reports. 
Scope of the Board's Responsibility 
11.6.40 This section has been written largely on the basis of the responsibilities 
of the Board envisaged in the present Public Service Act. But powerful arguments 
have been advanced for giving it some responsibilities for Commonwealth 
employment generally, and for extending its co-ordinating role to some aspects of 
the personnel and organisational concerns of some statutory agencies.' The 
previous Prime Minister drew the attention of the Commission to the fact that, 
since the establishment of Australia Post and the Australian Telecommunications 
Commission, less than 40 per cent of Commonwealth employment comes within 
the Public Service Act, and invited it to consider the relationship between the 
Board and agencies responsible for employment under other Acts. 
11.641 We recognise, as does the Public Service Board, that while some degree 
of co-ordination over the general field of Commonwealth government employ-
ment may be desirable, different agencies have different and specialised functions 
and needs. However, there are overwhelming reasons why the government and its 
agencies should co-ordinate certain aspects of government employment and why, 
for some purposes, Commonwealth government employment should be regarded 
as a single if rather loose entity. If this were done it would make available across 
Commonwealth government employment generally the expertise which the 
Public Service Board is equipped to provide. It would enable staff to move on 
their own initiative over a wider range of Commonwealth employment. It would 
facilitate the arrangements for Service-wide transfers we propose, and it would 
promote greater even-handedness in certain rights of employees and in basic terms 
and conditions of employment. A broader 'Commonwealth Service' of this kind 
could also make for greater ease of movement between Commonwealth agencies 
and the agencies of State and local governments.' In the longer term, it may even 
promote forms of common service similar to those which now exist in some joint 
Commonwealth-State activities such as the Albury-Wodonga Corporation and 
the Joint Coal Board. Such common service would promote mobility and make 
easier the preservation of rights for those who move. 
11.6.42 The first step would be to bring together in the Board responsibility for 
all legislatively determined conditions of employment which apply to all 
Commonwealth employees. The Commission recommends that under the Prime R333 
Minister, the Board should be responsible for administering all such legislation 
which applies universally or almost universally to Commonwealth government 
employment. At present it has administrative carriage of the Commonwealth 
Employee's Furlough Act, the Maternity Leave Act and the Officers' Rights 
Declaration Act. Our recommendation suggests that in addition to administering 
any new provisions of general application, the Compensation (Australian 
Government Employees) Act and the Superannuation Act and related legislation 
should be administered by the Prime Minister, and that the statutory authorities 
responsible for them (and their staffs) should work in association with the Board. 
I . See Chapter 9.4,  Towards a Unified Service 
2. 	 See Chapter 7.4.17. 
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The second step would be to embody in legislation the basic common conditions 
of employment applying to all Commonwealth employment and to define the 
role of the Board in relation to the employing agencies concerned. 
11.6.43 Whether or not the legislation should be contained in the one 
enactment, or form part of a related whole, is not for us to decide. However, it 
should be the object of any legislative provisions that the Board discharge its 
general role largely by persuasion. Where it has 'teeth', these would be designed 
essentially to enable it to lay down standards and monitor those standards rather 
than to give it detailed powers of control over departmental and agency 
management. 
11.6.44 Thus, the Commission considers that, while there could be a 
Parliamentary Service under the authority of the Presiding Officers (see Chapter 
9.4), the basic employment conditions would apply to its staff also. Autonomous 
agencies such as the Commonwealth Bank, TAA and universities and other 
similar educational institutions should continue to enjoy the independent powers 
provided for in the relevant legislation. Where a body is not currently in a 
statutory relationship with the Board, it would be a responsibility of the Board to 
negotiate with it about the extent to which the common employment provisions 
should apply. 
A New Act 
11.6.45 The changes contemplated and proposed in this and other sections 
affecting the Board are profound and comprehensive, affecting its objectives, 
methods of work and the scope of its authority. The Commission considers that 
there would be merit in now redesigning the Act so as to: 
(a) define the scope of the Board's responsibilities; 
(b) express its objectives, functions and powers in a form which would provide 
a continuing guide to the conduct of its affairs; 
(c) clarify its relationships with departments and agencies within its 
responsibility, with the government and with Parliament. 
11.6.46 As indicated in Chapter 4.4.21-22, we believe it desirable that, where 
appropriate, a statutory body should have included in its legislation a charter 
setting out its broad objectives. This is associated with our view that in a Service 
more specifically organised towards the effective achievement of objectives, and 
to measurement of efficiency, those objectives should be stated. It will provide 
bodies granted a measure of statutory autonomy with statements of principle 
which will guide their activities and help them to be flexible in the way they 
organise their resources. The formulation of objectives in this sense is a difficult 
matter. The Task Force on Efficiency working paper prepared by Professor 
Caiden contained a suggested charter.' Another approach is represented in the 
second submission to the Commission of the Public Service Board.' Consideration 
might be given to those suggestions in association with the major review of the 
R334 Public Service Act which we propose. For the present, we suggest that in any new 
Act the charter of the central personnel agency should be framed so as to include 
the following: 
Task Force on Efficiency Working Paper, Towards a More Efficient Government Administration, p. 
ITO. 
Public Servicc Board Second Submission, paragraphs 5.2, 5.13. 
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In the discharge of its functions, the Public Service Board (preferably retitled 
the Commonwealth Personnel Commission to reflect its wider sphere of 
influence and role) is: 
(a) to act as the central personnel authority for the Commonwealth; 
(b) to promote the efficient, effective and economical management and 
operation of all agencies and staff in the service of the Commonwealth; 
(c) to encourage the effective allocation and utilisation of the human resources 
in Commonwealth employment; 
(d) to conduct or to supervise the conduct of experiments in the management 
and organisation of Commonwealth employees, with a view to promoting 
the foregoing objectives; 
(e) to ensure that in the appointment of a person to Commonwealth 
employment, and in his or her promotion and transfer within that 
employment 
(i) there is no discrimination on grounds unrelated to the needs of the 
work to which the appointment, promotion or transfer is made or of 
work reasonably likely to be undertaken by that person, 
(ii) the relevant decisions are based on careful assessment of personal 
qualifications and attributes for the work, 
(iii) special measures are taken to secure adequate advancement of 
members of disadvantaged groups, provided the measures do not 
lead to the maintenance of separate rights for the members of such 
groups and are not continued after the objectives for which they 
have been taken are achieved. 
11.6.47 A number of the major recommendations included in this Report will 
make it necessary to amend the existing Public Service Act and related 
legislation. The Commission does not intend to suggest comprehensive or precise 
instructions for new legislation, but offers the following comments as reflecting the 
spirit intended by specific recommendations: 
(a) section i: the section as presently worded requires the Board to devise the 
means for and promote efficiency in departments, and also to examine (or 
audit) efficiency and economy and take certain steps to bring the results of 
its audit to attention. Under the Commission's recommendations it will be 
necessary to retain the spirit of section 17  as it relates to promoting 
efficiency in departments etc, and the existing sub-section (i) (a) contains 
the key provisions. Sub-section (i)(b), (c), and (d) should more 
appropriately appear in the Audit legislation to support the enhanced role 
intended for the Auditor-General (see Chapter 3.6 and section ii.); 
(b) section i: the Commission's recommendations do not envisage any 
lessening of the need for the Board to enter departments etc. as provided for 
in this section. Clearly, if the Board is to pursue its monitoring of 
departments' classification practices etc. effectively, it will need to have 
access to departments and agencies; 
(c) section 29: the Commission recommends that the process of creating and 
abolishing offices be abolished after a suitable period of preparation. This 
preparation should be associated with the introduction of a system of 
Forward Estimates which will allow the government to approve reasonably 
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precise manpower levels for individual departments and agencies. After 
such preparation, it will be possible to repeal section 29 and replace it with 
a provision reflecting a situation where departments can operate flexibly 
within a manpower budget determined by the government, and 
employing classifications within the guidelines prepared and promulgated 
by the Public Service Board. In the interim period, until a system is 
developed to a satisfactory level, the Board should use its section 29 powers 
in the spirit of the recommendations in this Report to. establish a 
complement of positions, leaving individual positions (and staff) to be 
flexibly deployed by departments and agencies; 
(d) sections 33-48: these provisions relate to the appointment and recruitment 
of officers. Basically they should remain in as much as they relate to 
maintaining the central personnel authority as the appointing body but 
with greater delegation to departments and agencies than presently exists. 
As in the past, the Board should delegate its recruitment and appointment 
powers selectively to departments and agencies (see Chapter 8.2); 
(e) sections 55-56: these provisions relate to offences and will need to be 
amended in line with the Commission's recommendations for a revision 
and integration of the grievance machinery (see Chapter 8.5). 
11.6.48 A number of the other recommendations contained in the Report 
relating to matters such as responsibilities of the departmental head, conditions of 
service (for example, retirement provisions, seniority), abolition of the divisional 
structure, general delegation arrangements and involvement of officers in 
industrial action, will also obviously require extensive adjustment to the existing 
legislation. 
The following reservation has been expressed by Commissioner Bailey on 
paragraph 11.6.28: 
I feel unable to support the 'on balance' view of the Commission because it 
seems to me that in a system of responsible government in which ministers have 
to take final responsibility for major policy issues, the government should 
reserve for itself a power of direction to the Public Service Board on policy in 
relation to the salaries and wages of its employees. My reasons can be 
summarised as follows: 
(a) the Commission's proposal that the Board have a power of determination 
not subject to disallowance (paragraph 9.6. 17) removes even the power 
the government currently has (though does not use) to disallow regulations 
made by the Board; 
(b) as the government has no direct power over wages generally, it would be 
well advised to preserve for itself power at least over wages policy in 
relation to its own employees: much of the thrust of the Commission's 
recommendations for a wider jurisdiction for the Board (paragraph 9.4.6) 
would be nullified without a power of direction; 
(c) in my judgment, the absence of a power of policy direction has led to less 
favourable overall outcomes (to government, Board, staff and community) 
than if such a power had existed and been occasionally used; 
(d) the existence of a power of policy direction would in my view enhance, over 
all, the autonomy of the Board in essential matters—and the balance of 
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having a statutory Board with government power of policy direction seems 
to me preferable to the alternative of a ministerial department with a 
relatively weak personnel authority as in Britain and Canada; 
(e) the arbitration point seems to me to be something of a red herring: 
there is to me just as great a risk in the government being forced to appear 
in the Arbitration Commission to argue against the policy underlying 
Board determinations (paragraph 11.6.28) as there is in the Board having 
to comply with policy directions issued by the government when the Board 
negotiates with unions or when it appears before the Commission (this kind 
of situation has already in effect occurred in the past and is better clarified 
than left obscure); 
(1) lines of responsibility would be clarified, again a theme in the report. 
In the last analysis, whether or not the government takes a power of direction is 
a political issue. While there are risks in either course, I have sufficient faith in 
the political processes to persuade me not to support the Commission's 
recommendation. The important element to emphasise is consultation. If a 
power of direction is to be reserved to the government, then a process modelled 
on that of section i i of the Reserve Bank Act would be suitable (and, if 
incorporated in the new legislation, could be substituted for the somewhat 
unsatisfactory procedures available in section 18 of the Public Service Act for 
situations where the Board and the government are not in agreement). If, as it 
should, such a provision were to lead to adequate consultation, it is unlikely 
that the power would often have to be used, but the roles of government and 
Board would be clarified. 
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Part C 
Achieving Change 

Chapter 12 	 Achieving Change 
12.1 THE PROCESS OF CHANGE 
12.1.1 Change is a characteristic of all human affairs; and there is powerful 
evidence that the rate of change has for many years been increasing, and 
continues to increase. Those involved in the processes of government, which bear 
upon almost all aspects of society, should be aware of change. They should have 
available ways of adapting those processes so as to preserve their functional 
relevance and efficiency. The point applies whether or not the changes arejudged 
to be socially useful by one's particular value standards. 
12. I .2 A persistent theme of this Report, underlying many of its recom-
mendations, is the need for adaptability, for those in the administration to be 
aware of and responsive to the facts of social change. We have made it clear that 
an effective response must be preceded by analysis of the nature of the changes 
occurring, examination of the alternative responses in the light of the 
government's objectives, and further analysis of the means available to make the 
response. We have also emphasised that adaptability implies a readiness to take 
risks, to experiment, in the interests of finding the right means to achieve greater 
efficiency. If the spirit of these recommendations infuses the attitudes of officials, 
adaptation is more likely to become a continuous, self-generating process. It 
would not, however, be wise to rely wholly on such internal sources of self 
criticism and adaptability. External stimulus is from time to time necessary, as is 
the 'lateral thinking' of persons with wide but different experience. The 
Commission believes that the delay in setting up a study of the kind it has 
undertaken has been unduly long. 
12.1.3 Such studies should occur more frequently. They do not all need to be as 
comprehensive as the one this Commission has undertaken—indeed, generally it 
would be desirable if their scope was more sharply delimited. Thus, we have 
referred in Part A to the fact that our inquiries have not touched upon the 
activities of the administration in the Defence area, despite its critical importance 
in the use of resources and the great significance of the organisational changes 
which were still in process during our work. We recommend that, after a few years' R335 
experience of the present pattern of Defence administration an independent body 
be appointed to undertake a thorough study of the effectiveness of the structural 
arrangements and their possible relevance to other fields of government 
responsibility. 
Outside Inquiries 
12.1.4 Independent studies and inquiries can be a source of fresh thinking and 
adaptation, a stimulus to greater effort and efficiency. They can be a means of 
resolving issues which are peculiarly difficult for the government administration, 
chiefly perhaps because entrenched interests or because of the delicate balance of 
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power and prestige that exists in the upper levels of the administration. 'Caesar to 
Caesar' dealings compromise the prospects for the expression of internal 
criticisms. Such inquiries can also draw, for short periods, on scarce but valuable 
community resources. It is important, therefore, that an effective machinery for 
their conduct should exist. 
12.1.5 The only machinery at present that makes general provision for the 
conduct of 'outside' inquiries is specified in the Royal Commissions Act 
1902_1973.1 
 Outside of it, an alternative exists to institute inquiries pursuant to 
the executive power of the Commonwealth; but such inquiries do not have an 
adequate range of powers available, nor can they provide the necessary 
protection to witnesses and others who submit material or undertake work for the 
inquiring body. In this respect, the Commonwealth government is less well 
placed than most national governments, and even several of the Australian 
States, which have legislation to authorise inquiries with different purposes, 
powers or status than those of Royal Commissions. 
12. 1.6 To ascertain the views about the adequacy of the existing arrangements 
of others who have had recent experience in the conduct of inquiries, we prepared 
a paper for discussion and circulated it, together with a number of supporting 
documents, to members of existing Royal Commissions and other bodies 
conducting inquiries.' We have not had sufficint time to follow up to a point of 
finality all of the wide range of constructive responses received, but our 
recommendations below draw heavily on them, as well as on our own experience. 
12.1.7 Our assessment is that some of the provisions of the Royal Commissions 
Act need improving, and in addition there is a need for legislative provisions to 
facilitate a style of inquiry which is based less upon submitted evidence and more 
on informal discussions with those who can contribute, supplemented by research 
drawing on material already in existence or prepared for the purpose of the 
inquiry. Sir Henry Bland has observed that there are two broad types of 'outside' 
inquiry: 
'(a) those whose purpose is to determine facts or the truth or otherwise of 
allegations and to fix responsibility--leading to a decision of precision 
confined to evidence formally adduced and subjected to detailed testing; 
(b) those whose purpose is to examine the continued appropriateness of 
particular legislation (or its administration) or practices or to discover the 
current circumstances relating to a particular matter and to ascertain 
views on the need for legislative changes, new legislation or other 
appropriate action—leading to a report with recommendations of a 
judgmental or attitudinal character not necessarily confined to the 
material adduced by those making submissions. '3  
12. 1.8 Cases of type (a) require processes analogous to those of courts of law. 
They may lead to the institution of legal proceedings of one sort or another against 
individuals and conceivably to legislation or the revision of administrative 
Some specific purpose legislation, e.g. the Industries Assistance Commission Act 1973,  and the 
Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974, makes provision for the conduct of 
inquiries under that legislation, but this is only available within the framework of. the 
particular Act. 
2. The text of the document circulated appears under the title The Royal Commissions Act at 
Appendix 4.K. 
3. Extract from letter to the Chairman of the Commission of 14 November 1975- 
arrangements to cure some defect. By contrast, cases of type (b) require the 
assembly of information from a wide range of sources and the use of a variety of 
methods of investigation. The information may come by way of oral discussions or 
written submissions, by the tendering of publications, by research undertaken by 
the inquirers or their staff; by sampling public opinion, and so on. Here, 
informality and flexibility are needed. The testing of alternatives is often better 
done by circulation of documents for comment, or by informal discussion, than by 
court-like procedures. We see no need to have separate legislation to provide for 
each of these two main types of inquiry. Rather, it may be preferable to have a 
single Act which would provide a suitable framework for both. 
12. 1.9 It is also necessary to consider how much the autonomy of bodies of 
inquiry needs protection. For the resources needed to carry out their work, they 
are at present very much dependent on the minister administering the Royal 
Commissions Act, and his department. Particularly in the area of staffing, some 
bodies of inquiry have experienced difficulties and have felt that there should be a 
recognised right of direct access to the Public Service Board. There was also 
general agreement on the need to develop a handbook of guidance on general 
aspects of the administration of Royal Commissions and other bodies of inquiry. 
12.1.10 There are many detailed and often complex legal problems associated 
with the Royal Commissions Act. These are analysed in some detail in an 
attachment to the paper we circulated (see Appendix 4.K), and will need to be 
the subject of further research and discussion. However, drawing on our 
experience and the responses of others involved in conducting inquiries for the 
Commonwealth government, we recommend that the Royal Commissions Act be R336 
examined with a view to its repeal and replacement by a new and improved Act 
covering public inquiries generally. 
12. 1.11 If new legislation along these lines were to be enacted, it would of course 
continue to be possible for the government to appoint bodies of inquiry as at 
present under the general executive power of the Commonwealth. These 
investigations might be expected, as in the past, to be more numerous than 
inquiries appointed under the proposed legislation. Nevertheless there will 
continue to be a need for legislatively backed machinery to allow a wide range of 
inquiries where the executive power is, for one reason or another, felt to be 
inadequate or inappropriate. 
12.2 IMPLEMENTATION 
12.2.1 The Commission has reviewed comprehensively the working of the 
Commonwealth administration, and has submitted a, wide ranging set of 
recommendations for its reform and development. If the key components of the 
recommendations are adopted by the government and applied to the practice of 
the administration, the effects will be pervasive—affecting profoundly the 
patterns of work of most officials at all levels. It is, therefore, to be expected that 
the consequent changes will be achieved only progressively, as the result of careful 
planning and dedicated effort. Even if such care and dedication are applied, there 
will be major difficulties to be overcome. 
12.2.2 On the other hand, the Commission has recommended few new major 
institutions or major changes in the general field of responsibilities of existing 
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departments and agencies.' The Commission believes that there is sufficient 
flexibility in the organisation and methods of work of existing institutions to 
encompass the changes contemplated. The absolutely necessary condition is that 
those within the institutions accept the principles which underlie the recom-
mendations, and become effectively involved in working out the detailed ways to 
apply them. The principle of achieving greater commitment to government 
objectives by participation in the process of translating them into action, which 
the Commission has advocated throughout this Report, should apply to the 
implementation of its own recommendations. 
12.2.3 Perhaps the most significant changes envisaged by the Commission flow 
from our emphasis on the primary responsibility of the individual department or 
agency for efficient use of resources, and the consequential changes in the role of 
the co-ordinating authorities, particularly the Treasury and the Public Service 
Board. But the Commission has been conscious that such a change of emphasis, 
however valuable if sensibly achieved, could fail, either because of the inertia and 
passive resistance inherent in established institutions and patterns of authority or, 
on the other hand, because of too enthusiastic and unplanned action which 
merely undermined existing responsibility without establishing an effective 
alternative. The first of these two risks is intensified if the proposals are not 
adequately understood or lack ministerial backing. The reality of the second risk 
is illustrated by recent observations of the Canadian Auditor General in evidence 
to the Canadian Standing Committee on Public Accounts,2 which suggests that 
efficiency in the Canadian administration has been adversely affected by a too 
enthusiastic and undisciplined devolution of authority to departmental managers 
and by a failure to carry through all the implications of the Glassco Commission's 
recommendations. Co-ordinating authorities emphasise the risk of a too 
enthusiastic devolution. Indeed, the final discussions the Commission has had 
with the Treasury and the Board have made clear their conviction that any major 
reduction in their own authority will weaken essential disciplines. 
12.2.4 It is essential that the Commission's proposals provide adequate 
safeguards against a breakdown in standards while holding to its purpose of 
achieving greater initiative and enterprise of managerial staff in departments 
and agencies at all levels, establishing more effective communication with and 
responsiveness to the community, giving greater scope and job satisfaction to 
those employed in departments, and bringing greater reality and substance to 
ministerial responsibility. To these ends the Commission has proposed that the 
greater responsibility and freedom of departmental managers should: 
(a) be set within the context of the Forward Estimates procedure which will 
reinforce ministerial responsibility and will in itself apply firm and 
objective discipline; 
On which, see our comments in Chapter 3.6.5. 
Q. Sec the evidence of Mr J. J. Macdonell, Auditor General of Canada, in Canadian House of 
Commons Minutes and Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts, Issues 45 
and 46, 4.3.76 and 9.3.76, especially at pages 45:19 and 46:22-3. Mr Macdonell commented: 
'I think, in fairness, there have been many recommendations that have been implemented but 
I think they could be summed up . . . as let the managers manage. Certainly . . there was 
excessive control previously; we certainly do not recommend the return to pre-Glassco days. I 
think what we are suggesting is that some of the recommendations he did make perhaps have 
not been fully implemented, or perhaps have been overlooked to some extent.' (46:23) 
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(b) be developed, in respect of manpower, by delegated authority through 
rapid extension along the lines of the Bulk Establishment Control Scheme 
and the issue of firm guidelines for departmental classifications, supported 
by a reserve power in the Public Service Board to reclassify; 
(c) be developed, in respect of financial controls, by delegation from the 
Treasury, after consultation about procedures, with a reserve power to 
withdraw the delegation; 
(d) be subject to regular efficiency audit by the Auditor-General who would 
have authority to report to the minister concerned, to Cabinet and to 
Parliament. 
12.2.5 The risk of inertia and other passive or active resistance to change will 
remain. Apart from the possible reluctance of the co-ordinating authorities to 
forego present authority, some heads of departments and agencies may not 
welcome either the greater responsibility or the greater accountability which 
would accompany it. The adequacy of their individual and corporate 
performance will, for the first time, become the subject of objective analysis and 
informed scrutiny by ministers and by Parliament. 
12.2.6 The risk of the Commission's proposals being inhibited by such inertia 
and resistance can be countered effectively only if: 
(a) Cabinet supports the principle of responsible and accountable manage-
ment and the procedures by which those responsible can be called to 
account for their performance; 
(b) the proposals are widely understood and discussed among the community 
generally and among staff at all levels; 
(c) progress towards their implementation is monitored by an independent 
and authoritative group responsible to Cabinet. 
12.2.7 Apart from inertia, the proposed procedure for Forward Estimates 
budgeting could be delayed and inhibited by fears about its apparent complexity 
and the volume of work of a somewhat novel character associated with its 
introduction. Furthermore, even though 'reserve' provisions have been made in 
the forward budgeting, there will be a reluctance among ministers and 
departments to accept any limitation on their freedom to submit new proposals, 
and a fear that their freedom may be impaired by the principle that all such 
proposals should be considered in the context of overall forward programming. 
Moreover, the procedures suggested both for the formulation of guidelines, and 
for the 'bargaining' phase of bringing initial bids into conformity with them, will 
modify the exclusiveness of the Treasury's role as policy adviser and financial 
controller—although, in our view, they will lend greater effectiveness to both 
aspects of the work of the Treasurer and his Department. The load of additional 
work is likely to be most feared if it seems to add to the already overwhelming 
burdens of the annual budget which at present fall predominantly on the 
Treasury. This is essentially a short-term problem linked with the change-over 
period. Thereafter, ihe Commission believes that work should be simplified. The 
initial phase of establishing the Forward Estimates procedure should, therefore, 
be separated sharply from that associated with the annual budget. Perhaps the 
most appropriate time to initiate the Forward Estimates process would be shortly 
after an annual budget had been submitted and dealt with. 
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12.2.8 These considerations illustrate the complexity of the task of giving effect 
to recommendations arising from a Report which covers so wide a field and deals 
with issues involving extensive organisational change. With these difficulties in 
mind, the Commission recognises the need to suggest a procedure designed: 
(a) to obtain Cabinet approval for the principles which underlie the 
Commission's major proposals; 
(b) to involve both ministers and officials in action to give effect to those 
principles, using the specific recommendations as a guiding framework; 
(c) to establish at both ministerial and senior official level an authoritative 
group which would 
(i) monitor the implementation of the reforms proposed, 
(ii) ensure that ministerial decisions are sought when necessary, that 
legislative action required is initiated, that departmental action is 
taken with deliberate speed, 
(iii) report progress at appropriate intervals to Cabinet. 
12.2.9 The Commission will conclude its report with a summary list of all main 
recommendations it has made. The list is arranged under headings which refer to 
chapters in the Report, where the recommendations are expressed more 
comprehensively in the context of the considerations leading to them. 
12.2. 10 The Commission recommends the following procedure for implementiiig 
its Report: 
(a) that Cabinet approve in principle the main recommendations of the 
Report which are listed below, and direct that action be taken to give effect 
to the principles which underlie them, taking the Commission's recom-
mendations (including the subsidiary recommendations in each chapter of 
the Report) as a guiding framework for appropriate action; 
(b) that the attention of ministers and departments be drawn to this direction 
with a request that they proceed expeditiously to prepare, and where 
appropriate give effect to, specific proposals for reform. To this end 
departments should set up internal groups representative of staff and 
management to study the relevant recommendations from the Commis-
sion; 
(c) that the Prime Minister nominate a committee of ministers, presided over 
by a member of Cabinet, to expedite these reforms and to act as a point of 
reference for ministers and departments in matters concerning more than 
one minister and department; 
(d) that the Prime Minister nominate a senior official of departmental head 
status to act full-time as executive officer of the ministerial committee, and 
that this officer be supported by a small secretariat in the Department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet; 
(e) that the ministerial committee and its executive officer be authorised 
(i) to establish working groups or task forces (not interdepartmental 
committees) to help the ministerial committee in matters involving a 
number of ministers and departments, 
(ii) to call together groups of departmental heads where joint or related 
action is called for. 
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12.3 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
Chapter : The Administration—The Basis for Reform 
The Commission recommends that no official code of behaviour for Com-
monwealth officials be formulated but suggests: 
(a) That action be taken to stimulate open discussion of ethical problems 
facing officials at various levels. 
(b) That the Public Service Board and appropriate staff organisations provide 
facilities for counselling on such matters. 
(c) That officials concerned by ethical problems arising in their relations with 
ministers have an established access to the Prime Minister through 
indicated statutory officers. (Ri; paragraph 2.4. 16) 
Chapter : The Efficient Use of Resources 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) A Forward Estimates Budgeting process be established within which 
ministers and their departments will negotiate for the financial and 
manpower resources they wish to use over the Forward Estimates period; 
and that these Estimates when approved by Cabinet be accepted as a basis 
for planning by ministers and their departments. (R2; paragraph 3.3.6) 
(b) Departmental heads be and be seen to be responsible for management of 
government programs within limits set by Cabinet and ministerial 
direction including decisions involved in the Forward Estimates; and be 
given by delegation from the Board, Treasury and other co-ordinating 
agencies adequate authority for this purpose. (R3; paragraph 3.4.7) 
(c) Treasury, the Public Service Board and other co-ordinating agencies 
organise to provide guidance and expertise on financial, organisational 
and personnel management practice and act as a source of stimulus and 
innovation rather than primarily as instruments of control. (Rio, ii; 
paragraphs 3.7.2, 3) 
(d) Action be taken to ensure that departmental decision makers at all levels 
have access to the information upon which their decisions should properly 
be based. (R12, i; paragraphs 3.8.1, 6) 
(e) (i) regular audits of efficiency in terms of financial, organisational and 
personnel management be carried out by 
• departments themselves, 
• the Auditor-General; 
(ii) these audits form the basis of action to improve efficiency by heads of 
departments, ministers and Cabinet; 
(iii) the content of audits of efficiency both those conducted within the 
department and by the Auditor-General be taken into account by 
• those making selections for promotion, 
• Cabinet, when determining salaries and placement of de-
partmental heads; 
(iv) the Auditor-General's reports on his efficiency audits to be presented 
to a parliamentary committee on administrative efficiency. (R4-9; 
paragraphs 3.6.1, 2, 15, 17, 20, 23) 
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Chapter : Ministers and the Administration 
Ministerial Responsibility 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) Section 25(2) of the Public Service Act be amended to incorporate direct 
references to the responsibility of the departmental head to the minister 
(provided there is recognition of the broader setting of senior officers' 
obligations to Cabinet) and to efficient and economical administration. 
(R14; paragraphs 4.2.8,9) 
(b) •Procedures be developed by which the Chairman of the Public Service 
Board, the Solicitor-General and the Auditor-General are available to 
discuss with a minister or official emerging sensitive issues, and the Board 
be responsible for gathering case studies to assist when similar issued arise. 
(R15; paragraph 4.2.12) 
(c) Advice to the minister bring to notice differences of view within the 
department, not insulate him from management problems and, where he is 
assisting another minister, the advice should normally come from the other 
department. (R 16, 18; paragraphs 4.2.14, 18) 
The Commission suggests for consideration that: 
(a) Arrangements might be made to determine the times of divisions in 
Parliament in advance. (R 17;  paragraph 4.2. 17) 
The Department of State 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) Departments explore various methods of collective decision making, and 
ministers involve themselves in the application of these methods. (Rig; 
paragraph 4-3- 19 ) 
(b) To distribute managerial responsibility more evenly throughout the 
system, the position of Chief Officer be revitalised by departments making, 
with the concurrence of the Public Service Board, appointments to such 
positions of officers responsible to the departmental head for day to day 
management of units of the department. (R20, 2'; paragraphs 4.3.14, 15) 
(c) As a general rule common service agencies have no control over the users of 
services, where possible charge for their services and where practicable 
compete in the provision of services with outside' sources. (R22; 
paragraph 4.3.24) 
(d) There be further development of the practice of departments preparing 
annual reports. These should include references to developments of 
significance and to issues, together with financial and staffing information. 
Within this framework, Treasury and others should review with the 
Auditor-General the range of financial information available about the 
administration to avoid duplication and free the Auditor-General for his 
primary task of making critical comment. (R23-25; paragraphs 
4-3.25-27) 
(e) The placement of officers in policy units of departments be reviewed 
frequently and there be a presumption against serving in such units for 
long periods without service in operational or management areas. (R27; 
paragraph 4.3.40) 
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(f) Departments give attention to the basis on which non-statutory bodies are 
appointed and serviced. (R30; paragraph 4.3.46) 
The Commission suggests for consideration: 
(a) That there be experiments in the use of 'sectoral groupings' of functionally 
related departments. (R26; paragraphs 4.3.34-37) 
(b) Where there is a special need for 'political' input, it may best be 
accommodated through task forces arranged through the Department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet. (R28; paragraph 4.3-41 ) 
(c) Where there is need for substantial continuing investment in research 
separate from the day to day activities of a department, the bureau form 
could with advantage be adopted on the basis that it would, while having a 
close working relationship with the department, not be restricted in the 
choice of subjects, have a right to publish, possibly have the assistance of an 
advisory board and be staffed primarily on short (though renewable) 
terms. (R29; paragraphs 4.3.42-44) 
Statutory Bodies 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) The Public Service Board convene meetings of groups of statutory bodies 
for discussion of mutual problems. (R3 1;  paragraph 4.4.8) 
(b) The primary consideration in creating statutory bodies be whether the 
function requires dissociation to some extent from ministerial and 
departmental administration. Purpose clauses should be used in approp-
riate cases to clarify the scope and effect-of legislation. Where there is 
doubt, it may be best not to establish such a body and where delineation is 
impossible between the department and a body, the body may best be 
abolished. (R32, 34-35; paragraphs 4.4.12, 22, 23) 
(c) If the minister is given power of direction over a statutory body, any 
direction should be in writing and be tabled in the Parliament. (R33; 
paragraph 4.4.20) 
(d) Statutory bodies be placed under obligation to report through the minister 
to Parliament, and to include in such report an account of any issues of 
concern. (R37, 38; paragraph 4.4.32) 
(e) There be standing authority for the Auditor-General to conduct efficiency 
audits of statutory bodies and the financial affairs of such bodies should 
come before the Public Accounts Committee directly rather than through 
the report of the Auditor-General, for which amendment of the Audit Act 
or Public Accounts Committee Act will be necessary. (R39, o; paragraph 
4.4.33) 
(f) Unless the appointment of a full time member of a statutory body is to be 
renewed, there should in the normal course be advertisement of the 
vacancy. (R41; paragraph 4.4.37) 
(g) Experience with staff representation on the governing boards of statutory 
bodies be evaluated. (R42; paragraph 4.4.39) 
(h) New legislation provide for removal of a statutory officer or member of a 
statutory board for misbehaviour only after inquiry by an independent 
body and confer a right to compensation according to declared principles, 
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perhaps assessable by the Remunerations Tribunal. (R43-46; paragraphs 
4.4.40-42) 
The Commission suggests for consideration that: 
(a) Regular conferences betweeen Minister, department and statutory body 
heads may in some circumstances be desirable. (R36; paragraph 4.4.24) 
Heads of Departments 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) Departmental heads be appointed Accounting Officers to emphasise 
their primary responsibility for financial management, and a procedure 
should be expressed in legislation for the recording of dissent from 
ministerial action which may involve breach of or departure from law. 
(R47, 48; paragraph 4.5.6) 
(b) As appointments to the key position of permanent head remain less 
regulated than to other positions, there should be an improved procedure 
for selection which would involve a small ad hoc advisory panel to 
assist in the selection and rotation processes, and advertisement of 
vacancies when circumstances allow (but with the concurrence of the 
Prime Minister). (R49; paragraph 4.5.9) 
(c) The limitation to qualified medical practitioners of appointment to the 
office of Director-General of Health be removed and the legal con-
sequences examined. (R50; paragraph 4.5. ii) 
(d) It be the practice to move departmental heads so that in the normal course 
they would not remain in the one department for more than 7 years: in the 
event that a minister finds it necessary to seek a change in departmental 
head other than as part of an ordinary progression the Prime Minister and 
the selection advisory committee should be involved. (R51, 52; paragraphs 
4.5.17, 18) 
(e) The office of permanent head be abolishcd and a new statutory office of 
head of department (normally designated 'Secretary') be created to 
facilitate movement within the Public Service, between the Public Service 
and statutory bodies and to safeguard and clarify the rights of those who 
lose office by virtue of abolition of departments. (R53, 	 paragraphs 
4.5.20, 23) 
(1) 'Permanent head' powers in future be vested in a new position of Chief 
Executive Officer provided under legislation: departmental heads would 
hold these powers ex officio and they should be conferred as appropriate on 
heads of statutory bodies. (R54; paragraph 4.5.22) 
Ministerial Offices 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) Consistent with its view that the ministerial office is capable of differing use 
according to ministerial requirements, but that it is essentially a small 
servicing group with the department providing research and advisory 
services, the grading of ministerial private secretaries be flexible. (R56; 
paragraph 4.6.5) 
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(b) The minister have full control over and responsibility for all members of his 
personal staff, including seconded officers: difficulties are best sorted out 
between the departmental head and the minister. (R57; paragraph 4.6.9) 
Chapter : The Administration and Parliament 
Parliamentary Scrutiny and Control of the Administration 
The Commission suggests for the consideration of Parliament and the 
government that: 
(a) The annual reports of departments and of statutory authorities be 
prepared with greater attention to the requirements of and essential 
conditions for effective parliamentary scrutiny of the activities of the 
administration. (R58; paragraph 5.1.9) 
(b) The importance of the responsibilities of the parliamentary committee 
primarily concerned with review of administrative efficiency be recognised 
by payment to the chairman and deputy chairman of the committee of 
salaries comparable with ministerial salaries. (R6o; paragraph 5.1.25) 
(c) Where the parliamentary committee primarily concerned with adminis-
trative efficiency reports critically or adversely upon the activities of a 
department or agency, or in relation to matters which are peculiarly its 
responsibility, the department or agency should be expected to report 
directly to the committee on action taken or proposed to be taken in 
response to the committee's comments and recommendations. (R59; 
paragraph 5.1.14) 
(d) The government prepare for the guidance of officials and for discussion a 
statement of the procedures it proposes should be followed when officials 
are requested or required to appear as witnesses before the Houses of 
Parliament and their committees, and at the same time, draft instructions 
for the guidance of these witnesses; Parliament should consider and 
determine these matters. (R61; paragraph 5.1.32) We have suggested: 
*(j) a possible course of proceeding (R62; paragraph 5.1.34); 
*(ii) that where Crown privilege is claimed, the claim or request should 
be supported by a clear statement of the grounds upon which the 
claim or request is made (R63; paragraph 5.1.35); 
* (iii) that official witnesses ought not to be expected to express personal 
opinions on government policy, or, without ministerial consent, to 
divulge the nature of the advice tendered by them to ministers, but 
that advice in this context should be construed narrowly. (R64; 
paragraphs 5.1.36, 37); 
(iv) generally there should be no inhibitions on the giving of evidence by 
officials in relation to the exercise by them of independent, statutory 
discretions. (R65; paragraph 5.1.38); 
(v) where an official witness has reason to believe that the giving of 
evidence on a particular matter would be in breach of a statutory 
duty of confidentiality, he should be permitted to make objection 
and to seek legal advice. (R66; paragraph 5.1.39) 
Members of Parliament and the Public Service 
The Commission recommends that: 
* Commissioner Munro's reservation to these recommendations is indicated, in Chapter 5. 
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(a) Each department develop its own rules and procedures related to its 
individual circumstances, and approved by its minister, for responding to 
requests for information by members of Parliament, but in general it 
should provide any factual information requested. Requests that present 
difficulties should be referred to the minister. (R67, 68; paragraphs 5.2.3, 
5) 
(b) The parliamentary departments consider providing courses of instruction 
and publishing a 'guide' for new members of Parliament about the 
activities of the administration. Information provided in the Government 
Directory and similar publications should be more comprehensive. (R69; 
paragraph 5.2.7) 
The Commission suggests that: 
(a) When public servants appear before party committees they be accom-
panied by the minister or at least another public servant, and that if they 
believe they are being asked to exceed the bounds of propriety they 
communicate their concern to their departmental head. (R7o, 71; 
paragraphs 5.2.9—I I) 
(b) Pre-election consultations between the Leader of the Opposition and the 
Chairman of the Public Service Board and Secretary of the Prime 
Minister's Department, and shadow ministers and the heads of relevant 
departments, should: 
(i) take place with the Prime Minister's consent; 
(ii) be confined to prospective changes in administrative arrangements; 
(iii) enable the officials to tender advice; 
(iv) be confidential. (R72; paragraphs 5.2.15, 16) 
Chapter 6: The Administration and the Community 
Cominunity Access to Services 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) Arrangements for all programs which involve direct contact between a 
member of the community as 'client' and a member of the administration 
be reviewed with the object of making the point of contact with the 
member of the public the point of decision also unless there are unusual 
considerations to be taken into account. (R73; paragraph 6.2.7) 
(b) Better access by members of the public to programs designed for their 
benefit can be achieved by improving: 
(i) training and career opportunities for public contact staff; (para-
graph 6.2.11) 
(ii) information available to clients; (paragraph 6.2.11) 
(iii) the physical surroundings of the office; (paragraph 6.2.11) 
procedures (paragraph 6.2.13-4 and methods, for example, of 
payment; (6-2. 12) 
(v) methods of dealing with complaints; (paragraph 6.2.12) 
(vi) responses to correspondence; (paragraphs 6.2.17). (R74 and R76) 
(c) An advisory board, with local outposts, be appointed, (to the proposed 
Department of Social Welfare if established) to assist departments 
involved in service delivery to improve procedures at the point of contact 
with the public. (R75; paragraph 6.2. 15) 
(d) Grievance procedures available to the public be improved through: 
(i) assisting local members of Parliament in that role; (paragraph 
6.2.2 I) 
(ii) early action to appoint an Ombudsman; (paragraph 6.2.22) 
(iii) a broader jurisdiction for the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and 
broader criteria of eligibility for presidential members; (paragraph 
6.2.23-24) 
(iv) simplification of the procedures for obtaining judicial review, with 
exploration of deficiencies in administrative law by the Com-
monwealth Law Reform Commission and the Administrative 
Review Council; (paragraphs 6.2.25-26). (R77-82) 
(e) Policy and administrative issues associated with greater use of voluntary 
agencies could be explored by the proposed Department of Social Welfare 
(paragraph 6.2.30. In the meantime, greater use should be made in 
certain circumstances of voluntary agencies (paragraph 6.2.28); and in 
using them there should be: 
(i) respect for the independence of the organisation; 
(ii) clear statements of purposes and terms and conditions of the grant; 
(iii) proper audit of the agency's finances; 
(iv) publication of details of grants; 
(v) periodic review of the activities of agencies receiving grants; 
(paragraph 6.2.30). (R83-85) 
Responsiveness in the Administration 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) The membership of all institutions where there is some form of 
'representation' of client groups be kept under review. (R86; paragraph 
6.3.14) 
(b) Departments and statutory bodies appoint advisory groups with a wide 
range of membership, making appointments for staggered fixed terms and 
paying travel costs and sitting fees. (R88-89; paragraph 6.3.19) 
(c) A neutral agency establish a fund to make small grants to assist associations 
making submissions to government if they can show hardship. (R9o; 
paragraph 6.3.2 2) 
(d) Statutory bodies advising on resource allocation be involved in the 
discipline of Forward Estimates. (R87; paragraph 6.3.15) 
(e) Ministers allow officers and their departments to have discussions with 
members of the community on the basis that the officers would assist the 
group or individual, though without becoming an advocate (paragraphs 
6.3.23-24); senior levels in departments should encourage the discussions, 
ensure clear lines of communication to the minister where necessary and 
the preparation of prompt replies (paragraph 6.3.25), and the Public 
Service Board should exercise a monitoring and mediating role (para-
graph 6.3.28). (R9-93) 
(f) A system of staff exchanges be developed by the Public Service Board, in 
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consultation with departments, with the private sector including State and 
local government administrations, larger firms, academic institutions and 
larger voluntary agencies—with the exchanges taking place at junior 
managerial levels for one to two years and with adequate safeguards for 
employees and the institutions concerned. (R94; paragraph 6.3.29) 
Chapter : Administration Away from the Centre 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) Senior management (in central and State offices), assisted by the Public 
Service Board: 
(i) increase the level of delegation to officers delivering services to the 
public and review annually those containing monetary limits; 
(ii) involve public contact officers in the formulation and review of 
objectives and administrative guidelines; 
and the arrangements be reviewed by the Auditor-General, by the 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in the course of 
effectiveness reviews, and by the Attorney-General's Department on forms 
of legislative delegation. (R95-96; paragraphs 7.2.11-13) 
(b) Attention be given to union proposals relating to staff conditions when 
dispersal and decentralisation occur (R97; paragraph 7.2. 14) and that in 
particular a specialised group advise on tropical housing standards. (R98; 
paragraph 7.2.17) 
(c) To improve the operation of, and the services provided by, agencies of the 
Commonwealth in areas away from the centre, departments and agencies 
arrange: 
(i) more effective consultation between officers of different departments 
in a region; (paragraph 7.3.5) 
(ii) sharing of support facilities, including with local or regional 
agencies, in remote areas; (paragraphs 7.3.5
-7) 
(iii) greater use of 'cross-delegations'; (paragraph 7.3.3) 
(iv) to make more use of the services of Australia Post on an agency basis; 
(paragraph 7.3.4). (R99-102) 
(d) At least one Commonwealth Government Representative be appointed 
as an experiment, to act as a general administrative representative across 
the spectrum of Commonwealth activities, to develop contacts with State 
and local government and community groups and to act on behalf of 
departments not otherwise represented in the region. (R 103;  paragraph 
7.3.") 
(e) Particular experiments towards improved regional operation should be 
conducted in Alice Springs, Queensland Northern (Townsville), Western 
Region (Melbourne), Moreton Region. (R104-105; paragraphs 
7.3. 12-13) 
(f) A decentralisation co-ordinating unit should be established in the 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet to encourage and monitor 
devolution. (Ri o6; paragraph 7.3.15) 
(g) The one stop shop (NOW) experiment in Coburg, Victoria be continued 
for at least two years, and be studied as a possible model for future co- 
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operative administration on a regional basis. (Ri 15—I i6; paragraph 
7.5.7) 
Other Levels oJ Government 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) There be greater use on an agreed basis of State administrative facilities, 
but so as to retain administrative flexibility and policy direction 
(paragraph 7.4.4) and to involve greater use of the provisions of Division 9 
of the Public Service Act which should include statutory authority staff, 
with Public Service Board exercising a monitoring role. (R107-109; 
paragraphs 7.4.4-6) 
(b) Primary responsibility for stimulating greater use of State administrative 
capacities be with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
which should review proposals before Cabinet where State administration 
might be used, appoint task forces to explore new opportunities and review 
programs, and arrange or co-ordinate negotiations with States. (Ri io; 
paragraph 7.4.8) 
(c) In conducting negotiations with the States, fair and operable arrange-
ments should be made for funding administrative activity and for 
obtaining information for evaluation purposes. (Ri ii, paragraph 7.4.9) 
(d) In appropriate cases, which should be identified, arrangements be made to 
recompense State authorities for the added responsibilities they carry for 
the Commonwealth, in order to promote accountability. (Ri i; para-
graph 7.4.13) 
(e) The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet be responsible for 
negotiations leading to the use of local government officers in carrying out 
federal programs. (Ri i; paragraph 7.4.16) 
(f) The United States Inter-governmental Personnel Act, and other relevant 
overseas legislation, be examined with a view to enabling exchanges of 
personnel between levels of government, along the lines of R94. (Ri 14; 
paragraph 7.4.17) 
Chapter 8: Staffing the Administration—I—Efficiency and Equity 
Recruitment 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) The following restrictions on eligibility for permanent appointment to the 
Commonwealth Public Service be changed: 
(i) Nationality: no restriction except where prescribed by the 
Governor-General-in-Council as a qualification for a particular 
position; (Ri 17-119; paragraphs 8.2.14-16) 
(ii) Health: realistic standards should be made public, monitored and 
subject to review; (RI 20; paragraph 8.2.19) 
(iii) Character and Security: determination that an applicant is not a 'fit 
and proper person' should be notified to the applicant and be 
subject to review (R121; paragraph 8.2.23). Routine security 
checks should only be undertaken for particular positions. (R122; 
paragraph 8.2.24) 
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(iv) Graduate Intake: abolish io Iper cent limit; (R123; paragraph 
8.2.25) 
(v) Ex-servicemen: remove special provisions. (R124; paragraph 
8.2.26) 
(b) The merit principle be stated in terms which allow the Public Service 
Board progressively to adapt its procedures to give effect to it (a form of 
words is suggested), and a committee to report on the basis and 
effectiveness of selection and promotion procedures be set up periodically. 
(R125; paragraphs 8.2.34, 37) 
(c) Procedures be adopted to minimise the risks involved in interviews 
including thorough training of interviewers, and recording of interviews. 
(R126, paragraph 8.2.38) 
(d) The Public Service Board should delegate more extensively to depart-
ments the power of recruitment, including lateral recruitment, and should 
set standards and monitor procedures. (R127—I28; paragraphs 8.2-40,44) 
(e) Less weight be given to educational qualifications in selection and 
advancement (R130; paragraph 8.2.48); mandatory qualifications be 
prescribed sparingly (R131; paragraph 8.2.53); and departments be 
delegated the power to specify such qualifications subject to Board power 
to determine 'equivalent' qualifications. (R132-3; paragraph 8.2.54) 
The Commission suggests for consideration that: 
(a) Officers who leave the Public Service with more than three years service 
should have their benefit entitlements restored on return. (R129; 
paragraph 8.2.45) 
Equal Opportunit) or Equality 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) The composition of the government work force be kept under continuous 
review to ensure that it is open to members of all social groups. (R134; 
paragraph 8.3.5) 
(b) There be special programs of recruitment, training and career develop 
ment to overcome past discrimination or lack of opportunities of women 
(R135; paragraph  8.3.13),  Aboriginals (R136; paragraph 8.3.17) and the 
handicapped (R137—I38;  paragraphs 8-3.20-21). 
(c) Legislation prohibiting discrimination in government employment be 
enacted, but so as to allow for approved programs to confer rights or 
advantages on members of a group designated as disadvantaged. (R 1 39; 
paragraphs 8.3.25-28) 
*(d) An Office of Equality in Employment be established within the Public 
Service Board to promote equality in employment, bring to notice 
discriminatory practices (R140; paragraph 8.3.29) and investigate 
complaints (RI45; paragraph 8.3.36). It should be able to demand 
information on employment practices from all agencies (R142; paragraph 
8.3.3 i). Its Director should have direct access to the Commissioners of the 
Public Service Board (R141; paragraph 8.3.30) and to heads of 
departments (R147; paragraph 8.3.38), and its staff have limited tenure in 
* Commissioner Munro's reservation on R 14 is set out in Chapter 8.3. 
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their positions (R144, 146; paragraphs 8.3.34, 38). Equal Opportunity 
Liaison officers should be established in all departments and statutory 
bodies (R143; paragraph 8.3.33). 
Motivation, Rewards and Penalties 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) The system of reclassification of positions according to the performance of 
the occupant be extended to all professional areas where there is scope for 
personal initiative. (R148; paragraph 8.4.12) 
(b) To provide better career opportunities for certain occupational groups 
(including typists and steno-secretaries---Rii; paragraphs 8.4.25-26): 
(i) the Public Service Board study the structure of work of such groups 
with a view to their restructuring; (R152; paragraph 8.4.2 7) 
(ii) the Public Service Board assemble and publicise patterns of 
promotion for various groups; (R 153;  paragraph 8.4.28) 
(iii) access to study assistance be made more open; (R154; paragraph 
8.4.30) 
(c) The Public Service Board assist departments in developing staff assessment 
schemes which involve written reports, open to staff, and available to 
promotion selection and appeal committees. (R156—i59; paragraphs 
8.4.34, 40-41) 
(d) Departments and statutory bodies establish Staff Training and Develop-
ment Committees to develop training programs, with the Public Service 
Board acting on a consultancy basis. A greater diversification of training 
objectives and methods is recommended (including training for counter 
stall) staff in remote areas, and staff performing 'bulk' functions). (R16o; 
paragraph 8.4.56) 
(e) Efficiency, defined as 'suitability for the work to be performed', be the sole 
criteria for promotion and appeals throughout the Service (R16i, 163, 
167; paragraphs 8.4.58, 61 and 77), and selection for promotion be by 
committee (Ri 62; paragraph 8.9.59). 
(1) The present promotions appeal system be retained, but increasing emphasis 
be placed on improving selection processes (R165—i66; paragraph 8.4.72). 
Procedures to be adopted by departments and appeal committees include 
notification of unsuccessful applicants (R 164;  paragraph 8.4.71), report-
ing on committee activities (Ri68—i69; paragraph 8.4.78), advertising of 
all vacancies (R170; paragraph 8.4.79), only limited appeal by non-
applicants (R1 7 1;  paragraph 8.4.80), better documentation by appellants 
(R172; paragraph 8.4.8 I),  limited use of interviewing (Ri73; paragraph 
8.4.82), and different forms of appointment of chairmen of committees 
(R 174-175;  paragraph 8.4.83). 
*(g) 
	
	 (i) the power to annul probationary appointment be delegated to 
departments, within Board guidelines and subject to review and 
appeal; (R176; paragraph 8.4.87) 
(ii) the changes proposed in disciplinary procedures by the Board/Joint 
Council review be implemented; (R1 7 7;  paragraph 8.4.90) 
*Commissioner Munro's viw on th mattrs covered by R176—i99 is set out in Chaptr 8 and 
Appendix 3.M. 
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(iii) the power to retire officers judged to be redundant or inefficient be 
delegated to departmental management, subject to review and 
appeal; (R178-179; paragraphs 8.4.92, 93) 
(iv) changes be made to procedures for voluntary and compulsory early 
retirement under section 85 of the Public Service Act. (Ri8o; 
paragraph 8.4.104 and Ri84; paragraph 8.5.17) 
The Commission suggests for consideration that: 
(a) Discretionary increments be reintroduced. (R 149;  paragraph 8-4- 1 4) 
(b) A system of classification of certain positions according to occupant, 
within a range, be introduced. (Ri 50; paragraph 8.4.15) 
(c) A single salary schedule be established in the Service. (R 155;  paragraph 
8
-4-31 ) 
(d) Certain specialist occupational groups be integrated. (R155;  paragraph 
8
-4-31 ) 
*Grievances, Rig/its and Duties 
The Commission recommends that: 
**(a) If the need arises, the Public Service Board consider establishing an 
independent inquiry into a particular grievance case the Commission has 
studied. (R18 1;  paragraph 8.5.7) 
(b) There be changes to procedures for hearing grievances arising in 
departments and statutory authorities; in particular staff should be 
informed of their rights (R182; paragraph 8.5.13). We suggest changes in 
procedures relating to matters such as allegations of favouritism, decisions 
to compel retirement, disciplinary offences, charges against public servants 
by citizens. (R183-186;  paragraphs 8.5.15-21) 
(c) A new structure of bodies for hearing grievances be created: 
(i) departments and agencies themselves should establish better 
internal means of reviewing complaints; (R187; paragraph 8.5.29) 
(ii) the Public Service Board should continue its function of reviewing 
personnel decisions; (R188; paragraph 8.5.30) 
(iii) a Personnel Appeals Tribunal be established to hear appeals against 
determinations of ineligibility for appointment, annulment of 
probation, compulsory retirement, or disciplinary charges; (R 189; 
paragraph 8.5.3 I) 
(iv) a Commonwealth Services Ombudsman be established to investi-
gate complaints. (R19o; paragraph 8.5.35) (see also summary 
table, paragraph 8.5.38) 
(d) A statutory framework of the rights of staff be incorporated in the Public 
Service Act (Ri9i; paragraph 8.5.46) covering such matters as: clearer 
definition of the processes for determining services for which engaged 
(R192; paragraph 8.5.47), tenure of employment (R193; paragraph 
8.5.49), conditions of employment (R194; paragraph appeal 
processes (R195; paragraph 8.5.52), equal opportunity (R139; para- 
* Commissioner Munro's view on the matters covered by Rr76—i99 is set out in Chapter 8 and 
Appendix 3.M. 
** The Chairman's reservation on R18i is set out in Chapter 8.5. 
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graphs 8.5.53, 8.3.25), recovery (.foverpayment (R196; paragraph 8.5.54) 
and civil and political rights cR197; paragraph 8.5.55). 
(e) A framework of duties be incorporated in the Public Service Act (Ri99; 
paragraph 8.5.64), and in particular a system for registering pecuniary 
interests of public servants be developed. (R 198; paragraph 8.5.62) 
Chapter : Staffing the Administration—il--Structure and Manage-
ment 
Control of Staff J'/umbers 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) The heads of departments be given more authority in internal staffing 
matters by alterations to the procedures under section 29 of the Public 
Service Act. (R200; paragraph 9. 1.9) 
(b) Staff ceilings in their present form be abandoned. (R20 i; paragraph 
9.1.13) 
The Organisation of' Work and Categories of Employment 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) The Public Service Board delegate its classification power under section 29 
to departmental heads, while retaining a power of review, and raise with 
Joint Council the question of re-establishing departmental classification 
committees. (R202, 203; paragraphs 9.2.3, 5) 
(b) Duty Statements be replaced by Individual Work Plans which could be 
used to stimulate staff development and improved management tech-
niques. (R204; paragraph 9.2.17) 
(c) The system of divisions be replaced by a system of categories and 
occupational groups, which could be developed and modified by the Board 
and departments and not set down in the Act. (R205; paragraph 9.2.23) 
(d) Reviews to restructure work where there is overlap between professional 
and technical grades should continue and there should be review of the 
overlap between clerical and clerical assistant areas. Such review teams 
should include staff representatives, and staff associations should have free 
access to their findings. (R2o6-208; paragraphs 9.2.2 7, 30, 31) 
(e) The distinction between officers and temporary employees should be 
replaced by categories of workers distinguished according to the length of 
time for which they are engaged. This should apply equally to part-time 
workers. Unnecessary differentiation in terms and conditions of employ-
ment between different categories should gradually be eliminated and 
suitable machinery to achieve this should be developed. (R209-212; 
paragraphs 9.3.5, 7, 9, ii) 
Towards a Unified Service 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) The whole of Commonwealth government employment should be 
regarded as a 'loose entity' and brought under one Act, with a few 
exceptions. (R213; paragraph 2.4.6) 
(b) Statutory bodies, including marketing authorities, generally be staffed 
under the Act, except where other arrangements are approved by 
legislation or negotiation. (R214, 215; paragraphs 9.4.14, 18) 
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(c) Ministers should not have the power to determine terms and conditions of 
employment for statutory authorities. Jurisdiction should pass, to the 
Public Service Board, with the Remunerations Tribunal approving salaries 
at higher levels. (R216, 217, 218; paragraphs 9.4.19-21) 
The Commission suggests for consideration that: 
(a) A minister, in appointing more senior ministerial staff, be advised by a 
committee approved by the Prime Minister. All positions in ministerial 
offices should be considered special areas of employment and be subject to 
special arrangements. (R219, 220; paragraphs 9.4.22, 24) 
(b) There be separate legislation to deal with the staffing of parliamentary 
departments. (R22 i; paragraph 9.4.33) 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) The proposal in Appendix 3.G to its Report for a reorganisation of the 
administrative arrangements for the courts be referred to thejudiciary and 
to the Attorney-General's department. (R222; paragraph 9.4.42) 
(b) There be a closer integration of the role of Foreign Affairs with other 
departments. As a part of this move the Trade Commission Act should be 
repealed and there should be a system of rotation for Foreign Affairs Staff 
with other departments and between diplomatic and other staff within the 
department. Recruitment, promotion and transfer should also be on a 
service-side basis. (R223-227; paragraphs 9.4.45, 47
-49) 
(c) An Overseas Service Advisory Council be set up. (R228; paragraph 
9.4.53) 
(d) New principles for the determination of overseas allowances be estab-
lished. (R229; paragraph 9.4.54) 
(e) There should be improvements in the conditions of employment applying 
to locally engaged staff. (R230-232; paragraphs 9.4.55-56) 
(f) New missions or posts be established only where there is a clear need and 
the need for all posts be regularly reviewed. The structure of posts should 
reflect their functions and they should not necessarily be headed by a 
Foreign Affairs officer. To ensure the continuing efficiency of posts the 
post liaison system should be maintained and there should be revised 
inspection arrangements. (R233-236; paragraphs 9.4.58-61) 
(g) Other recommendations in the Sharp Report be pursued by the Public 
Service Board and the Department of Foreign Affairs. (R237; paragraph 
9.4.65) 
Managers in the Administration 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) The second division should be replaced by a 'Senior Executive Category' 
with special provisions for appointment to it and with a high degree of 
mobility. (R238-240; paragraphs 9.5.4, 6, 9) 
(b) Management services units should provide efficient information manage-
ment, a variety of consultancy and organisational management services 
and expertise in industrial relations and personnel administration. The 
Public Service Board should provide a central focus for specialist skills and 
consultancy expertise, assist in long range planning and developing 
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guidelines for maintaining efficiency, effectiveness and morale. (R241, 
242; paragraphs 9.5.14, 15) 
(c) Officers employed in management services areas should be periodically 
moved out on rotation. (R243; paragraph 9-5.  16) 
Industrial Relations 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) The Public Service Arbitrator's jurisdiction be abolished and that apart 
from the defence forces and those covered by the Remuneration Tribunal, 
the whole of Commonwealth employment be placed under the Australian 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. The Public Service Board, 
ministers and statutory authorities have the same rights as all registered 
organisations to appear, to intervene and to initiate proceedings before the 
Arbitration Commission. The government's power of disallowance of 
determinations and awards at present contained in section 22 of the Public 
Service Arbitration Act should be removed. (R244-246, 254, 255; 
paragraphs 9.6.9, 13, 15, 40) 
(b) The Board be recognised as the 'employer' of those employed under the 
Public Service Act and those employed under other Acts all or some of 
whose terms and conditions are determined and approved by the Board. 
Subject to the overriding power of the Arbitration Commission and except 
on matters upon which it is specifically excluded (for example furlough, 
superannuation, compensation, etc.), the Board be given the necessary 
power to make determinations on terms and conditions of employment. 
The Board and other primary wage fixing authorities should continue to 
determine rates of pay and conditions of work on the basis of fair 
comparisons with the private or State sectors. (R247, 249; paragraphs 
9.6.17, 18) 
(c) Section 66 of the Public Service Act, which renders it illegal for public 
servants to take industrial action and renders them liable to summary 
dismissal, should be repealed. (R252; paragraph 9.6.20) 
(d) To promote co-ordination between the primary wage fixing authorities, 
pending the implementation of the Commission's recommendation in 
respect of staffing of statutory bodies, the present arrangements for co-
ordination be continued subject to a number of modifications. The 
Department of Employment and Industrial Relations and the Board 
should establish a joint committee to develop a code of standards on 
amenities and physical working conditions for Commonwealth employ-
ment. Favourable consideration be given to encourage, on an experimen-
tal basis, greater flexibility in 'flextime' schemes. (R256, 257, 259; 
paragraphs 9.6.52, 53, 70 
(e) The number of awards covering Commonwealth employees should be 
reduced as far as possible by consolidation of the claims of different unions 
but settlements should not be held up because of failure to agree by unions 
covering a minority of employees. In the interest of more efficient 
administration of industrial relations, the required membership for 
registration as an organisation under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
should be raised to i 000, and other actions should be taken to encourage 
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the reduction of the number of unions covering Commonwealth em-
ployees. (R250, 251, 258; paragraphs 9.6.19, 68) 
(f) Thejurisdiction ofJoint Council should be expanded to include statutory 
authorities, and a secretariat should be established to work under the 
direction of the Council. There should be statutory provision for the 
creation of consultative councils within departments and authorities. 
Although there are still a number of unresolved questions, as a general 
proposition, a staff representative should be included in any collegiate 
management of departments and statutory authorities. (R260-263; 
paragraphs 9.6.75, 77, 82,86) 
(g) Before changes are made to give effect to any of the above recom-
mendations, the draft legislation should be discussed by the peak councils 
of the unions, the Board and the Department of Employment and 
Industrial Relations. (R253; paragraph 9.6.32) 
Chapter zo: Special Problems of Administration 
Economic Policy 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) There be a department, which might be named the Department of 
Industries and the Economy, to act as the main source of advice on the 
medium and long term aspects of the industrial structure of the economy, 
and to co-ordinate the activities of the departments concerned with the 
various sectors of industry. (R264, 265; paragraphs 10.1.13, 14) 
(b) The Treasury brief economists in other departments regularly on the state 
of the economy: such briefings should disclose all relevant information, 
including quarterly national income forecasts, on which the state of the 
economy is analysed. (R266, 267; paragraph To. 1.17) 
(c) The Governor of the Reserve Bank have direct access to the Prime 
Minister and the Treasurer as he considers necessary, and to the Economic 
Committee of Cabinet on a regular basis. (R268, 269; paragraph Jo. 1.19) 
(d) The Australian Bureau of Statistics be placed with a more 'neutral' 
department such as the present Department of Administrative Services, 
and a research unit under the charge of a Research Director be re-
established within the Australian Bureau of Statistics and entrusted with 
the task of publishing regularly national income projections, and annual 
pre-Budget reports on the economy and other economic studies. (R270, 
272, 273; paragraphs 10.1.23, 30, 31) 
(e) As a rule, each statutory authority in the economic policy area be given 
explicit objectives to guide its activities, and, if possible, placed within the 
portfolio of one minister. (R274, 275; paragraphs 10.1.36, 37) 
(f) To ensure greater coherence in the work of responsible departments in the 
international field, a task force prepare a Green Paper on Australia and 
international economic issues to be followed by a White Paper as a guide to 
departments and to interests in the private sector. (R276; paragraph 
10  - 1 -39) 
The Commission suggests for consideration that: 
(a) To raise the level of public debate, an Economic Advisory Council could 
be appointed in due course, constituted of three distinguished economic 
428 
experts and assisted by a secretariat and a consultative board to report 
regularly on the state of the economy and make critical ex post evaluations 
of economic measures taken by the government. Alternatively, if such a 
course is felt to be impracticable for the time being, a single senior 
Economic Counsellor should be appointed who would be free to draw on 
information and views available to him from various sources for the 
purpose of reporting publicly on the economy. The consultative board 
could be linked with the Bureau of Statistics' Research Directorate. (R271; 
paragraphs 10.1.28, 295  32, 33) 
Science in Government 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) The Australian Science and Technology Council (ASTEC), or a similarly 
broadly-based body, advise the Prime Minister and a Ministerial 
Committee on Science Policy. (R277; paragraph 10.2.30) 
(b) A Council of Government Science Establishments (COGSE) be set up to 
supplement, including through specialised study groups, other sources of 
advice on organisational problems and on proposals relating to special 
terms and conditions for those engaged in science-based work in 
government. (R278, 282; paragraphs 10.2.36, 38, 48, 55) 
(c) ASTEC, COGSE and CSIRO be responsible to the Prime Minister, or to a 
minister nominated by him, acting in a trustee capacity for the Ministerial 
Committee on Science Policy. (R281; paragraph 10.2-51) 
(d) Specific purpose science establishments be associated with the minister 
and department with related functional responsibilities. (R28o; para-
graph 10.2.50) 
(e) The Bureau of Meteorology and the Analytical Laboratories be operated 
under statutes which give their managers reasonable day-to-day auto-
nomy in relation to staff and the use of financial resources within clear 
budgetary limits. (R279; paragraph 10.2.47) 
(1) All government science establishments be accountable for the use of 
resources and from time to time specially constituted groups report on the 
relevance and efficiency of their work. (R284; paragraph 10.2.60) 
(g) Action be taken to improve communication between government scientists 
and other scientists, users of science and officials, and Science Liaison 
Officers be appointed to promote such communication. (R283; paragraph 
10.2.57) 
Health and Social Welfare 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) There be a senior Minister for Social Welfare whose functions should 
include: 
(i) the achievement of a simplified administrative structure for 
government policy in this field; 
(ii) the co-ordination of health and welfare policies and programs; 
(iii) the achievement of efficiency and economy in the conduct of such 
programs; 
(iv) the evaluation of existing welfare programs; 
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(v) the conduct, support and co-ordination of related research. 
(b) The Minister for Social Welfare preside over a ministerial committee 
comprising Ministers for Health, Social Security, Repatriation and 
Aboriginal Affairs and for some purposes the Minister for Environment, 
Housing and Community Development. 
(c) The Minister for Social Welfare be supported by 
(i) a small department to provide administrative support for him and 
the committee of ministers; 
(ii) a consultative council of relevant heads of departments and 
agencies and outside experts; 
(iii) a Bureau of Social Policy. (R285; paragraph 10.3.23) 
Forming and Executing Foreign Polic) 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) The Department of Foreign Affairs arrange for the specialised briefing of 
officers of all Commonwealth agencies who are involved in complex 
international negotiations. (R286; paragraph 10.4-7) 
(b) All Commonwealth agencies should review their procedures for the 
exchange of information and for consultation with the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, monitored by the Public Service Board. (R287; paragraph 
10-4-15) 
(c) The Department of Foreign Affairs should establish task forces, study 
groups and interdepartmental committees (as appropriate) to review 
particular aspects of policy in relation to particular countries or groups of 
countries. (R288; paragraph 10-4.  18) 
The Administration of Aboriginal Affairs 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) The National Aboriginal Consultative Committee (NACC) be retained as 
a national forum for Aboriginals and the government and Department act 
to strengthen it. (R289; paragraph 10.5.10) 
(b) The NACC be encouraged to ensure that its membership is predominantly 
derived from and backed by Aboriginal Councils and other incorporated 
societies. (R290, paragraphs 10-5- 10, ii) 
(c) The Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Institute of Aboriginal Studies 
collaborate with NACC to provide training and administrative experience 
for its members and staff. (R291; paragraph 10.5.12) 
(d) To strengthen Aboriginal influence on policy and administration the 
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs establish a Ministerial Council to advise 
him and his Department. (R263; paragraph 10.5.20) 
(e) The policy of entrusting responsibility for local and community tasks in 
Aboriginal Affairs to Aboriginal institutions be continued and streng-
thened. (R294, 295; paragraph 10.5.25) 
(1) The government explore the possibility of 'one stop shop' agencies for 
different levels of government and voluntary agency action in administer-
ing Aboriginal programs. (R292; paragraph 10.5.18) 
(g) That the Departments of Aboriginal Affairs and Prime Minister and 
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Cabinet be responsible for periodical assessment of programs and the 
Department of Aboriginal Affairs and the Institute of Aboriginal Studies 
collaborate in research into possible indicators of social welfare. (R296, 
297; paragraphs 10.5.28, 29) 
Women 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) The Women's Affairs Branch in the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet be maintained and strengthened. (R298; paragraph io.6.8) 
(b) Women's Policy Units be developed on an experimental basis in 
departments whose work has significant implications for women (includ-
ing the Department of Social Welfare), and their performance be assessed 
after a period of 3  years. (R299; paragraph io.6.i i) 
(c) The Bureau of Social Policy in the proposed Department of Social Welfare 
initiate special studies relating to women. (R300; paragraph 10.6. 12) 
Information 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) Registries be more effectively integrated into the managerial and 
administrative structure of departments and agencies, techniques of group 
work organisation be introduced, and better training facilities be provided 
for registry staff and users. (R30 i; paragraph i 0.7. ii) 
(b) A unit be established in the Public Service Board, staffed largely by 
rotation, to service the interdepartmental committee on ADP and provide 
a source of advice on and review of standards in ADP throughout the 
Service. (R302; paragraphs I0.7.13-15) 
(c) The recommendations of the Committee on Integration of Data Systems 
be pursued and an advisory council to the Statistician be appointed, as 
provided for in the Australian Statistics Act, with consumer repre-
sentation. (R303; paragraph 10-7.  18) 
(d) Departments might employ only one or two information officers, to 
facilitate contact with the media. (R304; paragraph 10.7.25) 
(e) There be a review of departmental information programs, the 
qualifications of information staff and the levels at which release of non-
political information can be authorised. There should also be systematic 
evaluation of the relevance, effectiveness and objectivity of information 
programs. (R305; paragraph 10.7.26) 
(f) The Parliamentary Library Research Staff confer with departments to 
explore means by which departmental material can be made more timely 
and relevant. (R3o6; paragraph 10.2.27) 
*(g) There be positive steps to improve the flow of information to the 
community, for example by wider, better publicised distribution, more 
diverse forms, use of Green Papers, consultation on draft legislation, better 
information about the structure, functions and procedures of government 
organisations, tailoring information to the needs of the users. (R307; 
paragraph 10.7.30) 
* Commissioner Munro's views on community access to information held by the administration 
are set out at Chapter 10.7.22 and Appendix 2. A. 
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The Commission suggests for consideration: 
The establishment of a Commonwealth Information Advisory Council to give 
attention to the development of a comprehensive information policy, review 
information made available and the problems of users, and to recommend 
priorities for proposed developments. If established the Council should be 
assisted by the Public Service Board and serviced by a secretariat in the 
Department of Administrative Services. (R3o8; paragraphs 10-7-31,  32) 
Chapter i I: Co-ordination and Control 
Forward Estimates and the Budget 
The Commission recommends a new system of Forward Estimates, with the 
following essential features: 
(i) the formulation of policy guidelines for the preparation of such estimates 
for ministers and departments by the Economic Committee of Cabinet 
assisted by a working group of officials establishing 
• the maximum proportion of gross domestic product and numbers of 
the work force to be used, 
• the general objectives and priorities of the government; (ii .2.2-7) 
(ii) the guidelines to form the basis of three year financial and manpower 
estimates by ministers and departments; (i 1.2.8—Jo) 
(iii) the resulting estimates to be considered by a sub-committee of the 
Economic Committee of Cabinet, assisted by a working group of officials, 
and receiving comments from Treasury, Public Service Board and the 
new Department of Industries and the Economy (i 1.2.11-12); initial 
bargaining could take place by departments grouped according to 
function; (1 1.2.13) 
(iv) the report of the sub-committee to go to the Economic Committee and to 
full Cabinet for endorsement and the agreed estimates to become the 
basis for department and statutory body planning; (11.2. 14) 
(v) the Forward Estimates to be reviewed annually, in association with the 
preparation of the annual budget to take account of economic 
fluctuations and other short term considerations (i 1.2.15-17) 
(R3 10;  paragraph 11.2.2 if; see also diagram at paragraph 11.2.19) 
The Treasury and Financial Co-ordination 
The Commission recommends that: 
(i) Treasury involve ministers and departments more effectively in develop-
ing methods of financial control especially through the forward estimates 
process; ( 1  1-3.21 (a)-(b)) 
(ii) in the development of Forward Estimates the Treasury division of 
Financial and Economic policy be primarily concerned with formulating 
the guidelines and the Supply divisions with analysing departmental 
assessments, in consultation with departments; (i I.3.21(c)-(d)) 
(iii) there be greater mobility between Treasury and functional departments; 
(11.3.21(e)) 
(iv) Treasury progressively devolve detailed financial control to de-
partmental heads through more extensive delegation, thus becoming 
primarily a source of guidance and expertise; (11.3.21 (f)—(h)) 
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(v) Treasury propose to the relevant parliamentary committee a simplified 
structure for appropriations backed by full supporting estimates and 
other data so as to combine effective parliamentary control with 
administrative flexibility; (ii .3.2 I (i) - (j)) 
(vi) the independence from Treasury of the Bureau of Statistics and the 
Auditor-General be more clearly demonstrated; (i 1.3.2 1(k)) 
(R31 I; paragraph 11.3.21) 
The Auditor-General and Efficiency Audits 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) The Auditor-General audit the financial and organisational efficiency of 
all agencies which he currently audits in respect of financial regularity. 
(R312; paragraph 11.4.5) 
(b) These agencies prepare internal assessments of efficiency on agreed bases 
for the minister and the Auditor-General. (R3 13;  paragraph ii.z.) 
(c) The proposed parliamentary committee on administrative efficiency (R8; 
paragraph 3.6.20) be advised on professional matters by the Auditor-
General. (R3 14;  paragraph 11.4.8) 
(d) The Auditor-General be appointed by the Governor-General-in-Council 
on the advice of a selection committee whose composition is agreed by the 
government and the chairman and deputy chairman of the relevant 
parliamentary committee. (R315;  paragraph 11.4.8) 
(e) The Auditor-General be able to recruit specialist staff outside the Public 
Service Act. (R3 16; paragraph ii.. io) 
(1) An appropriate statutory basis for the efficiency audit role of the Auditor-
General be developed. (R3 17;  paragraph 11.4.11) 
(g) A committee chaired by the Auditor-General and comprising repre-
sentatives of the heads of Treasury; Public Service Board, Prime Minister 
and Cabinet and Administrative Services assist the Auditor-General to 
develop this role. (R3 18; 11.4.13) 
The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and Policy Co-ordination 
The Commission recommends: 
(a) That the policy divisions of the Department work as secretariats within the 
Cabinet Office to service Cabinet and its committees and that the 
secretariats be staffed by a mix of officers on normal posting and on 
rotation. (R319;  paragraph 11.5.12; see also paragraph 11.5.9) 
(b) That a small policy unit be developed within the Department to arrange 
the handling of assignments involving policy development or modification 
where existing departmental machinery is inadequate, and to assist in the 
formulation and evaluation of programs against the government's 
objectives: the unit would be small, be headed by an officer at or near 
departmental head status, and its primary operating mode would be the 
task force. (R320; paragraphs 11.5.14-21) 
(c) Before an interdepartmental committee is established, the alternatives of 
requiring the department primarily concerned to discharge the function in 
consultation with others, or of appointing a task force should be 
considered. (R321, paragraph 1 ' .5.25) 
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(d) When a task force or TDC is established by the Cabinet or ministers: 
(i) a register should be kept; 
(ii) the purpose, date for report and membership should be clearly 
defined; 
(iii) ministers should have a right to nominate a consultant to sit with it; 
(iv) progress should be reported periodically to Cabinet. 
(R322; paragraph 11.5.26) 
(e) While the Commission does not advocate establishment of a separate 
'Machinery of Government Unit', 
(i) the Public Service Board should maintain and make the subject of 
recommendations a continuing assessment of changes in adminis-
trative arrangements required on grounds of efficiency, and be 
responsible for preparing advice on senior appointments, 
(ii) the Department be responsible for advising on general machinery of 
government matters, drawing on the resources of the Board and 
relevant departments. (R323; paragraph 11.5.33) 
The Commission suggests for consideration that: 
Should the Prime Minister wish at any time to have assistance with 
administrative matters, the alternatives to be considered are either the 
appointment of a 'minister assisting' along traditional lines or the appointment 
of a minister, possibly designated Special Minister of State, to discharge this 
function along with the duties of another portfolio. (R324; paragraph 11.5.33) 
The Public Service Board 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) In accordance with the new role it envisages for the Board in Forward 
Estimates and the control of establishments: 
(i) it conduct regular checks to satisfy itself that its standards and 
guidelines are being observed and retain the right to reclassify any 
position ifjudged necessary; (R325; paragraph 11.6.17) 
(ii) section 29 of the Public Service Act be repealed at an appropriate 
time. (R326; paragraph ii.6.i8) 
(b) To assist it in the discharge of its role in promoting efficiency the Board: 
(i) have a small but competent group to provide specialised manage-
ment consultancy services on a full time and expert basis; (R327; 
paragraph 11.6.20) 
(ii) continue to provide advice to the Prime Minister on broader 
questions involved in the organisation of the work of government 
generally. (R328; paragraph 11.6.22) 
(c) To improve the processes for making higher appointments, the Chairman 
of the Board contact heads of departments and agencies to obtain details of 
foreseeable vacancies and reports on the potential of senior officers (with 
officers having the right to review and comment on the reports). (R329; 
paragraph i 1.6.24) 
(d) The Board, in consultation with departments and statutory and other 
agencies, develop a broadly based scheme of staff rotation (R330; 
paragraph 11.6.34); and where necessary it use the power of direction 
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currently contained in section 51 of the Public Service Act. (R331; 
paragraph 11.6.37) 
(e) The annual report of the Board to the Parliament should be a 
comprehensive source of information about Commonwealth employment, 
using a standard statistical base. (R332; paragraph 11.6.39) 
*(f) The Board, under the Prime Minister, be responsible for administering all 
legislation prescribing conditions of employment applying generally to 
Commonwealth employees, including the Compensation (Australian 
Government Employees) Act and the Superannuation Act. (R333; 
paragraph 11.6.42) 
(g) A charter be given to the Board (preferably retitled Commonwealth 
Personnel Commission, to reflect its wider sphere of influence and role): 
(i) as central personnel authority; 
(ii) in promoting efficient operation of all departments and agencies; 
(iii) in encouraging effective use of the human resources in Com-
monwealth employment; 
(iv) in conducting or supervising experiments in management and 
organisation; 
(v) in ensuring there is no discrimination in Commonwealth employ-
ment unrelated to the needs of the task involved, and that special 
measures are taken to secure adequate advancement of members of 
disadvantaged groups. (R334; paragraph 11.6.46) 
Chapter i: Achieving Change 
The Commission recommends that: 
(a) In a few years' time, an independent body be appointed to study the 
effectiveness of the present structural arrangements in the area of Defence 
administration, and their relevance to other fields ofgovernment. (R335; 
paragraph 12.1.3) 
(b) The Royal Commissions Act be examined with a view to its repeal and 
replacement by a new Act on public inquiries generally. (R336; paragraph 
12.1.10) 	 S  
Implementation 
The Commission recommends the acceptance in principle of its Report and 
proposes a plan of implementation. (R337; paragraph 12.2. 10) 
* Commissioner Bailey's reservation on recommendation 333  and paragraph i 1.6.28 is set out in 
Chapter i 1.6. 
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The Commission received submissions from the following: 
Abbott, J. 
Abbott, P. D. 
Ablong, A. P. 
Aboriginal Affairs, Department of 
Aboriginal Affairs, Department of, Staff 
Group 
Adams, J. S. (and 8 others) 
Administrative and Clerical Officers' As- 
sociation 
ADP Management Computer Society 
Aeronautical Research Laboratories 
Agriculture, Department of 
Airports Branch, NSW Region, Air Trans- 
port Group 
Albury City Council 
Albury-Wodonga Development Area. 
Committee of Victorian Municipalities 
Albury-Wodonga Development Corpo- 
ration 
Alexander, C. R. 
Alexander, P. D. 
Alford, J. D. 
Alice Springs Citizens Association 
Allison, J. R. C. 
Alm, M. 
Anderson, D. R. 
Anderson, L. L. 
Anthony, J. D. 
Appleby, G. 
Appleby, J. P. 
Arbitration Inspectors Association 
Argall, D. & Enfield, J. 
Ashton, C. 
Associated Chambers of Manufacturers of 
Australia 
Association of Architects, Engineers, Sur- 
veyors and Draftsmen of Australia 
Association of Architects, Engineers, Sur- 
veyors and Draftsmen of Australia 
(Penfield Branch, SA) 
Association of Architects, Engineers, Sur- 
veyors and Draftsmen of Australia (WA 
Division) 
Association of Consulting Engineers 
Association of Professional Engineers, 
ACT Branch 
Association of Professional Engineers of 
Australia 
Association of Professional Engineers of 
Australia (NCDC Group) 
Attorney-General's Department 
Attridge, J. D.  
Auditor-General 
Australia Party, Victorian Branch 
Australian Archives 
Australian Atomic Energy Commission 
Australian Broadcasting Commission 
Australian Broadcasting Commission, 
Senior Officers Association 
Australian Broadcasting Commission Staff 
Association 
Australian Broadcasting Control Board 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 
Australian Capital Territory, Department 
of 
Australian Chamber of Commerce 
Australian Computer Society, Canberra 
Branch, ADP Management 
Australian Council of Trade Unions 
Australian Country Party 
Australian Country Party (NSW Division) 
Australian Development Assistance 
Agency 
Australian Federation of Construction 
Contractors 
Australian Federation of Credit Union 
Leagues Ltd 
Australian Government Analytical Lab-
oratories 
Australian Government Analytical Lab-
oratories Staff Group 
Australian Institute of Building 
Australian Institute of Cartographers, 
Canberra 
Australian Institute of Management 
Australian Journalists Association 
Australian Local Government Women's 
Association, SA Branch 
Australian Postal & Telecommunications 
Union 
Australian Public Service Association 
(Fourth Division Officers) 
Australian Public Service Association 
(Fourth Division Officers) Parliament 
House Sectional Committee 
Australian Public Service Federation 
Australian Retailers Association, Sydney 
Australian Services Council 
Australian Society of Accountants 
Australian Survey Office 
Australian Taxation Office 
Australian Vice Chancellor's Committee 
Australian Women's Army Service Associ-
ation (NSW) 
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Baig, E. N. 
Bain, A. 
Bain, C. 
Baines, D. J. 
Baker, L. J. 
Baker, R. J. 
Baker, W. 
Baihorn, S. 
Balmer, P. E. 
Bates, R. 
Baxter, D. 
Baxter, J. R. 
Bayley, B. T. 
Becker, P. B. 
Beckwith, R. D. 
Belconnen Community Service 
Beilgard, E. J. H. 
Benn, R. W. 
Bensley, D. 
Bergersen, F. R. 
Berghouse,J. R. 
Berrill, H. T. 
Bevan, J. & Lee, P. 
Black, R. J. 
Boekenstein, P. A. & Nancarrow, M. E. 
Bott, L. F. (see Tourism & Recreation) 
Bowden, P. 
Brady, L. J. & Williams, A. C. 
Brander, L. 
Brennan, J. 
Brigg,J. S. 
Briggs, J. & Santa-Isobel, J. 
Briot, G. T. & Lloyd, C. J. 
Britten, J. W. 
Brock, C. 
Bromley, S. J. 
Brooks, R. L. 
Brown, G. A. 
Brown, J. P. 
Bryce, M. F. 
Buchannan, D. M. 
Buckland, D. R. 
Bull, D. J. 
Bullard, C. 
Bullock, G. E. & Duggleby,J. C. 
Bunn, D. 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics 
Bureau of Meteorology 
Bureau of Meteorology, Perth 
Bureau of Mineral Resources, Geology and 
Geophysics 
Bureau of Mineral Resources, Geoscien- 
tists 
Bureau of Mineral Resources, Marine 
Geophysics Group  
Bureau of Mineral Resources, Palaeonto- 
logy Group 
Bureau of Mineral Resources, Professional 
Officers Association 
Bureau of Mineral Resources, Technical 
Staff 
Burke, B. J. 
Burt, M. T. 
Byrnes, R. H. 
Cahill, J. F. 
Calder, R. R. 
Callcott, B. 
Cameron, G. I. 
Campaign Against Moral Persecution, 
NSW Branch 
Campbell, D. S. 
Campbell, J. R. 
Canberra Anti-Poverty League. 
Canberra College of Advanced Education 
Canberra Consumers Inc. 
Cardiff, F. 
Carlin, L. 
Carman, E. 
Carolan, S. 
Canton, R., McFarlane, I. & Smith, B. 
Carmody, A. T. (see Customs) 
Carter, F. J. 
Carter, M. K. 
Cartland, Sir George 
Caulfield Institute of Technology 
Cavanagh, K. G. 
Central Australia Aboriginal Legal Aid 
Services 
Central Industrial Secretariat 
Centre for Continuing Education 
Challans, B. W. 
Challinor, J. G. 
Chegwidden, L. G. 
Cheney, W. J. 
Chivers, B. M. 
Cho, K. Y. 
Church of England in Australia, Diocese of 
Adelaide 
Church of England in Australia, General 
Synod 
Cities Commission 
Civil Air Operation Officer's Association of 
Australia 
Clark, G. 
Clark, G. W. 
Clement, A. S. 
Clements, S. J. 
Clewley, H. 
Cloutt, T. A. 
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Collins, J. 
Collis, D. C. 
Commonwealth Bank Officers' Association 
Commonwealth Banking Corporation 
Commonwealth Employment Service 
Commonwealth Medical Officers Associ- 
ation, Sydney 
Commonwealth Professional Surveyors 
Association 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organisation 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organisation Officers Associ- 
ation 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organisation Division of 
Tropical Agronomy 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organisation Technical As- 
sociation 
Con, E. 
Connell, C. 
Connell, R. A. J. 
Connelly, D. M. 
Conway, K. J. 
Cook, E. C. 
Cook, G. J. 
Cooke, C. D. 
Cooley, Sir Alan (see Public Service 
Board) 
Coombs, I. C. 
Corbin, L. V. 
Corolan, S. 
Corless, E. W. 
Council of Commonwealth Public Service 
Organisations 
Council of Professional Associations 
Council of Social Service in NSW 
Council of Social Service, SA 
Council of Social Service, Tas 
Council of Social Service of WA Inc 
Coveney, C. A. 
Cox, J. 
Craddock, F. A. 
Crawford, A. R. 
Crawford, L. 
Cribb, F. 
Crompton, J. W. et al. 
Cronin, M. S. 
Cruikshanks, G. J. 
Currie, N. S. (see Manufacturing In- 
dustry) 
Curtis, J. G. 
Customs & Excise, Department of 
Cutler, G. I.  
Daddow, M. J. 
Daniels, L. J. (see Social Security) 
Darroch, V. M. 
Davenport, J. B. 
Davies, A. E. 
Davis, E. H. 
Deegan, J. L. 
Defence, Department of 
Defence, Department of, EDP Division 
Defence Science and Technology Organi- 
sation 
Deiden, E. P. 
Dexter, B. G. (see Aboriginal Affairs) 
Dickens, J. M. 
Diplomatic Courier Service 
Ditchburn, J. 
Dobie, A. 
Dodson, L. F. 
Doherty, J. G. 
Dolling, M. J. 
Donnelly, J. B. 
Doolan, M. T. 
Doube, K. 
Doutch, H. F. 
Drabble,J. S. 
Drabble, M. J. 
Drake, L. 
Drake Overload, Sydney 
Duggleby,J. C. & Bullock, G. E. 
Duke, C. & Sommerlad, E. 
Duncan, I. &Jarvis, R. 
Dunkle, R. V. & Kovarik, M. 
Dunn, M. 
Dyer, E. M. 
Dyrenforth, E. B. 
Eddy, D. R. 
Edgerley, M. W. 
Edmondson, R. 
Education, Department of 
Edwards, A. B. 
Edwards, Marjorie L. 
Eichler, N. C. 
Ellis, K. 
Ellis, R. K. (and 41 others) 
Emery, C. W. 
Emery, P. J. 
Enfield, J. & Argall, D. 
Engledow, L. W. B. (see Capital Territory) 
Ennor, Sir Hugh (see Science) 
Environment & Conservation, Depart- 
ment of 
Ermacora, H. R. 
Executive Development Centre 
Evans, E. 
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Evans, F. 
Ewers, T. C. 
Face, J. 
Fancy, J. B. 
Farquhar, A. 
Farran, A. 
Farrands,J. L. 
Federated Clerks Union of Australia 
Federated Clerks Union, Taxation Officers 
Branch 
Federated Miscellaneous Workers Union 
Federation of Australian University Staff 
Associations 
Fenwick, D. C. 
Ferguson, J. 
Fielden, A. 
Film Australia 
Finch, L. 
Fisher, H. F. 
Fisher, W. R. 
Ford, P. M. 
Foreign Affairs Association 
Foreign Affairs, Department of 
Foster, T. R. J. 
Fox, P. A. 
Francis, N. G. 
Frantz, Anna & Augustus 
Fraser, C. 
Freeman, J. 
Gallagher, R. 
Gallasch, J. W. 
Gallin, J. G. 
Gardner, M. 
Garlick, L. 
Garvey, E. J. 
Gawan-Taylor, M. 
Geddes, M. 
Geoffrey, J. F. 
Gibbs, E. H. 
Gibbs, W. J. 
Giecke, M. C. 
Gillespie, H. 
Gillespie, P. 
Gleeson, L. T. 
Good Neighbour Council of NSW 
Good Neighbour Council of SA Inc 
Good Neighbour Council of Tas 
Good Neighbour Council of Vie 
Good Neighbour Council of WA 
Graham, J. 
Grant, J. M. 
Grant, T. & Kain, J. 
Grassby, A. J.  
Gration, P. M. 
Green, Allen 
Green, C. W. 
Green, R. C. 
Greenham, C. 
Grogan, A. W. 
Gunn, P. M. 
Hack, R. J. B. 
Haffner, E. 
Hall, M. 
Halton, C. C. (see Transport) 
Hambley, J. R. 
Hamilton, A. 
Hammett, J. 
Hand, F. C. 
Hannah, A. 
Hanrahan, B. P. 
Harders, C. W. (see Attorney General's) 
Harding, W. J. 
Hare, W. T. 
Hargreaves, G. 
Harris, N. 
Harrison, D. H. 
Harrison, M. J. et al. 
Hart, D. J. 
Hart, H. 
Harvey, M. E. 
Hayes, J. M. 
Hayes, S. J. 
Haynes, C. D. 
Health, Department of 
Hearing Aid Council of Australia 
Hearn, C. G. 
Helmer, R. B. 
Henderson, B. 
Henderson, W. 
Henshall, J. 
Herriott, J. M. 
Herron, L. D. 
Hewitt, Sir Lenox (see Minerals and 
Energy) 
Hey, P. C. 
Hill, A. E. 0. 
Hill, C. J. 
Hinchcliffe, M. 
Hipsley, E. H. 
Hocking, J. W. 
Hoey, K. 
Hogan, K. B. 
Hoins, L. F. 
Hooper, P. T. 
Homer, R. 
Hospitals and Health Services Commission 
(see Health) 
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Housing & Construction, Department of 
Howells, G. (see Health) 
Hudson, M. 
Hunt, J. A. 
Hunter, W. F. 
Hunter River Region Coalition of Re- 
sident Action Groups 
Huston, J. J. 
Hyslop, R. 
Hy-Tone Cleaning Company 
Ihlein, G. 
Iles, L. 
Ilhi, P. F. 
Industries Assistance Commission 
Inglis, K. I. 
Institute of Affiliate Accountants 
Institute of Internal Auditors 
Institution of Engineers, Australia 
Inter-Church Trade and Industry Mission 
Internal Audit Group (nine signatures) 
Interpian Pty Ltd 
Ireland, F. 
Irons, D. 
Ives, W. (see Agriculture) 
Jackson, E. R. 
Jagerhofer, J. 
J anzow, I. 
Jarvis, R. & Duncan,-I. 
J egorow, W. 
Jennings, V. E. 
Joachim, D. 
Johnson, H. M. 
Johnston, P. W. 
Johnstone, P. J. 
Jones, E. 
Jones, H. E. 
Jones, K. N. (see Education) 
Jones, R. M. & D. M. 
Juddery, B. 
Kain, J. & Grant, T. 
Keane, R. J. 
Kearney, J. 
Keebie, I. S. 
Kemsiey, D. S. 
Kennedy, W. D. 
Kenny, R. T. 
Kimberley Research Station Staff Group 
King, A. 
Kingsiand, R. (see Repatriation and Com- 
pensation) 
Kissange, P. J. 
Knight, E. S. & Co.  
Kok, P. J. 
Kovarick, M. & Dunkle, R. V. 
Kovolec, J. 
Kraitsowits, I. K. 
Kramer, C.J. M. 
Kruger, P. 
Kuntz, J. S. 
Kununurra Action Group, WA 
Labour & Immigration, Department of 
Labour, Department of, Staff Task Force 
Lacey, C. J. 
Lacey, G. 
Lambert, B. P. 
Lamond, T. W. 
Lamont, H. 
Lane, E. J. 
Langford, A. F. W. 
Lansdown, R. B. (see Urban and Regional 
Development) 
Laube, A. G. 
Law Reform Commission 
Law Society of New South Wales 
Lawler, K. B. 
Lawler, P. J. (see Special Minister of State) 
Lawry, J. K. 
Laws, G. G. 
Lawyers Association, Australian Govern- 
ment 
Layton, E. 
Lean, H. K. 
Lennet, P. A. 
Lee, P. & Bevan, J. 
Lewarth, A. 
Leyland, M. 
Li, Ching Sing 
Liberal Party of Australia, ACT Region 
Library Association of Australia 
Lines, E. W. 
Lintern, C. R. 
Livingstone, R. S. (see Northern Develop- 
ment) 
Lloyd, C. J. & Briot, G. T. 
Loneragan, 0. W. 
Lowndes, W. N. 
Lowther, J. E. 
Luligrabe, P. M. 
Lynch, D. J. 
Lyne-Brown, R. 
Lyster, E. S. 
McAlister, D. 
McAuiiay, A. V. V. 
McCallum, D. J. 
MacCallum, W. A. 
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McCloud, M. 
McCourt, L. F. 
McCusker, J. 
McFarlane, G. C. 
MacFarlane, I. 
McGarvin,J. E. 
McGeehan, D. 
McGregor, R. 
McKay, D. H. (see Overseas Trade) 
McKenna, G. 
McKinnon, M. H. 
McLachlan, V. H. 
McMichael, D. F. (see Environment & 
Conservation) 
McMullan, J. D. 
McMullen, T. 
McNally, P. I. 
McSwain, N. D. 
Mackey, R. 
Magee, W. S. 
Maher, C. 
Malcolm, P. R. & Mathews, A. 
Malloy, G. M. 
Management Services Group (Canberra) 
Mangano, R. C. C. 
Mann, H. 
Mann, J. Y. 
Mann, R. 
Manufacturing Industry, Department of 
Marks, G. 
Marshall, A. C. 
Martin, C. 
Martin, L. et al. 
Martin, R. E. 
Mason, W. R. 
Materials Research Laboratories Group, 
POA 
Matheson, E. 
Matheson, G. 
Mathews, A. & Malcolm, P. R. 
Mayers, T. J. 
Maynard, G. 
Meat Inspectors' Association 
Media, Department of 
Mediansky, F. A. 
Menadue, J. L. (see Prime Minister and 
Cabinet) 
Meuross, D. 
Miller, C. L. (and 32 others) 
Mills, G. D. 
Mills, R. 
Millward, W. H. 
Minerals and Energy, Department of 
Minz, S. 
Mirabella, K. P.  
Monitronics Pty Ltd 
Moorehouse, R. T. 
Moroney,J. F. 
Morris, C. 
Morris, J. M. 
Morris, K. T. 
Morris, Y. 
Morschel, J. R. 
Mortimer, C. 
Movement for the Defence of Government 
Schools, Tasmania 
Moyse, E. 
Muller, L. 
Municipal Officers' Association of Aus- 
tralia, Victoria Branch 
Munro, A. 
Murray, J. 
Murray, J. D. 
Muspratt,J. S. 
Nancarrow, I. E. & Boekenstein, P. A. 
National Aboriginal Consultative Com-
mittee 
National Association of Testing Autho-
rities 
National Capital Development Commis-
sion 
National Committee on Discrimination in 
Employment and Occupation 
National Council of Women of Australia 
Neville, J. W. 
Neylon, G. T. 
Nicholas, A. R. 
Nicholas, C. T. 
Nicholson, I. F. 
Nisbett, S. 
Norris, H. 
Northern Australia, Department of 
Northern Development, Department of 
Northern Farmers Association 
Northern Territory, Department of 
Nugent, R. P. 
O'Brien, K. 
O'Brien, T. A. (see Northern Territory and 
Northern Australia) 
O'Brien, W. 
O'Callaghan, T. H. 
O'Connell, G. J. 
O'Dwyer, L. D. 
O'Meara, E. H. 
O'Meara, S. 
Orian,J.J. G. M. 
Orr, C. A. 
Osborne, C. 
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Oswin,J. H. (see Media) 
Overseas Student Service 
Overseas Trade, Department of 
Ozimic, S. 
Packer, T. J. 
Paddock, G. 
Paizer, H. R. 
Pang, H. 
Panich, D. 
Parker, G. B. 
Parliament House Sectional Committee 
(Fourth division officers) 
Parliamentary Library Society 
Patent Office Examination Branch, Staff 
Members 
Patents, Commissioner of 
Paterson, K. 
Payne, J. K. et al. 
Pearcy, W. 
Peebles, A. L. 
Penn, M. R. S. 
Perkins, C. N. 
Peters, F. E. 
Pickford, N. 
Pierce, W. G. 
Pinkerton, D. M. 
Pitzen, P. S. 
Polites, N. 
Pollack, D. 
Poole-Johnson, J. G. 
Postal Overseers' Union of Australia 
Postmaster-General's Department 
Potter, K. J. 
Power, M. 
Pratt, D. 
Presbyterian Women's Association of Aus- 
tralia 
Prime Minister & Cabinet, Department of 
Priorities Review Staff 
Professional Officers' Association 
Professional Officers' Association, Aero- 
nautical Research Group 
Professional Officers' Association, B.M.R. 
Group 
Professional Officers' Association, Lib- 
rarians Group 
Professional Officers' Association, NT 
Branch Darwin 
Professional Officers' Association, South 
Australian Branch 
Professional Officers' Association, Weap- 
ons Research Est. Branch 
Professional Radio Employees Institute of 
Australasia  
Promotions Appeal Committee, Mel- 
bourne 
Prowse, L. J. 
Public Service Arbitrator 
Public Service Association of NSW 
Public Service Board 
Pye, V. W. 
Pyle, J. R. (and eleven others) 
Queensland Conservation Council Inc. 
Queensland Disaster Welfare Committee 
Quinn, J. B. 
Quirk, M. J. 
Radio Frequency Management Branch 
Rafferty, R. G. 
Rankin, M. A. 
Rasmussen, C. W. H. 
Ratcliffe, G. 
Rattigan, G. A. 
Redcliff Environmental Enquiry 
Rees, F. 
Reid, B. 
Reid, G. S. 
Repatriation and Compensation, Depart- 
ment of 
Reiher, A. S. (see Housing and Con- 
struction) 
Renouf, A. P. (see Foreign Affairs) 
Richardson, S. S. 
Roach, E. J. 
Roberts, F. 
Roberts, H. E. 
Robertson, D. S. 
Robertson, S. G. 
Robin, G. 
Robinson, W. J. 
Roper, C. R. 
Rose, A. L. 
Rose, C. 
Rose, D. J. 
Ross, E. G. 
Ross, R. T. 
Royal Australian Institute of Architects 
Royal Australian Nursing Federation, 
Melbourne 
Royal Commission on Human Relations 
Royal Institute for the Blind, SA 
Rozen, M. 
Runnstrom, B. J. 
Russell, C. 
Rust, R. P. 
Ryce, (Raymond) Pty Ltd 
Sabadine, C. 
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Saddington, C. & N. 
St Joan's International Alliance, Queens- 
land Branch 
Santa-Isabel, J. & Briggs, J. 
Scamp, L. R. 
Schadel, F. R. 
Scharen, R. 
Schuller, J. R. 
Science, Department of 
Seaman, M. 
Secomb, I. 
Second Division Officers' Association 
See, A. J. 
Sekay, S.J. 
Sellars, L. G. 
Sercombe, R. 
Services & Property, Department of 
Sewell, J. (and 36 others) 
Sharp, I. G. (see Labour & Immigration) 
Sharp, S. 
Shaw, A. G. L. 
Shaw, A. J. 
Sheehan, M. A. 
Sheils, K. C. 
Shephard, D. A. W. 
Sherley, V. J. 
Shire of West Kimberley 
Shoobridge, D. W. 
Siegele, C. C. 
Simmonds.;J. D. 
Simmons, R. A. 
Simon, J. C. 
Simonds, P. 
Simonian, G. 
Simons, P. J. (and 
 3  others) 
Simpson, F. N. 
Sinclair, P. 
Singleton Community Health Centre 
Skeggs, R. 
Sloss, J. M. 
Smedley, P. 
Smith, A. 
Smith, B. 
Smith, J. 
Smith, R. B. 
Smitz, C. V. 
Smyth, F. S. 
Snelling (John W.) and Associates 
Snowy Mountains Engineering Corp. 
Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Auth-
ority 
Snowy Mountains Staff Associations Com-
mittee, Cooma 
Social Security, Department of  
Social Security, Department of, Staff Com- 
mittee, Townsville 
Social Welfare Commission 
Society of St Vincent de Paul 
Sommerlad, E. & Duke, C. 
Southern, R. L. 
Special Minister of State, Department of 
Spicer, E. H. 
Spier, R. 
Stacey, V. T. 
Stack, R. P. 
Stanton, V. 
Stapleton, I. 
Staunton, A. J. 
Steele, P. 
Stevens, C. 0. 
Stewart, J. E. 
Stone, D. 
Stone, F. E. 
Stone, G. B. 
Stone, J. 
Storozuk, I. 
Stow, R. A. 
Strzelecki, R. Z. M. 
Stuart, A. 
Students Association, ANU 
Student Representative Council Mercy 
College 
Sturtz,J. D. 
Stutchbury,J. E. 
Subnormal Children's Welfare Association 
Superannuation Board 
Swain, J. P. 
Sweeney, G. 
Sywidowski, W. F. 
Tange, Sir Arthur (see Defence) 
Tanswell, N. D. 
Tarrant, E. 
Taylor, H. A. 
Taylor, L. G. 
Telfer, B. 
Temesvary, A. 
Thacker, J. B. 
Thalbourne, T. A. 
Thomas, B. 
Thomas, F. P. 
Thomas, W. D. T. 
Thompson, P. J. 
Thompson, P. L. 
Thorpe, L. 
Thorpe, P. 
Throssell, R. P. 
Tibbett, G. B. 
Tomlinson, J. 
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Tonkin, D. 
Tonkin, R. G. 
Toomer, W. F. 
Tourism & Recreation, Department of 
Trade Practices Commission 
Transport, Department of 
Transport, Department of, Staff Group 
Travers, D. B. 
Treasury 
Trevan, T. D. 
Trianni, A. 
Trowbridge, M. 
Tuchin, J. 
Tucker, A. D. 
Tunbridge, L. 
Turner, H. H. 
Unit for Quality of Work Life, SA Dept of 
Labour and Industry 
United Council of Immigrants 
University of New England 
Urban & Regional Development, Depart-
ment of 
Urlini, G. 
Vale, K. R. 
Valiance, R. P. 
Van Ech, N. 
Victorian Automobile Chamber of Com- 
merce 
Waite, J. V. 
Walters, K. J. 
Waiters, R. 
Want, R. L. 
Wark, I. W. 
Wastell, F. J. 
Watershed Association of Victoria 
Watkins, R. 
Watson, W. R. 
Weapons Research Establishment 
Wesley-Smith, R. N. 
West, A. 
Westaway, D. L. 
Western Australian Institute of Tech- 
nology  
Weston, F. W. 
Wettenhall, R. L. 
Wheeler, Sir Frederick (see Treasury) 
Wheeler, M. E. 
Whelan, I. M. 
Whisson, K. 
Whitaker, J. P. 
White, D. 
White, G. 
Whitehead, J. 
Whitehead, J. B. 
Whitten, R. H. 
Whittle, A. 
Wickenden, D. 
Wienecke, G. E. 
Wildlife Preservation Society of Queens- 
land Inc. 
Wilkie, D. 
Wilkinson, E.J. 
Willems, J. 
Williams, N. M. 
Williams, P. W. 
Wills, J. 
Wilson, B. P. 
Wilson, E. G. 
Wilson, J. J. 
Wing, F. J. 
Women Active Politically 
Women in Australian Government Em- 
- ployment (182 signatories) 
Women's Community Aid Association 
Women's Electoral Lobby, Canberra 
Women's Electoral Lobby, Victoria 
Women's International League for Peace 
and Freedom 
Women's Liberation, Sydney 
Woodward, G. A. 
Wu, K. 
Wyly, S. A. L. 
Yachting World Pty Ltd 
Young Women's Christian Association, 
Australia 
Ziesig, Oskar 
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HEARINGS OF THE COMMISSION 
In the course of hearing oral evidence the Commission visited fifteen centres and 
sat for a total of fifty-four working days. Hearings were public except where 
confidentiality was requested by witnesses when the proceedings were held in 
camera. The Commission's program is set out below. 
Centre Dates 
Canberra, ACT 18—ig November, 1974 
25-29 November, 174 
2-4 	 December, 174 
20-23January, 1975 
11-14 February, 1975 
18-19 February, 1975 
29 April-2 May, 1975 
6 and 13 May, 1975 
13-14 August, 1975 
Melbourne, Vic. 21-22 November, 1974 
2 8-30 January, 1975 
14 and 24 April, 1975 
Sydney, NSW —6 	 December, 1974 
24-26 February, 1975 
Brisbane, Queensland 3-4 	 February, 1975 
Townsville, Queensland 6 February, 1975 
Albury—Wodona NSW/Vic. 28 February, 1975 
Hobart, Tas. ii March, 1975 
Alice Springs, NT 17-18 March, 1975 
Darwin, NT ig March, 1975 
Kununurra, WA 20 March, 1975 
Derby, WA 21 March, f975 
Port Hedland, WA 22 March, 1975 
Perth, WA 24 March, 1975 
Adelaide, SA 26 March, 1975 
Salisbury, SA 27 March, 1975 
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WITNESSES AT PUBLIC HEARINGS 
Abbott, D. C. Professional Officers Association 22.11.74 Melbourne, Vic. 
Adams, J. S. Weapons Research 
Establishment 27.4.75 Salisbury, SA 
Adams, N. A. Personal Submission 24.3.75 Perth, WA 
Agars, P. D. Australian Society of 
Accountants 29.1-75 Melbourne, Vic. 
(with Munro, R. F.) 
Ainsworth, B. A. Arbitration Inspectors Assoc. 22.4.75 Melbourne, Vic. 
Alexander, P. C. Personal submission 5.12.74 Sydney, NSW 
Alexander, R. F. Civil Air Operations Officers 
Assoc. 29.1.75 Melbourne, Vic. 
(with Garlick, R. J.) 
Allen, R. N. Department of Education 25.11.74 Canberra, ACT 
(with Jones, K. N.) 
Allison, E. H. Women's Electoral Lobby 
(ACT) 3.12.74 Canberra, ACT 
(with Bradley, J.) 
Anderson, D. National Aboriginal 
Consultative Committee 30.1.75 Melbourne, Vic. 
Anderson, D. National Aboriginal 
Consultative Committee 30.1.75 Melbourne, Vic. 
Anderson, 
Sir Donald* 
(the late) Qantas 14.8.75 Canberra, ACT 
Anderson, F. E. Department of Trade 12.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with McKay, D. H.) 
Anderson, L. L. Weapons Research 
Establishment 27.3.75 Salisbury, SA 
Argall, D. W. Personal submission 19.11.74 Canberra, ACT 
(with Enfield,J.D.) 
Attridge, J. D. Personal submission 14.7.75 Melbourne, Vic. 
Bain, A. Personal submission 24.3.75 Perth, WA 
Baker, J. Dept. of Aboriginal Affairs 21.3-75 Derby, WA 
Bannerman, R. M. Trade Practices Commission 30.4.75 Canberra, ACT 
Barnard-Brown, 
R. H. Weapons Research 
Establishment 27.3.75 Salisbury, SA 
(with Anderson, L. L.) 
Bates, W. R. Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics 19.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Ives, W.) 
Baxter, L. R. Weapons Research 
Establishment 27.3.75 Salisbury, SA 
Bennett, A. G.* Department of Northern 
Development 6.5-75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Livingstone, R. S.) 
Bird, G. N. Professional Radio Employees 
Institute 25.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
(with McGowan, J. E.) 
Blunt, C. Kimberley Research Station 20.3.75 Kununurra, WA 
Bond, M. E. Australian Local Government 
Womens Association South 
Australian Branch 26.3.75 Adelaide, SA 
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Bott, L. F. Department of Tourism and 
Recreation 12.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
Bradley, J. Women's Electoral Lobby 
(ACT) 3.12.75 Canberra, ACT 
Brennan, N. Good Neighbour Council of 
Victoria 21.11-75  Melbourne, Vic. 
Brigden, K. F. Taxation Office 19.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Cain, Sir Edward) 
Briscoe, G. Personal submission 14.8.75 Canberra, ACT 
Bromley, 5.J.* Personal submission 4.2.75 Brisbane, Qid 
Brockman, J. G. Weapons Research 
Establishment 27.3.75 Salisbury, SA 
(with Adams, J. G.) 
Bull, D. M. Personal submission 26.3.75 Adelaide, SA 
Bunting, Sir John Department of the Prime 
Minister & Cabinet 29.11.74 Canberra, ACT 
Burt, M. T. Personal submission 4.12.75 Brisbane, Qid 
Cain, Sir Edward Taxation Office 19.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
Callaghan, B. B. Commonwealth Banking Corp. 2.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
Callcott, B. Women's Liberation, NSW 26.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
Cameron, D. E. Professional Officers Assoc. 22.11.74 Melbourne, Vic. 
(with Abbott, D. C.) 
Campbell, N. J. Administrative & Clerical 
Officers Assoc. 22.11.74 Melbourne, Vie. 
Carmody, A. T. Dept of Customs & Excise 26.11.74 Canberra, ACT 
Carr, A. 5* Hearing Aid Council 2.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
Chapman, A. Kimberley Research Station 20.3.75 Kununurra, WA 
Chesterman, M. F. Good Neighbour Council of 
Tasmania 11.3.75 Hobart, Tas. 
Clohesy, M. Campaign Against Moral 
Persecution, NSW Branch 5.12.74 Sydney, NSW 
(with de Waal, P.) 
Cole, R. W. Treasury 28.11.74 Canberra, ACT 
(with Wheeler, Sir Frederick) 
Coleman, M. Y. Social Welfare Commission 2 1.1.75 Canberra, ACT 
Connolly, B. J. Australian Broadcasting Control 
Board 19.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Wright, M. F. E.) 
Connolly, D. M. Personal submission 24.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
Connop, N. C. Federated Clerks Union of 
Australia 30.1.75 Melbourne, Vie. 
Conway, J. L. Public Service Board 15.11.74 Canberra, ACT 
(with Cooley, Sir Alan) 
Coogan, C. K. CSIRO Officers Assoc. 1.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
Cooke, K. H. S. Commonwealth Medical Officers 
Assoc. 25.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
(with Ferguson, D.A.) 
Cooley, Sir Alan Public Service Board 18.11.74 Canberra, ACT 
Corin, R. A. Association of Professional 
Engineers 29.1.75 Melbourne, Vie. 
(with Michael, J. A.) 
Costello, C. H. Dept of Repatriation & 
Compensation 21.1.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Kingsland, R.) 
Costello, P. E. Dept of Social Security 24.3.75 Perth, WA 
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Coughlin, B. H. Dept of Services & Property 13.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Timbs, M. C.) 
Coutts, D. H. Bureau of Mineral Resources, 
Technical Officers 11.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
Cox, W. F. Professional Officers Assoc. 22.11.74 Melbourne, Vie. 
(with Abbott, D. C.) 
Craig, G. F. Albury-Wodonga Development 
Corp. 28.2.75 Wodonga, Vie. 
Craik, D. R. S. Auditor-General 26.11.74 Canberra, ACT 
Crohn, L. Professional Officers Assoc. 
(NT Br) 19.3.75 Darwin, NT 
Crompton, J. W. Weapons Research 
Establishment 27.3.75 Salisbury, SA 
(with Adams, J. S.) 
Cross, R. Liberal Party, ACT Region 13.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Selmes, T.) 
Crotty, K. W. Attorney-General's Department 30.4.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Harders, C. W.) 
Cullen, R. B. Second Division Officers 
Association 18.2-75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Roche, D. J.) 
Currie, N. 5* Department of Manufacturing 
Industry 6.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
Curtis, P. C. J. Department of Foreign Affairs 12.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Renouf, A. P.) 
Dalmau, P. Department of Labour & 
Immigration Staff Association 29.1.75 Melbourne, Vie. 
(with Quirk, M. J.) 
Daniel, R. Treasury 28.11.74 Canberra, ACT 
(with Wheeler, Sir Frederick) 
Daniels, L. J. Department of Social Security 21.1.75 Canberra, ACT 
Darrell, D. Kimberley Research Station 20.3.75 Kununurra, WA 
De Waal, P. Campaign Against Moral 
Persecution (NSW Branch) 5.12.75 Sydney, NSW 
(with Clohesy, M.) 
Desmond, R. CSIRO Technical Officers 
Association 1.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
Dexter, B. G. Dept of Aboriginal Affairs 3.12.75 Canberra, ACT 
Dorrian, P. A. Australian Broadcasting 
Commission 23.1.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Downing, R. I.) 
Downing, R. I. Australian Broadcasting 
Commission 23.1.75 Canberra, ACT 
Drabble,J. S. Canberra Consumers Inc. 13.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
Druce, E. C. Bureau of Mineral Resources 
Geoscientists 11.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
Duckmanton, T. J. Australian Broadcasting 
Commission 23.1.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Downing, R. I.) 
Duthie, L. P. Department of Trade 12.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with McKay, D. H.) 
Dwyer, M. Personal submission 21.3.75 Derby, WA 
Eddy, J. M. Personal submission 11.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Osborne, C.) 
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Else-Mitchell, 
R. Grants Commission 6.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
Emery, D. 0, Good Neighbour Council of 
Victoria 21.11-74  Melbourne, Vie. 
(with Brennan, N.) 
Enfield, J. D. Personal submission 19- 1 1-74 Canberra, ACT 
(with Argall, D. W.) 
Engleheart, M. G. NSW Public Service Association 24.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
Ennor, Sir Hugh Department of Science 1.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
Ewers, T. C. Department of Social Security 24.3.75 Perth, WA 
Fanning, M. P. Third Division Group of Women 
(ACT) 3.12.74 Canberra, ACT 
Farquhar, A. Personal submission 22.4.75 Melbourne, Vie. 
Farran, A. Personal submission 30.1.75 Melbourne, Vie. 
Ferguson, D. A. Commonwealth Medical Officers 
Assoc. 25.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
Flint, N. M. Third Division Group of Women 
(ACT) 3.12.74 Canberra, ACT 
(with Fanning, M.P.) 
Fogarty, P. StJohns International Alliance 4.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
Fogarty, P. J. Department of Defence 20.1.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Tange, Sir Arthur) 
Frost, J. M. R. Weapons Research 
Establishment 27.3.75 Salisbury, SA 
(with Anderson, L. L) 
Garlick, R. J. Civil Air Operations Association 29.1.75 Melbourne, Vie. 
(with Alexander, R. F.) 
Garrett, J. H. Treasury 28.11.74 Canberra, ACT 
(with Wheeler, Sir Frederick) 
Gibbons, M. Third Division Group of Women 
(ACT) 3.12.74' Canberra, ACT 
(with Fanning, M.P.) 
Gibbs, S. P. Australian Public Service 
Association (Fourth Division 
Officers) 20.11.74 Melbourne, Vie. 
Gibbs, W. T. Bureau of Meteorology 14.3.75 Melbourne, Vie. 
Glenwright, H. Department of Social Security 6.2.75 Townsville, Qid 
(with Miller, C. L.) 
Gore, D. C. Australian Federation of 
Construction Contractors 25.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
(with Mierisch, R. J.) 
Gorton, RtHon.J. G. Personal submission 2.12.74 Canberra, ACT 
Gradwell, L. L. CCPSO 18.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Turbet, K. C.) 
Grant, J. M. Bureau of Transport Economics 14.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Kam, J. D.) 
Grassby, A. J. Special Consultant on 
Community Relations 11.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
Green, A. C.* Health Department, SA Division 27.3.75 Adelaide, SA 
Green, C. B. Department of Social Security 24.3.75 Perth, WA 
Green, F. J. Department of Defence 20.1.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Tange, Sir Arthur) 
Greenham, C. Third Division Group of Women 
(ACT) 3.12.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Fanning, M. P.) 
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Gregson, A. W. 	 Good Neighbour Council of 
Tasmania 11.3.75 
(with Chesterman, M. F.) 
Halton, C. C. Department of Transport 19.2.75 
Hamilton, A. N. S. Postmaster General's 
Department 22.4.75 
Hammond, G. B. NSW Public Service Association 24.2.75 
(with Engleheart, M. G.) 
Harders, C. W. Attorney General's Department 30.4.75 
Harding, W. J. Personal submission 22.4.75 
Hargraves, G. W. Personal submission 4.2.75 
Harrison, M. J. Personal submission 14.2.75 
Hayes, S. Personal submission 26.2.75 
(with Simon, J. C.) 
Henderson, P. G. F. Department of Foreign Affairs 12.2.75 
(with Renouf, A. P.) 
Henderson, W. J. Associated Chamber of 
Manufacturers of Australia i 3.2.75 
Henschke, L. R. Weapons Research 
Establishment 27.3.75 
(with Anderson, L. L.) 
Herring, S. G. Second Division Officers 
Association 18.2.75 
(with Roche, D. J.) 
Hewitt, Sir Lenox Department of Minerals & 
Energy 18.2.75 
29.4-75 
Hickey, B. J. WA Council of Social Service 24.3.75 
Hill, D. J. Treasury 28.11.74 
(with Wheeler, Sir Frederick) 
Hill, F. T Social Welfare Commission 
(with Coleman, M. Y.) 
Hinton-Bayre, 
Hobart, Tas. 
Canberra, ACT 
Melbourne, Vie. 
Sydney, NSW 
Canberra, ACT 
Melbourne, Vie. 
Brisbane, Qld 
Canberra, ACT 
Sydney, NSW 
Canberra, ACT 
Canberra, ACT 
Salisbury, SA 
Canberra, ACT 
Canberra, ACT 
Perth, WA 
Canberra, ACT 
21.1.75 Canberra, ACT 
A.J.J. Dept of Labour & Immigration 
Staff Association 29.1.75 Melbourne, Vie. 
(with Quirk, M. J.) 
Hipsley, E. H. Personal submission 14.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
Hoey, K. Personal submission 11-3-75 Hobart, Tas. 
Honan, N. D. Bureau of Agricultural Economics 19.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Ives, W.) 
Hooper, A. D. L. Professional Officers Assoc. (NT) 19.3.75 Darwin, NT 
Hooper, P. T. Arid Zone Research Institute 17.3.75 Alice Springs, NT 
Home, S. B. Young Women's Christian 
Assoc. 28.1.75 Melbourne, Vie. 
(with Kean, J.) 
Hough, W. J. Personal submission 11.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Osborne, C.) 
Howells, G. Department of Health 2 1.1.75 Canberra, ACT 
Hundloe, T. Queensland Conservation 
Council 3.2.75 Brisbane, Qld 
(with Springell, P.) 
Ihlein, G. R. Australian Public Service 
Association (Fourth Division 
Officers) 20.11-74 Melbourne, Vie. 
(with McMullen, B. V.) 
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Iles, L. Good Neighbour Council of SA 26.3.75 Adelaide, SA 
Ives, W. Department of Agriculture 19.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
Jackson-Hope, 
R. 0. Air Transport Group (NSW) 26.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
(with Marrott, D. L.) 
James, W. G. Department of Social Security 
Officers Committee 6.2.75 Townsville, Qld 
Janzow, I. P. R. Personal submission 18.3.75 Alice Springs, NT 
Jensen, A. R. Bureau of Mineral Resources 
Geoscientists 11.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Druce, E. C.) 
Johnson, L. W. Australian Development 
Assistance Agency 30.4.75 Canberra, ACT 
Johnson, M. N. Bureau of Mineral Resources 11.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Coutts, D. A.) 
Jones, K. N. Department of Education 25.11.75 Canberra, ACT 
Jones, L. W. Kimberley Research Station 20.3.75 Kununurra, WA 
Jones, P. Department of Transport 19.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Halton, C. C.) 
Jones, R. E. Commonwealth Bank Officers 
Association 24.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
(with Morrow, N. H.) 
Juddery, B. Personal submission 20.1.75 Canberra, ACT 
Kain,J. D. Bureau of Transport Economics 14.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Grant, T. M.) 
Karmel, Universities Commission 6.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
Kean, J. E. Young Womens Christian 
Association 28.1.75 Melbourne, Vie. 
Kelly, A. H. Personal submission 30.1.75 Melbourne, Vie. 
Kelly, H. Kimberley Research Station 20.3.75 Kununurra, WA 
Kelly, R. G. Department of Repatriation & 
Compensation 21.1.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Kingsland, R.) 
Kennedy, J. E. Women's Electoral Lobby 
(ACT Group) 3.12.74 Canberra, ACT 
(with Bradley, J.) 
Kennedy, K. M. Bureau of Mineral Resources 
Geoscientists 11.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Druce, E. C.) 
Kennedy, P. G.* Personal submission 14.7.75 Melbourne, Vie. 
Kennedy, W. D. Department of Services & 
Property 13.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Timbs, M. C.) 
King, A. Personal submission 24.3.75 Perth, WA 
Kingsland, R. Department of Repatriation & 
Compensation 21.1.75 Canberra, ACT 
Koehne, P. R. Personal submission 18.3.75 Alice Springs, NT 
Kontsounadis, V. Personal submission 26.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
(with Simon, J. C.) 
Kraitsowits, K. J. Bureau of Mineral Resources 
Technical Staff 11.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Coutts, D. A.) 
Lambert, D. AAESDA 29.1.75 Melbourne, Vie. 
(with Walker, G. L.) 
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Lamond, T. W. 	 Industries Assistance 
Commission 5.12.74 Sydney, NSW 
Lamont, H. Personal submission 24.3.75 Perth, WA 
Lanigan, P. J. Taxation Office 19.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Cain, Sir Edward) 
Lansdown, R. B. Department of Urban & 
Regional Development 23.7.75 Canberra, ACT 
Larkins, G. Kimberley Research Station 20.3.75 Kununurra, WA 
Lawler, P. J. Department of the Special 
Minister of State 6.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
Lawler, T. Personal submission 19.3.75 Darwin, NT 
Li, C. S. Personal submission 19.3.75 Darwin, NT 
Linehan, D. L. Public Service Board 19.11.74 Canberra, ACT 
(with Cooley, Sir Alan) 
Linford, R. J. Department of the Prime 
Minister & Cabinet 29.11.74 Canberra, ACT 
(with Bunting, Sir John) 
Livingston, R. S. Department of the Northern 
Territory 6.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
Loftus-Hills, Australia Party 
G. D. (Vie. Branch) 21.11.74 Melbourne, Vic. 
Lonergan,J. P. Department of Science 1.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Ennor, Sir Hugh) 
Long, J. P. M. Department of Aboriginal Affairs 3. 12.74 Canberra, ACT 
(with Dexter, B. G.) 
Maher, P. C. Department of Education 25.11.74 Canberra, ACT 
(with Jones, K. N.) 
Malcolm, P. R. Weapons Research 
Establishment 27.3.75 Salisbury, SA 
Mallett, V. J. Personal submission 25.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
(with Thompson, K. L.) 
Malone, L. A. J. Department of Aboriginal Affairs 3.12.74 Canberra, ACT 
(with Dexter, B. G.) 
Mann, H.* Personal submission 26.3.75 Adelaide, SA 
Marks, G. Department of Education 17.3.75 Alice Springs, NT 
Marrott, D. L. Air Transport Group (NSW) 26.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
Martens, M. Central Industrial Secretariat 18.1.75 Melbourne, Vie. 
(with Polites, G.) 
Martin, J. Department of Transport 19.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Halton, C. C.) 
Martin, L. M. Personal submission 25.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
(with Thompson, K. L.) 
Mathams, G. G. Australian Federation of 
Construction Contractors 25.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
(with Mierisch, R. J.) 
Matthews, A. Weapons Research 
Establishment 27.3.75 Salisbury, SA 
(with Malcolm, P. R.) 
Maynard, G. B. Caulfield Institute of Technology 28.1.75 Melbourne, Vie. 
(with Wheaton, G. J.) 
Mediansky, F. A. Personal submission 14.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
Meeuwsen,J. P. Labour & Immigration Staff 
Association 29.1.75 Melbourne, Vie. 
(with Quirk, M. J.) 
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Menadue,J. L. Department of the Prime 
Minister & Cabinet 13.8.75 Canberra, ACT 
Menzies, A. C. C. Attorney-General's Department 30.4.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Harders, C. W.) 
Michael, J. A. Association of Professional 
Engineers 29.1-75 Melbourne, Vic. 
(with Corin, R. A.) 
Mierisch, R. J. Australian Federation of 
Construction Contractors 25.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
Miller, C. L. Department of Social Security 
Officers Committee 6.2.75 Townsville, QId 
Miller, P. 0. Association of Consulting 
Engineers 24.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
Mills, R. H. Personal submission 2.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
Minz, S. S. Personal submission 30.1.75 Melbourne, Vic. 
Mitchell, I. S. Department of Aboriginal Affairs 3.12.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Dexter, B. G.) 
Montgomery, V. G. Department of Customs & 
Excise 26.11.74 Canberra, ACT 
(with Carmody, A. T.) 
Moore, R. C. Department of Trade 12.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with McKay, D. H.) 
Moore, L. M. Personal submission 24.3.75 Perth, WA 
Morgan, G. J. Air Transport Group (NSW) 26.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
Mori arty, J. Personal submission 14.8.75 Canberra, ACT 
Morison, D. G. Royal Society for the Blind 26.3.75 Adelaide, SA 
Morris, J. M. Personal submission 5.12.74 Sydney, NSW 
Morrison, D. M. Department of Education 25.11.74 Canberra, ACT 
(with Jones, K. N.) 
Morrison, J. R. Third Division Group of Women 3.12.74 Canberra, ACT 
(with Fanning, M. P.) 
Morrow, N. H. Commonwealth Bank Officers 
Association 24.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
Moss, J. T. St L. Commonwealth Medical Officers 
Association 25.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
(with Ferguson, D. A.) 
Mounic, R. C. Australian Chamber of 
Commerce 25-11-75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Pelham-Thorman, 
R. R.) 
Muir, L. T. Albury-Wodonga Development 
Corporation 28.2.75 Wodonga, Vic. 
(with Craig, G. F.) 
Muller, L. A. G. Personal submission 19.3.75 Darwin, NT 
Munro, R. F. Australian Society of 
Accountants 29.1.75 Melbourne, Vic. 
(with Agars, P. D.) 
Murphy, K. Kimberley Research Station 20.3.75 Kununurra, WA 
Murray, F. C. Department of Foreign Affairs 12.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Renouf, A. P.) 
McCallum, D. J. Personal submission 2.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
McCallum, W. J. Personal submission 26.3.75 Adelaide, SA 
McConnell, J. M. National Council of Women 11.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
McCourt, L. F. Personal submission 4.2.75 Brisbane, Qld 
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McDonald, H. B. 	 Public Service Board 
(with Cooley, Sir Alan) 
McDonald, H. J* Department of Housing & 
Construction 
(with Reiher, A. S.) 
McDonald, L. Department of the Media 
(with Oswin,J. H. M.) 
McGowan, J. E. Professional Radio Employees 
Institute 
McGrath, M. J. Personal submission 
(with Thompson, K. L.) 
McKay, D. H. Department of Trade 
McKay, L. W. Womens Liberation (NSW) 
(with Callcott, B.) 
McKenzie, J. Patents Office 
(with Petersson, K. B.) 
McKenzie- McHarg, 
19.11.74 Canberra, ACT 
22.4.75 Melbourne, Vic. 
23.1.75 Canberra, ACT 
25.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
25.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
12.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
26.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
1.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
D. Committee of Five Municipal 
Councils, Albury-Wodonga 
McKinney, J. W. Wildlife Preservation Society 
(with Roe, J.) 
McMahon, P. A. Personal submission 14.2.75 
(with Harrison, M. J.) 
McMahon, Rt Hon. 
W. J. Personal submission 6.12.74 
McManus, S. F. Arbitration Inspectors 
Association 22.4.75 
(with Ainsworth, B. A.) 
McMichael, D. F. Department of Environment & 
Conservation 13.2.75 
McMullan, V. B. APSA (Fourth Division Officers) 20.11.74 
Newman, D. M. Arid Zone Research Institute 17.3.75 
Nicholson, I. F. Personal submission 4.2.75 
Noakes, B. Central Industrial Secretariat 28.1.75 
(with Polites, G.) 
O'Brien, T. A. Department of the Northern 
Territory 19.3.75 
O'Connor, J. T. Department of.Customs & 
Excise 26.11.74 
(with Carmody, A. T.) 
O'Dwyer, L. R. Personal submission 22.4.75 
Osborne, C. Personal submission 11.2.75 
Oswin,J. H. M. Department of the Media 23.1.75 
Overland, M. J. Associated Chamber of 
Manufacturers of Australia 13.2.75 
Ozimic, S. Bureau of Mineral Resources 
Technical Staff 11.2.75 
(with Coutts, D. A.) 
Packer, T. J. Weapons Research 
Establishment 27.3.75 
(with Baxter, J. R.) 
Palmer, B. W. Dept of Services & Property 13.2.75 
(with Timbs, M. C.) 
Parker, G. B. Personal submission 26.3.75 
Parker, M. F. Department of Science 1.5.75 
Canberra, ACT 
Sydney, NSW 
Melbourne, Vie. 
Canberra, ACT 
Melbourne, Vie. 
Alice Springs, NT 
Brisbane, Ojd 
Melbourne, Vie. 
Darwin, NT 
Canberra, ACT 
Melbourne, Vie. 
Canberra, ACT 
Canberra, ACT 
Canberra, ACT 
Canberra, ACT 
Salisbury, SA 
Canberra, ACT 
Adelaide, SA 
Canberra, ACT 
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28.2.75 Wodonga, Vic. 
3.2.75 Brisbane, Qjd 
Parkinson, N. F. Department of Foreign Affairs 12.2.75 Canberra, AC'I 
(with Renouf, A. P.) 
Patten, M. E. L. Royal Australian Nursing 
Federation, 28.1.75 Melbourne, Vie. 
Paull, Z. S. Personal submission 26.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
(with Simon, J. C.) 
Peebles, A. L. Personal submission 24.3.75 Perth, WA 
Pelham-Thorman 
R. R. Aust. Chamber of Commerce 2 5- 1 1.74 Canberra, ACT 
Penn, M. R. S. Personal submission 26.3.75 Adelaide, SA 
Perkins, C. N. Personal submission 14.8.75 Canberra, ACT 
Peters, F. E.* Personal submission 1-2.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
Petersson, K. B. Commissioner of Patents 1.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
Pitman, L. Young Women's Christian 
Association 28.1.75 Melbourne, Vic. 
(with Kean, J.) 
Polites, G. Central Industrial Secretariat 28.1.75 Melbourne, Vic. 
Powell, A. J. W. National Capital Development 
Commission 23.1.75 Canberra, ACT 
Powell, J. M. Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics 19.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Ives, W.) 
Quirk, M. J. Labour & Immigration, Staff 
Association 29.1.75 Melbourne, Vic. 
Ragless, A. K. Auditor General's Office 26.1.74 Canberra, ACT 
(with Craik, D. R. S.) 
Rainbow, J. G. Department of Agriculture 19.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Ives, W.) 
Rattigan, G. A. Industries Assistance 
Commission 2.12.74 Canberra, ACT 
Read, M. K. Albury-Wodonga Development 
Corporation 28.2.75 Wodonga, Vic. 
(with Craig, G. F.) 
Redoslovich, E. W. CSIRO Officers Assoc. 1.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Coogan, C. K.) 
Reid, G. Personal submission 24.3.75 Perth, WA 
Reiher, A. J. Dept of Housing & 
Construction 22.4.75 Melbourne, Vic. 
Renouf, A. P. Department of Foreign Affairs 12.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
Richardson, S. J. College of Advanced Education 2.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
Rideout, F. C., Arid Zone Research Institute 17.3.75 Alice Springs, NT 
(with Newman, D. M.) 
Robertson, D. M. Personal submission 26.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
(with Simon, J. C.) 
Robertson, D. R. Australian Journalists Assoc. 25.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
Robertson, P. S. Weapons Research 
Establishment 27.3.75 Salisbury, SA 
(with Baxter, J. R.) 
Robins, L. W. G. Good Neighbour Council of Vie. 21.11.74 Melbourne, Vie. 
(with Brennan, N.) 
Robinson, B. J. Administrative and Clerical 
Officers Association 15.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Campbell, N.J.) 
Roche, D. J. Second Division Officers Assoc. 15.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
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Rodda, K. J. Department of Housing & 
Construction 22.4.75 Melbourne, Vic. 
(with Reiher, A. S.) 
Roe, J. Wildlife Preservation Society of 
Queensland 3.2.75 Brisbane, Qid 
(with McKinnon, J. W.) 
Ronalds, C. A. Personal submission 14.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Harrison, M. J.) 
Rose, A. L. Northern Territory Reserves 
Board 17.3.75 Alice Springs, NT 
Rose, C. Personal submission 17.3.75 Alice Springs, NT 
Rossiter, N. E. L. Patents Office 1.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Petersson, K. B.) 
Russell, C. C. Personal submission 25.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
(with Scharen, V. R.) 
Scharen, V. Personal submission 25.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
(with Russell, C. C.) 
Schubert, D. J. Committee of Five Municipal 
Councils Albury-Wodonga 
Region 28.2.75 Wodonga, Vic. 
(with McHarg, D. M.) 
Schuller, J. R. Personal submission 19.3.75, Darwin, NT 
Scott, D. R. Department of Social Security 2 1.1.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Daniels, L. J.) 
Scott, M. J. Social Welfare Commission 2 1.1.75 Canberra, ACT 
Scully, J. Department of Trade 12.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with McKay, D. H.) 
Selmes, T. Liberal Party, ACT Region 13.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Cross, R.) 
Shannon, G. National Capital Development 
Commission 23.6.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Powell, A. J. W.) 
Simon, J. C. Personal submission 26.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
Simons, P. J. Personal submission 22.4-75 Melbourne, Vic. 
Sinclair, Hon. I. Australian Country Party 14.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
Smith, W. J. Council of Commonwealth 
Public Service Organisations 18.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Turbet, K. C.) 
Smyth, F. S. Personal submission 11 
.2-75 Canberra, ACT 
Springell, P. Queensland Conservation 
Council 3.2.75 Brisbane, Qld 
(with Hundloe, T.) 
Stephenson, M. 0. Council of Social Service, WA 24.3.75 Perth, WA 
Sturtz,J. D. Personal submission 19.3.75 Darwin, NT 
Sullivan, P. J. Department of Aboriginal Affairs 3.12.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Dexter, B. G.) 
Tange, Sir Arthur*  Department of Defence 20.1.75 Canberra, ACT 
Tapper, B. P. Australian Federation of 
Construction 20.1.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Mierisch, R. J.) 
Taylor, E. S.* Personal submission 26.3.75 Adelaide, SA 
Thacker, J. B. Personal submission 26.3.75 Adelaide, SA 
Thomas, F. P. Personal submission 29.1.75 Melbourne, Vic. 
Thomas, L. C. Air Transport Group (NSW) 26.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
(with Marrott, D. L.) 
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Thompson, K. L. Personal submission 25.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
Timbs, M. C. Department of Services & 
Property 13.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
Toomer, W. F. Personal submission 22.3.75 Port Hedland, WA 
Travers, D. B. Department of Health 14.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
Treharne, R. F. Weapons Research 
Establishment 27.3.75 Salisbury, SA 
Turbet, K. C. Council of Commonwealth 
Public Service Organisations 18.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
Turner, J. A. Department of the Capital 
Territory 29.4.75 Canberra, ACT 
Type, F. E. Taxation Office 19.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Cain, Sir Edward) 
Vaughan, J. Library Association of Australia 2.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
Walden, R. Women's Electoral Lobby 
(ACT) 3.12.74 Canberra, ACT 
(with Bradley, J.) 
Walker, G. L. AAESDA 29.1.75 Melbourne, Vic. 
(with Lambert, D. I.) 
Walsh, J. E. Second Division Officers Assoc. 18.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Roche, D. J.) 
Walsh, K. Commonwealth Bank Officers 
Assoc. 24.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
(with Morrow, N. H.) 
Walter, P. J. G. Personal submission 19.3.75 Darwin, NT 
Walters, K. J. Department of Housing & 
Construction 22.4.75 Melbourne, Vic. 
Walters, R. Personal submission 25.11.75 Canberra, ACT 
Warrell, E. G. Cities Commission 23.1.75 Canberra, ACT 
Watson, A. K. Australian Broadcasting 
Commission Staff Association 24.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
Watson, W. R. Department of Environment & 
Conservation 13.2-75 Canberra, ACT 
Webster, C. A. Department of Science 1.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Ennor, Sir Hugh) 
Wellard,J. F. B. Personal submission 19.3.75 Darwin, NT 
Wesley-Smith, R. N. Personal submission 26.3.75 Adelaide, SA 
Westerman, Australian Industrial 
Sir Alan Development Corporation 30.4.75 Canberra, ACT 
Westerman, H. L. National Capital Development 
Commission 23.1.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Powell, A. J. W.) 
Wettenhall, R. L. College of Advanced Education 2.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Richardson, J. J.) 
Wheaton, G. J. Caulfield Institute of Technology 28.1.75 Melbourne, Vie. 
(with Maynard, G. B.) 
Wheeler, Sir 
Frederick Treasury 28.11.74 Canberra, ACT 
White, D. Personal submission 2.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
White, G. E. E. Personal submission 17.3.75 Alice Springs, NT 
Whitten, R. H. Professional Officers Association 22.11.75 Melbourne, Vie. 
(with Abbott, D. C.) 
Williams, M. P. Department of Social Security 
Officers Committee 6.2.75 Townsville, Qjd 
(with Miller, C. L.) 
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Williams, N. Personal submission 19.3.75 Darwin, NT 
Wilson, E. G. Personal submission 25.11.74 Canberra, ACT 
Wood, C. A. Personal submission 19.3.75 Darwin, NT 
Wood, M. WA Institute of Technology 24.3.75 Perth, WA 
Woodward, G. R. Department of Transport 2.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Halton, C. C.) 
Worthington, S. F. Commonwealth Banking 
Corporation 2.5.75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Callaghan, B. B.) 
Wright, M. F. E. Australian Broadcasting Control 
Board 19.2.75 Canberra, ACT 
Wryell, M. Department of Social Security 21-1-75 Canberra, ACT 
(with Daniels, L. J.) 
Wyly, S. A. L. Personal submission 11.3.75 Hobart, Tas. 
Wynne, I. C. Australian Broadcasting 
Commission Staff Association 24.2.75 Sydney, NSW 
(with Watson, A. K.) 
Yeend, G. J. Department of the Prime 
Minister & Cabinet 29.11.74 Canberra, ACT 
(with Bunting, Sir John) 
Young, R. J. Public Service Board 19.11.74 Canberra, ACT 
(with Cooley, Sir Alan) 
*Evjdcnce 
 heard partially or wholly in camera. 
JVte: The nomenclature of departments, authorities, staff associations, etc. conforms with usage 
at the time of the hearings. 
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STAFF OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION 
Chairman's Personal Staff 
M. J. McNamara 
C. B. Osborne 
R. E. Petch 
E. Yeend 
Secretarial Assistance to Commissioners 
J. Egan 	 to July 761, 
P. Harrington (19/8/74 to 10/1/75) 
P. Midgley (12/8/74 to 11/10/74) 
N. Porach (11/2/75 to 1/9/75) 
J. B. Robinson (15/7/74  to July 76) 
E. Roy (7/3/75 to 7/5/76) 
Secretariat 
Secretary—M.J. Wilson (11/7/74 to 23/7/75) 
N. J. Attwood (28/7/75 to July 76) 
M. Berryman (23/8/74  to 23/1/75) 
L. Dzunda (29/9/75 to 1/3/76) 
P. Eagles (4/8/75 to July 76) 
P. Eisler (22/7/74 to 28/2/76) 
D. Ferguson (3/2/75 to 20/1/76) 
J. Ireland (1/7/7 toJuly 76) 
M. Kennedy (16/9/74 to July 76) 
E. Lowrie 	 to 18/3/76) 
C. Lubans (29/1/75 to 18/3/76) 
E. McCulloch (30/9/75 to 31/5/76) 
L. McGrath (12/1 1/74  to 28/4/75) 
R. McMillan (26/5/75 to 29/8/75) 
W. H. McMillan (12/8/74 toJuly 76) 
J. McNaughton (12/11/74 to 28/4/75) 
S. Manwaring (8/7/74 to July 76) 
B. Mengelkamp (25/1/75 to 14/1/76) 
R. Oag (2/6/75 to 1 /7/75) 
J. Preston (24/3/75 to July 76) 
G. Rossitter (4/8/75 to July 76) 
W. Sedgeman (2/6/75 to 10/3/76) 
M. V. Serrano (15/3/76 to July 76) 
R. Sharp (11/7/74 to 1/6/75) 
D. Stapleton (12/11/74 to 22/9/75) 
K. Taperell (1/8/74 to 17/3/76) 
J. M. Tenison (19/8/74 to 4/4/76) 
B. Williamson (23/1/75 to 11/6/76) 
L. Wirun (5/4/76 to July 76) 
K. Wood (25/10/74 to 23/3/75) 
M. York (26/8/74 to July 76) 
Research Section 
Director—G. N. Hawker (19/8/74 to 30/6/76) 
J. Anderson (2/12/74 to 27/4/76) 
M. Blood (2 1/3/75 to 16/3/76) 
C. Busch (11/8/75 to 28/3/76) 
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P. Clayton (31/10/74 to 29/10/75) 
A. Cameron (11/11/74 to July 76) 
B. Carey (25/11/74 to 20/2/76) 
M. Cass (3/10/74 to 25/6/76) 
H. Dent (14/11/74 to 9/4/76) 
A. Dobell (24/2/75 to 19/9/75) 
S. Ellims (2/6/75 to 12/9/75) 
V. Fanning (22/8/74 to 22/1/75) 
J. Farrow (10/3/75 to 27/1/76) 
M. Forrest (2/12/74 to 31 / 1 /75) 
G. Fry (2/12/74 to 31 /l/75) 
C. Fox (5/2/75 to 11/6/76) 
B. Goodhew (20/1/75 to 15/5175) 
P. Grundy (// to 24/9/75) 
S. Hamilton (10/3/75 to July 76) 
S. A. Hamilton (2/1/76 to July 76) 
C. Hackett (10/3/75 to 2/10/75) 
J. Hodges (21/1/75  to 19/3/75) 
I. Hundloe (10/12/74 to 16/3/75) 
M. Kemppi (12/2/75 to 2/3/76) 
I. Knox (18/2/75 to 26/3/76) 
W. Klekner (2/12/74 to 30/5/75) 
L. Lardelli (24/11/75 to 6/2/76) 
S. Jamison (10/3/75 to 12/9/76) 
J. D. McMillan (29/9/75 to 12/1/76) 
A. Milibank (12/2/75 to 12/3/75) 
J. Milibank (3/2/75 to 22/5/75) 
E. O'Keeffe (16/1/75 to 16/6/76) 
S. Prasser (9/12/74 to 24/1/75) 
C. Poll (24/2/75 to 21/3/75) 
F. Roberts (10/3/75 to 10/8/75) 
M. Roberts (30/9/74 to 30/11/75) 
P. Saul (24/2/75 to 11/2/76) 
P. Sellers (5/3/75  to 1/12/75) 
G. Thompson (10/3/75 to 1/4/75) 
L. Tilley (9/12/74 to 31/1/75) 
Special Adviser's Office 
Special Adviser—P. Wilenski (1/8/74 to 26/12/74) 
T. M. Fitzgerald (10/2/75 to July 76) 
A. Carson (29/7/74 to 15/5/75) 
P. Gross (21/7/75 to 11/12/75) 
A. Latham (//7  to 17/6/76) 
A. Marchant (10/2/75 to 7/6/76) 
J. R. Nethercote (5/8/74 to July 76) 
D. Nimmo (6/12/74 to 2 1/2/75) 
communzt Relations Section 
Adviser—M. Bourke (17/10/74 to 26/9/75) 
R. Francis (28/11/74 to 22/3/76) 
J. Hilvert (30/9/74 to 30/4/76) 
J. King (24/3/75 to 17/6/76) 
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CONSULTANTS 
In the course of the Commission's inquiries it commissioned some fifty consultancy 
projects. Consultants and the subject matter on which they were required to report are 
listed below. 
Consultants Subject 
(Listed in alphabetical order) 
Australian Council of Social 
Service ParticipACTION 
Allen, G. The Press and the Public Service 
Antill, DrJ. K. Selection Procedures 	 in 	 the Australian 
Public Service 
Bensley, D. and Associates Access project 
Bilney, E. Co-ordinating 	 Bodies—references 	 to 	 in 
submissions 
Brotherhood of St Laurence Family Centre Project 
Burton, M. P. and McBroom, I. Users View of the Development Aspect of 
Training 
Byrt, W. J. Promotion Appeal Practices 
Centre for Continuing Education, Lilciong and Recurrent Education in the 
ANU APS 
Centre for Urban Research and 
Action Evaluation of NOW Project 
Colebatch, Dr H. Ringwood (later NOW) Project 
Conlon, Dr T. Analysis and report on submissions on 
areas of science in the APS 
Cooke, E. Access—Methods of Observations 
Cox, E. Career Service Survey—Questionnaire de- 
sign 
Cruickshank & Partners Pty Ltd Registry procedures 
Cutt, Prof. J. Program Budgeting in the APS 
Emy, Dr H. V. The Public Service and Political Control: 
The Problem of Accountability 
Encel, Prof. S. Career Service—General Consultant 
Encel, Prof. S. Research within 	 the Australian Public 
Service 
Griffiths, D. Autocracy in the Airwaves 
Hughes, Prof. C. A. Ministers and Departments 
Jones, B. F. Position Classification 
Jones, M. A. IDC Case Study and Discussion paper 
Kasper, Dr W. Co-ordination of Economic Policy 
Knight, Prof. K. Information for Members of Parliament 
Kondos, Dr A. Career Service Survey 
Lansbury, Dr R. Staff Appraisal 
Matthews, Dr T. V. IDC Case Study 
Matthews, Dr T. V. Interest Group Access to the Australian 
Government Bureaucracy 
Melbourne University Industrial 
Relations Program Categories of Employment 
Painter, Dr M. IDC Case Study 
Ragg, Dr B. Career Service—ADP Methods 
Rowley, Prof. C. D. Aboriginal Administration 
Schaffer, Dr B. B. General Consultant/Access 
Scott, A. J. Handicapped 	 Employees in Australian 
Government Administration 
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Scott, W. D. & Co. 
Sharp, Dr I. G. 
Smith, Dr R. F. I. 
Smith, Dr R. F. I. 
Smith, Dr R. F. I. (with Weller, Dr P.) 
Smith, Dr T. 
Spann, Prof. R. N. 
Terry, G. J. (with Weller, Dr P.) 
Van Munster, R. 
Wainwright, J. 
Wallace, Prof. C. 
Weller, Dr P. 
Weller, Dr P. (with Smith, Dr R. F. I.) 
Weller, Dr P. (with Terry, G. J.) 
Wettenhall, Dr R. L. 
Williams, Dr T. A. 
Wiltshire, Dr K.  
A Pilot Study on Comparative Decision 
Making 
Conditions of Overseas Service 
Ministerial Advisers 
Australian Cabinet Structures and Pro- 
cedures 
Cases in Policy Formulation 
Non-statutory Bodies 
Permanent Heads 
Treasury Control of Federal Government 
Expenditure 
Administrative Arrangements Orders 
Career Service—ADP Methods 
ADP Services in Government 
Parliamentary Committees 
Cases in Policy Formulation 
Treasury Control 
Statutory Bodies 
Management Training 
Staff Ceilings and Manpower Planning 
TASK FORCES, ADVISORY BODIES AND OTHER WORKING 
GROUPS 
During the course of its work the Commission established task forces to examine specific 
aspects of government administration. Each task force worked to a Commissioner who 
reported its findings to the Commission. Details of each task force are set out below. 
Additionally, the Commission invited key unions with significant Public Service 
representation, and members of the business community, to participate in the process of 
defining issues for consideration and recommendation. Two committees, the Trade 
Union Advisory Committee, and the Business Advisory Committee, were set up and 
details of these are also set out below. Similar information in respect of less formal working 
groups and seminars conducted during the life of the Commission is also included. 
Task Force on Science 
Commissioner: Dr H. C. Coombs. 
Co-ordinator: 	 Dr J. R. Philip, Environmental Mechanics Division, Commonwealth 
Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation. 
Members: 	 Professor R. Hanbury Brown, F.A.A., F.R.S., School of Physics, 
University of Sydney; 
Emeritus Professor C. M. Donald, F.A.A., Waite Agricultural 
Institute; 
Professor R. Porter, F.A.A., Department of Physiology, Monash 
University; 
Dr R. G. Ward, Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd; 
Mr G. B. Gresford, Scientific Adviser, Department of Foreign Affairs; 
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Mr M. Court, Department of Community Welfare, South Australia. 
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Members: 	 Mr W. P. Butler, Department of Environment, Housing and 
Community Development; 
Mr A. T. Griffith, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet; 
Mr N.J. Attwood, then Public Service Board; 
MrJ. D. Hall, Social Welfare Commission; 
Mr M. Bourke, Royal Commission Staff; 
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Officer: Mr W. H. McMillan, Royal Commission Staff. 
Attached: Mr G. Sanderson, Regional Co-ordinator (Northern), Department of 
the Co-ordina tor- General, Queensland; 
Mr R. A. Hamilton, Director, Office of the North-West, Western 
Australia; 
Mr G. M. Loveday, Department of the Northern Territory, Alice 
Springs. 
Task Force on Economic Policy 
Commissioner: DrJ. E. Isaac. 
Members: Professor S. Harris, Australian National University; 
Dr R. G. Gregory, Industries Assistance Commission; 
Mr I. Castles, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
Executive 
Officer: Mr R. Petch, Chairman's Personal Staff. 
Attached: Mr M. J. McNamara, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet; 
Mr A. A. Bain, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
Trade Union Advisor5 Committee 
Members: 	 Mr K. Turbet 	 1 	 Representing the Council of Australian 
Mr N. J. Campbell L Government Employee Organisations 
MrW.J. Smith 
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Mr L. Himan 	 I 
Business Advisory Committee 
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Discussion Groups and Seminars 
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discussions took place over a period of some months between the Commission and groups 
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gionalisation. The Commission gratefully acknowledges the interest and support of all 
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